26 Oct
2005
26 Oct
'05
1:54 p.m.
Barry Loewer
Department of Philosophy, Rutgers University
Mental Causation: Or Something Near Enough
8 November, 2005 (Tuesday) 5 PM
CEU Department of Philosophy, 1051 Budapest, Zrínyi u. 14, 4th floor,
rm. 412.
I defend a version of non-reductive physicalism against the criticism
(due to Kim among others) that it can't
account for mental causation. I argue that Kim's so called "exclusion
argument" presupposes a view of causation
that is, as Russell once put it, "like much that passes muster among
philosophers, is a relic of a bygone age,
surviving, like the monarchy, only because it is erroneously supposed to
do no harm."
*BMS home page:* http://philosophy.elte.hu/bms
*Inquiries:* zjakab(a)cogsci.bme.hu <mailto:zjakab@cogsci.bme.hu>