Sajnos, a Harmadik Kultura Szalon kovetkezo osszejovetelenek idopontja
utkozik a mi hetfonkenti Tudomanyfilozofia Szeminariumunkkal. Az
athidalo megoldast mar megbeszeltuk: mi egy kicsit sietunk a
szeminariumon, ok egy kicsit huzzak az idot az elejen, es majd futunk.
Udvozlettel,
Sz. L.
-------- Original Message --------
Subject: [TypoKlub] Harmadik Kultura Szalon
Date: Tue, 25 Feb 2003 12:31:43 +0100 (CET)
From: "Betti" <betti(a)typotex.hu>
Reply-To: typoklub(a)typotex.hu
To: typoklub(a)typotex.hu
Kedves Klubtagunk!
A Harmadik Kultura Szalon legujabb temaja a
VEGTELEN
CSIRMAZ LASZLO matematikus es
SZEKELY LASZLO filozofus vezeti a beszelgetest.
Helyszin: Helikon Konyveshaz
Budapest, VI. Bajcsy-Zsilinszky ut 37.
Idopont: 2003. marcius 10. (hetfo) delutan 6 ora.
Varjuk Ont!
Szokas szerint szereny etel-itallal is szolgalunk.
Votisky Zsusza
(Typotex Kiado)
es
Hortobagyi Tiborne
(Helikon Konyvesbolt)
Typotex Kiado
www.typotex.hu
1024 Bp., Retek u. 33-35.
06-1-315-0256
_______________________________________________
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--
L a s z l o E. S z a b o
Theoretical Physics Research Group of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences
Department of History and Philosophy of Science
Eotvos University, Budapest
H-1518 Budapest, Pf. 32, Hungary
Phone/Fax: (36-1)372-2924
Mobil/SMS: (36) 20-366-1172
http://hps.elte.hu/~leszabo
---------- Forwarded message ----------
Date: Tue, 25 Feb 2003 14:49:25 -0500
From: "Lefebvre, Claire" <lefebvre.claire(a)uqam.ca>
To: iscgroupe: ;
Subject: Ecole d'ete
Bonjour à tous, Veuillez trouver cette invitation à participer à
l'École d'été en sciences cognitives de l'UQAM de Claire Lefebvre,
directrice de l'École. Nicolas Marchand
<bold>Premier Institut d'été en sciences cognitives à l'Université du
Québec à Montréal</bold>
Chères, chers collègues Comme vous le vous savez sans doute, notre
université tiendra sa première École d'été en sciences cognitives. Nous
aurons le plaisir d'accueillir pour l'occasion de nombreux
conférenciers de l'extérieur.
Le thème sera la<bold> catégorisation</bold>, telle que vue par les
disciplines suivantes: l'anthropologie cognitive, l'informatique
cognitive, la linguistique, la neuroscience cognitive, la philosophie
et la psychologie.
L'événement vous est destiné, ainsi qu'à vos étudiants des cycles
supérieurs.
Il a lieu du<bold> 30 juin au 11 juillet 2003</bold>.
Vous trouverez le programme en annexe. Aussi, pour de plus amples
renseignements, vous pouvez consulter le site Internet:
http://www.unites.uqam.ca/sccog. Il faut souligner que les inscriptions
effectuées avant le 1er mars bénéficient d'un tarif réduit.
Salutations cordiales
Claire Lefebvre Département de Linguistique Téléphone: (514) 987-3000
#8464 Télécopieur: (514) 987-4652
Department of HISTORY AND PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE
Eotvos University, Budapest
Pazmany P. setany 1/A Budapest
Phone/Fax: (36-1) 372 2924
Department's Home Page:http://hps.elte.hu
P h i l o s o p h y o f S c i e n c e C o l l o q u i u m
Room 6.54 (6th floor) Monday 4:00 PM
____________________________________
P r o g r a m: March
3 March 4:00 PM 6th floor 6.54
(English, except all participants speak Hungarian)
K a t a l i n F a r k a s <http://www.ceu.hu/phil/farkas>
Deprtment of Philosophy
Central European University, Budapest
Descartes on sensations
In contemporary philosophy of mind dualism is often characterised as the
view that the mental and the physical are fundamentally different, where
paradigmatic examples of the mental are provided by conscious mental
events with a phenomenal character - like sensations, sensory
perceptions or feelings. It is also common to claim that the originator
of this view was Descartes. A problem that is often discussed in
connection with these question is known as the "explanatory gap" problem
- this is the idea that even if we accept that mental events are
identical to physical events, there is no intelligible connection
between the nature of the mental and the physical event, hence the kind
of theoretical reduction familiar from the sciences (e.g. that water is
H2O) is not possible between the mental and the physical.
But when we look at what Descartes actually says about sensations,
perceptions or feelings, the picture is rather different. As a matter of
fact, he thought that these mental events have the closest connection to
the body, and his reason for this is probably found in his scientific
theory. And he may have seen an explanatory gap between the mental and
the physical, but he was more interested in another explanatory gap,
which he claimed to lie between sensations and pure cognitive acts.
These and other aspects of Decsartes' views on sensations will be
discussed in the lecture.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
10 March 4:00 PM 6th floor 6.54
A n d r á s L o" r i n c z <http://people.inf.elte.hu/lorincz/>
Department of Information Systems
Eötvös University, Budapest
A homunculus modellezése
(Modeling of the 'homunculus')
A homunculus paradoxon szerint "reprezentáció" nem értelmes, azt meg
kell vizsgálni és értelmezni kell. Igy -- sajnos -- adódik a kérdés,
hogy (1) hol van "az" a valaki, aki az értelmezést végzi és (2) milyen
reprezentációt használ. Tehát végtelen regresszióhoz jutunk.
A paradoxonon megpróbálhatunk "kifogni" a következ? módon: Az input
értelmes (és nem a reprezentáció), ha az input a reprezentációból (és a
tapasztalatok alapján) el?állítható. Így két dolgot tettünk egyszerre:
(3) a végtelen regressziót hurokká alakítottuk és (4) a paradoxon
feloldási kísérletével modellalkotási lehet?séget kaptunk.
Az el?adásban azt próbálom elhitetni a hallgatósággal, hogy a fenti elv
-- és néhány apró "dialektikus" kiegészítés -- részletes leírást
származtat a hippocampusról, az hippocampust körülvev? entorhinális
kéreg szerkezetér?l, a neocortex struktúrájáról és a bazális ganglionok
szerkezetér?l is. Az el?adásban csak logikai és matematikai
megfontolásokról lesz szó, a neurobiológiai részleteket illet?en
(részben már publikált) hivatkozásokra fogok szorítkozni.
Fontosabb hivatkozások:
Two-phase computational model of the entorhinal-hippocampal region
A. Lörincz and Gy. Buzsáki
In: The parahippocampal region: Implications for neurological and
psychiatric diseases Eds.: H.E. Sharfman, M.P. Witter, R. Schwarcz.
(Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences, Vol. 911, 2000) pp. 83-111.
Independent component analysis of temporal sequences subject to
constraints by LGN inputs yields all the three major cell types of the
primary visual cortex
B. Szatmáry and A. Lörincz
Journal of Computational Neuroscience 11: 241-248, 2001.
Ockham's razor modeling of the matrisome channels of the basal ganglia
thalamocortical loop
A. Lörincz, Gy. Hévízi and Cs. Szepesvári
International Journal of Neural Systems 11: 125-143, 2001.
Categories, prototypes and memory systems in Alzheimer's disease
Sz. Kéri, Z. Janka, Gy. Benedek, P. Aszalós, B. Szatmáry, G. Szirtes,
and A. Lörincz
Trends in Cognitive Science 6: 132-136, 2002.
Ockham's razor at work: Modeling of the 'homunculus'
A. Lörincz, B. Póczos, G. Szirtes, and B. Takács
Brain and Mind 3: 187-220, 2002
Relating priming and repetition suppression
A. Lörincz, G. Szirtes, B. Takács, I. Biederman, and R. Vogels
International Journal of Neural Systems 12 : 187-202, 2002.
Mystery of structure and function of sensory processing areas of the
neocortex: A resolution
A. Lörincz, B. Szatmáry and G. Szirtes
Journal of Computational Neuroscience 13: 187?205, 2002.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
17 March 4:00 PM 6th floor 6.54
L á s z l ó S z é k e l y <http://www.phil-inst.hu/intezet/szl.htm>
Institute for Philosophical Research
of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences
Túl az antropikus elven
(Beyond antropic principle)
Az antropikus kozmológiai elv kapcsán két élésen szembenálló filozófiai
álláspont alakult ki. Az egyik ? az ?anti antropikus? ? oldal a priori
elutasítja azt a leheto"séget, hogy a természettudományos kutatás a
fizikai világban emberi vonatkozásokat tárjon föl, s ezért minden ilyen
irányú kutatást és álláspontot a természettudományos normák durva
megsértéseként, a természettudományba történo" agresszív ideológiai
behatolásként értékel. Az ?antropikus-párti? oldal szerint ezzel szemben
az antropikus elvet valós természettudományos problémák indukálták, s
ezért minden természettudósnak és a természettudományokkal foglalkozó
filozófusnak szembe kell néznie vele ? még akkor is, ha a
természettudománnyal kapcsolatos hagyományos materialista-ateista
elvárásoknak ellentmondó filozófiai következményei vannak. A vita ero"s
ideológiai töltésu" ero"térében ? amelyet alapveto"en az anti-antropikus
oldalnak az elvvel szembeni ellenséges érzülete, s a benne jelentkezo"
valós probléma tagadására irányuló törekvése határoz meg ? hiányoznak az
olyan elemzések, melyek elfogulatlanul közelítenének az itt fölveto"do"
kérdésekhez.
Elo"adásomban korábbi könyvem szellemében ? de a könyv konkrét érveit
részben újrafogalmazva, s továbbgondolva ? az antropikus elvvel
kapcsolatos vita hibás fogalmi kontextusára szeretnék rámutat. Ennek
részeként elo"ször amellett fogok érvelni, hogy a fizikai világ emberi
vonatkozásnak keresése nem csupán nem tudományellenes, hanem triviális
természettudományos módszertani követelmény abban az értelemben,
amiképpen az a gyenge elvben megfogalmazódik. A gyenge antropikus elv ?
bár ?antropikus? ? semmiféle ideológiai vagy metafizikai tartalommal nem
bír, s még a legortodoxabb materialista sem találhat kivetni valót
benne. A nagy számokra vonatkozó Dirac-féle hipotézis kapcsán
megmutatom, hogy éppen az ?emberi vonatkozás? kizárása tünteti ki
megengedhetetlen, anti-kopernikánus módon a megfigyelo"t, s sérti meg a
természettudományos kutatás normáit. Amikor Dicke új ? antropikus ?
magyarázatot ad ugyanezen számokra, valójában csupán visszaállítja a
természettudományos magyarázat hagyományos logikáját, amit az
egyoldalúan anti-antropikus tradíció eltorzított.
Bár a gyenge elv ismeretelméletileg és kultúrtörténetileg igen érdekes,
egy filozófus számára az ero"s antropikus elv az, ami igazán izgalmas,
hiszen itt a háttérben tradicionális metafizikai problémák húzódnak meg.
Filozófiai szempontból azonban az ero"s antropikus elvnek ? legalábbis
abban a szu"k értelemben, amiképpen az megfogalmazódott és a mai
diszkussziókban szerepel ? csupán másodlagos jelento"sége van: az elv
által érintett tényleges ontológiai és metafizikai kérdések ?túl? vannak
az antropikus elven. Ma egyre gyakrabban olvashatunk szenzációsnak szánt
kijelentéseket arról, hogy az ero"s antropikus elv az új tudományos
elméletek fényében fölöslegessé vált, azt megsemmisítette a fizika
fejlo"dése. Amennyiben azonban az ero"s elv a természettudományban
fontossággal bírhat, s amennyiben azt a természettudomány fölöslegessé
teheti, filozófiailag nem igazán érdekes. Az igazi filozófiai kérdés a
világegyetem antropikusságára vonatkozik, s e kérdés mint a filozófia
leibnizi és heideggeri alapkérdésének levezetettje nyeri el értelmét.
Azt a természettudomány ezért sohasem válaszolhatja meg, s így sohasem
teheti meghaladottá.
Ajánlott irodalom: Székely László: Az emberarcú kozmosz. Budapest: Áron
Kiadó, 1997.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
24 March 4:00 PM 6th floor 6.54
S z a b o l c s K i s s* <mailto:kiss.szabolcs@matavnet.hu>
I r i n g ó H a l a s i
E d i t M o l n á r
_________
* elo"adó
Institute of Psychology
University of Pécs
A humán vélekedésrendszer konzisztenciájának tulajdonítása gyermekeknél
(Children's ascription logical consistency to human beliefs)
Az ún. naív tudatelmélet kutatása napjaink megismeréstudományának egyik
központi területe (ld. pl. Baron-Cohen et al. 2000). Ezen belül a
gyermek elméro"l való gondolkodásának és ítélethozatalának a feltárása
kitüntetett terület (ld. pl. Mitchell és Riggs 2000). A
szociálpszichológiában a fenti kutatásoktól függetlenül ugyanakkor nagy
hagyománya van a humán nézet- vagy vélekedésrendszerek kutatásának. Itt
az egyik központi kérdés a vélekedésrendszerek konzisztenciáját érinti
(ld. pl. Hunyadi 1980). Napjaink tudatfilozófiájában pedig a másik
személy tudatának interpretálásakor használt racionális elvek
beazonosítása kap központi szerepet. Jelen elo"adás célja, hogy egy saját
empirikus munka eredményeinek ismertetése keretében összekapcsolja a
naív tudatelméleti, a szociálpszichológiai és a tudatfilozófiai
elméleteket.
A kognitív fejlo"déslélektani kísérleti adatgyu"jtés kiindulópontja a
másik személy tudatának értelmezésekor használt normatív (racionális)
alapelvek egyike volt. Ezt az ún. zárás alapelvét a tudatfilozófiában
például Fodor és Lepore (1992, 143.o.) is ismerteti : ?(...)
Szükségszeru"en, ha egy lényt úgy reprezentálunk, mint aki P-t véli és P
implikálja Q-t, akkor a lényt úgy kell reprezentálni, mint aki Q-t véli.?
Mikortól folyamodik a gyermek ehhez az alapelvhez? Hogyan sajátítja
ezt el? Mi a kapcsolat a gyermek logikai fejlo"dése és a zárás
alapelvének kialakulása között? Milyen szerepet játszik a saját
vélekedésrendszerhez való introspektív hozzáférés az alapelv
elsajátításában?
Az elo"adásban ismertetett kísérlettel a fenti kérdésekre kerestünk
választ. Az empirikus munka során óvodás korú gyermekek olyan rövid
történeteket hallgattak, amelyek feltételezték a zárás alapelvének
megértését. A történetek végén feltett kérdésekre adott helyes
válaszokon keresztül mértük fel a gyermekek teljesítményét. A számos
rendkivül izgalmas kísérleti eredmény ismertetésekor kitérek a három
évesek gyenge adataira és erre vonatkozó lehetséges magyarázatokat
fogalmazok meg. Tárgyalom a talált fejlo"dési trendet és az eredményeket
összevetem a hamis vélekedés teszt klasszikus eredményeivel. Eközben
bemutatom az általunk használt próba komputációs szintu" feladatelemzését
is, amely szorosan kapcsolódik a vélekedésrendszer reprezentációjának
különbözo" szintjeihez.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
31 March 4:00 PM 6th floor 6.54
P é t e r F ö l d i á k <http://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/%7Epf2/>
School of Psychology, University of St Andrews
Centre for Cognitive Science, Budapest University of Technology and
Economics
Neurális reprezentáció a magasszintu" látókéregben
(Neural representation in visual cortex)
A Barlow-féle redundancia-csökkentési elv már régóta jósolta, hogy
hasznos, ha a nagy valószínu"séggel el?forduló jellemzo"-kombinációk
lokális neurális reprezentációt kapnak. Egy ilyen gyakori, és
viselkedésileg is jelento"s kombinációt hoz létre az emberi arc. A
halántéklebeny STSa agykérgi területén már régóta találtak arcokra
reagáló idegsejteket (Perret), de a szelektivitás mérésének egy újfajta,
gyors megjelenítésen alapuló módszerével ezek a sejtek (is) lényegesen
objektívebben vizsgálhatóak.
___________________________________
The 60-minute lecture is followed by a 10-minute break. Then we held a
30-60-minute discussion.The participants may comment the talks and
initiate discussion on the Internet. The comments should be written in
the language of the presentation.
The organizer of the colloquium:
Laszlo E. Szabo (email: leszabo(a)hps.elte.hu)
--
Laszlo E. Szabo
Department of Theoretical Physics
Department of History and Philosophy of Science
Eotvos University, Budapest
H-1518 Budapest, Pf. 32, Hungary
Phone/Fax: (36-1)372-2924
Home: (36-1) 200-7318
Mobil/SMS: (36) 20-366-1172
http://hps.elte.hu/~leszabo
Department of HISTORY AND PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE
Eotvos University, Budapest
Pazmany P. setany 1/A Budapest
Phone/Fax: (36-1) 372 2924
Department's Home Page:http://hps.elte.hu
Philosophy of Science Colloquium
Room 6.54 (6th floor) Monday 4:00 PM
____________________________________
24 February 4:00 PM 6th floor 6.54
(English, except all participants speak Hungarian)
L o r á n d A m b r u s - L a k a t o s
<http://www.ceu.hu/phil/faculty_staff_6.html>
Deprtment of Philosophy
Central European University, Budapest
John Rawls: Getting beyond Social Choice Theory
I will present first the main tenets of Arrovian social choice theory,
and explain its relationship to decision and game theory. Then I will
offer conjectures why it was thought by many that this theory could
ground political philosophy. At the end, I will sketch John Rawls'
solution to the social choice problem.
___________________________________
The 60-minute lecture is followed by a 10-minute break. Then we held a
30-60-minute discussion.The participants may comment the talks and
initiate discussion on the Internet. The comments should be written in
the language of the presentation.
The organizer of the colloquium:
Laszlo E. Szabo (email: leszabo(a)hps.elte.hu)
--
Laszlo E. Szabo
Department of Theoretical Physics
Department of History and Philosophy of Science
Eotvos University, Budapest
H-1518 Budapest, Pf. 32, Hungary
Phone/Fax: (36-1)372-2924
Home: (36-1) 200-7318
Mobil/SMS: (36) 20-366-1172
http://hps.elte.hu/~leszabo
Dear member of this list,
Science & Consciousness Review ( http://psych.pomona.edu/scr ) has released
new articles and reviews:
_______________________
EDITORIAL REVIEW --- THIRD COMMENTARY ON CRICK & KOCH
The Missing Self, or: 10 Ways How To Be A Zombie
- by John G. Taylor
The article by Crick and Koch is undoubtedly a first: for Nature to cave in
so spectacularly to the so-called Framework proffered to them in the name
of neuroscience. But unfortunately the Framework gets nowhere fast, since it
has no real teeth to get at the underlying phenomenon of consciousness
itself. The Framework needs to feel right from the inside consciousness
is surely about our inner experience
Full text at: http://psych.pomona.edu/scr/editorials/20030203.html
In February, Science & Consciousness Review publishes editorial commentaries
on Crick & Koch's recent article in Nature Neuroscience.
_______________________
LATEST HEADLINES
- Neuronal synchrony does not correlate with motion coherence in cortical
area MT
- Multiple routes to memory
- Mapping the brain
- Brain imaging study sheds light on inner workings of human intelligence
See NEWS IN BRIEF at: http://psych.pomona.edu/scr/more_news.html
_______________________
PREVIOUS ARTICLES
Integration in the brain
at: http://psych.pomona.edu/scr/news/articles/20021002.html
Automaticity, unconsciousness and speech production
at: http://psych.pomona.edu/scr/news/articles/20020501.html
Touching what is out there
at: http://psych.pomona.edu/scr/news/articles/20020903.html
Visit our archives at:
http://psych.pomona.edu/scr/archive.html
_______________________
SEND YOUR CONTRIBUTION
For students, teachers, scientists, and all other fans of consciousness...
Send your news summaries to us.
See more at: http://psych.pomona.edu/scr/author_instructions.html
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Managing Editor
2nd Annual Conference of the New England Institute for Cognitive Science and Evolutionary Psychology (NEI)
RELIGION, COGNITIVE SCIENCE AND EVOLUTIONARY PSYCHOLOGY
August 12-13, 2003
Eastland Park Hotel, Portland, Maine
At least since the great psychologist and philosopher William James, the issue of religious experience has been the subject of scientific investigation. The conference will apply empirical and theoretical findings from cognitive science and evolutionary psychology, including neuroscience, philosophy, and anthropology to explore the nature of religion and the religious experience from a variety of disciplinary perspectives and methodologies.
Conference Presentations:
Opening remarks
Nicholas Humphrey, Ph.D.
Religion and The Mental Instincts That Create It
Pascal Boyer, Ph.D.
Religion's Evolutionary Landscape: Counterintuition, Commitment, Compassion, Communion
Scott Atran, Ph.D.
The evolutionary origins of spiritual consciousness
Matthew Apler
Natural selection is non-denominational: why evolutionary models of religion should be more concerned with behavior than concepts
Jesse M. Bering, Ph.D.
Religious costs as adaptations signalling altruistic intention.
Joseph A. Bulbulia, Ph.D.
Cognitive psychology of 'original sin'
H. John Caulfield, Ph.D.
Religion, death and horror films: an evolutionary analysis
Hank Davis, Ph.D and Andrea Javor, Ph.D.*
Problem solving and religion in the EEA: an endorphin rush?
Christopher di Carlo, Ph.D.
Negation and doubt in religious representations
Bradley Franks, Ph.D. *
God talk: abstract schemata of deity in verbal narratives
Robert E. Haskell, Ph.D.
Why do people behave religiously?
Stephen W. Kercel, Ph.D. and Donald C. Mikulecky, Ph.D.
The capacity for religious experience is an evolutionary adaptation to warfare
Allen D. MacNeill, Ph.D.
The cognitive neuropsychiatry of religious belief
Ryan McKay, Ph.D.
With or without belief: a new evolutionary approach to the definition and explanation of religion.
Craig Palmer, Ph.D.and Lyle B. Steadman, Ph.D.
Categorizing the supernatural: an investigation of the relationship between conceptualization and belief
Andre W. Shtulman, Ph.D.
Religion, evolution and an immunology of cultural systems
Jespert Sørensen, Ph.D.
To register for the conference or to obtain further information visit our web page at www.une.edu/nei and click on the hyperlink for international conferences.
Below is a link to the forthcoming BBS target article:
Separate Visual Representations in the Planning and Control of Action
by
Scott Glover
http://www.bbsonline.org/Preprints/Glover/Referees/
This article has been accepted for publication in Behavioral and Brain
Sciences (BBS), an international, interdisciplinary journal providing
Open Peer Commentary on important and controversial current research in
the biobehavioral and cognitive sciences.
Commentators must be BBS Associates or suggested by a BBS Associate. To be
considered as a commentator for this article, to suggest other appropriate
commentators, or for information about how to become a BBS Associate,
please reply by EMAIL within three (3) weeks to:
calls(a)bbsonline.org
The Calls are sent to 10,000 BBS Associates, so there is no expectation
(indeed, it would be calamitous) that each recipient should comment on every
occasion! Hence there is no need to reply except if you wish to comment, or
to suggest someone to comment.
If you are not a BBS Associate, please approach a current BBS Associate
(there are currently over 10,000 worldwide) who is familiar with your work
to nominate you. All past BBS authors, referees and commentators are
eligible to become BBS Associates. An electronic list of current BBS
Associates is available at this location to help you select a name:
http://www.bbsonline.org/Instructions/assoclist.html
(please note that this list is being updated)
If no current BBS Associate knows your work, please send us your
Curriculum Vitae and BBS will circulate it to appropriate Associates to
ask whether they would be prepared to nominate you. (In the meantime, your
name, address and email address will be entered into our database as an
unaffiliated investigator.)
=======================================================================
** IMPORTANT **
=======================================================================
To help us put together a balanced list of commentators, it would be most
helpful if you would send us an indication of the relevant expertise you
would bring to bear on the paper, and what aspect of the paper you would
anticipate commenting upon.
(Please note that we only request expertise information in order to
simplify the selection process.)
Please DO NOT prepare a commentary until you receive a formal invitation,
indicating that it was possible to include your name on the final list,
which is constructed so as to balance areas of expertise and frequency of
prior commentaries in BBS.
To help you decide whether you would be an appropriate commentator for
this article, an electronic draft is retrievable at the URL that follows
the abstract and keywords below.
=======================================================================
=======================================================================
Separate Visual Representations in the Planning and Control of Action
Scott Glover
University of Oxford
ABSTRACT: Evidence for a dichotomy between the planning of an action and its
on-line control in humans is reviewed. This evidence suggests that planning
and on-line control each serve a specialized purpose different from the
other, and utilize distinct visual representations. Evidence from behavioral
studies suggests that planning is influenced by a large array of visual and
cognitive information, whereas control is influenced solely by the spatial
characteristics of the target, including such things as its size, shape,
orientation, etc. Evidence from brain imaging and neuropsychology suggest
that planning and control are subserved by separate visual centers in the
posterior parietal lobes, each constituting part of a larger network for
planning and control. Planning appears to rely on phylogenetically newer
regions in the inferior parietal lobe, along with the frontal lobes and
basal ganglia, whereas control appears to rely on older regions in the
superior parietal lobe, along with the cerebellum.
KEYWORDS: action, apraxia, control, illusions, optic ataxia, planning, PET,
reaching
http://www.bbsonline.org/Preprints/Glover/Referees/
=======================================================================
=======================================================================
*** SUPPLEMENTARY ANNOUNCEMENT ***
(1) Call for Book Nominations for BBS Multiple Book Review
In the past, Behavioral and Brain Sciences (BBS) had only been able
to do 1-2 BBS multiple book treatments per year, because of our
limited annual page quota. BBS's new expanded page quota will make
it possible for us to increase the number of books we treat per
year, so this is an excellent time for BBS Associates and
biobehavioral/cognitive scientists in general to nominate books you
would like to see accorded BBS multiple book review.
(Authors may self-nominate, but books can only be selected on the
basis of multiple nominations.) It would be very helpful if you
indicated in what way a BBS Multiple Book Review of the book(s) you
nominate would be useful to the field (and of course a rich list of
potential reviewers would be the best evidence of its potential
impact!).
*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*
Please note: Your email address has been added to our user database for
Calls for Commentators, the reason you received this email. If you do not
wish to receive further Calls, please feel free to change your mailshot
status through your User Login link on the BBSPrints homepage, using your
username and password. Or, email a response with the word "remove" in the
subject line.
*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*
Barbara Finlay
Editor
Jeffrey Gray
Editor
Behavioral and Brain Sciences
bbs(a)bbsonline.org
http://www.bbsonline.org
-------------------------------------------------------------------
----- Original Message -----
From: "Art Markman" <markman(a)psyvax.psy.utexas.edu>
To: <acl(a)aclweb.org>; <chi-Announcements(a)acm.org>; <cogdop(a)lsv.uky.edu>;
<cogpsy(a)listserv.tamu.edu>; <Cognitive.Neuroscience.Society(a)Dartmouth.EDU>;
<cogsci(a)umich.edu>; <connectionists(a)cs.cmu.edu>;
<distributed-ai-request(a)mailbase.ac.uk>;
<empiricists-request(a)unagi.cis.upenn.edu>;
<evolutionary-computing-request(a)mailbase.ac.uk>; <hybrid-list(a)cs.ua.edu>;
<info(a)aaai.org>; <info-childes(a)childes.psy.cmu.edu>;
<linguist(a)tamvm1.tamu.edu>; <ml(a)ics.uci.edu>; <mlnet(a)csd.abdn.ac.uk>;
<cogling(a)ucsd.edu>; <MPSYCH-L(a)lISTSERV.BROWN.EDU>;
<neron-request(a)cattell.psych.upenn.edu>;
<news-announce-conferences(a)uuunet.uu.NET.cs.cmu.edu>; <nipsinfo(a)salk.edu>;
<owner-info-psyling-digest(a)gla.ac.uk>; <psyling(a)psy.gla.ac.uk>;
<soar-requests(a)cs.cmu.edu>; <soar-group(a)umich.edu>;
<linguist(a)listserv.linguistlist.org>; <rasmusse(a)cs.rutgers.edu>;
<BWanchisen(a)apa.org>
Sent: Tuesday, February 18, 2003 4:13 PM
Subject: Cognitive Science Society Virtual Colloquium
> The Cognitive Science Society is hosting a 2002-2003 virtual colloquium
> series presented live via the Internet, with the with the fourth talk
given
> by Dr. John Anderson. Register now to attend:
> www.ctaresource.com/CognitiveScience.
>
> Time: Friday February 28, 2003
> 1:00pm US Eastern Standard Time
>
> Presenter: Dr. John Anderson
> Carnegie Mellon University, Department of Psychology
>
> Topic: Use of a Cognitive Architecture and fMRI to Mutually inform Each
> Other or A Tale of Three Buffers
>
> We will describe the interaction between cognitive modeling and brain
> imaging. Two fMRI studies will be described. The first was concerned
with
> the solution of algebraic equations. We tried to relate the brain regions
> discovered to components of a prior ACT-R model that had been developed.
A
> left posterior parietal region corresponded to the behavior of a module in
> ACT-R that maintains an image of the equation and performs mental
> transformations on it. A left prefrontal region corresponded to the
> behavior of a module that retrieves relevant information such as
arithmetic
> facts. A left motor region corresponded to the behavior of module that
> programs hand movements. We will describe how we were able to fit
precisely
> the BOLD functions obtained from these regions given the operation of the
> ACT-R model. To show that these regions were not specific to mathematics
and
> to turn our model-fitting exercise from postdiction to prediction we
> performed a second study using a more abstract symbol-manipulation task.
The
> model fits were equally good if not better, although we had to adjust our
a
> priori rehearsal assumptions. The second study identified an anterior
> cingulate particle whose behavior appears to correspond to the conflict
> resolution process in ACT-R. This research illustrates profitable back and
> forth that is possible between brain imaging and cognitive modeling. The
> basic methodology can be applied to help shape any information processing
> architecture, not just ACT-R.
>
> Further information about this talk, the colloquium series, a schedule of
> future talks, and an archive of previous talks are available at
> http://www.cognitivesciencesociety.org/colloquium
>
> Contact Janet Morrow, cta(a)aptima.com with any questions about registration
> for this seminar.
>
> Please forward this invitation to colleagues who would benefit from this
> seminar or the series.
>
> This series is sponsored by the Office of Naval Research.
>
> Sincerely,
> Art Markman
> markman(a)psy.utexas.edu
>
> Dr. Arthur B. Markman
> University of Texas
> Department of Psychology
> Austin, TX 78712
> 512-232-4645
Dear Dr. Qwerty,
Below is a link to the forthcoming BBS target article:
Separate Visual Representations in the Planning and Control of Action
by
Scott Glover
http://www.bbsonline.org/Preprints/Glover/Referees/
This article has been accepted for publication in Behavioral and Brain
Sciences (BBS), an international, interdisciplinary journal providing
Open Peer Commentary on important and controversial current research in
the biobehavioral and cognitive sciences.
Commentators must be BBS Associates or suggested by a BBS Associate. To be
considered as a commentator for this article, to suggest other appropriate
commentators, or for information about how to become a BBS Associate,
please reply by EMAIL within three (3) weeks to:
calls(a)bbsonline.org
The Calls are sent to 10,000 BBS Associates, so there is no expectation
(indeed, it would be calamitous) that each recipient should comment on every
occasion! Hence there is no need to reply except if you wish to comment, or
to suggest someone to comment.
If you are not a BBS Associate, please approach a current BBS Associate
(there are currently over 10,000 worldwide) who is familiar with your work
to nominate you. All past BBS authors, referees and commentators are
eligible to become BBS Associates. An electronic list of current BBS
Associates is available at this location to help you select a name:
http://www.bbsonline.org/Instructions/assoclist.html
(please note that this list is being updated)
If no current BBS Associate knows your work, please send us your
Curriculum Vitae and BBS will circulate it to appropriate Associates to
ask whether they would be prepared to nominate you. (In the meantime, your
name, address and email address will be entered into our database as an
unaffiliated investigator.)
=======================================================================
** IMPORTANT **
=======================================================================
To help us put together a balanced list of commentators, it would be most
helpful if you would send us an indication of the relevant expertise you
would bring to bear on the paper, and what aspect of the paper you would
anticipate commenting upon.
(Please note that we only request expertise information in order to
simplify the selection process.)
Please DO NOT prepare a commentary until you receive a formal invitation,
indicating that it was possible to include your name on the final list,
which is constructed so as to balance areas of expertise and frequency of
prior commentaries in BBS.
To help you decide whether you would be an appropriate commentator for
this article, an electronic draft is retrievable at the URL that follows
the abstract and keywords below.
=======================================================================
=======================================================================
Separate Visual Representations in the Planning and Control of Action
Scott Glover
University of Oxford
ABSTRACT: Evidence for a dichotomy between the planning of an action and its
on-line control in humans is reviewed. This evidence suggests that planning
and on-line control each serve a specialized purpose different from the
other, and utilize distinct visual representations. Evidence from behavioral
studies suggests that planning is influenced by a large array of visual and
cognitive information, whereas control is influenced solely by the spatial
characteristics of the target, including such things as its size, shape,
orientation, etc. Evidence from brain imaging and neuropsychology suggest
that planning and control are subserved by separate visual centers in the
posterior parietal lobes, each constituting part of a larger network for
planning and control. Planning appears to rely on phylogenetically newer
regions in the inferior parietal lobe, along with the frontal lobes and
basal ganglia, whereas control appears to rely on older regions in the
superior parietal lobe, along with the cerebellum.
KEYWORDS: action, apraxia, control, illusions, optic ataxia, planning, PET,
reaching
http://www.bbsonline.org/Preprints/Glover/Referees/
=======================================================================
=======================================================================
*** SUPPLEMENTARY ANNOUNCEMENT ***
(1) Call for Book Nominations for BBS Multiple Book Review
In the past, Behavioral and Brain Sciences (BBS) had only been able
to do 1-2 BBS multiple book treatments per year, because of our
limited annual page quota. BBS's new expanded page quota will make
it possible for us to increase the number of books we treat per
year, so this is an excellent time for BBS Associates and
biobehavioral/cognitive scientists in general to nominate books you
would like to see accorded BBS multiple book review.
(Authors may self-nominate, but books can only be selected on the
basis of multiple nominations.) It would be very helpful if you
indicated in what way a BBS Multiple Book Review of the book(s) you
nominate would be useful to the field (and of course a rich list of
potential reviewers would be the best evidence of its potential
impact!).
*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*
Please note: Your email address has been added to our user database for
Calls for Commentators, the reason you received this email. If you do not
wish to receive further Calls, please feel free to change your mailshot
status through your User Login link on the BBSPrints homepage, using your
username and password. Or, email a response with the word "remove" in the
subject line.
*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*
Barbara Finlay
Editor
Jeffrey Gray
Editor
Behavioral and Brain Sciences
bbs(a)bbsonline.org
http://www.bbsonline.org
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Workshop on
Cognitive Modeling of Agents and Multi-Agent Interactions
During IJCAI'2003
August 9, 2003. Acapulco, Mexico
Computational models of cognitive agents that incorporate a wide
range of cognitive functionalities (such as a variety of
memory/representation, various types of learning, and sensory motor
capabilities) have been developed in both AI and cognitive science.
In AI, they appear under the rubric of intelligent agents and
multi-agent systems. In cognitive science, they are often known as
cognitive architectures. These strands of research provide useful
paradigms for addressing some fundamental questions in AI and
Cognitive Science.
Artificial intelligence started out with the goal of designing functioning
intelligent agents. However, faced with the enormous difficulty of
the task, the focus has largely been on modeling specific aspects of
intelligence, often in highly restricted domains. Nevertheless, some
researchers have focused on putting the pieces together with the goal
of designing autonomous agents. More important, there is a growing interest in
multi-agent interactions that addresses issues of coordination and cooperation
among cognitive agents.
On the other side, traditionally, the main focus of research in cognitive
science has been on specific components of cognition (e.g., perception,
memory, learning, language). Recent developments in computational modeling
of cognitive architectures provide new avenues for precisely specifying
complex cognitive processes in tangible ways, thereby addressing foundational
questions in cognitive science. Such developments need to be extended to
multi-agent interactions and there are promising developments in this regard
(see e.g. recent papers in this area in the journal Cognitive Systems Research).
Against this background, this workshop seeks to bring together cognitive
scientists and AI researchers, with a wide range of background and expertise,
to discuss research problems in understanding cognition at the individual
level as well as at the collective level.
The workshop is open to all members of the AI and CogSci research communities.
We invite submissions on all aspects of cognitive modeling of agents and
multi-agent interactions, including, but not limited to:
* Cognitive architectures of individual cognitive agents.
* Cognitive models of multi-agent interactions (e.g., communication,
cooperation, and negotiation, in relation to cognition).
* Cognitive models of multi-agent organizations (e.g., organizational
structure, economies, culture, and other coordination structures and
mechanisms, in relation to cognition).
* Cognitive models of co-learning of multiple cognitive agents.
* Computational models of evolution of cognition and behavior.
* Computational abstractions, languages, and tools for cognitive modeling
of agents and multi-agent interactions.
The discussions at the workshop will focus on the following issues,
among many others:
* What are the characteristics of the successful cognitive architectures for
modeling individual cognitive agents?
* What are the suitable characteristics of cognitive architectures for
modeling both individual cognitive agents and multi-agent interactions?
* What are the fundamental ways of understanding and modeling multi-agent
interactions? Can they be reduced to individual cognition?
* How can we best characterize and model social structures and organizations
in relation to cognition?
* How important is evolution in shaping individual cognition and collective
behavior? How can we model that aspect?
SUBMISSION
If you are interested in giving a presentation at the workshop, please submit
a full paper, 6-10 pages, in the IJCAI paper format. If you are only interested
in attending, submit a brief abstract (one page or less) describing your
interest.
Use the IJCAI paper format (and templates) for your papers.
See the IJCAI Web site: http://www.ijcai-03.org for details.
Electronic submission is required. Only the Postscript or PDF format is
accepted. Send your paper (in PS or PDF) as an email attachment.
In the body of your email, include (in plain ASCII): names of all authors,
their affiliations, their physical addresses, and their email addresses.
In addition, the same information should also be included in your paper itself.
All submissions should be sent to: rsun(a)cecs.missouri.edu
Each paper will be reviewed for technical soundness, relevance, significance,
and clarity.
An edited book volume, as well as a special issue of the journal
Cognitive System Research, is planned for a selected subset of the papers of
the workshop.
IMPORTANT DATES AND DEADLINES
* Deadline for the submission of full papers (6 to 10 pages) or abstracts (1
page): March 1, 2003.
* Notification of acceptance/rejection: March 30, 2003.
* Deadline for the receipt of camera-ready papers: May 1, 2003
ORGANIZING COMMITTEE
Prof. Ron Sun (Chair)
CECS Department, 201 EBW
University of Missouri-Columbia
Columbia, MO 65211-2060
rsun(a)cecs.missouri.edu
http://www.cecs.missouri.edu/~rsun
Prof. Cristiano Castelfranchi
Department of Communication Sciences
University of Siena
Siena, Italy
castel(a)ip.rm.cnr.it
Prof. Jan Treur
Department of Artificial Intelligence
Faculty of Sciences
Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam
1081 HV Amsterdam, Netherlands
treur(a)cs.vu.nl
Dr. Robert L. West
Department of Psychology and Department of Cognitive Science
Carleton University
1125 Colonel By Drive
Ottawa, Ontario K1S 5B6
robert_west(a)carleton.ca
Dr. Christian Lebiere
Human-Computer Interaction Institute
School of Computer Science
Carnegie Mellon University
Pittsburgh, PA 15213
cl(a)andrew.cmu.edu
------------------------------------------------------------
See the workshop Web page at:
http://www.cecs.missouri.edu/~rsun/wsp03.html
===================================================================
Professor Ron Sun, Ph.D James C. Dowell Professor
CECS Department, 201 EBW phone: (573) 884-7662
University of Missouri-Columbia fax: (573) 882-8318
Columbia, MO 65211-2060 email: rsun(a)cecs.missouri.edu
http://www.cecs.missouri.edu/~rsun
===================================================================