Kedves Kollegak, Az ELTE Tudomanytortenet es Tudomanyfilozofia Tanszek szokott szeminariumainak soraban csutortokon, majus 14.-en a kovetkezo ket eloadasra kerul sor. Az eloadasok kezdete 4 es 5 ora, helye Rakoczi ut 5., II. em 229. Minden erdeklodot szerettel varunk. udv kgy (1) Szabo Richard PhD hallgato, ELTE informatika doktori iskola Szintetikus elolenyek szintetikus vilagokban Az eloadas attekintest nyujt adaptiv szintetikus elolenyek neuralis halozaton alapulo vezerlorendszereinek tervezesi lehetosegeirol. Az attekintes kiterjed elore programozott, tanitott, evolucios algoritmussal eloallitott es kifejlodesen alapulo tervezesi modszerekre es veluk elert eredmenyekre. (2) Prof. John Bickle Department of Philosophy and Program in Neuroscience East Carolina University Greenville, North Carolina, U.S.A. ON RECENT DEBATES ABOUT NATURALISM IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF MIND: LESSONS FROM AN UPDATED CARNAPIAN APPROACH Much philosophical discussion has ensued lately about naturalistic approaches in philosophy of mind. Although no clear statement of naturalism is universally accepted, the guiding question is whether intentional states and events--those with representational content--can be explained within the purview of the "natural sciences." Given a literal reading, this question is meaningful and appropriate (and an affirmative answer to it is justified). Yet philosophers continue to press this issue into increasingly bizarre contexts. A sound methodological proposal and empirically-based prediction gets construed as a metaphysical principle, and proponents on both sides formulate their intuition pumps about its conceptual viability. What begins as a legitimate and (meta-) scientifically interesting issue becomes a fruitless clash of intuitions, irresolvable by empirical or logical argument. This talk will have three parts. In the first part, I will argue for the interest and importance of a core aspect of debates about naturalism in recent philosophy of mind. In the second part, I will point out how this core aspect has been ignored as the debates have developed of late. In the third part, I will argue that an updated version of Rudolph Carnap's approaches to the distinction between science and metaphysics can return philosophy of mind to the core issue of naturalism. The revival of Carnap's approach is tricky, however. First, one must decide which of Carnap's approaches to revive: the early approach from "The Elimination of Metaphysics" (1928); the later approach from "Testability and Meaning" (1934), or the even later (and less radical) approach from "Empiricism, Semantics, Ontology" (1948). Regardless of which Carnapian approach one chooses, one also must strip the basic idea from Carnap's mistake of using the structure of first-order logic as a general model for theories and linguistic frameworks. I'll close the talk with some preliminary ideas on how best to accomplish this final task. ===================================================================== George Kampis, Associate Professor, Chairman, Department of History and Philosophy of Science, ELTE University, Budapest, H-1088 Rakoczi u. 5., Hungary Phone/FAX: (36) 1 266 4954 email: gk(a)hps.elte.hu http://hps.elte.hu ftp://hps.elte.hu =====================================================================