Barry Loewer
Department of Philosophy, Rutgers University
 
Mental Causation: Or Something Near Enough
 
8 November, 2005 (Tuesday) 5 PM
CEU Department of Philosophy, 1051 Budapest, Zrínyi u. 14, 4th floor, rm. 412.
 
I defend a version of non-reductive physicalism against the criticism (due to Kim among others) that it can't
account for mental causation. I argue that Kim's so called "exclusion argument" presupposes a view of causation
that is, as Russell once put it, "like much that passes muster among philosophers, is a relic of a bygone age,
surviving, like the monarchy, only because it is erroneously supposed to do no harm."
 
 
 
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