Dear All,
This is a kind reminder about the TODAY talk starting at 4 pm.
Kind regards,
Reka
*****
Dear All,
The CEU Department of Cognitive Science cordially invites you to the following talk by:
Eleanor Power (LSE, Department of
Methodology)<https://www.lse.ac.uk/Methodology/People/Academic-Staff/Eleanor-Power/Eleanor-Power>
Date: Monday, June 16, 2024 (note please the extraordinary day)
Time: 4 pm (to 5:30 pm) CET
Venue: D001 (QS Vienna) and Zoom:
https://ceu-edu.zoom.us/j/92869295981?pwd=0ygrEhV6fip00PSY8757YUSvTnOJ66.1&…
Meeting ID: 928 6929 5981
Passcode: 700596
Chair: Christophe Heintz
Title: Generosity and Reputational Concern Across Cultures: Networked Dictator Games in
Five Countries
Abstract: We conduct experimental economic games to study how reputational stake
influences people's decision-making. Players make a series of "Dictator
Game" decisions, dividing an endowment between themselves and a recipient. Crucially,
recipients are not anonymous strangers but are other community members, presented via
photo. By varying the identity of the recipient and whether they will come to know the
identity of the donor, we effectively vary the reputational exposure of the donor's
decision. We expect that players will be more generous when their decisions have greater
reputational stake. This greater reputational stake could come from: the revelation of the
donor's identity, the social proximity of donor and recipient, and their respective
network positions. To date, we conduct these games in eight rural communities in five
countries (India, Colombia, Nepal, Morocco, and Mexico), where we already have full
sociodemographic and social network data. This entails over 1800 players and almost 50,000
allocation decisions.
While there is substantial cross-site variation in the average amount given (implying
different cultural norms), we find strikingly similar effects of social proximity and
revelation across sites. Donors give more of their endowment to friends or
friends-of-friends, as opposed to more distant recipients. We further find a small but
consistent effect of revelation on Dictator Game allocations: donors give more of their
endowment when their identity is revealed, as opposed to being kept anonymous. There is
greater heterogeneity in how revelation interacts with social proximity and the network
position of donor and recipient, the implications of which we discuss.
Bio: Eleanor Power is an Associate Professor in the Department of Methodology. She
completed her PhD in Anthropology at Stanford University in 2015. Prior to joining LSE in
2017, she was an Omidyar Postdoctoral Fellow at the Santa Fe Institute.
*Anyone not affiliated with CEU wishing to attend in-person in Vienna must reply
here<https://forms.office.com/e/mp8UKGD4iG> to get access to the lecture hall.
Let Christophe know, please, if you would like to schedule a meeting with the speaker.
Sincerely,
Reka
[Central European University]
Györgyné Finta (Réka)
Department Coordinator
Department of Cognitive Science
Pronouns: she/her | szabor@ceu.edu<mailto:szabor@ceu.edu> | +43 1 25230 5138
CENTRAL EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY
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