The CEU Department of Philosophy cordially invites you to a talk
(as part of its Departmental Colloquium series)
by
Eric Brown (CEU Business School)
on
`Pro-attitudes and the problem of the wrong kind of reasons`
Tuesday, 27 September, 2011, 4.30 PM, Zrinyi 14, Room 412
ABSTRACT
Wrong kind of reasons (WKR) objections to fitting-attitude analysis of value, as well as the very idea of the wrong kind of reasons, can be defused by paying close attention to the attitudes that are posited or imagined by scenarios, e.g., in which we are told that an evil demon will punish us with
extreme pain unless they admire him. My argument, based on considerations relation to the role proattitudes must play in defeasible practical inference, is that such attitudes are strictly impossible. If the attitudes are impossible, then there cannot be reasons for them. A fortiori there can be no wrong kind
of reasons for them. I also provide a diagnosis of the standard approach to WKR objections. Such approaches focus on trying to sort reasons into the right and wrong kinds using some right- or wrong-making property. I
try to show, through a detailed analysis of two such attempts, why this won't work.
Kriszta Biber
Department Coordinator
Philosophy Department
Tel: 36-1-327-3806
Fax: 36-1-327-3072
E-mail: biberk(a)ceu.hu
The CEU Department of Philosophy cordially invites you to a talk
(as part of its Departmental Colloquium series)
by
Eric Brown (CEU Business School)
on
`Pro-attitudes and the problem of the wrong kind of reasons`
Tuesday, 27 September, 2011, 4.30 PM, Zrinyi 14, Room 412
ABSTRACT
Wrong kind of reasons (WKR) objections to fitting-attitude analysis of value, as well as the very idea of the wrong kind of reasons, can be defused by paying close attention to the attitudes that are posited or imagined by scenarios, e.g., in which we are told that an evil demon will punish us with
extreme pain unless they admire him. My argument, based on considerations relation to the role proattitudes must play in defeasible practical inference, is that such attitudes are strictly impossible. If the attitudes are impossible, then there cannot be reasons for them. A fortiori there can be no wrong kind
of reasons for them. I also provide a diagnosis of the standard approach to WKR objections. Such approaches focus on trying to sort reasons into the right and wrong kinds using some right- or wrong-making property. I
try to show, through a detailed analysis of two such attempts, why this won't work.
Kriszta Biber
Department Coordinator
Philosophy Department
Tel: 36-1-327-3806
Fax: 36-1-327-3072
E-mail: biberk(a)ceu.hu
The next talk in the CDC Seminar series will be given by:
Soonja Choi, San Diego State University
Date: Wednesday, September 21, 2011, 5 PM
Location: CEU Cognitive Development Center, Hattyú u. 14, 3rd floor
*Language and Thought: Spatial Semantics & Spatial Cognition from Infancy to
Adulthood*
Abstract: Languages differ significantly in the way they categorize spatial
relations. For example, English makes a distinction between containment
(e.g. putting an apple IN a bowl) and support (e.g. putting a cup ON a
table), whereas Korean makes a distinction between loose fit and tight fit
regardless of containment and support. In Korean, the verb *KKITA* ‘tight
fit or interlock’ is used for both a tight-fit containment relation such as
‘putting a book tightly in its box-shaped cover’ and a tight-fit support
relation such as ‘putting a Lego piece tightly onto another’.
The extensiveness of cross-linguistic differences in spatial semantic
categorization found in recent studies on adult grammars raises questions
about when and how children acquire the spatial semantic system of their
native language, and more generally, about the relationship between language
and cognition in children and adults. In this talk, I present studies that
examine language-specific input and spatial cognition in learners and adult
speakers of English and Korean. In particular, I examine whether and to what
extent language-specific semantics can influence nonverbal spatial
categorization involving tight fit, containment and support. Overall, my
studies show that there is a dynamic interaction between language and
cognition from an early age and that language starts to influence spatial
cognition as children use spatial words productively. However, some
perceptual aspects persist and contribute to spatial categorization in
certain contexts regardless of language-specific input.
Cognitive Science events at CEU: http://cognitivescience.ceu.hu/events
_______________________________________________
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Continuity and Innovation in Medieval and Modern Philosophy of Knowledge, Mind and Language
The Dawes Hicks Symposium
10.30am - 5.30pm, Friday, 28 October 2011
British Academy, 10-11 Carlton House Terrace, London SW1
Main speakers: Martin Lenz (Humboldt University, Berlin); Robert Pasnau (University of Colorado); Dominik Perler (Humboldt University, Berlin)
Commentators (respectively): Michael Ayers FBA (University of Oxford); John Hawthorne (University of Oxford); Andrew Pyle (University of Bristol)
Chairman/organizer: John Marenbon FBA (Trinity College, Cambridge)
How modern is modern philosophy? Recently specialists in medieval philosophy have been examining how scholasticism was developed up to the Seventeenth Century, whilst experts on seventeenth-century philosophers have been looking back to scholasticism. This symposium
explores these continuities and changes.
About the Speakers:
Martin Lenz, whose recent book (Lockes Sprachkonzeption, 2010) shows how far Locke’s philosophy of language is far from a crude mentalist stereotype, will speak on "Essences and
Signification: Medieval Heritage and Innovation in Locke's Philosophy of Language".
Robert Pasnau, author of Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 (2011) looks at "Epistemic Divisions of Labor: Who Should Know, Who Should Believe, and Who Should be Left in the Dark", with special reference to Aquinas, Locke and Averroes.
Dominik Perler, who has just published Transformationen der Gefühle. Philosophische Emotionstheorien 1270-1670, will discuss "What Are Mental Faculties? A Debate in Late Medieval and Early Modern Philosophy", looking especially at Olivi, Ockham, Descartes and Malebranche.
Attendance is free, but registration is required for this event. Please click here to register via our website.
The British Academy, 10-11 Carlton House Terrace, London SW1Y 5AH Tel: 020 7969 5200, Fax: 020 7969 5300, Web: www.britac.ac.uk
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The next talk in the CDC Seminar series will be given by:
Soonja Choi, San Diego State University
Date: Wednesday, September 21, 2011, 5 PM
Location: CEU Cognitive Development Center, Hattyú u. 14, 3rd floor
*Language and Thought: Spatial Semantics & Spatial Cognition from Infancy to
Adulthood*
Abstract: Languages differ significantly in the way they categorize spatial
relations. For example, English makes a distinction between containment
(e.g. putting an apple IN a bowl) and support (e.g. putting a cup ON a
table), whereas Korean makes a distinction between loose fit and tight fit
regardless of containment and support. In Korean, the verb *KKITA* ‘tight
fit or interlock’ is used for both a tight-fit containment relation such as
‘putting a book tightly in its box-shaped cover’ and a tight-fit support
relation such as ‘putting a Lego piece tightly onto another’.
The extensiveness of cross-linguistic differences in spatial semantic
categorization found in recent studies on adult grammars raises questions
about when and how children acquire the spatial semantic system of their
native language, and more generally, about the relationship between language
and cognition in children and adults. In this talk, I present studies that
examine language-specific input and spatial cognition in learners and adult
speakers of English and Korean. In particular, I examine whether and to what
extent language-specific semantics can influence nonverbal spatial
categorization involving tight fit, containment and support. Overall, my
studies show that there is a dynamic interaction between language and
cognition from an early age and that language starts to influence spatial
cognition as children use spatial words productively. However, some
perceptual aspects persist and contribute to spatial categorization in
certain contexts regardless of language-specific input.
Cognitive Science events at CEU: http://cognitivescience.ceu.hu/events
_______________________________________________
Subscribe by sending an empty mail to seminars-subscribe(a)cdc.ceu.hu
Unsubscribe by sending an empty mail to seminars-unsubscribe(a)cdc.ceu.hu
The next talk in the CDC Seminar series will be given by
Mikołaj Hernik, CEU
Date: Wednesday, September 14, 2011, 5 PM
Location: Cognitive Development Center, Hattyú u. 14, 3 em.
Front matters: On infants’ ability to fast-map fronts of novel agents
Abstract:
Bodies of almost all modern animals, including all vertebrates, are
organized according to a bilateral body-plan with a pronounced
anterio-posterior axis. In other words, most animals have fronts and backs.
In addition, in many organisms neuronal structures (e.g. brains in
vertebrates) tend to be accumulated towards their frontal parts (an
evolutionary trend called cephalization). These two general facts of animal
evolution may have tremendous significance for a cognitive grasp of animal
behavior for two reasons: (i) the ubiquitous bilateral and cephalized body
plan promotes salient differences in morphology (most animals’ fronts tend
to look different from their backs); (ii) the body plan constrains animal
locomotion (some obvious exceptions notwithstanding, animals tend to move
facing forward). As a consequence, animal’s orientation in motion is a
reliable source of information about its frontal features (the parts at the
front of a moving animal are very likely to *be* its frontal features). But
also, the location of the already known frontal features of an animal in
rest is a reliable source of information about that animal’s ability to act
(it is more likely to start moving in the direction determined by its
frontal features). I am going to present results from a series of studies
designed to test whether preverbal human infants can engage in such
inferences. Indeed infants in their first year of life are sensitive to
front-movement mismatches, they fast-map novel frontal features from the
agent’s behavior and take their orientation into account when anticipating
the agent’s subsequent actions. I will argue that the ubiquity of bilateral
body plan might have resulted in cognitive adaptations for processing the
movement-front co-relation.
_______________________________________________
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Reminder/Sorry for cross-postings.
The programme of the Institute for Linguistics can be found at the following page (the schedule for September):
http://www.nytud.hu/eng/prog.html
A happy new academic year to all of you.
Anne