The CEU Philosophy Department cordially invites you to a talk (as part of its Departmental Colloquium series)
by
Maria Alvarez (University of Southampton)
on
Anscombe on Practical Knowledge
Tuesday, 28 October 2008, 5.30 PM, Zrinyi 14, Room 412
ABSTRACT
In her 1957 book Intention, Anscombe wrote:
Can it be that there is something that modern philosophy has blankly misunderstood: namely what ancient and medieval philosophers meant by practical knowledge? Certainly, in modern philosophy, we have an incorrigibly contemplative conception of knowledge. Knowledge must be something that is judged as such by being in accordance with the facts. The facts, reality, are prior, and dictate what is to be said, if it is knowledge (p.57).
In this paper, I try to partly elucidate the concept of practical knowledge and explain why Anscombe thinks that modern philosophy has misunderstood it
Kriszta Biber
Department Coordinator
Philosophy Department
Tel: 36-1-327-3806
Fax: 36-1-327-3072
E-mail: biberk(a)ceu.hu
The CEU Philosophy Department cordially invites you to a talk (as part of its Departmental Colloquium series)
by
Maria Alvarez (University of Southampton)
on
Anscombe on Practical Knowledge
Tuesday, 28 October 2008, 5.30 PM, Zrinyi 14, Room 412
ABSTRACT
In her 1957 book Intention, Anscombe wrote:
Can it be that there is something that modern philosophy has blankly misunderstood: namely what ancient and medieval philosophers meant by practical knowledge? Certainly, in modern philosophy, we have an incorrigibly contemplative conception of knowledge. Knowledge must be something that is judged as such by being in accordance with the facts. The facts, reality, are prior, and dictate what is to be said, if it is knowledge (p.57).
In this paper, I try to partly elucidate the concept of practical knowledge and explain why Anscombe thinks that modern philosophy has misunderstood it
Az MTA Pszichológiai Kutatóintézet "fiatal kutatói" két részes elõadás
sorozatot tartanak.
Az 1. alkalom: nov 7. Helyszín: Teréz krt 13 (az Intézet volt épüéete az
Oktogonnál).
2. alkalom: dec. 5. Helyszín: Victor Hufo u 18-22.
A rendezvény 9-kor kezdõdik és kb. 4-ig tart.
A program megtekinthetõ az Intézet honlapján (www.mtapi.hu)
Minden érdeklõdõt szeretettel várunk.
22 Oct, 4.30pm
Zoltán Jakab (Cognitive Science, BME) & Szabolcs Kiss (Psychology, Pécs)
Understanding privileged access to mental states in preschoolers and
first graders
Venue:
Room 137, Institute for Psychology, Hungarian Academy of Sciences
Victor Hugo u. 18-22, 1132 Budapest
Everyone is welcome to attend.
---
Gergely Csibra
THEORETICAL PHILOSOPHY FORUM
Institute of Philosophy
Faculty of Humanities, Eotvos University
Room 226 Monday 4:00 PM Muzeum krt. 4/i, Budapest
Web site: http://phil.elte.hu/tpf
November Program
3 November 4:00 PM Room 226
Gyorgy Inzelt
Institute of Philosophy, Eotvos University, Budapest
Game theoretic reconstruction of some classical problems of political
philosophy
Abstract: http://phil.elte.hu/tpf/2008-2009/November/#1
10 November 4:00 PM Room 226
Tamas Mihalydeak
Department of Computer Science, University of Debrecen
Mi tortenne, ha komolyan vennenk elofelteveseinket?
(What if we took our pre-assumptions seriously?)
Abstract: http://phil.elte.hu/tpf/2008-2009/November/#2
17 November 4:00 PM Room 226
Jeno Pontor
Institute of Philosophy, Eotvos University, Budapest
A tudas mint mentalis allapot, es a szkepticizmus
(Knowledge as a mental state; and the skepticism)
Abstract: http://phil.elte.hu/tpf/2008-2009/November/#3
24 November 4:00 PM Room 226
Janos Tozser
Philosophy of Language Research Group of the
Hungarian Academy of Sciences
Eotvos University, Budapest
Fenomenalis es intencionalis tulajdonsagok
(Phenomenal and intentional properties)
Abstract: http://phil.elte.hu/tpf/2008-2009/November/#4
___________________________________
The Forum is open to everyone, including students,visitors, and faculty
members from all departments and institutes!
Format: 60 minute lecture, 10 minute coffee break, followed by a 30-60
minute discussion. The language of presentation is English or Hungarian.
A printable poster is available from here:
http://phil.elte.hu/tpf/2008-2009/November/poster.pdf
Please feel free to post it in your institution!
The organizer of the Forum: Laszlo E. Szabo
(leszabo(a)phil.elte.hu)
--
L a s z l o E. S z a b o
Department of Logic, Institute of Philosophy
Faculty of Humanities, Eotvos University, Budapest
http://phil.elte.hu/leszabo
The CEU Philosophy Department cordially invites you to a talk (as part
of its Departmental Colloquium series)
by
Gerard O'Brien (University of Adelaide)
on
How Does Mind Matter?
Tuesday, 21 October 2008, 5.30 PM, Zrinyi 14, Room 412
ABSTRACT
Nothing could be more obvious than that minds matter. Specifically,
nothing could be more obvious than that mental phenomena-beliefs,
desires, thoughts, perceptions, and so forth-have a causal impact on
behaviour. Yet it has proved notoriously difficult to explain how this
can be so. The problem of “mental causation” takes a number of forms
in the philosophy of mind. One of these arises from the conjunction of
two widely accepted theses about the mind. The first is that
representation is the mark of the mental: that mental phenomena are
essentially contentful. The second is that the representational
properties of mental phenomena fail to supervene on the intrinsic
physical properties of states of the brain. The standard response to
this form of the problem has been to accept that representational
properties are causally inert, but to argue that there is enough room
between explanation and causation for representational properties to be
“explanatorily relevant”. In their heart of hearts, however, most
philosophers know this response is deeply unsatisfactory, and this
discontent has motivated a flirtation in the contemporary philosophy of
mind with “extended mind” hypotheses and even forms of
“anti-representationalism”. In this paper I will present a simple
solution to this construal of the problem of mental causation. Rather
than toying with ways of redrawing the boundaries of the mind or
abandoning representation completely, I will develop an account of
mental representation according to which representational content
supervenes on the intrinsic physical properties of states of the brain.
Kriszta Biber
Department Coordinator
Philosophy Department
Tel: 36-1-327-3806
Fax: 36-1-327-3072
E-mail: biberk(a)ceu.hu
THEORETICAL PHILOSOPHY FORUM
Institute of Philosophy
Faculty of Humanities, Eotvos University
Room 226 Monday 4:00 PM Muzeum krt. 4/i, Budapest
Web site: http://phil.elte.hu/tpf
20 October 4:00 PM Room 226
Gabor Hofer-Szabo
Institute for Communication and Cultural Studies
King Sigismund College, Budapest
Department of Logic, Institute of Philosophy
Eotvos University, Budapest
Objektivista kalauz a szubjektiv valoszinuseghez
(Objectivist guide to subjective probability)
Abstract: http://phil.elte.hu/tpf/2008-2009/October/#3
___________________________________
The Forum is open to everyone, including students,visitors, and faculty
members from all departments and institutes!
Format: 60 minute lecture, 10 minute coffee break, followed by a 30-60
minute discussion. The language of presentation is English or Hungarian.
A printable poster is available from here:
http://phil.elte.hu/tpf/2008-2009/October/poster.pdf
Please feel free to post it in your institution!
The organizer of the Forum: Laszlo E. Szabo
(leszabo(a)phil.elte.hu)
--
L a s z l o E. S z a b o
Department of Logic, Institute of Philosophy
Faculty of Humanities, Eotvos University, Budapest
http://phil.elte.hu/leszabo
