THEORETICAL PHILOSOPHY FORUM
Institute of Philosophy
Faculty of Humanities, Eotvos University
Room 208 Monday 4:00 PM Puskin u. 3, Budapest
Web site: http://philosophy.elte.hu/tpf
This is just to remind you that there will be NO seminar session on
Monday (2 April), because of the holidays. The next talk is on 16 April:
16 April 4:00 PM Room 208 (Puskin u. 3)
Szabolcs Kiss
Institute of Psychology
University of Pecs
A mentalis allapotokhoz valo kivaltsagos hozzaferes tulajdonitasanak
kognitiv fejlodeslelektani vizsgalata
(Developmental-psychological analysis of the ascription of privileged
access to mental states)
Abstract: http://philosophy.elte.hu/tpf/2007/April/#3
___________________________________
The Forum is open to everyone, including students,visitors, and faculty
members from all departments and institutes!
Format: 60 minute lecture, 10 minute coffee break, followed by a 30-60
minute discussion. The language of presentation is English or Hungarian.
A printable poster is available from here:
http://philosophy.elte.hu/tpf/2007/April/poster.pdf
Please feel free to post it in your institution!
The organizer of the Forum: Laszlo E. Szabo
(leszabo(a)philosophy.elte.hu)
--
L a s z l o E. S z a b o
Theoretical Physics Research Group of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences
Department of History and Philosophy of Science
Eotvos University, Budapest
http://philosophy.elte.hu/leszabo
Dear Dr. Qwerty,
==================================================================
*** CALL RESPONSE INSTRUCTIONS ***
==================================================================
Please DO NOT respond to this email. If you wish to submit a proposal for
commentary and/or suggest potential commentators, please go to the new
Online Commentary Proposal System at the following URL:
http://www.bbsonline.org/perl/commentary/commproposal?authordir=Block-09282…
* If you only wish to suggest potential commentators, please ignore prompts to
submit a proposal with expertise information.
* If you experience technical difficulties, please email bbs(a)bbsonline.org.
* Please respond to this Call no later than April 23, 2007
NOTE: Behavioral and Brain Sciences (BBS) is an international, interdisciplinary
journal providing Open Peer Commentary on important and controversial current
research in the biobehavioral and cognitive sciences. Commentators must be BBS
Associates, or suggested by a BBS Associate. If you are not a BBS Associate, please
follow the instructions linked below:
http://www.bbsonline.org/Instructions/associnst.html
==================================================================
** Target Article Information **
==================================================================
To help you decide whether you would be an appropriate commentator for this article,
an unedited, uncorrected target article is retrievable at the URL that follows the
abstract and keywords below. This unedited draft has been prepared only for potential
commentators who wish to nominate themselves for formal commentary invitation. Please
DO NOT write a commentary until you receive a formal invitation. If you are invited
to submit a commentary, a copyedited, corrected version of this paper will be posted
in the invitation letter. The commentary invitation list is compiled by the Editors
so as to balance proposals, areas of expertise, and frequency of prior commentaries
in BBS.
TITLE: Consciousness, Accessibility, and the Mesh between Psychology and Neuroscience
AUTHOR: Ned Block
ABSTRACT: How can we disentangle the neural basis of phenomenal consciousness from
the neural machinery of the cognitive access that underlies reports of phenomenal
consciousness? We can see the problem in stark form if we ask how we could tell
whether representations inside a Fodorian module are phenomenally conscious. The
methodology would seem straightforward: find the neural natural kinds that are the
basis of phenomenal consciousness in clear cases when subjects are completely
confident and we have no reason to doubt their authority, and look to see whether
those neural natural kinds exist within Fodorian modules. But a puzzle arises: do we
include the machinery underlying reportability within the neural natural kinds of the
clear cases? If the answer is Yes, then there can be no phenomenally conscious
representations in Fodorian modules. But how can we know if the answer is Yes? The
suggested methodology requires an answer to the question it was supposed to answer!
The paper argues for an abstract solution to the problem and exhibits a source of
empirical data that is relevant, data that show that in a certain sense phenomenal
consciousness overflows cognitive accessibility. The paper argues that we can find a
neural realizer of this overflow if assume that the neural basis of phenomenal
consciousness does not include the neural basis of cognitive accessibility and that
this assumption is justified (other things equal) by the explanations it allows.
KEYWORDS: access consciousness; accessibility; change blindness; consciousness;
mind/body problem; NCC; phenomenal consciousness; refrigerator light illusion;
reportability; unconscious; vegetative state; working memory
FULL TEXT: http://www.bbsonline.org/Preprints/Block-09282006/Referees/
==================================================================
*** CALL RESPONSE INSTRUCTIONS ***
==================================================================
Please DO NOT respond to this email. If you wish to submit a proposal for
commentary and/or suggest potential commentators, please go to the new
Online Commentary Proposal System at the following URL:
http://www.bbsonline.org/perl/commentary/commproposal?authordir=Block-09282…
* If you only wish to suggest potential commentators, please ignore prompts to
submit a proposal with expertise information.
* If you experience technical difficulties, please email bbs(a)bbsonline.org.
* Please respond to this Call no later than April 23, 2007
NOTE: Behavioral and Brain Sciences (BBS) is an international, interdisciplinary
journal providing Open Peer Commentary on important and controversial current
research in the biobehavioral and cognitive sciences. Commentators must be BBS
Associates, or suggested by a BBS Associate. If you are not a BBS Associate, please
follow the instructions linked below:
http://www.bbsonline.org/Instructions/associnst.html
==================================================================
==================================================================
Paul Bloom - Editor
Barbara Finlay - Editor
Behavioral and Brain Sciences
bbs(a)bbsonline.org
http://www.bbsonline.org
-------------------------------------------------------------------
==================================================================
*** CALL RESPONSE INSTRUCTIONS ***
==================================================================
Please DO NOT respond to this email. If you wish to submit a proposal for
commentary and/or suggest potential commentators, please go to the new
Online Commentary Proposal System at the following URL:
http://www.bbsonline.org/perl/commentary/commproposal?authordir=Block-09282…
* If you only wish to suggest potential commentators, please ignore prompts to
submit a proposal with expertise information.
* If you experience technical difficulties, please email bbs(a)bbsonline.org.
* Please respond to this Call no later than April 23, 2007
NOTE: Behavioral and Brain Sciences (BBS) is an international, interdisciplinary
journal providing Open Peer Commentary on important and controversial current
research in the biobehavioral and cognitive sciences. Commentators must be BBS
Associates, or suggested by a BBS Associate. If you are not a BBS Associate, please
follow the instructions linked below:
http://www.bbsonline.org/Instructions/associnst.html
==================================================================
** Target Article Information **
==================================================================
To help you decide whether you would be an appropriate commentator for this article,
an unedited, uncorrected target article is retrievable at the URL that follows the
abstract and keywords below. This unedited draft has been prepared only for potential
commentators who wish to nominate themselves for formal commentary invitation. Please
DO NOT write a commentary until you receive a formal invitation. If you are invited
to submit a commentary, a copyedited, corrected version of this paper will be posted
in the invitation letter. The commentary invitation list is compiled by the Editors
so as to balance proposals, areas of expertise, and frequency of prior commentaries
in BBS.
TITLE: Consciousness, Accessibility, and the Mesh between Psychology and Neuroscience
AUTHOR: Ned Block
ABSTRACT: How can we disentangle the neural basis of phenomenal consciousness from
the neural machinery of the cognitive access that underlies reports of phenomenal
consciousness? We can see the problem in stark form if we ask how we could tell
whether representations inside a Fodorian module are phenomenally conscious. The
methodology would seem straightforward: find the neural natural kinds that are the
basis of phenomenal consciousness in clear cases when subjects are completely
confident and we have no reason to doubt their authority, and look to see whether
those neural natural kinds exist within Fodorian modules. But a puzzle arises: do we
include the machinery underlying reportability within the neural natural kinds of the
clear cases? If the answer is Yes, then there can be no phenomenally conscious
representations in Fodorian modules. But how can we know if the answer is Yes? The
suggested methodology requires an answer to the question it was supposed to answer!
The paper argues for an abstract solution to the problem and exhibits a source of
empirical data that is relevant, data that show that in a certain sense phenomenal
consciousness overflows cognitive accessibility. The paper argues that we can find a
neural realizer of this overflow if assume that the neural basis of phenomenal
consciousness does not include the neural basis of cognitive accessibility and that
this assumption is justified (other things equal) by the explanations it allows.
KEYWORDS: access consciousness; accessibility; change blindness; consciousness;
mind/body problem; NCC; phenomenal consciousness; refrigerator light illusion;
reportability; unconscious; vegetative state; working memory
FULL TEXT: http://www.bbsonline.org/Preprints/Block-09282006/Referees/
==================================================================
*** CALL RESPONSE INSTRUCTIONS ***
==================================================================
Please DO NOT respond to this email. If you wish to submit a proposal for
commentary and/or suggest potential commentators, please go to the new
Online Commentary Proposal System at the following URL:
http://www.bbsonline.org/perl/commentary/commproposal?authordir=Block-09282…
* If you only wish to suggest potential commentators, please ignore prompts to
submit a proposal with expertise information.
* If you experience technical difficulties, please email bbs(a)bbsonline.org.
* Please respond to this Call no later than April 23, 2007
NOTE: Behavioral and Brain Sciences (BBS) is an international, interdisciplinary
journal providing Open Peer Commentary on important and controversial current
research in the biobehavioral and cognitive sciences. Commentators must be BBS
Associates, or suggested by a BBS Associate. If you are not a BBS Associate, please
follow the instructions linked below:
http://www.bbsonline.org/Instructions/associnst.html
==================================================================
==================================================================
Paul Bloom - Editor
Barbara Finlay - Editor
Behavioral and Brain Sciences
bbs(a)bbsonline.org
http://www.bbsonline.org
-------------------------------------------------------------------
The CEU Department of Philosophy cordially invites you to a talk
by
Guy Longworth (University College London)
on
'Confronting Grammatical Properties'
5.00 PM, Tuesday, 27. March, Zrinyi 14, Room 412
Abstract
What is the status of grammatical properties? I begin by suggesting
some reasons for thinking that our ordinary experience of grammatical
properties is akin to our experience of mind-independent properties. I
then consider a line of argument, derived from scientific linguistics,
that suggests grammatical properties could not be mind-independent. I
then sketch a line of response to the latter argument.
**********************************************************************
The CEU Department of Philosophy cordially invites you to a talk
by
Jan-Willem van der Rijt (University of Groningen, DSP at CEU Department
of Philosophy)
on
'Dignity and Domination'
5.00 PM, Wednesday, 28. March, Zrinyi 14, Room 412
Abstract
The republican notion of freedom put forth by Quentin Skinner and
Philip Pettit holds a person to be free if he or she is not dominated,
i.e. if no-one can interfere with him or her arbitrarily. It differs
from the standard notion of (negative) freedom as absence of
interference in two ways. Firstly, it focuses on the possibility of
interference, rather than its actual presence. Secondly, it holds
certain kinds of interference compatible with freedom.
One of the main reasons why domination is of concern is its
incompatibility with the dominated individual's dignity. To be dominated
is to be at someone else's mercy, which is humiliating to one's person.
However, I will argue that the definition of arbitrary interference
introduced by Pettit fails to capture this notion of dignity
sufficiently. Pettit's definition relies on the "avowed or readily
avowable interests" of the person interfered with, which leaves room for
certain types of humiliating paternalistic interference. To ensure
personal dignity, I introduce an alternative dominance relation that
relies on moral consent. Interference is only compatible with a person's
dignity if it does not cause affront, i.e. if it is in accordance with
his or her views on how he or she should be treated.
This alternative notion of domination has a number of advantages over
the interest based notion formulated by Pettit, and some of its
implications for political theory will be discussed.
----- Apologies for cross posting ------
Please see the following announcement of the BPS Developmental
Psychology Section Annual Conference which will be held this Summer in
Plymouth! Note that the deadline for submissions of paper presentations,
posters and symposia is Monday 16th April.
-------
British Psychological Society
Developmental Psychology Section
Annual Conference 2007
We are pleased to announce that the 2007 Annual Conference of the BPS
Developmental Psychology Section will be held at the University of
Plymouth, UK, from 29 - 31 August. Members of the organising committee
are: John Clibbens, Allegra Cattani, Frederique Arreckx, Kirsten
Abbot-Smith, Pedro Guijarro-Fuentes, Caroline Floccia, Simon Handley and
Becky Mckenzie.
This year's keynote speakers are:
Jay Belsky
Institute for the Study of Children, Families and Social Issues
Birkbeck, University of London
Annette Karmiloff-Smith
Centre for Brain and Cognitive Development
School of Psychology
Birkbeck, University of London
Henry Markovits
Department of Psychology
University of Quebec at Montreal
Call for papers, posters and symposia
Submissions of paper presentations, posters and symposia are invited.
Talks will be 20 minutes long, followed by 10 minutes discussion. The
deadline for all such submissions is Monday 16th April. Decisions will
be announced by 15th May.
Abstract must be submitted via the conference website where full
instructions can be found. The website is located at
http://www.bpsdevsec07.org/default.asp
We look forward to seeing you in Plymouth!
Allegra Cattani, Ph.D.
Lecturer in Psychology
School of Applied Psychosocial Studies
University of Plymouth
PSQ Building C517
Drake Circus
Plymouth PL4 8AA
Phone ++44 (0)1752 238338
The CEU Department of Philosophy cordially invites you to a talk
by
Jan-Willem van der Rijt (University of Groningen, DSP at CEU Department
of Philosophy)
on
'Dignity and Domination'
5.00 PM, Wednesday, 28. March, Zrinyi 14, Room 412
Abstract
The republican notion of freedom put forth by Quentin Skinner and
Philip Pettit holds a person to be free if he or she is not dominated,
i.e. if no-one can interfere with him or her arbitrarily. It differs
from the standard notion of (negative) freedom as absence of
interference in two ways. Firstly, it focuses on the possibility of
interference, rather than its actual presence. Secondly, it holds
certain kinds of interference compatible with freedom.
One of the main reasons why domination is of concern is its
incompatibility with the dominated individual's dignity. To be dominated
is to be at someone else's mercy, which is humiliating to one's person.
However, I will argue that the definition of arbitrary interference
introduced by Pettit fails to capture this notion of dignity
sufficiently. Pettit's definition relies on the "avowed or readily
avowable interests" of the person interfered with, which leaves room for
certain types of humiliating paternalistic interference. To ensure
personal dignity, I introduce an alternative dominance relation that
relies on moral consent. Interference is only compatible with a person's
dignity if it does not cause affront, i.e. if it is in accordance with
his or her views on how he or she should be treated.
This alternative notion of domination has a number of advantages over
the interest based notion formulated by Pettit, and some of its
implications for political theory will be discussed.
Kriszta Biber
Department Coordinator
Philosophy Department
Tel: 36-1-327-3806
Fax: 36-1-327-3072
E-mail: biberk(a)ceu.hu
The CEU Department of Philosophy cordially invites you to a talk
by
Guy Longworth (University College London)
on
'Confronting Grammatical Properties'
5.00 PM, Tuesday, 27. March, Zrinyi 14, Room 412
Abstract
What is the status of grammatical properties? I begin by suggesting
some reasons for thinking that our ordinary experience of grammatical
properties is akin to our experience of mind-independent properties. I
then consider a line of argument, derived from scientific linguistics,
that suggests grammatical properties could not be mind-independent. I
then sketch a line of response to the latter argument.
Kriszta Biber
Department Coordinator
Philosophy Department
Tel: 36-1-327-3806
Fax: 36-1-327-3072
E-mail: biberk(a)ceu.hu
THEORETICAL PHILOSOPHY COLLOQUIUM
Institute of Philosophy
Faculty of Humanities, Eotvos University
Room 208 Monday 4:00 PM Puskin u. 3, Budapest
Web site: http://philosophy.elte.hu/colloquium
!!! Notice that the location is:
Room 208, 2nd Floor, Building "i" (Puskin u. 3), Faculty of Humanities,
Eotvos University !!!
26 March 4:00 PM Room 208 (Puskin u. 3)
Nenad Miscevic
Philosophy, Central European University, Budapest
Philosophy, University of Maribor
Thought experiments, inference and apriority
Abstract: http://philosophy.elte.hu/colloquium/2007/March/#4
___________________________________
The Colloquium is open to everyone, including students,
visitors, and faculty members from all departments and institutes!
Format of the colloquium: 60 minute lecture, 10 minute break, followed
by a 30-60 minute discussion.The language of presentation is English or
Hungarian.
A printable poster is available from here:
http://philosophy.elte.hu/colloquium/2007/March/poster.pdf
Please feel free to post it in your institution!
The organizer of the colloquium: Laszlo E. Szabo
(leszabo(a)philosophy.elte.hu)
--
L a s z l o E. S z a b o
Theoretical Physics Research Group of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences
Department of History and Philosophy of Science
Eotvos University, Budapest
http://philosophy.elte.hu/leszabo