koglist March 2007

koglist@maillist.ttk.hu

6 participants
16 discussions

by Laszlo E. Szabo

THEORETICAL PHILOSOPHY FORUM Institute of Philosophy Faculty of Humanities, Eotvos University Room 208 Monday 4:00 PM Puskin u. 3, Budapest Web site: http://philosophy.elte.hu/tpf This is just to remind you that there will be NO seminar session on Monday (2 April), because of the holidays. The next talk is on 16 April: 16 April 4:00 PM Room 208 (Puskin u. 3) Szabolcs Kiss Institute of Psychology University of Pecs A mentalis allapotokhoz valo kivaltsagos hozzaferes tulajdonitasanak kognitiv fejlodeslelektani vizsgalata (Developmental-psychological analysis of the ascription of privileged access to mental states) Abstract: http://philosophy.elte.hu/tpf/2007/April/#3 ___________________________________ The Forum is open to everyone, including students,visitors, and faculty members from all departments and institutes! Format: 60 minute lecture, 10 minute coffee break, followed by a 30-60 minute discussion. The language of presentation is English or Hungarian. A printable poster is available from here: http://philosophy.elte.hu/tpf/2007/April/poster.pdf Please feel free to post it in your institution! The organizer of the Forum: Laszlo E. Szabo (leszabo(a)philosophy.elte.hu) -- L a s z l o E. S z a b o Theoretical Physics Research Group of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences Department of History and Philosophy of Science Eotvos University, Budapest http://philosophy.elte.hu/leszabo

19 years, 1 month

Block/Consciousness, Accessibility: BBS Call for Commentators

by Behavioral & Brain Sciences

Dear Dr. Qwerty, ================================================================== *** CALL RESPONSE INSTRUCTIONS *** ================================================================== Please DO NOT respond to this email. If you wish to submit a proposal for commentary and/or suggest potential commentators, please go to the new Online Commentary Proposal System at the following URL: http://www.bbsonline.org/perl/commentary/commproposal?authordir=Block-09282… * If you only wish to suggest potential commentators, please ignore prompts to submit a proposal with expertise information. * If you experience technical difficulties, please email bbs(a)bbsonline.org. * Please respond to this Call no later than April 23, 2007 NOTE: Behavioral and Brain Sciences (BBS) is an international, interdisciplinary journal providing Open Peer Commentary on important and controversial current research in the biobehavioral and cognitive sciences. Commentators must be BBS Associates, or suggested by a BBS Associate. If you are not a BBS Associate, please follow the instructions linked below: http://www.bbsonline.org/Instructions/associnst.html ================================================================== ** Target Article Information ** ================================================================== To help you decide whether you would be an appropriate commentator for this article, an unedited, uncorrected target article is retrievable at the URL that follows the abstract and keywords below. This unedited draft has been prepared only for potential commentators who wish to nominate themselves for formal commentary invitation. Please DO NOT write a commentary until you receive a formal invitation. If you are invited to submit a commentary, a copyedited, corrected version of this paper will be posted in the invitation letter. The commentary invitation list is compiled by the Editors so as to balance proposals, areas of expertise, and frequency of prior commentaries in BBS. TITLE: Consciousness, Accessibility, and the Mesh between Psychology and Neuroscience AUTHOR: Ned Block ABSTRACT: How can we disentangle the neural basis of phenomenal consciousness from the neural machinery of the cognitive access that underlies reports of phenomenal consciousness? We can see the problem in stark form if we ask how we could tell whether representations inside a Fodorian module are phenomenally conscious. The methodology would seem straightforward: find the neural natural kinds that are the basis of phenomenal consciousness in clear cases when subjects are completely confident and we have no reason to doubt their authority, and look to see whether those neural natural kinds exist within Fodorian modules. But a puzzle arises: do we include the machinery underlying reportability within the neural natural kinds of the clear cases? If the answer is Yes, then there can be no phenomenally conscious representations in Fodorian modules. But how can we know if the answer is Yes? The suggested methodology requires an answer to the question it was supposed to answer! The paper argues for an abstract solution to the problem and exhibits a source of empirical data that is relevant, data that show that in a certain sense phenomenal consciousness overflows cognitive accessibility. The paper argues that we can find a neural realizer of this overflow if assume that the neural basis of phenomenal consciousness does not include the neural basis of cognitive accessibility and that this assumption is justified (other things equal) by the explanations it allows. KEYWORDS: access consciousness; accessibility; change blindness; consciousness; mind/body problem; NCC; phenomenal consciousness; refrigerator light illusion; reportability; unconscious; vegetative state; working memory FULL TEXT: http://www.bbsonline.org/Preprints/Block-09282006/Referees/ ================================================================== *** CALL RESPONSE INSTRUCTIONS *** ================================================================== Please DO NOT respond to this email. If you wish to submit a proposal for commentary and/or suggest potential commentators, please go to the new Online Commentary Proposal System at the following URL: http://www.bbsonline.org/perl/commentary/commproposal?authordir=Block-09282… * If you only wish to suggest potential commentators, please ignore prompts to submit a proposal with expertise information. * If you experience technical difficulties, please email bbs(a)bbsonline.org. * Please respond to this Call no later than April 23, 2007 NOTE: Behavioral and Brain Sciences (BBS) is an international, interdisciplinary journal providing Open Peer Commentary on important and controversial current research in the biobehavioral and cognitive sciences. Commentators must be BBS Associates, or suggested by a BBS Associate. If you are not a BBS Associate, please follow the instructions linked below: http://www.bbsonline.org/Instructions/associnst.html ================================================================== ================================================================== Paul Bloom - Editor Barbara Finlay - Editor Behavioral and Brain Sciences bbs(a)bbsonline.org http://www.bbsonline.org -------------------------------------------------------------------

19 years, 1 month

Block/Consciousness, Accessibility: BBS Call for Commentators

by Behavioral & Brain Sciences

================================================================== *** CALL RESPONSE INSTRUCTIONS *** ================================================================== Please DO NOT respond to this email. If you wish to submit a proposal for commentary and/or suggest potential commentators, please go to the new Online Commentary Proposal System at the following URL: http://www.bbsonline.org/perl/commentary/commproposal?authordir=Block-09282… * If you only wish to suggest potential commentators, please ignore prompts to submit a proposal with expertise information. * If you experience technical difficulties, please email bbs(a)bbsonline.org. * Please respond to this Call no later than April 23, 2007 NOTE: Behavioral and Brain Sciences (BBS) is an international, interdisciplinary journal providing Open Peer Commentary on important and controversial current research in the biobehavioral and cognitive sciences. Commentators must be BBS Associates, or suggested by a BBS Associate. If you are not a BBS Associate, please follow the instructions linked below: http://www.bbsonline.org/Instructions/associnst.html ================================================================== ** Target Article Information ** ================================================================== To help you decide whether you would be an appropriate commentator for this article, an unedited, uncorrected target article is retrievable at the URL that follows the abstract and keywords below. This unedited draft has been prepared only for potential commentators who wish to nominate themselves for formal commentary invitation. Please DO NOT write a commentary until you receive a formal invitation. If you are invited to submit a commentary, a copyedited, corrected version of this paper will be posted in the invitation letter. The commentary invitation list is compiled by the Editors so as to balance proposals, areas of expertise, and frequency of prior commentaries in BBS. TITLE: Consciousness, Accessibility, and the Mesh between Psychology and Neuroscience AUTHOR: Ned Block ABSTRACT: How can we disentangle the neural basis of phenomenal consciousness from the neural machinery of the cognitive access that underlies reports of phenomenal consciousness? We can see the problem in stark form if we ask how we could tell whether representations inside a Fodorian module are phenomenally conscious. The methodology would seem straightforward: find the neural natural kinds that are the basis of phenomenal consciousness in clear cases when subjects are completely confident and we have no reason to doubt their authority, and look to see whether those neural natural kinds exist within Fodorian modules. But a puzzle arises: do we include the machinery underlying reportability within the neural natural kinds of the clear cases? If the answer is Yes, then there can be no phenomenally conscious representations in Fodorian modules. But how can we know if the answer is Yes? The suggested methodology requires an answer to the question it was supposed to answer! The paper argues for an abstract solution to the problem and exhibits a source of empirical data that is relevant, data that show that in a certain sense phenomenal consciousness overflows cognitive accessibility. The paper argues that we can find a neural realizer of this overflow if assume that the neural basis of phenomenal consciousness does not include the neural basis of cognitive accessibility and that this assumption is justified (other things equal) by the explanations it allows. KEYWORDS: access consciousness; accessibility; change blindness; consciousness; mind/body problem; NCC; phenomenal consciousness; refrigerator light illusion; reportability; unconscious; vegetative state; working memory FULL TEXT: http://www.bbsonline.org/Preprints/Block-09282006/Referees/ ================================================================== *** CALL RESPONSE INSTRUCTIONS *** ================================================================== Please DO NOT respond to this email. If you wish to submit a proposal for commentary and/or suggest potential commentators, please go to the new Online Commentary Proposal System at the following URL: http://www.bbsonline.org/perl/commentary/commproposal?authordir=Block-09282… * If you only wish to suggest potential commentators, please ignore prompts to submit a proposal with expertise information. * If you experience technical difficulties, please email bbs(a)bbsonline.org. * Please respond to this Call no later than April 23, 2007 NOTE: Behavioral and Brain Sciences (BBS) is an international, interdisciplinary journal providing Open Peer Commentary on important and controversial current research in the biobehavioral and cognitive sciences. Commentators must be BBS Associates, or suggested by a BBS Associate. If you are not a BBS Associate, please follow the instructions linked below: http://www.bbsonline.org/Instructions/associnst.html ================================================================== ================================================================== Paul Bloom - Editor Barbara Finlay - Editor Behavioral and Brain Sciences bbs(a)bbsonline.org http://www.bbsonline.org -------------------------------------------------------------------

19 years, 1 month

invitation to two philosophy talks (March 27.28.) - reminder

by Krisztina Biber

The CEU Department of Philosophy cordially invites you to a talk by Guy Longworth (University College London) on 'Confronting Grammatical Properties' 5.00 PM, Tuesday, 27. March, Zrinyi 14, Room 412 Abstract What is the status of grammatical properties? I begin by suggesting some reasons for thinking that our ordinary experience of grammatical properties is akin to our experience of mind-independent properties. I then consider a line of argument, derived from scientific linguistics, that suggests grammatical properties could not be mind-independent. I then sketch a line of response to the latter argument. ********************************************************************** The CEU Department of Philosophy cordially invites you to a talk by Jan-Willem van der Rijt (University of Groningen, DSP at CEU Department of Philosophy) on 'Dignity and Domination' 5.00 PM, Wednesday, 28. March, Zrinyi 14, Room 412 Abstract The republican notion of freedom put forth by Quentin Skinner and Philip Pettit holds a person to be free if he or she is not dominated, i.e. if no-one can interfere with him or her arbitrarily. It differs from the standard notion of (negative) freedom as absence of interference in two ways. Firstly, it focuses on the possibility of interference, rather than its actual presence. Secondly, it holds certain kinds of interference compatible with freedom. One of the main reasons why domination is of concern is its incompatibility with the dominated individual's dignity. To be dominated is to be at someone else's mercy, which is humiliating to one's person. However, I will argue that the definition of arbitrary interference introduced by Pettit fails to capture this notion of dignity sufficiently. Pettit's definition relies on the "avowed or readily avowable interests" of the person interfered with, which leaves room for certain types of humiliating paternalistic interference. To ensure personal dignity, I introduce an alternative dominance relation that relies on moral consent. Interference is only compatible with a person's dignity if it does not cause affront, i.e. if it is in accordance with his or her views on how he or she should be treated. This alternative notion of domination has a number of advantages over the interest based notion formulated by Pettit, and some of its implications for political theory will be discussed.

19 years, 1 month

FW: Meghívó

by Horváth Zsuzsa

Elnézést, a meghívó lemaradt! -----Original Message----- From: Horváth Zsuzsa [mailto:horvath.zsuzsa@ppk.elte.hu] Sent: Thursday, March 22, 2007 12:21 PM To: 'koglist(a)cogpsyphy.hu'; 'koglist(a)cogpsyphy.hu'; 'zsemaap(a)gmail.com'; 'kmohai(a)freemail.hu'; 'zsoldos(a)gmail.com'; 'rozsa.graf(a)barczi.hu'; 'Violetta Varga'; 'Batta Barbara'; 'Brózik Péter'; 'Csuhaj Roland'; 'Gaál Zsófia'; 'Hahn Noémi'; 'Jolsvai Hajnal'; 'Kántor Árpád'; 'Sallay Viola'; 'Soltész Fruzsina'; 'Surányi Zsuzsa'; 'Tóth Dénes' Subject: Meghívó Kedves Kollégák! Mellékelten küldöm a következő "Kognitív Péntek"-re szóló meghívót Üdv., Zsuzsa Horváth Zsuzsa ELTE PPK Kognitív Pszichológiai Tanszék 1064 Bp. Izabella u. 46. tel/fax: 461-2649 e-mail: <mailto:horvath.zsuzsa@ppk.elte.hu> horvath.zsuzsa(a)ppk.elte.hu

19 years, 1 month

Meghívó

by Horváth Zsuzsa

Kedves Kollégák! Mellékelten küldöm a következő "Kognitív Péntek"-re szóló meghívót Üdv., Zsuzsa Horváth Zsuzsa ELTE PPK Kognitív Pszichológiai Tanszék 1064 Bp. Izabella u. 46. tel/fax: 461-2649 e-mail: <mailto:horvath.zsuzsa@ppk.elte.hu> horvath.zsuzsa(a)ppk.elte.hu

19 years, 1 month

BPS Developmental Psychology Section - Annual Conference 2007

by Kinga Morsanyi

----- Apologies for cross posting ------ Please see the following announcement of the BPS Developmental Psychology Section Annual Conference which will be held this Summer in Plymouth! Note that the deadline for submissions of paper presentations, posters and symposia is Monday 16th April. ------- British Psychological Society Developmental Psychology Section Annual Conference 2007 We are pleased to announce that the 2007 Annual Conference of the BPS Developmental Psychology Section will be held at the University of Plymouth, UK, from 29 - 31 August. Members of the organising committee are: John Clibbens, Allegra Cattani, Frederique Arreckx, Kirsten Abbot-Smith, Pedro Guijarro-Fuentes, Caroline Floccia, Simon Handley and Becky Mckenzie. This year's keynote speakers are: Jay Belsky Institute for the Study of Children, Families and Social Issues Birkbeck, University of London Annette Karmiloff-Smith Centre for Brain and Cognitive Development School of Psychology Birkbeck, University of London Henry Markovits Department of Psychology University of Quebec at Montreal Call for papers, posters and symposia Submissions of paper presentations, posters and symposia are invited. Talks will be 20 minutes long, followed by 10 minutes discussion. The deadline for all such submissions is Monday 16th April. Decisions will be announced by 15th May. Abstract must be submitted via the conference website where full instructions can be found. The website is located at http://www.bpsdevsec07.org/default.asp We look forward to seeing you in Plymouth! Allegra Cattani, Ph.D. Lecturer in Psychology School of Applied Psychosocial Studies University of Plymouth PSQ Building C517 Drake Circus Plymouth PL4 8AA Phone ++44 (0)1752 238338

19 years, 1 month

invitation to a philosophy talk - March 28.

by Krisztina Biber

The CEU Department of Philosophy cordially invites you to a talk by Jan-Willem van der Rijt (University of Groningen, DSP at CEU Department of Philosophy) on 'Dignity and Domination' 5.00 PM, Wednesday, 28. March, Zrinyi 14, Room 412 Abstract The republican notion of freedom put forth by Quentin Skinner and Philip Pettit holds a person to be free if he or she is not dominated, i.e. if no-one can interfere with him or her arbitrarily. It differs from the standard notion of (negative) freedom as absence of interference in two ways. Firstly, it focuses on the possibility of interference, rather than its actual presence. Secondly, it holds certain kinds of interference compatible with freedom. One of the main reasons why domination is of concern is its incompatibility with the dominated individual's dignity. To be dominated is to be at someone else's mercy, which is humiliating to one's person. However, I will argue that the definition of arbitrary interference introduced by Pettit fails to capture this notion of dignity sufficiently. Pettit's definition relies on the "avowed or readily avowable interests" of the person interfered with, which leaves room for certain types of humiliating paternalistic interference. To ensure personal dignity, I introduce an alternative dominance relation that relies on moral consent. Interference is only compatible with a person's dignity if it does not cause affront, i.e. if it is in accordance with his or her views on how he or she should be treated. This alternative notion of domination has a number of advantages over the interest based notion formulated by Pettit, and some of its implications for political theory will be discussed. Kriszta Biber Department Coordinator Philosophy Department Tel: 36-1-327-3806 Fax: 36-1-327-3072 E-mail: biberk(a)ceu.hu

19 years, 1 month

invitation to a philosophy talk - March 27.

by Krisztina Biber

19 years, 1 month

THEORETICAL PHILOSOPHY COLLOQUIUM, Nenad Miscevic

by Laszlo E. Szabo

THEORETICAL PHILOSOPHY COLLOQUIUM Institute of Philosophy Faculty of Humanities, Eotvos University Room 208 Monday 4:00 PM Puskin u. 3, Budapest Web site: http://philosophy.elte.hu/colloquium !!! Notice that the location is: Room 208, 2nd Floor, Building "i" (Puskin u. 3), Faculty of Humanities, Eotvos University !!! 26 March 4:00 PM Room 208 (Puskin u. 3) Nenad Miscevic Philosophy, Central European University, Budapest Philosophy, University of Maribor Thought experiments, inference and apriority Abstract: http://philosophy.elte.hu/colloquium/2007/March/#4 ___________________________________ The Colloquium is open to everyone, including students, visitors, and faculty members from all departments and institutes! Format of the colloquium: 60 minute lecture, 10 minute break, followed by a 30-60 minute discussion.The language of presentation is English or Hungarian. A printable poster is available from here: http://philosophy.elte.hu/colloquium/2007/March/poster.pdf Please feel free to post it in your institution! The organizer of the colloquium: Laszlo E. Szabo (leszabo(a)philosophy.elte.hu) -- L a s z l o E. S z a b o Theoretical Physics Research Group of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences Department of History and Philosophy of Science Eotvos University, Budapest http://philosophy.elte.hu/leszabo

19 years, 1 month

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koglist March 2007