The CEU Department of Cognitive Science cordially invites you to a talk
(as part of its Departmental Colloquium series)
by
Anna Babarczy, Budapest University of Technology and Economics
on
Can the comprehension of abstract language be rooted in sensory
experiences?
Date: Wed, March 14, 2012 - 17:00 - 18:30
Location: Department of Cognitive Science, CEU, Frankel Leó út 30-34.,
Room G15
Can the comprehension of abstract language be rooted in sensory
experiences?
ABSTRACT: The question of learning the meaning of abstract language
(roughly, expressions with no perceptible referents) has been bugging
philosophers for thousands of years. More recently, a number of
experimental paradigms have emerged trying to shed light on this issue.
The basic idea explored in the talk is that people understand abstract
(metaphorical) expressions by linking them to sensory or bodily
experiences. If this is the case, we should be able to show that these
experiences affect people’s interpretation of abstract utterances. The
talk looks at the evidence we have so far (pro and contra).We're looking
forward to see you there (Frankel Leo u. 30-34) !
_______________________________________________
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-------- Forwarded Message --------
From: Hasok Chang <hc372(a)cam.ac.uk>
To: spsp-members(a)philosophy-science-practice.org
Subject: [SPSP-members] faculty position at Cambridge
Date: Fri, 31 Jan 2014 23:13:45 +0000
UNIVERSITY OF CAMBRIDGE DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY AND PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE
AND SELWYN COLLEGE University Lecturer in the Philosophy of Psychology
and Cognitive Science (JN02015)
Salary: £37,756 to £47,787 pa
Applications are invited for a permanent University Lectureship in the
Philosophy of Psychology and Cognitive Science, to start on 1 September
2014 or as soon as possible thereafter. This post is part of the Trinity
Scheme for Joint Lectureships and will be held in the Department of
History and Philosophy of Science (HPS) in conjunction with a Fellowship
at Selwyn College. Responsibilities will include contributing to all
aspects of undergraduate and graduate teaching, supervising and
examining, leading research in the philosophy of psychology or cognitive
science, and various administrative duties for the Department and the
College. Applicants must hold a PhD (or equivalent) and have an
outstanding record of excellence in teaching, research and publication
in this area. The Department offers an exceptionally stimulating and
supportive interdisciplinary research environment and the opportunity to
develop undergraduate and graduate teaching in the post-holder's areas
of expertise. Further particulars and information on how to apply are
available at: http://www.hps.cam.ac.uk/jobs/jn02015.html Schedule:
Closing Date: 5pm on Friday 7th March 2014 Longlisting: by approx
17th March 2014
Shortlisting: by approx 25th March 2014 Job talks and informal meetings:
all day on 23rd April 2014 Interviews: morning of 24th April 2014
(videoconferencing will be available if required) For information on
the Department of History and Philosophy of Science
see www.hps.cam.ac.uk, for Selwyn College see www.sel.cam.ac.uk, for
more on the University of Cambridge see www.cam.ac.uk.
_______________________________________________
SPSP-members mailing list
SPSP-members(a)philosophy-science-practice.org
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--
L a s z l o E. S z a b o
Professor of Philosophy
DEPARTMENT OF LOGIC, INSTITUTE OF PHILOSOPHY
EOTVOS UNIVERSITY, BUDAPEST
http://phil.elte.hu/leszabo
Szeretettel várunk mindenkit az MTA Nyelvtudományi Intézetének februári
programjaira!
2014. február 3-5.
7th Budapest Uralic Workshop
http://www.nytud.hu/buw7
szervezo": Finnugor és Nyelvtörténeti Osztály
helyszín: földszinti elo"adóterem
2014. február 7.
VIII. Alkalmazott Nyelvészeti Doktoranduszkonferencia
http://www.nytud.hu/alknyelvdok14
szervezo": Nyelvtechnológiai és Alkalmazott Nyelvészeti Osztály
helyszín: földszinti elo"adóterem
2014. február 13. csütörtök 17.00 óra
Deme Andrea
Az énekelt magánhangzók akusztikai és percepciós jellemzo"i
szervezo": Elméleti Nyelvészeti Osztály - Kísérleti és Analógiás
Fonológia és Alaktan Kutatócsoport
helyszín: 208-as terem
2014. február 20. csütörtök 11.00 óra
A magyar nyelv nagyszótára 5. (C--dézs)
bemutató és sajtótájékoztató
szervezo": Szótári Osztály
helyszín: földszinti elo"adóterem
2014. február 25. kedd 10.30 óra
Elmélet és kísérlet a nyelvészetben -- kerekasztal-beszélgetés
Moderátor: Bánréti Zoltán
Résztvevo"k: É. Kiss Katalin, Gyuris Beáta, Lukács Ágnes, Mády Katalin
Felkért hozzászólók: Surányi Balázs, Zétényi Tamás
szervezo": Pszicho-, Neuro- és Szociolingvisztikai Osztály
helyszín: földszinti elo"adóterem
2014. február 27. csütörtök 17.00 óra
Maleczki Márta
Szegedi Tudományegyetem
TBA
szervezo": Magyar Szemantikusok Asztaltársasága
helyszín: földszinti elo"adóterem
***
Az absztraktok és az esetleges változások a honlapon találhatók meg:
http://www.nytud.hu/intprog.html
***
MTA Nyelvtudományi Intézet
1068 Budapest, Benczúr u. 33.
CEU Summer University Course onMORALITY: EVOLUTIONARY ORIGINS AND
COGNITIVE MECHANISMS
We invite applications from graduate students, junior or post-doctoral
researchers, teachers and professionals in the social sciences and
humanities.
Application deadline is February 14, 2014
Financial aid is available for most courses.
**************************************************************
COURSE DIRECTOR Nicolas Baumard, Ecole Normale Supérieure, Paris,
France
FACULTY Jean-Baptiste André, CNRS, Paris, France; Paul Bloom, Yale
University, New Haven, USA; Redouan Bshary, University of Neuchatel,
Switzerland; Leda Cosmides, University of California, Santa Barbara,
USA; Molly Crockett, University College London, UK; Gergely Csibra,
Central European University, Budapest, Hungary; Fiery Cushman, Brown
University, Providence, USA; Keith Jensen, Manchester University, UK;
Dan Sperber, Department of Cognitive Science / Department of Philosophy,
CEU, Budapest, Hungary | Directeur de Recherche au CNRS, Paris, Institut
Jean Nicod, France; John Tooby, Anthropology, University of California
Santa Barbara, US; and Karen Wynn, Yale University, New Haven, USA
GUEST SPEAKER Pascal Boyer, Psychology and Anthropology departments,
Washington University in St Louis, USA
BRIEF COURSE DESCRIPTION
What makes humans moral beings? This question can be understood either
as a proximate “how” question or as an ultimate “why” question. The “how”
question, which is about the mental and social mechanisms that produce
moral judgments, has been investigated by psychologists and social
scientists. The “why” question, which is about the fitness consequences
that explain why humans have morality, has been discussed by
evolutionary biologists in the context of the evolution of cooperation.
The goal of this summer school is to contribute to a fruitful
articulation of such proximate and ultimate explanations of human
morality.
The school will be taught by internationally renowned experts
interested in both ultimate and proximate questions, from evolutionary
biology (Jean-Baptiste André, Redouan Bshary), comparative psychology
(Keith Jensen), evolutionary psychology (Nicolas Baumard, Leda Cosmides)
to cognitive neuroscience (Molly Crockett), developmental psychology
(Paul Bloom, Gergely Csibra, Karen Wynn) and cognitive psychology (Fiery
Cushman).
The design of the course stresses highly interactive forms of teaching.
The course will begin with introductory lectures to build common ground
between the researchers from different disciplines. After the
introductions, all segments will be held in a seminar format, with
faculty members leading the seminar, and responses/commentaries
delivered by teams of students. There will be specific time devoted to
smaller group discussions, also led by a member of the faculty, and also
opportunities for selected students to give talks and poster
presentations.
The summer course is aimed at providing a state-of-the-art cutting-edge
scientific and research-oriented training for post-doctoral young
researchers and highly promising pre-doctoral students from European and
overseas universities and research institutes on the evolutionary and
psychological bases of morality.
Central European University's summer school (CEU SUN), established in
1996, is a program in English for graduate students, junior or
post-doctoral researchers, teachers and professionals. It offers
high-level, research-oriented, interdisciplinary academic courses as
well as workshops on policy issues for professional development, taught
by internationally renowned scholars and policy experts (including CEU
faculty). Application from all over the world is encouraged. Financial
aid is available.
For further academic information on the course and on eligibility
criteria and funding options please visit the web site at
http://summer.ceu.hu/morality-2014
The CEU Department of Philosophy cordially invites you to a talk
(as part of its Departmental Colloquium series)
by
Ulrike Heuer (Leeds)
on
`Acting intentionally`
Tuesday, 4 February, 2014, 5.30 PM, Zrinyi 14, Room 412
ABSTRACT
Generally reasons to act in a certain way are also reasons to form an
intention to do so, some philosophers think. At any rate, the fact that
it would be good to have an intention when there is nothing to be said
for acting as intended is no reason for forming an intention (or
alternatively: it is a reason, but we can’t follow it). Intentions are
like beliefs in that they cannot be formed for state-given reasons.
However, according to an influential account of intentions – Bratman’s
planning conception – intentions enable coordination with oneself and
others. Intentions are useful in that regard. Thus the reasons for
forming them would appear to be instrumental reasons of a certain kind –
not unlike state-given reasons. There is a tension between the two
approaches. I will argue that while the instrumental view of reasons to
intend holds at least a partial truth, the symmetry claim of reasons to
believe and reasons to intend misunderstands the dependence of
intentions on reasons to act.
The CEU Department of Philosophy cordially invites you to a talk
(as part of its Departmental Colloquium series)
by
Clotilde Calabi (University of Milan)
on
“Ancona”? Aha, that’s her name!
Tots and Clicks
Tuesday, 28 January, 2014, 5.30 PM, Zrinyi 14, Room 412
ABSTRACT
Someone asks me what is her name. I feel I know it. As we often say,
her name is on the tip of my tongue. I can’t say it now, but I am sure
that in a few moments it will come back.
Sometimes I do not make efforts to recall. I sit back and let the
question linger on me. One minute later, the answer comes out. It is as
if the obstacles occluding it are gone all together and I have done
nothing to remove them. I shout: “Ancona!”. I feel that that the word
clicks. Yet, generally, I do make efforts and try to recall the name by
relying on some cues. In fact, I do not have a total blank. I remember
something and I try to fill the gap by deliberately retrieving
information I have about the bearer of the name and some other general
information. If there is no general information to retrieve, I may also
go through the alphabet letter by letter, until I find the letter that
helps me to fill the gap. Or, I recall in some way how the word sounds –
where is the pitch, whether it is an open mouth word, and so on - and
search, until I find it. Again, the word clicks. It may also happen
that I give one answer and immediately afterwards I acknowledge that I
was wrong and correct myself. For example, after saying “Ancona”, I
rejoin “No, wait a minute. It is D’Ancona”. Now it clicks!
In all these cases, first I have the feeling that I am about to bring
to consciousness a piece of knowledge I possess concerning a lexical
item, and then, when the lexical item pops out, I have a feeling of
rightness. Of course, I may get the name wrong: my feeling of rightness
does not entail infallibility.
Call the experience before retrieval tip of the tongue (TOT) experience
and the experience after retrieval CLICK experience. My question is what
kind of experience they are. Are they beliefs, memories, emotions, gut
feelings, or what?
VI. Dubrovnik Conference on Cognitive Science
Language and Conceptual Development
22-24 May 2014
Dubrovnik, Croatia
Participants are invited to submit their work as a poster
Abstract submission is open (deadline: February 17th)
Chairs: Judit Gervain & Ágnes Melinda Kovács
Invited speakers
Lisa Feigenson and Justin Halberda
Department of Psychological and Brain Sciences, Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, USA
Alex Cristia and Emmanuel Dupoux
Laboratoire de Science Cognitive et Psycholinguistique, ENS-CNRS-EHESS, Paris, France
Nuria Sebastian Galles and Luca Bonatti
Center for Brain and Cognition, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Barcelona, Spain
Gergely Csibra and György Gergely
Department of Cognitive Science, Central European University, Budapest, Hungary
Special Session: ERC information Symposium
Panelists: Nuria Sebastian Galles, Emmanuel Dupoux, Csaba Pléh, Gergely Csibra, György Gergely, Ágnes Melinda Kovács
Financial aid available for a limited number of students from Central and Eastern Europe on the basis of the quality of their abstracts.
Early bird registration deadline: March 15th
For more information visit: http://www.cecog.eu/ducog/page_invitation.php
Dear Koglist members,
Due to the relocation of our servers Koglist will be on hold for a few
days as of 23.01.2014. The messages sent to Koglist during downtime will
be delivered as soon as the servers are operational at our new location.
We apologize for any inconvenience.
Best,
Laszlo Balazs
--
--
*** Please make a note of my new Email ***
*** Kérem jegyezze fel az új Email címet ***
balazs.laszlo(a)ttk.mta.hu
dr. Balázs László
MTA Természettudományi Kutatóközpont
Kognitív Idegtudományi és Pszichológiai Intézet
Laszlo Balazs, Ph.D.
MTA Research Centre for Natural Sciences
Institute of Cognitive Neuroscience and Psychology
P O B 398, Budapest, Hungary, H-1394
Tel:+36(1)382-6811
http://www.cogpsyphy.hu/balazs
--
--
*** Please make a note of my new Email ***
*** Kérem jegyezze fel az új Email címet ***
balazs.laszlo(a)ttk.mta.hu
dr. Balázs László
MTA Természettudományi Kutatóközpont
Kognitív Idegtudományi és Pszichológiai Intézet
Laszlo Balazs, Ph.D.
MTA Research Centre for Natural Sciences
Institute of Cognitive Neuroscience and Psychology
P O B 398, Budapest, Hungary, H-1394
Tel:+36(1)382-6811
http://www.cogpsyphy.hu/balazs
The CEU Department of Philosophy cordially invites you to a talk
(as part of its Departmental Colloquium series)
by
Clotilde Calabi (University of Milan)
on
“Ancona”? Aha, that’s her name!
Tots and Clicks
Tuesday, 28 January, 2014, 5.30 PM, Zrinyi 14, Room 412
ABSTRACT
Someone asks me what is her name. I feel I know it. As we often say,
her name is on the tip of my tongue. I can’t say it now, but I am sure
that in a few moments it will come back.
Sometimes I do not make efforts to recall. I sit back and let the
question linger on me. One minute later, the answer comes out. It is as
if the obstacles occluding it are gone all together and I have done
nothing to remove them. I shout: “Ancona!”. I feel that that the word
clicks. Yet, generally, I do make efforts and try to recall the name by
relying on some cues. In fact, I do not have a total blank. I remember
something and I try to fill the gap by deliberately retrieving
information I have about the bearer of the name and some other general
information. If there is no general information to retrieve, I may also
go through the alphabet letter by letter, until I find the letter that
helps me to fill the gap. Or, I recall in some way how the word sounds –
where is the pitch, whether it is an open mouth word, and so on - and
search, until I find it. Again, the word clicks. It may also happen
that I give one answer and immediately afterwards I acknowledge that I
was wrong and correct myself. For example, after saying “Ancona”, I
rejoin “No, wait a minute. It is D’Ancona”. Now it clicks!
In all these cases, first I have the feeling that I am about to bring
to consciousness a piece of knowledge I possess concerning a lexical
item, and then, when the lexical item pops out, I have a feeling of
rightness. Of course, I may get the name wrong: my feeling of rightness
does not entail infallibility.
Call the experience before retrieval tip of the tongue (TOT) experience
and the experience after retrieval CLICK experience. My question is what
kind of experience they are. Are they beliefs, memories, emotions, gut
feelings, or what?