The Philosophy Department cordially invites you to two public lectures
by
Elvio Baccarini (University of Rijeka)
on
'Public Reason and Animal Rights'
Monday, 27 February, 5:00pm, Zrinyi 14,room 412
the abstract can be found here:
http://www.ceu.hu/phil/Baccarini_Abstract.htm
and
by Snje*ana Priji*-Samar*ija (University of Rijeka)
on
'Evidentialism and Trust'
Tuesday, 28 February, 5:00pm, Zrinyi 14,room 412
the abstract can be found here:
http://www.ceu.hu/phil/talks_abstracts.html#SPS
Kriszta Biber
Department Coordinator
Philosophy Department
Tel: 36-1-327-3806
Fax: 36-1-327-3072
E-mail: biberk(a)ceu.hu
Philosophy of Science Colloquium
Department of History and Philosophy of Science
Eotvos Lorand University, Budapest
Room 1.817 (1st floor) Monday 4:00 PM
Pazmany P. setany 1/C Budapest, Hungary
Phone/Fax: (36-1) 372 2924
http://hps.elte.hu
This is just to remind you that there will be no seminar session on 27th
February. Instead, we offer the following two lectures at the Central
European University:
_____________________________________
Elvio Baccarini
(University of Rijeka)
'Public Reason and Animal Rights'
27 February 2006 5:00pm, Zrinyi 14,
room 412
Abstract: http://www.ceu.hu/phil/Baccarini_Abstract.htm
_____________________________________
February 27, 2006, 4 pm, Gellner room, CEU
Public lecture:
"Einstein and Oppenheimer: Intersections"
by S i l v a n S. S c h w e b e r
(Professor of Physics and Richard Koret Professor in the History of
Ideas, Brandeis University)
Lecture Abstract:
The interactions between Einstein and Oppenheimer will be presented.
After Einstein's death Oppenheimer was at times highly critical of
Einstein in public. Their contrasting views regarding creativity,
physics, philosophy, politics, nationalism, and their Jewishness will be
analyzed to understand Oppenheimer's stance.
_______________________________________________________________
The organizer of the colloquium: Laszlo E. Szabo (email: leszabo(a)hps.elte.hu)
--
L a s z l o E. S z a b o
Theoretical Physics Research Group of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences
Department of History and Philosophy of Science
Eotvos University, Budapest
http://hps.elte.hu/leszabo
*Katalin Balog*
Department of Philosophy, Yale University
The Quotational Account of Phenomenal Concepts
14 March, 2006 (Tuesday) 5 PM
CEU Department of Philosophy, 1051 Budapest, ZrÃnyi u. 14, 4th floor,
rm. 412.
The central /metaphysical/ question in the philosophy of mind is
whether mental phenomena- intentionality and phenomenal consciousness-
are ultimately /physical/biological /phenomena or whether they are or
involve fundamental aspects of reality that transcend the physical and
biological. Most contemporary philosophers and neuro-scientists reject
dualism because - among other difficulties - it cannot account for how
consciousness causally interacts with physical events including
behavior. The central /explanatory /issue is whether mental phenomena -
even if they are physical - can be explained in terms of more basic
physical/biological phenomena. While there has been some progress with
respect to understanding intentional and rational features of mentality
in biological/physical terms we still have no idea of how the subjective
experience - /the what its like -/ of seeing a sunset can emerge from a
brain process. The situation with respect to subjective experience
contrasts, for example, with the way we can understand (although many
details are lacking) how the complex organization of molecules can
constitute cells and how cells can constitute living organisms, and in
general, how chemical processes can give rise to biological phenomena.
There seems to be something about consciousness that /resists/
scientific explanation. Lacking a physicalist account of consciousness,
a defense of physicalism needs to explain the existence of this
explanatory gap in a way that is compatible with the truth of physicalism.
<> On my account, our lack of understanding the psychophysical
connection, the /explanatory gap/, is not due to consciousness being
non-physical but rather to the special nature of the /concepts /via
which we represent our subjective experiences to ourselves. My view is
that these concepts are partly /constituted/ by the experiences they
represent. This view has recently become popular among physicalists who
accept the existence of the explanatory gap. However, proponents of the
constitutional theory of phenomenal concepts have to offer and account
of how the reference of phenomenal concepts are determined. After all,
constitution doesn't make for reference in most cases. The concept DOG
is not constituted by dogs, and the fact that the concept ATOM /is/
constituted by atoms has nothing to do with why it refers to atoms. It
seems to me plausible that one must look to the /conceptual role /of
phenomenal concepts for an explanation of their self-referential nature.
The idea of an item partly constituting a representation that refers to that item is reminiscent of how linguistic quotation works.
The referent of "__" is exemplified by whatever fills in the blank. My proposal is that there is a concept forming mechanism that operates on
an experience and turns it into a phenomenal concept that refers to a type of experience where the type is qualitative property (a qualia) of
the experience. Further, the operation, like linguistic quotation, can be explained in terms of its conceptual roles.
* *
*BMS home page:* http://philosophy.elte.hu/bms
*Inquiries:* zjakab(a)cogsci.bme.hu <mailto:zjakab@cogsci.bme.hu>
Gyakorlott matlab programozot keresek nehany honapos munkara
Londonba, kognitiv pszichologiai laborba. Angol nyelvtudas szukseges,
Macintosh gyakorlat elony. Esetleg hosszabb tavra is.
Csibra Gergely
g.csibra(a)bbk.ac.uk
PhD Studentships in the School of Psychology at University of St Andrews
The School of Psychology has a number of studentships currently
available to start in September 2006. These three-year studentships
cover UK/EU fees and provide a living allowance of £10,000 per annum.
The deadline for applications is April 21st 2006. Applications are
sought for research in any area of psychology that links with the
research interests of current staff members. The School of Psychology's
research is organised into five broad areas:
Behavioural and Cognitive Neuroscience
Social Psychology
Cognition
Performance and Action
Evolutionary and Developmental Psychology
Further details of research within these areas are provided on the
website: http://psy.st-andrews.ac.uk/research/index.shtml.
You will normally hold a good honours degree in Psychology. A research
proposal, which should be on a topic aligned with the research interests
of a potential supervisor, must accompany your application. Please note
that the research proposal will form a major part of our evaluation of
the application.
For a PhD Application Pack or for further information, please contact:
The Postgraduate Secretary, School of Psychology, University of St
Andrews, St Andrews, KY16 9JL, UK or visit the website below.
Email: smm7(a)st-and.ac.uk
Web: http://psy.st-andrews.ac.uk/vacancies/phd.shtml
(vagy irjatok nekem)
Philosophy of Science Colloquium
Department of History and Philosophy of Science
Eotvos Lorand University, Budapest
Room 1.817 (1st floor) Monday 4:00 PM
Pazmany P. setany 1/C Budapest, Hungary
Phone/Fax: (36-1) 372 2924
http://hps.elte.hu
Program - March
6 March 4:00 PM 1st floor 1.817
Language: English
Gabor Kutrovatz
Department of History and Philosophy of Science
Eotvos Lorand University, Budapest
Apriorism in the Sociology of Scientific Knowledge
Abstract: http://philosophy.elte.hu/colloquium/2006/March/#1
____
13 March 4:00 PM 1st floor 1.817
Language: English
Hideto Nakajima
Collegium Budapest
Department of History, Philosophy and Social Studies of Science & Technology,
Tokyo Institute of Technology
Robert Hooke as an Astronomer
Abstract: http://philosophy.elte.hu/colloquium/2006/March/#2
____
20 March 4:00 PM 1st floor 1.817
Language: English
Laszlo E. Szabo
Theoretical Physics Research Group
Department of History and Philosophy of Science
Eotvos Lorand University, Budapest
The metaphysical basis of logic and mathematics
(A physicalist approach)
Abstract: http://philosophy.elte.hu/colloquium/2006/March/#3
____
27 March 4:00 PM 1st floor 1.817
Language: Hungarian
Gabor Takacs
Theoretical Physics Research Group
Eotvos Lorand University, Budapest
Relativisztikus kvantumelmelet: reszecskek vagy mezok?
(Relativistic quantum theory: particles or fields?)
Abstract: http://philosophy.elte.hu/colloquium/2006/March/#4
___________________________________
The colloquium is open to everyone, including students, visitors, and faculty
members from all departments!
The 60-minute lecture is followed by a 10-minute break. Then we hold a
30-60-minute discussion. The participants may comment on the talks and are
encouraged to initiate discussion through the Internet. The comments should
be written in the language of the presentation.
The organizer of the colloquium: Laszlo E. Szabo (email: leszabo(a)hps.elte.hu)
--
L a s z l o E. S z a b o
Theoretical Physics Research Group of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences
Department of History and Philosophy of Science
Eotvos University, Budapest
http://hps.elte.hu/leszabo