koglist January 2013

koglist@maillist.ttk.hu

8 participants
20 discussions

[koglist] [CDC Seminars] CogSci CEU Departmental Colloquium: March 14. Can the comprehension of abstract language be rooted in sensory experiences?

by Gyorgyne Finta

The CEU Department of Cognitive Science cordially invites you to a talk (as part of its Departmental Colloquium series) by Anna Babarczy, Budapest University of Technology and Economics on Can the comprehension of abstract language be rooted in sensory experiences? Date: Wed, March 14, 2012 - 17:00 - 18:30 Location: Department of Cognitive Science, CEU, Frankel Leó út 30-34., Room G15 Can the comprehension of abstract language be rooted in sensory experiences? ABSTRACT: The question of learning the meaning of abstract language (roughly, expressions with no perceptible referents) has been bugging philosophers for thousands of years. More recently, a number of experimental paradigms have emerged trying to shed light on this issue. The basic idea explored in the talk is that people understand abstract (metaphorical) expressions by linking them to sensory or bodily experiences. If this is the case, we should be able to show that these experiences affect people’s interpretation of abstract utterances. The talk looks at the evidence we have so far (pro and contra).We're looking forward to see you there (Frankel Leo u. 30-34) ! _______________________________________________ Subscribe by sending an empty mail to seminars-subscribe(a)cdc.ceu.hu Unsubscribe by sending an empty mail to seminars-unsubscribe(a)cdc.ceu.hu

11 years, 4 months

[koglist] invitation to a talk on `A puzzle about belief-ascription` by Pierre Jacob - 5 February, 5.30 PM

by Krisztina Biber

The CEU Department of Philosophy cordially invites you to a talk (as part of its Departmental Colloquium series) by Pierre Jacob (Institut Jean Nicod, Paris / CEU) on `A puzzle about belief-ascription` Tuesday, 5 February, 2013, 5.30 PM, Zrinyi 14, Room 412 ABSTRACT (1) Much developmental evidence based on the so-called “standard or elicited false belief task” shows that when asked to predict where an agent with a false belief about an object’s location will look for it, children who know the location of the object fail until they are well into their fifth year. (2) However, several more recent experiments based on different paradigms, including the violation-of-expectation paradigm, anticipatory looking, helping and referential communication, also show that preverbal human infants seem to reliably represent an agent’s false beliefs. The puzzle is: how to reconcile (1) and (2)? Until recently there were two main strategies for solving the puzzle. One strategy is to take the data on preverbal human infants at face value and show why it is so hard for 3-year-olds to pass the standard false belief task. The other strategy is to offer low-level explanations for the data on preverbal human infants and deny that they are able to represent another’s false beliefs. A third strategy has recently emerged, based on a “two-systems” approach to belief-ascription. On behalf of the first strategy, I will argue that there is decisive evidence against the second strategy and that it is hard for the third strategy to get off the ground.

13 years, 3 months

[koglist] Theoretical Philosophy Forum, February

by Laszlo E. Szabo

THEORETICAL PHILOSOPHY FORUM Institute of Philosophy Faculty of Humanities, Eötvös University Address: Múzeum krt. 4/i, Budapest February Program 20 February (Wednesday) 5:00 PM Room 226 Peter Fekete Former Headmaster of Black's Academy, Jersey, Channel Islands On the Continuum 27 February (Wednesday) 5:00 PM Room 226 László Nemes Department of Behavioural Sciences, University of Debrecen A filozófiai praxis elméleti alapjai (The theoretical basis of philosophical praxis) ___________________________________ Abstracts and printable program (poster) are available from the web site of the Forum: http://phil.elte.hu/tpf (Please feel free to post the program in your institution!) The Forum is open to everyone, including students, visitors, and faculty members from all departments and institutes! Format: 60 minute lecture, coffee break, 60 minute discussion. The organizer of the Forum: László E. Szabó (leszabo(a)phil.elte.hu) -- L a s z l o E. S z a b o Professor of Philosophy DEPARTMENT OF LOGIC, INSTITUTE OF PHILOSOPHY EOTVOS UNIVERSITY, BUDAPEST http://phil.elte.hu/leszabo

13 years, 3 months

[koglist] reminder: invitation to a talk on 'Virtues and Vices of Attachment' by Edward Harcourt - 29 January, 5.30 PM

by Krisztina Biber

The CEU Department of Philosophy cordially invites you to a talk (as part of its Departmental Colloquium series) by Edward Harcourt (Oxford University) on 'Virtues and Vices of Attachment' Tuesday, 29 January, 2013, 5.30 PM, Zrinyi 14, Room 412 ABSTRACT Is love a response to rational autonomy (Velleman), or nothing to do with reason (Frankfurt)? This paper aims to do justice to both outlooks by offering a philosophical interpretation of attachment theory. The concept of love is argued to coincide roughly with that of attachment - a bond to another person for its own sake - and as such not a response to any particular properties (the Frankfurtian insight). However, attachments are to be seen as an Aristotelian ‘field’ divided into normative subspaces (secure and the various kinds of insecure attachment; compare the Aristotelian virtues and vices). It is thus a kind of bond that – as in secure attachment - is made good to the extent that intimacy is combined with the due acknowledgment of one’s own and the other’s autonomy (the Vellemanian insight). The paper also thereby shows why the concept of love is unified across parental, filial and ‘romantic’ subvarieties.

13 years, 3 months

[koglist] invitation to a talk on 'Virtues and Vices of Attachment' by Edward Harcourt - 29 January, 5.30 PM

by Krisztina Biber

13 years, 3 months

[koglist] reminder: invitation to a talk on “Free Will and Neuroscience” by Alfred Mele - 22 February, 5.30 PM

by Krisztina Biber

The CEU Department of Philosophy cordially invites you to a talk (as part of its Departmental Colloquium series) by Alfred Mele (Florida State University) on “Free Will and Neuroscience” Tuesday, 22 January, 2013, 5.30 PM, Zrinyi 14, Room 412 ABSTRACT A major source of scientific skepticism about free will is the belief (defended by neuroscientist Benjamin Libet, social psychologist Daniel Wegner, and others) that conscious decisions and intentions never play a role in producing corresponding actions. I discuss two serious problems encountered by any attempt to justify this belief by appealing to existing neuroscientific data. Kriszta Biber Department Coordinator Philosophy Department Tel: 36-1-327-3806 Fax: 36-1-327-3072 E-mail: biberk(a)ceu.hu

13 years, 3 months

[koglist] LAST CALL FOR PAPERS - DuCog V.

by sára szakadát

*LAST CALL FOR PAPERS* * * *V. Dubrovnik Conference on Cognitive Science - May 16-19, 2013.* * * *SLEEP, NEURAL OSCILLATIONS AND COGNITION*** The Central European Cognitive Science Association (CECOG) is pleased to announce the V. Dubrovnik Conference on Cognitive Science (DuCog) to be held in the historical town of Dubrovnik, Croatia, on May 16-19, 2013. *DuCog *is a small-medium size annual conference with up to 100 participants. Every year a specific topic is covered by keynote speakers and invited speakers. The focus of the conference this year is* sleep, neural oscillations and cognition*. *Keynote Speakers* * * * **György Buzsáki* New York University, USA** * * * * *Peter Achermann* University of Zürich, Switzerland * * *Philippe Peigneux* Université Libre de Bruxelles, Belgium *Victor Spoormaker* Max Planck Institute of Psychiatry, Germany * * *Invited speakers* * * * * *Marcello Massimini* University of Milan, Italy * * *Ursula Voss* Bonn University, Germany * * *Péter Simor* Budapest University of Technology and Economics, Hungary *Gareth Gaskell* University of York, UK *Péter Halász* Péter Pázmány Catholic University, Hungary * * *Susanne Diekelmann* University of Lübeck, Germany *Róbert Bódizs* Semmelweis University, Hungary * * *Submission is open until February 1, 2013.* * * *Submit a poster abstract!* * * *For further information see the attached flyer or visit the conference website at **http://www.cecog.eu/ducog/page_invitation.php***

13 years, 3 months

[koglist] a report of ESF about the future of brain research

by Csaba Pléh

Csaba Pléh professor of psychology presently: Collegium de Lyon 15 parvis Rene Descartes ENS Recherche R 147 69007 Lyon France T: 33437376596 Fax: 33437376273 Mobile: 36303493735, csaba.pleh(a)ens-lyon.fr Eszterhazy Karoly College Eger H-3300 editor in chief, Hungarian Review of Psychology member, Academia Europaea and the Hungarian Academy of Sciences

13 years, 3 months

[koglist] invitation to a talk on “Free Will and Neuroscience” by Alfred Mele - 22 February, 5.30 PM

by Krisztina Biber

13 years, 3 months

[koglist] prehistory of psycholingustics talk

by Csaba Pléh

http://www.mpi.nl/events/nijmegen-lectures-2013

13 years, 3 months

2026

2025

2024

2023

2022

2021

2020

2019

2018

2017

2016

2015

2014

2013

2012

2011

2010

2009

2008

2007

2006

2005

2004

2003

2002

2001

2000

1999

1998

1997

1996

1995

1994

1993

koglist January 2013