please disregard the previous message this is the correct one - sorry
about the mix-up!
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The CEU Philosophy Department cordially invites you to a talk
by
Ruth Weintraub (Tel-Aviv University)
What If Scepticism Is True? (An Exercise in Reliabilism)
Friday, 17 October 2008, 3.30pm, Zrinyi 14, Room 412
ABSTRACT
The two prevalent responses to sceptical arguments are to brush them
aside or to attempt to refute them. But there is another kind of
response, the acquiescent, which I propose to consider. It allows that
the sceptical conclusion may be true, and explores its implications,
both practical and theoretical, and proceeds by diagnosing the rationale
behind the assumptions pertaining to justification which the sceptic
exploits to derive his (seemingly devastating) conclusion. My test-case
is the reliabilist conception of justification (hence the sub-title),
which jettisons an internalist assumption responsible for Hume’s
sceptical conclusion vis-a-vis induction.
Kriszta Biber
Department Coordinator
Philosophy Department
Tel: 36-1-327-3806
Fax: 36-1-327-3072
E-mail: biberk(a)ceu.hu
The CEU Philosophy Department cordially invites you to a talk
by
Ruth Weintraub (Tel-Aviv University)
on
What If Scepticism Is True? (An Exercise in Reliabilism)
NOTE: FRIDAY!!! 17 Oct, 3.30 PM, Zrinyi 14, Room 412
ABSTRACT
Our ability to track objects as they undergo change suggests very strongly that we both perceive, and conceive of, objects as things distinct from their properties, as enduring individual substances. This notion that objects are individual substances, rather than simply co-instantiated collections of properties we can call the intrinsic concept of objects. An alternative view, that objects are collections of properties we can call the relational conception of objects. On the relational view when (essential?) properties change, so do objects. I apply some lessons from debates about the nature of objects and our perception of them in order to understand the nature of the experience involved in delusions of misidentification. These delusions report the experience of seeing someone who is perceptually indistinguishable from a familiar person but is not the familiar person. On the relational conception of objects this would be impossible. Yet the standard way of explaining these delusions within cognitive neuropsychiatry assumes the relational conception. Not only that but the standard view also assumes that experience of seeing a particular relational object (in this case a person) is partly constituted by affective experience. This combination of assumptions leads to problems whose resolution is the aim of the final section of this paper
Kriszta Biber
Department Coordinator
Philosophy Department
Tel: 36-1-327-3806
Fax: 36-1-327-3072
E-mail: biberk(a)ceu.hu
The CEU Philosophy Department cordially invites you to a talk
by
Ruth Weintraub (Tel-Aviv University)
on
What If Scpeticism Is True? (An Exercise in Reliabilism)
NOTE: FRIDAY!! 17 Oct 2008, 3.30 PM, Zrinyi 14, Room 412
ABSTRACT
Our ability to track objects as they undergo change suggests very strongly that we both perceive, and conceive of, objects as things distinct from their properties, as enduring individual substances. This notion that objects are individual substances, rather than simply co-instantiated collections of properties we can call the intrinsic concept of objects. An alternative view, that objects are collections of properties we can call the relational conception of objects. On the relational view when (essential?) properties change, so do objects. I apply some lessons from debates about the nature of objects and our perception of them in order to understand the nature of the experience involved in delusions of misidentification. These delusions report the experience of seeing someone who is perceptually indistinguishable from a familiar person but is not the familiar person. On the relational conception of objects this would be impossible. Yet the standard way of explaining these delusions within cognitive neuropsychiatry assumes the relational conception. Not only that but the standard view also assumes that experience of seeing a particular relational object (in this case a person) is partly constituted by affective experience. This combination of assumptions leads to problems whose resolution is the aim of the final section of this paper
Kriszta Biber
Department Coordinator
Philosophy Department
Tel: 36-1-327-3806
Fax: 36-1-327-3072
E-mail: biberk(a)ceu.hu
The CEU Philosophy Department cordially invites you to a talk (as part of its Departmental Colloquium series)
by
Milosz Pawlowski (CEU)
on
The Future of A Parfitian Reductionist
Tuesday, 14 Oct 2008, 5.30 PM, Zrinyi 14, Room 412
ABSTRACT
Derek Parfit is the most influential proponent of the view that persons are logical constructions out of ontologically more basic objects. For Parfit, these are mental events. Parfit's position is intended to be different from Eliminativism about persons. On Parfitian Reductionism, persons are genuine, albeit convention- and thought-dependent, objects. My aim will be to examine an objection to this view, which has it that if such Reductionism is true, it is a mistake to think that we can anticipate "our" futures. I will first show how inconsistencies in Parfit's position are resolved by the account developed by Raymond Martin. On Martin's view, we can anticipate experiences of people who are not identical to us. Yet I will argue that the conventionalist component of Parfitian Reductionism
makes it impossible for it to preserve the distinction between genuine and seeming anticipation. This makes genuine anticipation impossible. Since possibility of anticipation is an essential component of the concept of a person, it follows that there are no people if Parfitian Reductionism is true. The view collapses into Eliminativism.
Kriszta Biber
Department Coordinator
Philosophy Department
Tel: 36-1-327-3806
Fax: 36-1-327-3072
THEORETICAL PHILOSOPHY FORUM
Institute of Philosophy
Faculty of Humanities, Eotvos University
Room 226 Monday 4:00 PM Muzeum krt. 4/i, Budapest
Web site: http://phil.elte.hu/tpf
13 October 4:00 PM Room 226
Matyas Brendel
Computer and Automation Research Institute, Budapest
'Et tu mi fili, Thomas?!' – avagy Carnap ujraertekelese
('Et tu mi fili, Thomas?!' – reconsidering Carnap)
Abstract: http://phil.elte.hu/tpf/2008-2009/October/#2
___________________________________
The Forum is open to everyone, including students,visitors, and faculty
members from all departments and institutes!
Format: 60 minute lecture, 10 minute coffee break, followed by a 30-60
minute discussion. The language of presentation is English or Hungarian.
A printable poster is available from here:
http://phil.elte.hu/tpf/2008-2009/October/poster.pdf
Please feel free to post it in your institution!
The organizer of the Forum: Laszlo E. Szabo
(leszabo(a)phil.elte.hu)
--
L a s z l o E. S z a b o
Department of Logic, Institute of Philosophy
Faculty of Humanities, Eotvos University, Budapest
http://phil.elte.hu/leszabo
THEORETICAL PHILOSOPHY FORUM
Institute of Philosophy
Faculty of Humanities, Eotvos University
Room 226 Monday 4:00 PM Muzeum krt. 4/i, Budapest
Web site: http://phil.elte.hu/tpf
6 October 4:00 PM Room 226
Adolf Karda
Institute of Philosophy, Eotvos University, Budapest
Evolucios tudatfilozofia: DONALD kontra DENNETT
(Evolutionary philosophy of mind: DONALD contra DENNETT)
Abstract: http://phil.elte.hu/tpf/2008-2009/October/#1
13 October 4:00 PM Room 226
Matyas Brendel
Computer and Automation Research Institute, Budapest
'Et tu mi fili, Thomas?!' – avagy Carnap ujraertekelese
('Et tu mi fili, Thomas?!' – reconsidering Carnap)
Abstract: http://phil.elte.hu/tpf/2008-2009/October/#2
___________________________________
The Forum is open to everyone, including students,visitors, and faculty
members from all departments and institutes!
Format: 60 minute lecture, 10 minute coffee break, followed by a 30-60
minute discussion. The language of presentation is English or Hungarian.
A printable poster is available from here:
http://phil.elte.hu/tpf/2008-2009/October/poster.pdf
Please feel free to post it in your institution!
The organizer of the Forum: Laszlo E. Szabo
(leszabo(a)phil.elte.hu)
--
L a s z l o E. S z a b o
Department of Logic, Institute of Philosophy
Faculty of Humanities, Eotvos University, Budapest
http://phil.elte.hu/leszabo
The CEU Philosophy Department cordially invites you to a talk (as part of its Departmental Colloquium series)
by
Philip Gerrans (University of Adelaide)
on
Seeing Doubles and Singular Thoughts:
Experience and Explanation in Delusions of Misidentification
Tuesday, 7 Oct 2008, 5.30 PM, Zrinyi 14, Room 412
ABSTRACT
Our ability to track objects as they undergo change suggests very strongly that we both perceive, and conceive of, objects as things distinct from their properties, as enduring individual substances. This notion that objects are individual substances, rather than simply co-instantiated collections of properties we can call the intrinsic concept of objects. An alternative view, that objects are collections of properties we can call the relational conception of objects. On the relational view when (essential?) properties change, so do objects. I apply some lessons from debates about the nature of objects and our perception of them in order to understand the nature of the experience involved in delusions of misidentification. These delusions report the experience of seeing someone who is perceptually indistinguishable from a familiar person but is not the familiar person. On the relational conception of objects this would be impossible. Yet the standard way of explaining these delusions within cognitive neuropsychiatry assumes the relational conception. Not only that but the standard view also assumes that experience of seeing a particular relational object (in this case a person) is partly constituted by affective experience. This combination of assumptions leads to problems whose resolution is the aim of the final section of this paper
Kriszta Biber
Department Coordinator
Philosophy Department
Tel: 36-1-327-3806
Fax: 36-1-327-3072
E-mail: biberk(a)ceu.hu
