koglist July 2008

koglist@maillist.ttk.hu

6 participants
7 discussions

by Jozsef Fiser

Elnezest a technikai bejelentesert: Szerver hibak miatt az a 2008 augusztus 30-an megrendezento 14. Magyar Latas Konferencia web oldalat at kenyszerultunk helyezni a http://kognit.pszich.u-szeged.hu/latasszimpozium/ cimre. A hibak miatt elnezest kerunk, az uj szerver remelhetoleg megbizhatoan fog mukodni. Koszonettel: A Szervezok

17 years, 9 months

MAKOG felhivas

by George Kampis

Kedves Kollegak, fogadjatok szeretettel, udv kgy Kampis Gyorgy Kedves Érdeklődők! A Magyar Kognitív Tudományi Alapítvány a Kelet-Nyugat Kutatóintézettel karöltve,és a Tan Kapuja Buddhista Főiskola, mint házigazda védnöksége alatt meghirdette a XVI. Magyar Kognitív Tudományok Konferenciát "Szubjektív Tudás - Objektív Tudomány" témakörben. http://makogxvi.com

17 years, 9 months

szuletesnap

by Gergely Csibra

Kogtarsak, ma 15 eves a koglist. Eljen soka. Amikor 10 evesek voltunk, kerestem onkent vallalkozokat a listamenedzser szerepere, de egy se akadt. Most ismet megkerdezem: nem volna valaki, aki ezt a feladatot atvenne tolem? Udv, Csibra Gergely

17 years, 9 months

invitation to a philosophy talk - reminder

by Krisztina Biber

The CEU Department of Philosophy cordially invites you to a talk by Katalin Balog (Yale University) on Physicalism and Conceivability Arguments Thursday, 17 July, 5.30 PM, in Zrinyi str. 14/ room 412 ABSTRACT In this paper I want to take a new look at the history and wider landscape of recent arguments against physicalism and physicalist responses to them. These arguments - I will call them conceivability arguments after Descartes’ famous conceivability argument for the distinctness of mind and body - start from conceivability considerations, or more generally, from a premise about an epistemic or explanatory gap between physical and phenomenal descriptions and conclude from this that physicalism is false. The main goal of this paper is to defend what I believe to be the most powerful physicalist response to these arguments, recently dubbed the “Phenomenal Concept Strategy”. The Phenomenal Concept Strategy explains the epistemic or explanatory gap between phenomenal and physical descriptions by appeal to certain unique features of phenomenal concepts in a manner consistent with physicalism. This strategy can be viewed as an important part of a general physicalist answer to the dualist arguments. The physicalist can answer the a priori concerns of the dualist by asserting the conceivability of “qualia-heads”, i.e., purely physical beings that are our physical duplicates and have phenomenal experiences. I will show in detail that such beings are (at least) conceivable, in spite of the epistemic gaps the dualists are drawing attention to, and that their conceivability is enough to rebut the anti-physicalist arguments. This argument, let’s call it Counter Conceivability Argument, is the Master Argument that physicalists who admit to the epistemic gaps can rely on to rebut any conceivability argument. Kriszta Biber Department Coordinator Philosophy Department Tel: 36-1-327-3806 Fax: 36-1-327-3072 E-mail: biberk(a)ceu.hu

17 years, 9 months

CEU - philosophy talk: Katalin Balog

by Laszlo E. Szabo

Department of Philosophy Central European University UPCOMING EVENT: Katalin Balog (Yale University) Physicalism and Conceivability Arguments Thursday, 17 July, 17:30 Room 412, 14 Zrinyi street The event is open to the public. Note that visitors to CEU may be asked to register at the reception when entering the building. If you are coming to the lecture, please just tell the receptionist which event you are visiting. Thank you for your understanding. Contact: Hanoch Ben-Yami <benyamih(a)ceu.hu> -- L a s z l o E. S z a b o Department of Logic, Institute of Philosophy Faculty of Humanities, Eotvos University, Budapest http://phil.elte.hu/leszabo

17 years, 10 months

invitation to a philosophy talk

by Krisztina Biber

The CEU Department of Philosophy cordially invites you to a talk by Katalin Balog (Yale University) on Physicalism and Conceivability Arguments Thursday, 17 July, 5.30 PM, in Zrinyi str. 14/ room 412 Kriszta Biber Department Coordinator Philosophy Department Tel: 36-1-327-3806 Fax: 36-1-327-3072 E-mail: biberk(a)ceu.hu

17 years, 10 months

A New book from Cambridge U. Press: The Cambridge Handbook of Computational Psychology

by Professor Ron Sun

The Cambridge Handbook of Computational Psychology edited by Ron Sun published by Cambridge U. Press see: http://www.cambridge.org/catalogue/catalogue.asp? isbn=9780521857413 This book is a definitive reference source for the growing, increasingly more important, and interdisciplinary field of computational cognitive modeling, that is, computational psychology. It combines breadth of coverage with definitive statements by leading scientists in this field. Research in computational cognitive modeling (or, simply, computational psychology) explores the essence of cognition and various cognitive functionalities through developing detailed, process-based understanding by specifying computational mechanisms, structures, and processes. Given the complexity of the human mind and its manifestation in behavioral flexibility, process- based computational models may be necessary to explicate and elucidate the intricate details of the mind. The key to understanding cognitive processes is often in fine details. Computational models provide algorithmic specificity: detailed, exactly specified, and carefully thought-out steps, arranged in precise yet flexible sequences. These models provide both conceptual clarity and precision at the same time. This book substantiates this approach through overviews and many examples. Table of Contents ------------------------------------------ Part 1: Introduction Chapter 1. Introduction to Computational Cognitive Modeling. Ron Sun Part 2: Cognitive Modeling Paradigms Chapter 2. Connectionist Models of Cognition. Michael Thomas and James McClelland Chapter 3. Bayesian Models of Cognition. Thomas Griffiths, Charles Kemp, and Joshua Tenenbaum Chapter 4. Dynamical Systems Approaches to Cognition. Gregor Schoener Chapter 5. Declarative/Logic-Based Computational Cognitive Modeling. Selmer Bringsjord Chapter 6. Constraints in Cognitive Architectures. Niels Taatgen and John Anderson Part 3: Computational Modeling of Various Cognitive Functionalities and Domains Chapter 7. Computational Models of Episodic Memory. Kenneth Norman, Greg Detre, and Sean Polyn Chapter 8. Computational Models of Semantic Memory. Timothy Rogers Chapter 9. Models of Categorization. John Kruschke Chapter 10. Micro-Process Models of Decision Making. Jerome Busemeyer and Joseph Johnson Chapter 11. Models of Inductive Reasoning. Evan Heit Chapter 12. Mental Logic, Mental Models, and Simulations of Human Deductive Reasoning. Philip Johnson-Laird and Yingrui Yang Chapter 13. Computational Models of Skill Acquisition. Stellan Ohlsson Chapter 14. Computational Models of Implicit Learning. Axel Cleeremans and Zoltan Dienes Chapter 15. Computational Models of Attention and Cognitive Control. Nicola De Pisapia, Grega Repovs, Todd Braver Chapter 16. Computational Models of Developmental Psychology. Thomas Shultz and Sylvain Sirois Chapter 17. Computational Models of Psycholinguistics. Nick Chater and Morten Christiansen Chapter 18. Computational Models in Personality and Social Psychology. Stephen Read and Brian Monroe Chapter 19. Cognitive Social Simulation. Ron Sun Chapter 20. Models of Scientific Explanation. Paul Thagard and Abninder Litt Chapter 21. Cognitive Modeling for Cognitive Engineering. Wayne Gray Chapter 22. Models of Animal Learning and Their Relations to Human Learning. Francisco Lopez and David Shanks Chapter 23. Computational Modeling of Visual Information Processing. Pawan Sinha and Benjamin Balas Chapter 24. Models of Motor Control. Ferdinando Mussa-Ivaldi and Sara Solla Part 4: Concluding Remarks Chapter 25. An Evaluation of Computational Modeling in Cognitive Science. Margaret Boden Chapter 26. Putting the Pieces Together Again. Aaron Sloman ----------------------------------------------------- To order, go to: http://www.cambridge.org/catalogue/catalogue.asp?isbn=9780521857413 or http://www.amazon.com/Cambridge-Handbook-Computational-Psychology/dp/ 0521674107/ref=ed_oe_p ======================================================== Professor Ron Sun Cognitive Science Department Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute 110 Eighth Street, Carnegie 302A Troy, NY 12180, USA phone: 518-276-3409 fax: 518-276-3017 email: rsun(a)rpi.edu web: http://www.cogsci.rpi.edu/~rsun =======================================================

17 years, 10 months

2026

2025

2024

2023

2022

2021

2020

2019

2018

2017

2016

2015

2014

2013

2012

2011

2010

2009

2008

2007

2006

2005

2004

2003

2002

2001

2000

1999

1998

1997

1996

1995

1994

1993

koglist July 2008