Dear Dr. Qwerty,
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*** CALL RESPONSE INSTRUCTIONS ***
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Please DO NOT respond to this email. Please note that this is NOT a formal invitation. If
you wish to submit a proposal for commentary and/or suggest potential commentators,
please go to the Online Commentary Proposal System at the following URL:
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* If you only wish to suggest potential commentators, please ignore prompts to
submit a proposal with expertise information.
* If you experience technical difficulties, please email bbs(a)bbsonline.org.
* Please respond to this Call no later than November 7, 2007
NOTE: Behavioral and Brain Sciences (BBS) is an international, interdisciplinary journal
providing Open Peer Commentary on important and controversial current research in the
biobehavioral and cognitive sciences. Commentators must be BBS Associates, or suggested
by a BBS Associate. If you are not a BBS Associate, please follow the instructions linked
below:
http://www.bbsonline.org/Instructions/associnst.html
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** Target Article Information **
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To help you decide whether you would be an appropriate commentator for this article, an
unedited, uncorrected target article is retrievable at the URL that follows the abstract
and keywords below. This unedited draft has been prepared only for potential commentators
who wish to nominate themselves for formal commentary invitation. Please DO NOT write a
commentary until you receive a formal invitation. If you are invited to submit a
commentary, a copyedited, corrected version of this paper will be posted in the
invitation letter. The commentary invitation list is compiled by the Editors so as to
balance proposals, areas of expertise, and frequency of prior commentaries in BBS.
TITLE: Psychosis and Autism as Diametrical Disorders of the Social Brain
AUTHORS: Bernard Crespi and Christopher Badcock
ABSTRACT: Autistic-spectrum conditions and psychotic-spectrum conditions (mainly schizophrenia,
bipolar disorder, and major depression) represent two major suites of disorders of human
cognition, affect and behavior that involve altered development and function of the social
brain. We describe evidence that a large set of phenotypic traits exhibit
diametrically-opposite phenotypes in autistic-spectrum vs. psychotic-spectrum conditions, with a
focus on schizophrenia. This suite of traits is inter-correlated, in that autism involves a
general pattern of constrained overgrowth, whereas schizophrenia involves undergrowth. These
disorders also exhibit diametric patterns for traits related to social brain development,
including aspects of gaze, agency, social cognition, local vs. global processing, language, and
behavior. Social cognition is thus under-developed in autistic-spectrum conditions, and
hyper-developed on the psychotic spectrum.
We propose and evaluate a novel hypothesis that may help to explain these diametric phenotypes:
that the development of these two sets of conditions is mediated in part by alterations of
genomic imprinting. Evidence regarding the genetic, physiological, neurological and
psychological underpinnings of psychotic spectrum conditions support the hypothesis that the
etiologies of these conditions involve biases towards increased relative effects from imprinted
genes with maternal expression, which engender a general pattern of undergrowth. By contrast,
autistic-spectrum conditions appear to involve increased relative bias towards effects of
paternally-expressed genes, which mediate overgrowth. This hypothesis provides a simple yet
comprehensive theory, grounded in evolutionary biology and genetics, for understanding the
causes and phenotypes of autistic-spectrum and psychotic-spectrum conditions.
KEYWORDS: autism, cognition, genomic conflict, genomic imprinting, psychosis, schizophrenia,
hyper-mentalism
FULL TEXT: http://www.bbsonline.org/Preprints/Crespi-02162007/Referees/
==================================================================
*** CALL RESPONSE INSTRUCTIONS ***
==================================================================
Please DO NOT respond to this email. Please note that this is NOT a formal invitation. If
you wish to submit a proposal for commentary and/or suggest potential commentators,
please go to the Online Commentary Proposal System at the following URL:
http://www.bbsonline.org/perl/commentary/commproposal?authordir=Crespi-0216…
* If you only wish to suggest potential commentators, please ignore prompts to
submit a proposal with expertise information.
* If you experience technical difficulties, please email bbs(a)bbsonline.org.
* Please respond to this Call no later than November 7, 2007
NOTE: Behavioral and Brain Sciences (BBS) is an international, interdisciplinary journal
providing Open Peer Commentary on important and controversial current research in the
biobehavioral and cognitive sciences. Commentators must be BBS Associates, or suggested
by a BBS Associate. If you are not a BBS Associate, please follow the instructions linked
below:
http://www.bbsonline.org/Instructions/associnst.html
==================================================================
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Barbara Finlay - Editor
Paul Bloom - Editor
Behavioral and Brain Sciences
bbs(a)bbsonline.org
http://www.bbsonline.org
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Talk at the Department of Philosophy, Central European University
*Peter Hacker* *(**St Johns College, Oxford University**)*
*''What Philosophy Can Do for Neuroscience?**'*
*Tuesday, 16 October 2007, 5.30pm, Zrinyi 14, Room 412*
Abstract
Philosophy is concerned with conceptual questions, not empirical ones.
The character of conceptual questions and their methods of resolution is
clarified. Cognitive neuroscience inevitably raises a wide range of
such questions which are not amenable to experimental resolution. The
character of these conceptual problems in cognitive neuroscience is
explored by way of a brief historical survey. It is argued that
twentieth century cognitive neuroscience evolved from a form of
Cartesian dualism (Sherrington, Penfield, Eccles) into a degenerate form
of dualism (Crick, Edelman, Kandel) in which attributes Cartesians
ascribed to the mind were ascribed to the brain, leaving the rest of the
misconceived Cartesian structure intact. Some of the misconceptions
that ensued are examined, and some exemplary confusions are clarified in
order to demonstrate what philosophy can do for cognitive neuroscience.
==================================================================
*** CALL RESPONSE INSTRUCTIONS ***
==================================================================
Please DO NOT respond to this email. Please note that this is NOT a formal invitation. If
you wish to submit a proposal for commentary and/or suggest potential commentators,
please go to the Online Commentary Proposal System at the following URL:
http://www.bbsonline.org/perl/commentary/commproposal?authordir=Crespi-0216…
* If you only wish to suggest potential commentators, please ignore prompts to
submit a proposal with expertise information.
* If you experience technical difficulties, please email bbs(a)bbsonline.org.
* Please respond to this Call no later than November 7, 2007
NOTE: Behavioral and Brain Sciences (BBS) is an international, interdisciplinary journal
providing Open Peer Commentary on important and controversial current research in the
biobehavioral and cognitive sciences. Commentators must be BBS Associates, or suggested
by a BBS Associate. If you are not a BBS Associate, please follow the instructions linked
below:
http://www.bbsonline.org/Instructions/associnst.html
==================================================================
** Target Article Information **
==================================================================
To help you decide whether you would be an appropriate commentator for this article, an
unedited, uncorrected target article is retrievable at the URL that follows the abstract
and keywords below. This unedited draft has been prepared only for potential commentators
who wish to nominate themselves for formal commentary invitation. Please DO NOT write a
commentary until you receive a formal invitation. If you are invited to submit a
commentary, a copyedited, corrected version of this paper will be posted in the
invitation letter. The commentary invitation list is compiled by the Editors so as to
balance proposals, areas of expertise, and frequency of prior commentaries in BBS.
TITLE: Psychosis and Autism as Diametrical Disorders of the Social Brain
AUTHORS: Bernard Crespi and Christopher Badcock
ABSTRACT: Autistic-spectrum conditions and psychotic-spectrum conditions (mainly schizophrenia,
bipolar disorder, and major depression) represent two major suites of disorders of human
cognition, affect and behavior that involve altered development and function of the social
brain. We describe evidence that a large set of phenotypic traits exhibit
diametrically-opposite phenotypes in autistic-spectrum vs. psychotic-spectrum conditions, with a
focus on schizophrenia. This suite of traits is inter-correlated, in that autism involves a
general pattern of constrained overgrowth, whereas schizophrenia involves undergrowth. These
disorders also exhibit diametric patterns for traits related to social brain development,
including aspects of gaze, agency, social cognition, local vs. global processing, language, and
behavior. Social cognition is thus under-developed in autistic-spectrum conditions, and
hyper-developed on the psychotic spectrum.
We propose and evaluate a novel hypothesis that may help to explain these diametric phenotypes:
that the development of these two sets of conditions is mediated in part by alterations of
genomic imprinting. Evidence regarding the genetic, physiological, neurological and
psychological underpinnings of psychotic spectrum conditions support the hypothesis that the
etiologies of these conditions involve biases towards increased relative effects from imprinted
genes with maternal expression, which engender a general pattern of undergrowth. By contrast,
autistic-spectrum conditions appear to involve increased relative bias towards effects of
paternally-expressed genes, which mediate overgrowth. This hypothesis provides a simple yet
comprehensive theory, grounded in evolutionary biology and genetics, for understanding the
causes and phenotypes of autistic-spectrum and psychotic-spectrum conditions.
KEYWORDS: autism, cognition, genomic conflict, genomic imprinting, psychosis, schizophrenia,
hyper-mentalism
FULL TEXT: http://www.bbsonline.org/Preprints/Crespi-02162007/Referees/
==================================================================
*** CALL RESPONSE INSTRUCTIONS ***
==================================================================
Please DO NOT respond to this email. Please note that this is NOT a formal invitation. If
you wish to submit a proposal for commentary and/or suggest potential commentators,
please go to the Online Commentary Proposal System at the following URL:
http://www.bbsonline.org/perl/commentary/commproposal?authordir=Crespi-0216…
* If you only wish to suggest potential commentators, please ignore prompts to
submit a proposal with expertise information.
* If you experience technical difficulties, please email bbs(a)bbsonline.org.
* Please respond to this Call no later than November 7, 2007
NOTE: Behavioral and Brain Sciences (BBS) is an international, interdisciplinary journal
providing Open Peer Commentary on important and controversial current research in the
biobehavioral and cognitive sciences. Commentators must be BBS Associates, or suggested
by a BBS Associate. If you are not a BBS Associate, please follow the instructions linked
below:
http://www.bbsonline.org/Instructions/associnst.html
==================================================================
==================================================================
Barbara Finlay - Editor
Paul Bloom - Editor
Behavioral and Brain Sciences
bbs(a)bbsonline.org
http://www.bbsonline.org
-------------------------------------------------------------------
THEORETICAL PHILOSOPHY FORUM
Institute of Philosophy
Faculty of Humanities, Eotvos University
Room 208 Monday 4:00 PM Muzeum krt. 4/i, Budapest
Web site: http://philosophy.elte.hu/tpf
15 October 4:00 PM Room 208 (Muzeum krt. 4/i)
Marta Ujvari
Institute of Sociology and Social Policy
Corvinus University, Budapest
The Bundle Theory of Substances and the Leibniz Principle
Abstract: http://philosophy.elte.hu/tpf/2007/October/#3
___________________________________
The Forum is open to everyone, including students,visitors, and faculty
members from all departments and institutes!
Format: 60 minute lecture, 10 minute coffee break, followed by a 30-60
minute discussion. The language of presentation is English or Hungarian.
A printable poster is available from here:
http://philosophy.elte.hu/tpf/2007/October/poster.pdf
Please feel free to post it in your institution!
The organizer of the Forum: Laszlo E. Szabo
(leszabo(a)philosophy.elte.hu)
--
L a s z l o E. S z a b o
Department of Logic, Institute of Philosophy
Faculty of Humanities, Eotvos University, Budapest
http://philosophy.elte.hu/leszabo
The CEU Department of Philosophy cordially invites you to a talk
by
Peter Hacker (St Johns College, Oxford University)
on
'What Philosophy can Contribute to Cognitive Neuroscience'
5.30 PM, Tuesday, 16 October 2007, Zrinyi 14 building, Room 412
Abstract:
Philosophy is concerned with conceptual questions, not empirical ones.
The character of conceptual questions and their methods of resolution is
clarified. Cognitive neuroscience inevitably raises a wide range of
such questions which are not amenable to experimental resolution. The
character of these conceptual problems in cognitive neuroscience is
explored by way of a brief historical survey. It is argued that
twentieth century cognitive neuroscience evolved from a form of
Cartesian dualism (Sherrington, Penfield, Eccles) into a degenerate form
of dualism (Crick, Edelman, Kandel) in which attributes Cartesians
ascribed to the mind were ascribed to the brain, leaving the rest of the
misconceived Cartesian structure intact. Some of the misconceptions
that ensued are examined, and some exemplary confusions are clarified in
order to demonstrate what philosophy can do for cognitive neuroscience.
Kriszta Biber
Department Coordinator
Philosophy Department
Tel: 36-1-327-3806
Fax: 36-1-327-3072
E-mail: biberk(a)ceu.hu
THEORETICAL PHILOSOPHY FORUM
Institute of Philosophy
Faculty of Humanities, Eotvos University
Room 208 Monday 4:00 PM Muzeum krt. 4/i, Budapest
Web site: http://philosophy.elte.hu/tpf
8 October 4:00 PM Room 208 (Muzeum krt. 4/i)
Miklos Lehmann
Department of Social Science
Faculty of Elementary and Nursery School Teachers' Training
Eotvos University, Budapest
Mentalis reprezentaciok: kiserlet a fogalom tisztazasara
(Mental representation: an attempt to clarify the concept)
Abstract: http://philosophy.elte.hu/tpf/2007/October/#2
___________________________________
The Forum is open to everyone, including students,visitors, and faculty
members from all departments and institutes!
Format: 60 minute lecture, 10 minute coffee break, followed by a 30-60
minute discussion. The language of presentation is English or Hungarian.
A printable poster is available from here:
http://philosophy.elte.hu/tpf/2007/October/poster.pdf
Please feel free to post it in your institution!
The organizer of the Forum: Laszlo E. Szabo
(leszabo(a)philosophy.elte.hu)
--
L a s z l o E. S z a b o
Department of Logic, Institute of Philosophy
Faculty of Humanities, Eotvos University, Budapest
http://philosophy.elte.hu/leszabo
The CEU Department of Philosophy cordially invites you to a talk
by
Aldo Frigerio (Catholic University, Milan)
on
'Conditions of Reference'
5.30 PM, Tuesday, 2 October 2007, Zrinyi 14 building, Room 412
ABSTRACT
According to Frege, in order to refer to an object we must grasp a conceptual content which uniquely identifies that object. Frege called it “sense”. Russell did not agree with Frege about this matter: he thought that grasping a conceptual content is not a sufficient condition in order to refer to an object. We can grasp a conceptual content that identifies an object and nonetheless not know which object that object is and not be able to recognize it among others. Referring requires a much stronger connection between the speaker and the object. This connection is acquaintance. Only if we know an object by acquaintance can we refer to it, because only in that case we know which object that object is and are able to recognize it among others. If we only know an object by description, the link between our words and the object is not reference but a weaker connection, which Russell called “denotation”.
In this talk I would like to give some arguments in favor of FregeÂ’s view. Particularly, I will show that RussellÂ’s theory of reference produces too many ambiguities: every device of singular reference (proper names, indexicals and definite descriptions) can refer both to objects we are and to objects we are not acquainted with. If these devices had different meaning depending on the relation the speaker maintains with the referent, they would be systematically ambiguous. Another weakness of RussellÂ’s view is the fact that according to it, in order to understand other people who refer to an object, we should be able to know if they are acquainted with their referent or not. But we often fail to have that information and this fact does not jeopardize our comprehension.
Kriszta Biber
Department Coordinator
Philosophy Department
Tel: 36-1-327-3806
Fax: 36-1-327-3072
E-mail: biberk(a)ceu.hu