The CEU Department of Philosophy cordially invites you to a talk (as part of its Departmental Colloquium series) by Eric Brown (CEU Business School) on `Pro-attitudes and the problem of the wrong kind of reasons` Tuesday, 27 September, 2011, 4.30 PM, Zrinyi 14, Room 412 ABSTRACT Wrong kind of reasons (WKR) objections to fitting-attitude analysis of value, as well as the very idea of the wrong kind of reasons, can be defused by paying close attention to the attitudes that are posited or imagined by scenarios, e.g., in which we are told that an evil demon will punish us with extreme pain unless they admire him. My argument, based on considerations relation to the role proattitudes must play in defeasible practical inference, is that such attitudes are strictly impossible. If the attitudes are impossible, then there cannot be reasons for them. A fortiori there can be no wrong kind of reasons for them. I also provide a diagnosis of the standard approach to WKR objections. Such approaches focus on trying to sort reasons into the right and wrong kinds using some right- or wrong-making property. I try to show, through a detailed analysis of two such attempts, why this won't work. Kriszta Biber Department Coordinator Philosophy Department Tel: 36-1-327-3806 Fax: 36-1-327-3072 E-mail: biberk(a)ceu.hu