koglist May 2011

koglist@maillist.ttk.hu

9 participants
27 discussions

[koglist] [CDC Seminars] REMINDER: CDC Seminar, Michael Brody, Wednesday, June 1, 2011, 5 PM

by Marian Chen

The next talk in the CDC seminar series will be given by: Michael Brody, UCL/Hungarian Academy of Sciences Date: Wednesday, June 1, 2011, 5 PM Location: CEU Cognitive Development Center, Hattyú u. 14, 3rd floor *The default human* Abstract: The pronoun *they* in a sentence like (1) is ambiguous: (1) At the watchmakers shop, they buzz every morning. *They * can refer to concrete people or objects, as when I am thinking for example of Peter and John or I might be having a couple of watches in mind. Another, more interesting, reading is where *they* picks no specific referents. On this interpretation (1) means something like (2a) (2) a. At the watchmakers shop, some people buzz every morning (possibly, but not necessarily by making watches buzz) b.NOT: At the watchmakers shop, watches buzz every morning In spite of the fact that the contextually natural interpretation would require an inanimate referent (watches), and nothing in the structure overtly signals the necessity of a human referent, as indicated by (2b) a nonhuman subject is impossible on this non-specific reading. I will show that this phenomenon is very general and stable both cross-linguistically and across various constructions. I'll provide a partial explanation and raise the possibility of a potential connection with core cognitive systems. CEU Cognitive Science events calendar: http://cognitivescience.ceu.hu/events _______________________________________________ Subscribe by sending an empty mail to seminars-subscribe(a)cdc.ceu.hu Unsubscribe by sending an empty mail to seminars-unsubscribe(a)cdc.ceu.hu

14 years, 11 months

[koglist] Theoretical Philosophy Forum, Graeme Forbes

by Laszlo E. Szabo

THEORETICAL PHILOSOPHY FORUM Institute of Philosophy Faculty of Humanities, Eötvös University Address: Múzeum krt. 4/i, Budapest 1 June (Wednesday) 5:00 PM Room 226 Graeme Forbes Department of Philosophy, University of Colorado, Boulder The Problem Of Factives For Sense Theories ___________________________________ Abstracts and printable program (poster) are available from the web site of the Forum: http://phil.elte.hu/tpf (Please feel free to post the program in your institution!) The Forum is open to everyone, including students, visitors, and faculty members from all departments and institutes! Format: 60 minute lecture, coffee break, 60 minute discussion. The organizer of the Forum: László E. Szabó (leszabo(a)phil.elte.hu) -- L a s z l o E. S z a b o Professor of Philosophy DEPARTMENT OF LOGIC, INSTITUTE OF PHILOSOPHY EOTVOS UNIVERSITY, BUDAPEST http://phil.elte.hu/leszabo

14 years, 11 months

[koglist] [CDC Seminars] ANNOUNCEMENT: CDC Seminar, Michael Brody, Wed, June 1, 2011

by Marian Chen

The next talk in the CDC seminar series will be given by: Michael Brody, UCL/Hungarian Academy of Sciences Date: Wednesday, June 1, 2011, 5 PM Location: CEU Cognitive Development Center, Hattyú u. 14, 3rd floor The default human Abstract: The pronoun *they* in a sentence like (1) is ambiguous: (1) At the watchmakers shop, they buzz every morning. *They * can refer to concrete people or objects, as when I am thinking for example of Peter and John or I might be having a couple of watches in mind. Another, more interesting, reading is where *they* picks no specific referents. On this interpretation (1) means something like (2a) (2) a. At the watchmakers shop, some people buzz every morning (possibly, but not necessarily by making watches buzz) b.NOT: At the watchmakers shop, watches buzz every morning In spite of the fact that the contextually natural interpretation would require an inanimate referent (watches), and nothing in the structure overtly signals the necessity of a human referent, as indicated by (2b) a nonhuman subject is impossible on this non-specific reading. I will show that this phenomenon is very general and stable both cross-linguistically and across various constructions. I'll provide a partial explanation and raise the possibility of a potential connection with core cognitive systems. CEU Cognitive Science events calendar: http://cognitivescience.ceu.hu/events _______________________________________________ Subscribe by sending an empty mail to seminars-subscribe(a)cdc.ceu.hu Unsubscribe by sending an empty mail to seminars-unsubscribe(a)cdc.ceu.hu

14 years, 11 months

[koglist] [CDC Seminars] REMINDER: CDC Seminar - Hanna Marno, Wednesday, May 25, 5 PM

by Marian Chen

The next talk in the CDC seminar series will be given by Hanna Marno, CEU Date: Wednesday, May 25, 2011, 5 PM Location: CEU Cognitive Development Center, Hattyú u. 14, 3rd floor How do we learn about objects in the context of communication? Abstract: Humans, uniquely among animals, learn from each other by receiving semantic information via communication. It has been hypothesized that the emergence of this ability is supported by perceptual biases in learning that would make people more likely to extract semantically relevant features of a scene in a communicative context. According to this hypothesis, when people observe an object in an ambiguous communicative context, they would be biased to encode the permanent features of the object, such as its colour or shape, at the expense of its transient features, such as its location. Although experimental evidence with young infants corroborated this proposal, it has been unclear whether the same tendency still exists in adults. I will present a series of studies that provides evidence that, similarly to infants, adults have a tendency to preferentially encode permanent features of objects under communicative contexts. By using a change detection paradigm, our first series of studies focused on immediate perceptual coding. We found that people more likely detect changes of identity than changes of location of objects when the objects are presented in the context of communication. Our second series of studies tested the long-term effect of communicative cues on memory representations. By using a recall task, we found that subjects memorised and recalled the permanent features of objects more reliably in situations where the objects were encountered in a communicative context. Together these studies shed new light on the complex interaction between communication and learning in humans. _______________________________________________ Subscribe by sending an empty mail to seminars-subscribe(a)cdc.ceu.hu Unsubscribe by sending an empty mail to seminars-unsubscribe(a)cdc.ceu.hu

14 years, 11 months

[koglist] reminder - MTAPI Friday seminar series - Joram Feldon - TOMORROW - 14:00

by Bohm Tamas

Dear All, The next talk in the Friday seminar series at the Institute for Psychology, HAS, is going to be given by: Joram Feldon (Laboratory of Behavioural Neurobiology, Swiss Federal Institute of Technology (ETH) Zurich) "Prenatal Infections and Long-Term Mental Outcome" Please find attached the abstract of the talk. MAY 20, 14:00, Szondi u. 83-85. Everyone is welcome to attend. Kindest regards, Tamás Bőhm __________ Information from ESET NOD32 Antivirus, version of virus signature database 6134 (20110519) __________ The message was checked by ESET NOD32 Antivirus. http://www.eset.com

14 years, 11 months

[koglist] Emlékeztető: ELTE Kognitív Péntek

by Garami Linda

Kedves Érdeklődők, emlékeztetőül írom, hogy ezen a héten kerül sor az ELTE kognitív Péntek sorozatának utolsó előadására ebben a tanévben. Téglás Ernő: A kontingens reakciók észlelése és értelmezései csecsemőkorban 2011. május 20. 14:00-15:00, Izabella u. 46., 216 terem Absztrakt: https://sites.google.com/site/eltekognitiv/home/elte-kognitiv-pentek Szeretettel várunk mindenkit! Üdvözlettel: Garami Linda ELTE-PPK, Kognitív Pszichológia Tanszék

14 years, 11 months

[koglist] [CDC Seminars] ANNOUNCEMENT: CDC Seminar, Hanna Marno, Wednesday, May 25, 2011

by Marian Chen

14 years, 11 months

[koglist] Fwd: [MaFLa] invitation to a philosophy talk on`Kant's Case for the Syntheticity of Mathematical Judgments in the First Critique and Afterwards`

by Laszlo E. Szabo

---------- Forwarded Message ---------- Subject: [MaFLa] invitation to a philosophy talk on`Kant's Case for the Syntheticity of Mathematical Judgments in the First Critique and Afterwards` Date: Tuesday, May 17, 2011, 02:44:16 PM From: "Krisztina Biber" <Biberk(a)ceu.hu> To: whatson(a)ceu.hu, mafla(a)phil.elte.hu The CEU Department of Philosophy cordially invites you to a talk by Katherine Dunlop (Brown University) on `Kant's Case for the Syntheticity of Mathematical Judgments in the First Critique and Afterwards` Friday, 3 June, 2011, 4.00 PM, Zrinyi 14, Room 411 ABSTRACT In the _Critique of Pure Reason_, especially the "Doctrine of Method" portion, Kant seems to argue that mathematical judgments are synthetic because they are justified by "pure intuition", where intuition represents particulars (and pure intuition is a priori). But it is not easy to understand how representation of a particular can justify a priori conclusions. In this paper, I develop a further reason to seek an another way to understand Kant's argument that mathematical judgments are synthetic. I show that the position Kant takes in the first Critique is vulnerable to objections made by followers of Christian Wolff in the 1790s. These opponents argued that the predicate of any mathematical judgment could be incorporated into an appropriate definition of its subject. The judgment would then be justified by conceptual analysis--without any contribution from intuition--and so would be analytic. Kant is vulnerable to the objection because he maintains that mathematical definitions are "arbitrary". I argue, however, that Kant has the resources to withstand the objection. Kant can argue that the definitions introduced by the Wolffians presuppose the same cognitive capacities used to prove the result in question, in particular, the capacity to construct figures in space. However, this cognitive power is not easily understood as representation of a particular, i.e., intuition as Kant defines it in the first Critique. Kant should instead maintain that definitions of concepts presuppose, on the part of the sensible faculty, general constructive abilities. I show that Kant indeed formulates his view this way in response to the Wolffians. ----------------------------------------- -- L a s z l o E. S z a b o Professor of Philosophy DEPARTMENT OF LOGIC, INSTITUTE OF PHILOSOPHY EOTVOS UNIVERSITY, BUDAPEST http://phil.elte.hu/leszabo

14 years, 11 months

[koglist] [CDC Seminars] REMINDER: CDC Seminar, Sarah Lloyd-Fox, Wednesday, May 18, 5 PM

by Marian Chen

The next talk in the CDC seminar series will be given by Sarah Lloyd-Fox, Birkbeck, University of London Date: Wednesday, May 18, 2011, 5 PM Location: CEU Cognitive Development Center, Hattyú u. 14, 3rd floor Cortical mapping of human action perception during infancy: A functional Near Infrared Spectroscopy investigation <http://www.ceu.hu/node/21879> Abstract: The ability to identify cues from motion, such as eye gaze shifts, emotional expression, articulation of the mouth and manual gestures, provides the foundation of social perception and allows us to comprehend and interpret the intentions, language, emotions and desires of others. The cortical mapping of human action perception in the infant brain is poorly understood, largely due to the limitations of available neuroimaging methods. The research presented in this talk investigated cortical activation to facial and manual human actions using functional near infrared spectroscopy (fNIRS). fNIRS provides an elegant solution to bridge this methodological gap, and is an emerging new technology for investigating developmental cognitive neuroscience. Over a series of experiments, four to six-month-old infants watched life-size videos of adult actors moving their hand, their mouth, or their eyes, while haemodynamic responses were recorded over the frontal and temporal cortices. The data presented in Study 1 and 2 suggests that a localised superior temporal region of the cortex is responsive to the observation of complex social human actions, and not to non-human mechanical actions. Study 3 reveals localised cortical responses to differing dynamic facial and manual human action cues in regions of the frontal and temporal cortex with partially separable localised responses evident to different types of human movements. Finally Study 4, which investigated these effects further, presents optical data alongside concurrent eye-tracking data and additional behavioural measures of manual dexterity. These preliminary findings suggest that infant’s own fine motor abilities may be correlated with cortical activation to the perception of another’s hand movements. Taken together, this work illuminates hitherto undocumented maps of cortical activation to human action perception in the early developing brain, and demonstrate the potential that fNIRS offers for developmental research. _______________________________________________ Subscribe by sending an empty mail to seminars-subscribe(a)cdc.ceu.hu Unsubscribe by sending an empty mail to seminars-unsubscribe(a)cdc.ceu.hu

14 years, 11 months

[koglist] Fwd: JAM program

by Gergely Csibra

Begin forwarded message: > From: Anne Boeckler <jam4in2011(a)gmail.com> > Date: 16 May 2011 12:12:08 pm CEST > Subject: JAM program > > Dear friends, colleagues, and JAMmers, > > please find attached the program of JAM IV. > Details about the location are available on our homepage www.somby.nl > > Conference fees are 30 Euro for (graduate/PhD)-students and 60 Euro for postdocs/seniors. Please pay in cash at the conference reception. > > Looking forward to seeing you in Vienna! > Best, > Anne, Georg, Günther, and Natalie

14 years, 12 months

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koglist May 2011