Elnezest kerek mindenkitol, hogy elozo uzenetemben az alabbi meghivo helyett
a hozza tartozo cikket kuldtem el:
Az ELTE BTK Logika tanszek szeminariuman
majus 21., csutortok du. 4-kor
Mihalydeak Tamas
(KLTE, Debrecen) tart vitainditot
LOGIKAFILOZOFIAROL --- MASKEPPEN
cimmel. Helyszin: Pesti B. u. 1., A ep. felem. 23.
A vita alapjaul szant cikket erdeklodoknek keresre megkuldom Word 6.0
formatumban. Kivonatat ld. alabb.
Mate Andras
A kivonat:
Egy olyan beszelgetest szeretnek kezdemenyezni, amely a
logikafilozofiai kerdeseket az elo3feltevesek oldalarol probalja
megragadni. Nagyon altalanosan a kerdes ugy fogalmazhato meg, hogy a
legkulonbozobb logikai rendszerek milyen elofelteveseket fogadnak el,
mire tamaszkodnak akkor, amikor logikai rendszerkent jelennek meg.
Szandekom szerint explicitte szeretnem tenni azokat a donteseket,
amelyek nelkul logikafilozofiai ertelemben nem erthetjuk igazan azt,
ami letrejon akkor, amikor egy logikai rendszer felepitese megtortenik.
Nem tagadhatom (sot hangsulyozni szeretnem), hogy eddigi vizsgalataim
soran tul sokra nem jutottam. Az alapkoncepcio kihamozhato abbol a
rovidke irasbol, amely a tanszeken beszerezheto. (Az iras
vazlatossaga, s osszerendezetlensege miatt mindenkitol elnezest
szeretnek kerni. Egy keszulo munka elso fogalmazvanyarol van szo.)
Szandekom szerint ez az iras kepezne a beszelgetes alapjat.
Ahogy most latom, a funktor-argumentum felbontas, s a hozza szorosan
kapcsolodo kompozicionalitas a legkulonbozobb logikai rendszerek
elengedhetetlen elofeltevese. Vajon ezen elofelteves lepesrol lepesre
torteno specifikacioja alkalmas-e arra, hogy explicitte tegyuk a
logikai rendszerek elofelteveseit? A beszelgetes soran azt szeretnem
bizonyitani, hogy - legalabbis az elofeltevesek egy meghatarozott
korere - alkalmazhato a javasolt eljaras.
==============================================================================
Andras Mate CSc, assoc. prof. -- Dept. of Symbolic Logic
Lorand Eotvos University Budapest, Faculty of Arts and Humanities
H-1364 Budapest, POB 107
Phone: (36 1) 266 9100/5328 -- TAD/Fax: (36 1) 266 41 95
e-mail:mate@isis.elte.hu
Home: H-1119 Budapest, Nandorfehervar koz 11 / Phone: (36 1) 204 0489
Rejected message: sent to koglist(a)cogpsyphy.hu by CHRISTO(a)YORKU.CA follows.
Reason for rejection: sender not subscribed.
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1998 17:59:30 -0400 (EDT)
X-X-Sender: christo(a)postoffice.yorku.ca
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: TEXT/PLAIN; charset=US-ASCII
Message-ID: <Pine.WNT.3.96.980511175740.-259763B-100000(a)york.yorku.ca>
Date: Mon, 11 May 1998 18:00:47 -0400
Reply-To: Society for the History of the Social and Behavioral Sciences
<CHEIRON(a)YORKU.CA>
Sender: Society for the History of the Social and Behavioral Sciences
<CHEIRON(a)YORKU.CA>
From: "Christopher D. Green" <christo(a)YORKU.CA>
Subject: Conference Announcement: Historiography (fwd)
Comments: To: cpahpp(a)YorkU.CA, Margaret Morrsion <mmorris(a)chass.utoronto.ca>
To: CHEIRON(a)YORKU.CA
X-PMFLAGS: 34078848
Folks,
I thought this might be of interest to you.
Christopher D. Green office: (416) 736-5115 ext. 66164
Department of Psychology FAX: (416) 736-5814
York University
Toronto, Ontario M3J 1P3 e-mail: christo(a)yorku.ca
CANADA
http://www.yorku.ca/faculty/academic/christo
---------- Forwarded message ----------
Date: Tue, 5 May 1998 11:02:01 -0400 (EDT)
From: Wesley C Salmon <wsalmon+(a)pitt.edu>
PRELIMINARY ANNOUNCEMENT
International Joint Conference of the Division of History of Science and
the Division of Logic, Methodology, and Philosophy of Science of the
International Union of History and Philosophy of Science
PHILOSOPHICAL PROBLEMS IN THE HISTORIOGRAPHY OF SCIENCE
Saturday-Sunday 14-15 November 1998
Center for Philosophy of Science, University of Pittsburgh
Sponsored jointly by:
The Division of Logic, Methodology, and Philosophy of Science and
the University of Pittsburgh Center for the Philosophy of Science
Among the principal speakers will be
Aristides Baltas, National Technical University, Athens
John Beatty, University of Minnesota
Philip Ehrlich, Ohio University
Daniel Garber, University of Chicago
Jean Gayon, University of Paris
Don Howard, University of Notre Dame
Jane Maienschein, Arizona State University
One primary goal of the conference will be to address problems of interest
to both historians of science and philosophers of science.
For further information, please contact Wesley C. Salmon, Center for
Philosophy of Science, 817 Cathedral of Learning, University of
Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, PA 15260, USA.
Fax: (412)-624-4489
E-mail: wsalmon+(a)pitt.edu
--- End Forwarded Message ---
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-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
VIKOTE KONGRESZUS
A Magyar Viselkedestanulmanyi es Kognitiv Terapias Egyesuelet
kongresszusa
Pilisszentkereszt, 1998. majus 15-17.
A kongresszus fo temaja: Nyelv es pszichoterapia
Program
Pentek
17.00 Tringer Laszlo: Megnyito
17.15 Bagdy Emoke: "Egyszerre szolnak valamennyi nyelven" (A kepek,
szimbolumok a pszichoterapia nyelvi kulturajaban)
19.00 Vacsora
20.00 Szalonnasuetes
Szombat
8.00 Reggeli
9.00 Pleh Csaba: A tarsalgas elemzese a pszicholingvisztikaban
10.00 Proszeky Gabor: Nyelv, szamitogep es pszichologiai realitas
11.00 Kaveszuenet
11.15 Szabad eloadasok
13.00 Ebed
14.00 A hagyomanyos Videk-Budapest focimeccs.
15.00 Szabad eloadasok
19.00 Vacsora
20.00 |rnyekkongresszus
Vasarnap
8.00 Reggeli
9.00 Simon Lajos: A nonverbalis nyelv
10.00 Siklaky Istvan: A befolyasolas koezvetett nyelvi strategiai a
terapias interjuban
11.00 Kaveszuenet
11.15 VIKOTE koezgyules
12.30 Ebed
A kongresszus helyszine: Pilisszentkereszt BV Tovabbkepzesi es
Konferencia Koezpontja (Pilisszentkereszt, Pomazi u.6.)
Kedves Kollegak,
Az ELTE Tudomanytortenet es Tudomanyfilozofia Tanszek
szokott szeminariumainak soraban
csutortokon, majus 14.-en
a kovetkezo ket eloadasra kerul sor.
Az eloadasok kezdete 4 es 5 ora, helye Rakoczi ut 5., II. em 229.
Minden erdeklodot szerettel varunk. udv kgy
(1) Szabo Richard
PhD hallgato,
ELTE informatika doktori iskola
Szintetikus elolenyek szintetikus vilagokban
Az eloadas attekintest nyujt adaptiv szintetikus elolenyek neuralis
halozaton alapulo vezerlorendszereinek tervezesi lehetosegeirol.
Az attekintes kiterjed elore programozott, tanitott, evolucios
algoritmussal eloallitott es kifejlodesen alapulo tervezesi
modszerekre es veluk elert eredmenyekre.
(2) Prof. John Bickle
Department of Philosophy and Program in Neuroscience
East Carolina University
Greenville, North Carolina, U.S.A.
ON RECENT DEBATES ABOUT NATURALISM IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF MIND: LESSONS
FROM AN UPDATED CARNAPIAN APPROACH
Much philosophical discussion has ensued lately about naturalistic
approaches in philosophy of mind. Although no clear statement of
naturalism is universally accepted, the guiding question is whether
intentional states and events--those with representational content--can
be explained within the purview of the "natural sciences."
Given a literal reading, this question is meaningful and appropriate
(and an affirmative answer to it is justified). Yet philosophers
continue to press this issue into increasingly bizarre contexts. A sound
methodological proposal and empirically-based prediction gets construed
as a metaphysical principle, and proponents on both sides formulate
their intuition pumps about its conceptual viability. What begins as a
legitimate and (meta-) scientifically interesting issue becomes a
fruitless clash of intuitions, irresolvable by empirical or logical
argument.
This talk will have three parts. In the first part, I will argue for the
interest and importance of a core aspect of debates about naturalism in
recent philosophy of mind. In the second part, I will point out how this
core aspect has been ignored as the debates have developed of late. In
the third part, I will argue that an updated version of Rudolph Carnap's
approaches to the distinction between science and metaphysics can return
philosophy of mind to the core issue of naturalism. The revival of
Carnap's approach is tricky, however. First, one must decide which of
Carnap's approaches to revive: the early approach from "The Elimination
of Metaphysics" (1928); the later approach from "Testability and
Meaning" (1934), or the even later (and less radical) approach from
"Empiricism, Semantics, Ontology" (1948). Regardless of which Carnapian
approach one chooses, one also must strip the basic idea from Carnap's
mistake of using the structure of first-order logic as a general model
for theories and linguistic frameworks. I'll close the talk with some
preliminary ideas on how best to accomplish this final task.
=====================================================================
George Kampis, Associate Professor, Chairman,
Department of History and Philosophy of Science,
ELTE University, Budapest, H-1088 Rakoczi u. 5., Hungary
Phone/FAX: (36) 1 266 4954 email: gk(a)hps.elte.hu
http://hps.elte.hu ftp://hps.elte.hu
=====================================================================
Kedves Kollegak
Az MTA KFKI RMKI Biofiziak Osztaly
Computational Neuroscience
szeminariumainak soraban
szerdan, majus 13.-an
a kovetkezo eloadasra kerul sor.
Az eloadasok kezdete 15.15 , helye KFKI RMKI, III-as epulet tanacsterem
Minden erdeklodot szerettel varunk. udv ep
*******************************************************************
MODELING NEURAL MECHANISMS OF SELECTIVE VISUAL ATTENTION USING
BIOLOGICALLY-PLAUSIBLE COMPUTER SIMULATIONS
Dr. John Bickle and Ms. Marica Bernstein
Focused Research Program in Computational Neuroscience
East Carolina University
Greenville, North Carolina, U.S.A.
Vision provides an excellent sensory modality for computer simulation in
biologically plausible neural network. We know more about the cell
properties and connectivities in the visual system than for any other
sensory modality. Yet deep puzzles remain about how these cell
properties and connectivities combine to produce visual phenomena. One
puzzling phenomena remains selective attention: what are the neural
mechanisms by which the visual systems in mammals focuses in on
particular aspects of the entire range of input, maintains focus on
salient aspects, and regains focus following peripheral distractions?
In this talk we will present two of our computer simulations. Our NISSL
model mimics cell properties and connectivities within and between
lateral geniculate nucleus (of the dorsal thalamus (LGN), cortical
vertical columns of primary visual cortex (V1), and reticular nucleus of
the ventral thalamus (TRN). We adapt cell properties and connectivities
within these structures in an interactive activation and competition
(IAC) neural network. Experiments with the model suggest that this
thalamocortical system is part of a mammalian mechanism for
stimulus-driven selective visual attention.
Our second model (the MOUNTCASTLE model) is a bit more ambitious. Using
the GENESIS program, we are modeling cell properties and connectivities
within the lateral intraparietal area of posterior parietal cortex (area
LIP), frontal eye fields of premotor cortex (FEF), and intermediate
layers of midbrain superior colliculus (ISC). This structure contains
neurons with response properties necessary for implementing vector
subtraction, which enables the saccade generating system to compute a
sequence of saccades from an initial fixation point. Recent
physiological discoveries suggest that FEFs also contain neurons capable
of sending a 'redirect' message to the saccade generating system,
enabling the system to control when visual attention returns to original
fixation point following peripheral distraction. Initial results with
our proto-MOUNTCASTLE model suggests that this system (LIP-FEF-ISC)
might be an important component of the mechanism by which we "choose" to
redirect attention following distraction or continue to explore the
distracting stimulus.
***********************************************************************
***************************************************
Sixth International Colloquium on Cognitive Science
Donostia - San Sebastian, - Spain - May 12-15, 1999
***************************************************
FIRST ANNOUNCEMENT
ICCS'99 is organized by the Institute for Logic, Cognition, Language and
Information (ILCLI) and the Deptartment of Logic and Philosophy of Science
of the University of the Basque Country (Euskadi). It will take place in
the Faculty of Philosophy of the Univiversity of the Basque Country at
Donostia - San Sebastian.
MAIN TOPICS :
(1) Cognition: Epistemology and Metaphysics.
(2) Cognition and Emotion.
(3) Cognitive Approaches to Learning: Know-how, Imitation, Innovation.
(4) Foundations and Models of Discourse Pragmatics.
Provisional list of INVITED SPEAKERS :
K. Bach (San Francisco), B. Brewer (Oxford), P. Ekman (San Francisco),
L. Kaelbling (Providence), P. Lipton (Cambridge), T. Mitchell (Pittsburgh),
J. Rosenberg (Chapel Hill), E. Sosa (Providence), R. de Sousa (Toronto),
D. Sperber (Paris).
SEMINARS and TUTORIALS by :
B. Claverie, M. Davies, J. Ezquerro, F. Garcia-Murga, K. Korta...
CONTRIBUTED PAPERS:
Contributed papers (25-30 minutes) are invited from all areas of Cognitive
Science.
Authors wishing to submit a paper should send four (4) hardcopies of an
extended abstract of 5-6 pages written in English to Pr. J. M. LARRAZABAL
(address above) by January 31, 1999. Submissions by e-mail are not
accepted. A cover page should be added to the abstract including title, all
authors names and affiliations, corresponding author's address, Fax number
and e-mail address. To facilitate blind review by two or more referees all
indications of authorship should appear on this detachable cover page only.
Papers will be evaluated by the Program Committee on the basis of
originality, clarity, correctness and significance of results. Authors of
accepted papers are expected to present them at the Colloquium.
Notification of acceptance/rejection: March 15, 1999.
IBERDROLA BEST PAPER AWARD
A prize will be awarded by Iberdrola to the author(s) of the best
contributed paper as judged by a committee drawn from the Program Committee.
Submissions of complete papers (25 pages maximum, 4 hardcopies) of
previously accepted abstracts, with indication of salient keywords, should
be sent to the Organizing Committee by April 12, 1999.
GRANTS :
Student travel grants for European graduate students in Cognitive Science
will be available, so that they may attend the meeting and present a
contributed paper.
To be considered for a grant, please
(i) send a letter of application, and
(ii) ask your thesis supervisor to send a brief letter of recommendation
including
(1) your name,
(2) your home institution,
(3) your supervisor's name,
(4) a description (300 words) of your studies in Cognitive Science, and
(5) your estimate of the travel expenses you will incur.
Your application materials should be sent by the deadline of March 22,
1999, to F. Migura (address above).
Notification of grants by March 30, 1999.
The registration fee is 28,000 ptas. (14,000 ptas. for students and
accompanying persons) before April 7, 1999.
Program Committee :
B. Claverie (Bordeaux), M. Davies (Oxford), A. Garcia Suarez (Oviedo),
J. M. Gondra (San Sebastian), J. M. Larrazabal (Secretary),
T. Mitchell (Pittsburgh), J. Rosenberg (Chapel Hill),
E. Sosa (Providence), L. Vieu (Toulouse).
Organizing Committee :
B. Asua (San Sebastian), E. Delgado (Vitoria), M. Iza (Malaga),
J. M.Maganto (San Sebastian), F. Migura (Assistant Secretary),
Luis A. Perez Miranda (Secretary), M.Vazquez (La Laguna),
S. Yarnoz (San Sebastian).
Further information :
Pr. J. M. Larrazabal or Dr. Luis A. Perez Miranda.
ICCS'99 (address above).
mailto:ICCS-99@sf.ehu.es
<http:// www.sc.ehu.es/scrwwwil/iccs-99.html>
(Sorry if you get this message twice)
The BBS and Psycoloquy Archives have been temporarily linked to
the Institute for Scientific Information (ISI) database (till
the end of May only) in connection with the JISC/Elib-funded
Open Journal Project.
You can go to an article, click on what it cites and
jump to its abstract and references in the ISI database.
There are gaps, but with a little imagination, you will have a
foretaste of what will soon be possible with citation linking
of electronic journals and databases
I suggest you start with the "MOST-LINKED PAPERS" in BBS and
Psycoloquy. As you scan the text, click on a cited paper you want to
see. It will first jump to the full citation in the bibliography; click
again and you will find yourself in the ISI database, navigating the
abstracts through citations. (Imagine it was all full text.)
Please try it:
http://journals.ecs.soton.ac.uk/cogsci.htm
Then PLEASE let the Open Journal Project (funded by JISC/ELib)
know what you thought and what you suggest to make it better:
http://journals.ecs.soton.ac.uk/cogsci-yourview.htm
For background information on citation linking see our published papers.
Webs of Research: Putting the User in Control
http://sosig.ac.uk/iriss/papers/paper42.htm
Citation Linking: Improving Access to Online Journals
http://journals.ecs.soton.ac.uk/acmdl97.htm
All relevant papers are listed at
http://journals.ecs.soton.ac.uk/papers.htm
Kedves Erdeklodok,
kerlek terjesszetek. Aprilis 20 es majus 29 kozott lehet jelentkezni
hivatlosn a doktori programokra. Az altalanos, hivatalos tajekoztato
az IZU 315 szobaban, Kadar Laszlonal megkaphato.
Reszletes tematikat, mely tartalmazza a vizsagan szamonkert irodalmat
hamarosan osszeallityunk, addig is akit a kognitiv pszicholgia
erdekel, keresse pleh(a)izabell.elte.hu,
akit inkabb a kognitiv tudomany, az gk(a)hps.elte.hu cimeken Kampis
Gyorgy illetve Pleh Csaba kollegat.
Udvozlettel
Pleh Csaba
Csaba Pleh
associate professor
Dept General Psychology Eotvos Lorand U
Budapest 64 P.O. Box 4 Hungary 1378
T.: 36 13423130 Fax: 36 13423109 Home: 36 23453933
Rejected message: sent to koglist(a)cogpsyphy.hu by GARYH(a)VT.EDU follows.
Reason for rejection: sender not subscribed.
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
With apologies for cross-posting...
Logical Empiricism in North America (LENA)
7-9 May, 1998
Science Center 226
Harvard University
WWW Page: http://www.phil.vt.edu/lena
(here you will find more information about LENA, including directions
and the opportunity to register on-line)
Description:
>From the 1930s through the 1960s, Logical Empiricism provided North
American intellectuals with the dominant philosophical framework within
which to understand science. Yet Logical Empiricisms hegemony was not
inevitable. It was a result of historical, sociological, intellectual,
and political factors that Logical Empiricism came to influence North
American thinking about science so deeply.
Logical Empiricism in North America (LENA) aims to promote historical,
philosophical, and sociological understanding of the transmission of the
people and ideas associated with Logical Empiricism to North America in
the 1930s and 1940s. LENA extends recent efforts to understand Logical
Empiricism and related intellectual movements in their historical and
intellectual contexts. Participants in LENA include:
Program:
All sessions are in the Cohen Seminar Room, Science Center 226, Harvard
University
Thursday May 7, 1998
2-2:10
Preliminary Remarks
I 2:10-5:30 PM
Chair: Susan Lanzoni (Harvard University)
Friedrich Stadler (Institute Vienna Circle)
Transfer and Transformation of Logical Empiricism: Quantitative and
Qualitative Aspects
Robert S. Cohen (Boston University)
Encounters With LENA: On Blumberg, Carnap, Feigl, Frank, Hanson,
Kaufman, Margeneau, Nagel, Neurath, and Reichenbach
Alan Richardson (University of British Columbia)
Linguistic and Pragmatic Aspects of Unified Science: Carnap, Morris,
and the Rapprochement between Logical Empiricism and American
Pragmatism
II 7-9:00 PM
Chair: TBA
Peter Galison (Harvard University)
Relativity: Time and Again
Friday May 8, 1998
III 9-11:20 AM
Chair: Jimena Canales (Harvard University)
Gerald Holton (Harvard University)
The Americanized Vienna Circle and B.F. Skinner
Mitchell Ash (University of Vienna)
Psychology, Migration, Unity, Change: Gustav Bergmann, Egon Brunswik
and Other Imigris Between Logical Empiricism and Neo-Behaviorism
11:20-1:00
Lunch
IV 1-3:15 PM
Chair: Michael Gordin (Harvard University)
Gary Hardcastle (Virginia Tech)
C.I. Lewis and Logical Positivism
Richard Creath (Arizona State University)
Carnap, Quine, and Logical Truth
3:15-3:30 PM
Break
V 3:30-6:30 PM
Chair: Christian Fleck (Universitdt Graz)
Ronald Giere (University of Minnesota)
"The Minnesota Center and the Institutionalization of Logical Empiricism
in North America: A View From the Archives"
Rudolf Haller
"On Herbert Feigl"
Alfred Schramm
A New Home for Logical Empiricism: Feigl and the MCPS
Eckehart Koehler
Normative Psychology, Pure Pragmatics and Intuition: The Black Hole of
Logical Empiricism
6:30-9:00 PM
Dinner
9:00-11:30 PM
Reception, Inn at Harvard
Saturday May 9, 1998
VI 9-11:20 AM
Chair: Bob Brain (Harvard University)
Thomas Ricketts (University of Pennsylvania)
"Languages and Calculi"
Hans-Joachim Dahms
(Universitdt Gvttingen)
How to Become An Endangered Species: Pragmatists and Pragmatism in
Neuraths International Encyclopedia of Unified Science
11:20-1:00
Lunch
VII 1-3:15 PM
Chair: Sherri Roush (Harvard University)
George Reisch (Illinois Institute of Technology)
Disunity in the International Encyclopedia of Unified Science
Thomas Uebel (London School of Economics)
Frank's History of the Vienna Circle: A Programmatic Retrospective
3:15-3:30 PM
Break
VIII 3:30-6:30 PM
Chair: Matt Price (Harvard University)
Diederick Raven
Zilsel In America: A Case Study
Don Howard (University of Notre Dame)
The End of the Science and Values Debate in 1950s Philosophy of
Science
Michael Friedman (Indiana University)
Hempel and the Vienna Circle
Registration:
There is no registration fee for LENA, but registration is required for
all attendees. Registrants will receive a nametag, program, and LENA
materials and are invited to LENA sessions and reception at the Inn at
Harvard, 9-11:30 PM, Friday, May 8th.
You may register for LENA via the WWW at http://www.phil.vt.edu/lena or
by emailing or faxing your name, address, affiliation (as you wish it to
appear on your name tag) and any special instructions to
Gary Hardcastle
Department of Philosophy, 0126
Virginia Tech
email: garyh(a)vt.edu
Fax: (540) 231-6367
Sponsors:
LENA is made possible by The National Science Foundation, the Institut
Wiener Kreis, and the Zentrum f|r Internationale und Interdisziplindre
Studien at the Universitdt Wien, and by the Department of History of
Science at Harvard University, the Austrian Cultural Institute New York,
and Virginia Tech.
There is lively Commentary on Green's target article appearing
in Psycoloquy, a refereed electronic journal sponsored by the American
psychological Association. Further Commentary is invited.
(All submissions are refereed.)
URLs: US: http://www.princeton.edu/~harnad/psyc.html
UK: http://www.cogsci.soton.ac.uk/psyc
Address for submitting commentaries:
psyc(a)pucc.princeton.edu
Instructions at bottom of this message, preceded by latest commentary.
Green, CD. Are Connectionist Models Theories of Cognition?
PSYCOLOQUY 9(04) Tuesday 14 April 1998
ftp://ftp.princeton.edu/pub/harnad/Psycoloquy/1998.volume.9/
psyc.98.9.04.connectionist-explanation.1.green
Orbach, J. Do Wires Model Neurons?
PSYCOLOQUY 9(05) Wednesday 15 April 1998
ftp://ftp.princeton.edu/pub/harnad/Psycoloquy/1998.volume.9/
psyc.98.9.05.connectionist-explanation.2.orbach
O'Brien, GJ. The Role of Implementation in Connectionist Explanation.
PSYCOLOQUY 9(06) Sunday 19 April 1998
ftp://ftp.princeton.edu/pub/harnad/Psycoloquy/1998.volume.9/
psyc.98.9.06.connectionist-explanation.3.obrien
Green, CD. Lashley's Lesson Is Not Germane.
Reply to Orbach
PSYCOLOQUY 9(07) Wednesday 22 April 1998
ftp://ftp.princeton.edu/pub/harnad/Psycoloquy/1998.volume.9/
psyc.98.9.07.connectionist-explanation.4.green
Green, CD. Problems with the Implementation Argument.
Reply to O'Brien
PSYCOLOQUY 9(08) Saturday 25 April 1998
ftp://ftp.princeton.edu/pub/harnad/Psycoloquy/1998.volume.9/
psyc.98.9.08.connectionist-explanation.5.green
Young, ME. Are Hypothetical Constructs Preferred Over Intervening
Variables?
PSYCOLOQUY 9(09) Monday 27 April 1998
ftp://ftp.princeton.edu/pub/harnad/Psycoloquy/1998.volume.9/
psyc.98.9.09.connectionist-explanation.6.young
Grainger, J. & Jacobs, AM. Localist Connectionism Fits the Bill
PSYCOLOQUY 9(09) Monday 27 April 1998
ftp://ftp.princeton.edu/pub/harnad/Psycoloquy/1998.volume.9/
psyc.98.9.10.connectionist-explanation.7.grainger
----------
psycoloquy.98.9.10.connectionist-explanation.7.grainger Mon 27 Apr 1998
ISSN 1055-0143 (6 paragraphs, 8 references, 153 lines)
PSYCOLOQUY is sponsored by the American Psychological Association (APA)
Copyright 1998 Jonathan Grainger
LOCALIST CONNECTIONISM FITS THE BILL
Commentary on Green on Connectionist-Explanation
Jonathan Grainger
Centre de Recherche en Psychologie Cognitive, CNRS
Universite de Provence
Aix-en-Provence
France
grainger(a)newsup.univ-mrs.fr
Arthur M. Jacobs
Dept. of Psychology
Philips University of Marburg,
Marbug, Germany
jacobsa(a)mailer.uni-marburg.de
ABSTRACT: Green (1998) restates a now standard critique of
connectionist models: they have poor explanatory value as a result
of their opaque functioning. However, this problem only arises in
connectionist models that use distributed hidden unit
representations, and is NOT a feature of localist connectionism.
Indeed, Green's critique reads as an appeal for the development of
localist connectionist models as an excellent starting point for
building a unified theory of human cognition.
1. First, if we agree that theory development in psychological science
is ready for the shift from prequantitative verbal-boxological modeling
toward more formal modeling efforts, then the kinds of questions we
should be asking are: What kind of quantitative modeling is
appropriate? How should we evaluate its appropriateness? In other
words, the verbal theories of human memory discussed by Green (1998)
are not a serious alternative to whatever connectionism might offer.
They are at best a starting point for developing more formal accounts
of human memory. We have recently argued that localist connectionism
provides a promising framework for such an endeavor (Grainger & Jacobs,
1998).
2. Green (1998), as well as many other critics of connectionism,
appears to use the term connectionism as synonymous with trainable
networks with hidden units (often called PDP models, and typically
trained with backpropagation, Rumelhart, Hinton, & Williams, 1986).
Many connectionist models do not include hidden units. Some of these
are trainable (with Hebbian learning, for example), and some are
hardwired (e.g., McClelland & Rumelhart's, 1981, interactive activation
model). We refer to any connectionist model in which all processing
units can be unambiguously assigned a meaningful interpretation as
"localist connectionist." Note that, as in all connectionist models, all
processing units in localist connectionist models are identical; it is
only their position in the network that guarantees their unique
interpretation. The modeler can artificially label each of these units
in order to facilitate interpretation of network activity.
3. Grainger and Jacobs (1998) analyzed the advantages of adopting
a localist connectionist approach as opposed to the currently more
popular PDP approach. Here we will discuss only those points relevant
to the issues raised by Green (1998). Green identifies the close
connection between theoretical and observable entities as a critical
feature of traditional scientific theories. One must be able to link
transparently the theoretical entities of the theory to the observable
entities in the target world in order to achieve explanatory adequacy.
Without examining the extent to which this is fails to be a feature of
PDP models, it should be clear from the above discussion that localist
connectionist models do provide this transparent link. Units in
localist connectionist models do refer to relatively uncontroversial
aspects of the target world. They represent the categories (such as
letters and words) that the brain has learned from repeated exposure to
the environment.
4. As noted by Jacobs, Rey, Ziegler, and Grainger (1998), transparency
will always tend to diminish as models become more complex. Jacobs et
al. conclude, however, that algorithmic models of the localist
connectionist variety may offer the best trade-off between
clarity/transparency and formality/precision. It is the increased level
of precision that allows localist connectionist models to achieve
greater descriptive adequacy (Jacobs & Grainger, 1994) without
sacrificing explanatory adequacy.
5. Apart from greater explanatory and descriptive adequacy, localist
connectionist models offer a simple means of quantifying pre-existing
verbal-boxological models that have already stood the test of extensive
empirical research. Referring to this point, Page and Norris (1998)
speak of a symbiosis between verbal theorizing and quantitative
modeling. Furthermore, the principle of nested modeling has been
readily applied with localist connectionist models. Adopting this
approach facilitates the process of model-to-model comparison.
Models differing by a single feature (e.g., interactivity, Jacobs &
Grainger, 1992), can be compared, and different variants of the model
can compete in strong inference studies (e.g., Dijkstra & van Heuven,
1998).
6. Finally, localist connectionist models, using the same simple
processing units and activation functions, provide a unified
explanation for phenomena observed in the different subdomains of human
cognition. The general principles that govern processing in all
localist models (e.g., similarity based parallel activation, lateral
inhibition) can also be isolated and analyzed in an easily
interpretable manner (see e.g., Grainger & Jacobs, in press). We
therefore conclude that localist connectionism provides an excellent
starting point for the development of a unified theory of human
cognition.
REFERENCES
Dijkstra, T. & van Heuven, W.J.B. (1998). The BIA model and bilingual
word recognition. In J. Grainger & A.M. Jacobs (Eds.), Localist
connectionist approaches to human cognition. Mahwah, NJ.: Erlbaum.
Grainger, J. & Jacobs, A.M. (1998). On localist connectionism and
psychological science. In J. Grainger & A.M. Jacobs (Eds.), Localist
connectionist approaches to human cognition. Mahwah, NJ.: Erlbaum.
Grainger, J. & Jacobs, A.M. (1998). Temporal integration of information
in orthographic priming. Visual Cognition, in press.
Green, CD. (1998) Are Connectionist Models Theories of Cognition?
PSYCOLOQUY 9(4)
ftp://ftp.princeton.edu/pub/harnad/Psycoloquy/1998.volume.9/
psyc.98.9.04.connectionist-explanation.1.green
Jacobs, A.M. & Grainger, J. (1992). Testing a semistochastic variant of
the interactive activation model in different word recognition
experiments. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and
Performance, 18, 1174-1188.
Jacobs, A. M., & Grainger, J. (1994). Models of visual word
recognition: Sampling the state of the art. Journal of Experimental
Psychology: Human Perception and Performance, 20, 1311-1334.
Jacobs, A.M., Rey, A., Ziegler, J.C, & Grainger, J. (1998). MROM-P: An
interactive activation, multiple read-out model of orthographic and
phonological processes in visual word recognition. In J. Grainger &
A.M. Jacobs (Eds.), Localist connectionist approaches to human
cognition. Mahwah, NJ.: Erlbaum.
McClelland, J. L. & Rumelhart, D. E. (1981). An interactive activation
model of context effects in letter perception: Part I. An account of
basic findings. Psychological Review, 88, 375-407.
Page, M. & Norris, D. (1998). Modeling immediate serial recall with a
localist implementation of the primacy model. In J. Grainger & A.M.
Jacobs (Eds.), Localist connectionist approaches to human cognition.
Mahwah, NJ.: Erlbaum.
Rumelhart, D.E., Hinton, G.E. & Williams, R.J. (1986). Learning
internal represenatations by error propagation. In D.E. Rumelhart, J.L.
McClelland, & the PDP research group, Parallel distributed processing:
Explorations in the microstructure of cognition (Vol. 1). Cambridge,
MA: Bradford Books.
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