Dear Koglist members,
Due to the relocation of our servers Koglist will be on hold for a few
days as of 23.01.2014. The messages sent to Koglist during downtime will
be delivered as soon as the servers are operational at our new location.
We apologize for any inconvenience.
Best,
Laszlo Balazs
--
--
*** Please make a note of my new Email ***
*** Kérem jegyezze fel az új Email címet ***
balazs.laszlo(a)ttk.mta.hu
dr. Balázs László
MTA Természettudományi Kutatóközpont
Kognitív Idegtudományi és Pszichológiai Intézet
Laszlo Balazs, Ph.D.
MTA Research Centre for Natural Sciences
Institute of Cognitive Neuroscience and Psychology
P O B 398, Budapest, Hungary, H-1394
Tel:+36(1)382-6811
http://www.cogpsyphy.hu/balazs
--
--
*** Please make a note of my new Email ***
*** Kérem jegyezze fel az új Email címet ***
balazs.laszlo(a)ttk.mta.hu
dr. Balázs László
MTA Természettudományi Kutatóközpont
Kognitív Idegtudományi és Pszichológiai Intézet
Laszlo Balazs, Ph.D.
MTA Research Centre for Natural Sciences
Institute of Cognitive Neuroscience and Psychology
P O B 398, Budapest, Hungary, H-1394
Tel:+36(1)382-6811
http://www.cogpsyphy.hu/balazs
The CEU Department of Philosophy cordially invites you to a talk
(as part of its Departmental Colloquium series)
by
Clotilde Calabi (University of Milan)
on
“Ancona”? Aha, that’s her name!
Tots and Clicks
Tuesday, 28 January, 2014, 5.30 PM, Zrinyi 14, Room 412
ABSTRACT
Someone asks me what is her name. I feel I know it. As we often say,
her name is on the tip of my tongue. I can’t say it now, but I am sure
that in a few moments it will come back.
Sometimes I do not make efforts to recall. I sit back and let the
question linger on me. One minute later, the answer comes out. It is as
if the obstacles occluding it are gone all together and I have done
nothing to remove them. I shout: “Ancona!”. I feel that that the word
clicks. Yet, generally, I do make efforts and try to recall the name by
relying on some cues. In fact, I do not have a total blank. I remember
something and I try to fill the gap by deliberately retrieving
information I have about the bearer of the name and some other general
information. If there is no general information to retrieve, I may also
go through the alphabet letter by letter, until I find the letter that
helps me to fill the gap. Or, I recall in some way how the word sounds –
where is the pitch, whether it is an open mouth word, and so on - and
search, until I find it. Again, the word clicks. It may also happen
that I give one answer and immediately afterwards I acknowledge that I
was wrong and correct myself. For example, after saying “Ancona”, I
rejoin “No, wait a minute. It is D’Ancona”. Now it clicks!
In all these cases, first I have the feeling that I am about to bring
to consciousness a piece of knowledge I possess concerning a lexical
item, and then, when the lexical item pops out, I have a feeling of
rightness. Of course, I may get the name wrong: my feeling of rightness
does not entail infallibility.
Call the experience before retrieval tip of the tongue (TOT) experience
and the experience after retrieval CLICK experience. My question is what
kind of experience they are. Are they beliefs, memories, emotions, gut
feelings, or what?
The CEU Department of Philosophy cordially invites you to a talk
(as part of its Departmental Colloquium series)
By
Claudine Tiercelin (College de France)
on
`Should one be afraid of essentialism ?`
Tuesday, 21 January, 2014, 5.30 PM, Zrinyi 14, Room 412
ABSTRACT
Essentialism, basically viewed both as aristotelian and
anti-scientific, was largely out of favor during the two thirds of the
twentieth century, thanks to the prevailing anti-metaphysical attitude
associated with the linguistic and logical positivist heritage (Quine).
Together with a revival of metaphysics, some new forms of essentialism
came to the fore, which were no longer tied to a substantialist or «
deep » approach, but insisted more (as in Kripke or Putnam’s versions)
on viewing essence as a modality. More recently, such conceptions have
been attacked (Fine) and other versions of essentialist metaphysics have
been proposed : either along neo-aristotelian lines (E. J. Lowe), or in
such versions as B. Ellis’s « scientific essentialism ». However,
essentialism still has a bad reputation in many circles, and not only
among metaphysicians but among scientists (and philosophers of biology
in particular). Now, are they right to be afraid of essentialism ? In
the first part of my talk, I shall proceed to a brief clarification of
the main meanings attached to the concepts of essence and essentialism ;
I shall then present, in broad outlines, the merits and limits of the
various essentialist responses that have been proposed to some
antimetaphysical reactions, before suggesting, in the last part of my
talk, another (hopefully more convincing and reassuring) approach, which
I have called « aliquidditism » - consisting mainly in viewing essence
along relational and dispositional lines – and which is part and parcel
of the dispositional realistic and scientific attitude I recommend in
metaphysics.
The CEU Department of Philosophy cordially invites you to a talk
(as part of its Departmental Colloquium series)
By
Claudine Tiercelin (College de France)
on
`Should one be afraid of essentialism ?`
Tuesday, 21 January, 2014, 5.30 PM, Zrinyi 14, Room 412
ABSTRACT
Essentialism, basically viewed both as aristotelian and
anti-scientific, was largely out of favor during the two thirds of the
twentieth century, thanks to the prevailing anti-metaphysical attitude
associated with the linguistic and logical positivist heritage (Quine).
Together with a revival of metaphysics, some new forms of essentialism
came to the fore, which were no longer tied to a substantialist or «
deep » approach, but insisted more (as in Kripke or Putnam’s versions)
on viewing essence as a modality. More recently, such conceptions have
been attacked (Fine) and other versions of essentialist metaphysics have
been proposed : either along neo-aristotelian lines (E. J. Lowe), or in
such versions as B. Ellis’s « scientific essentialism ». However,
essentialism still has a bad reputation in many circles, and not only
among metaphysicians but among scientists (and philosophers of biology
in particular). Now, are they right to be afraid of essentialism ? In
the first part of my talk, I shall proceed to a brief clarification of
the main meanings attached to the concepts of essence and essentialism ;
I shall then present, in broad outlines, the merits and limits of the
various essentialist responses that have been proposed to some
antimetaphysical reactions, before suggesting, in the last part of my
talk, another (hopefully more convincing and reassuring) approach, which
I have called « aliquidditism » - consisting mainly in viewing essence
along relational and dispositional lines – and which is part and parcel
of the dispositional realistic and scientific attitude I recommend in
metaphysics.
Dear all,
This is to remind you that the next talk in the CEU Cognitive Science
seminar series will by given by:
*Gerry Altmann* *(The **University of York)*
Date: Wednesday, January 15, 2013, 5 PM
Location: Cognitive Development Center, Hattyú u. 14, 3rd floor
*Title:* Representing objects across time: eye movement and fMRI studies of
language-mediated event representation.
Language is often used to describe the changes that occur around us –
changes in either state (“I cracked the glass…”) or location (“I moved the
glass onto the table…”). To fully comprehend such events requires that we
represent the ‘before’ and ‘after’ states of the object. But how do we
represent these mutually exclusive states of a single object at the same
time? I shall summarise a series of studies, primarily from fMRI, which
show that we do represent such alternative states, and that these
alternative states compete with one another in much the same way as
alternative interpretations of an ambiguous word might compete. These
studies also show that whereas the representations of distinct but similar
objects (e.g. a glass and a cup) interfere with one another in proportion
to their similarity, representations of the distinct states of the same
object interfere in proportion to their dissimilarity. This interference,
or competition, manifests in a part of the brain that has been implicated
in resolving competition. Furthermore, activity in this area is predicted
by the dissimilarity, elsewhere in the brain, between sensorimotor
instantiations of the described object’s distinct states. I shall end with
new data (still too hot to touch) whose interpretation is a first step
towards a brain mechanism for distinguishing between object types, tokens,
and token-states.
PLEASE NOTE: Our seminar room has a limited capacity. Please arrive early
to ensure you get a seat. The talk will begin promptly at 5.
Cognitive Science Events at CEU: http://cognitivescience.ceu.hu/events
_______________________________________________
Subscribe by sending an empty mail to seminars-subscribe(a)cdc.ceu.hu
Unsubscribe by sending an empty mail to seminars-unsubscribe(a)cdc.ceu.hu
_______________________________________________
Subscribe by sending an empty mail to seminars-subscribe(a)cdc.ceu.hu
Unsubscribe by sending an empty mail to seminars-unsubscribe(a)cdc.ceu.hu
The CEU Department of Philosophy cordially invites you to a talk
(as part of its Departmental Colloquium series)
by
David Ebrey (Northwestern University)
on
`The Difference between Teaching and Habituation in Plato and
Aristotle`
Tuesday, 14 January, 2014, 5.30 PM, Zrinyi 14, Room 412
ABSTRACT
One of Plato and Aristotle’s insights is that moral education should
develop both reason and the emotions. But how should it do this? Should
there be a single type of education that simultaneously develops both
reason and the emotions or should these be developed by separate
processes? If separate, how should they relate to each other? Our
answers to these questions will be tightly connected to our
understanding of moral psychology: what is the relation between reason,
desires, and emotions, and what role do they play in a good life? I
argue that Plato and Aristotle have interesting, compelling, and yet
importantly different answers to these questions. It is frequently
thought that their views on moral education are very similar, perhaps
with different emphases. I argue that they differ on some key issues. We
can put the basic issue this way: are there fundamentally different
methods for acquiring different virtues, or is the acquisition of virtue
a more holistic process, in which the same sort of training is involved
in the acquisition of the virtues? Aristotle thinks that there are two
fundamentally different processes for different types of virtues.
Habituation is the process for developing the non-rational part of our
soul and, in doing so, one develops the character virtues. Teaching, by
contrast, properly develops the rational part of the soul, leading to
the intellectual virtues. Plato, by contrast, doesn’t think that there
are fundamentally distinct processes for developing the different parts
of the soul. Instead, in Plato’s Republic moral education sometimes
involves the same activity developing different parts of the soul and
sometimes involves very different activities developing the very same
part of the soul. Typically the goal of this web of activities is to
bring the different parts of the soul into harmony, not to separately
develop the different parts. And Plato doesn’t contrast teaching with
habituation at all. He gives habituation a different role from
Aristotle, an interesting development found in his Phaedo, Republic, and
Laws.
Dear all,
The next talk in the CEU Cognitive Science seminar series will by given by:
*Gerry Altmann* *(The **University of York)*
Date: Wednesday, January 15, 2013, 5 PM
Location: Cognitive Development Center, Hattyú u. 14, 3rd floor
*Title:* Representing objects across time: eye movement and fMRI studies of
language-mediated event representation.
Language is often used to describe the changes that occur around us –
changes in either state (“I cracked the glass…”) or location (“I moved the
glass onto the table…”). To fully comprehend such events requires that we
represent the ‘before’ and ‘after’ states of the object. But how do we
represent these mutually exclusive states of a single object at the same
time? I shall summarise a series of studies, primarily from fMRI, which
show that we do represent such alternative states, and that these
alternative states compete with one another in much the same way as
alternative interpretations of an ambiguous word might compete. These
studies also show that whereas the representations of distinct but similar
objects (e.g. a glass and a cup) interfere with one another in proportion
to their similarity, representations of the distinct states of the same
object interfere in proportion to their dissimilarity. This interference,
or competition, manifests in a part of the brain that has been implicated
in resolving competition. Furthermore, activity in this area is predicted
by the dissimilarity, elsewhere in the brain, between sensorimotor
instantiations of the described object’s distinct states. I shall end with
new data (still too hot to touch) whose interpretation is a first step
towards a brain mechanism for distinguishing between object types, tokens,
and token-states.
PLEASE NOTE: Our seminar room has a limited capacity. Please arrive early
to ensure you get a seat. The talk will begin promptly at 5.
Cognitive Science Events at CEU: http://cognitivescience.ceu.hu/events
_______________________________________________
Subscribe by sending an empty mail to seminars-subscribe(a)cdc.ceu.hu
Unsubscribe by sending an empty mail to seminars-unsubscribe(a)cdc.ceu.hu
_______________________________________________
Subscribe by sending an empty mail to seminars-subscribe(a)cdc.ceu.hu
Unsubscribe by sending an empty mail to seminars-unsubscribe(a)cdc.ceu.hu
Kedves Kollégák!
Alább bemásolva küldöm a Nyelvtudományi Intézet januári programját.
Üdvözlettel,
Hegedűs Veronika
tudományos titkár
-------------------
Az MTA Nyelvtudományi Intézetének januári programja
2014. január 21. kedd, 11.00 óra
Garamszegi László Zsolt
Estacion Biológica de Donana – CSIC
Kényszerházasság a nyelvészet és az evolúcióbiológia között?
Lexikális hálózatok, filogenetikai módszerek és az állati
kommunikáció
helyszín: földszinti előadóterem
2014. január 23. csütörtök, 11.00 óra
Andreas Nolda
Szegedi Tudományegyetem, Német Nyelvészeti Tanszék
Word-formation types. Definition, identification, classification
szervező: Elméleti Nyelvészeti Osztály
helyszín: földszinti előadóterem
2014. január 28. kedd, 11.00 óra
Olach Zsuzsanna
MTA-SzTE Turkológiai Kutatócsoport
Ószövetségi szövegek halicsi karaim fordításának nyelvészeti
tanulságai
helyszín: földszinti előadóterem
***
http://www.nytud.hu/intprog.html
MTA Nyelvtudományi Intézet
1068 Budapest, Benczúr u. 33.
Dear All,
Please find the announcement of the CEU Summer University course on
MORALITY: EVOLUTIONARY ORIGINS AND COGNITIVE MECHANISMS.
(Gergely Csibra and Dan Sperber representing the department)
Date: between June 23-30, 2014.
We would very much appreciate if you could share this AD with your colleagues/students/in your email lists.
Thank you very much,
Kind regards,
Reka
_______________________________________________
Subscribe by sending an empty mail to seminars-subscribe(a)cdc.ceu.hu
Unsubscribe by sending an empty mail to seminars-unsubscribe(a)cdc.ceu.hu