Talk at the Department of Philosophy, Central European University *Peter Hacker* *(**St Johns College, Oxford University**)* *''What Philosophy Can Do for Neuroscience?**'* *Tuesday, 16 October 2007, 5.30pm, Zrinyi 14, Room 412* Abstract Philosophy is concerned with conceptual questions, not empirical ones. The character of conceptual questions and their methods of resolution is clarified. Cognitive neuroscience inevitably raises a wide range of such questions which are not amenable to experimental resolution. The character of these conceptual problems in cognitive neuroscience is explored by way of a brief historical survey. It is argued that twentieth century cognitive neuroscience evolved from a form of Cartesian dualism (Sherrington, Penfield, Eccles) into a degenerate form of dualism (Crick, Edelman, Kandel) in which attributes Cartesians ascribed to the mind were ascribed to the brain, leaving the rest of the misconceived Cartesian structure intact. Some of the misconceptions that ensued are examined, and some exemplary confusions are clarified in order to demonstrate what philosophy can do for cognitive neuroscience.