Dear All,

 

This is a kind reminder about the TODAY talk starting at 4 pm.

Kind regards,

Reka

*****

Dear All,

 

The CEU Department of Cognitive Science cordially invites you to the following talk by:

 

Eleanor Power (LSE, Department of Methodology)

 

Date: Monday, June 16, 2024 (note please the extraordinary day)

Time4 pm (to 5:30 pm) CET

Venue: D001 (QS Vienna) and Zoom:   https://ceu-edu.zoom.us/j/92869295981?pwd=0ygrEhV6fip00PSY8757YUSvTnOJ66.1

 

Meeting ID: 928 6929 5981
Passcode: 700596

 

Chair: Christophe Heintz

 

Title: Generosity and Reputational Concern Across Cultures: Networked Dictator Games in Five Countries

 

Abstract: We conduct experimental economic games to study how reputational stake influences people’s decision-making. Players make a series of “Dictator Game” decisions, dividing an endowment between themselves and a recipient. Crucially, recipients are not anonymous strangers but are other community members, presented via photo. By varying the identity of the recipient and whether they will come to know the identity of the donor, we effectively vary the reputational exposure of the donor's decision.  We expect that players will be more generous when their decisions have greater reputational stake. This greater reputational stake could come from: the revelation of the donor's identity, the social proximity of donor and recipient, and their respective network positions. To date, we conduct these games in eight rural communities in five countries (India, Colombia, Nepal, Morocco, and Mexico), where we already have full sociodemographic and social network data. This entails over 1800 players and almost 50,000 allocation decisions.

 

While there is substantial cross-site variation in the average amount given (implying different cultural norms), we find strikingly similar effects of social proximity and revelation across sites. Donors give more of their endowment to friends or friends-of-friends, as opposed to more distant recipients. We further find a small but consistent effect of revelation on Dictator Game allocations: donors give more of their endowment when their identity is revealed, as opposed to being kept anonymous. There is greater heterogeneity in how revelation interacts with social proximity and the network position of donor and recipient, the implications of which we discuss.

 

Bio: Eleanor Power is an Associate Professor in the Department of Methodology. She completed her PhD in Anthropology at Stanford University in 2015. Prior to joining LSE in 2017, she was an Omidyar Postdoctoral Fellow at the Santa Fe Institute.

 

*Anyone not affiliated with CEU wishing to attend in-person in Vienna must reply here to get access to the lecture hall.

 

Let Christophe know, please, if you would like to schedule a meeting with the speaker.

 

 

 

 

Sincerely,

Reka

 

Central European University

Györgyné Finta (Réka)
Department Coordinator

Department of Cognitive Science 
Pronouns:
she/her | szabor@ceu.edu | +43 1 25230 5138

CENTRAL EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY
Quellenstrasse 51 | A-1100 Vienna | Austria | www.ceu.edu


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