Kedves Kollégák!
Tisztelettel meghívom Önöket doktori védésemre.
A védés időpontja: 2010. január 27., szerda, 10.30.
Helyszíne: ELTE PPK Kari Tanácsterem (1075 Budapest, Kazinczy u.
23-27., I.em. 104.)
A disszertáció és tézisei az alábbi címen érhetők el: http://humlab.cogpsyphy.hu/publikaciok
Üdvözlettel,
Honbolygó Ferenc
Upcoming seminar at the CEU Cognitive Development Center:
talk by
Clark Barrett (UCLA department of Anthropology)
TODAY, 18 of January at 5.00pm.
Title: Additivism versus subtractivism: The right way to think about
evolutionary psychology
Venue:
CEU Cognitive Development Center
Hattyuhaz
1015 Budapest
Hattyu u 14.
level 3 (one level up from the main level)
Abstract:
The role of evolved mechanisms is often seen as providing constraints
on
more general-purpose systems that would otherwise find solutions to
problems eventually, but perhaps more slowly, in the absence of the
evolved constraints. On this view, evolved mechanisms are removers of
flexibility rather than enablers of it: to the extent that we could
remove
or overcome our evolved mechanisms, we would become more and more free
and
flexible. Arguably, this “subtractivist” view stems from a
history in psychology of seeing frame problems as the fundamental
problems
that cognitive and developmental mechanisms need to solve. This is
true:
cognitive abilities cannot evolve unless frame problems are solved. But
it
is a mistake to think that this is generally done first by evolving
general-purpose, unconstrained mechanisms, and then adding constraints
to
make them more efficient. Instead, cognitive innovations are selected
for
because they work right away: they must solve frame problems at the
moment
of their appearance. In this sense, evolution is not a constrainer but
an
enabler, altering developmental systems so that new representations
and
computations occur that did not occur before. This
“additivist” view in turn implies that each new
evolutionary
step proceeds via emergent interactions or synergies between new
(potentially small) changes and pre-existing architecture. This often
occurs by exploiting what was already there in new ways, much as a
chef
adding new ingredients to his kitchen makes possible new ways of using
old
ingredients. In this talk, I will explore the example of mechanisms
that
enable cultural transmission, and use these to illustrate the
additivist
view. I will argue that additivism requires revision of widely held
beliefs about what evolutionary views imply for innateness,
determinism,
flexibility, and the ability to handle novel, “open”
contents.
The CEU Philosophy Department cordially invites you to a talk
(as part of its Departmental Colloquium series)
by
Philip Goff (University of Hertfordshire)
on
How should a qualia freak do metaphysics?
Tuesday, 19 January, 2010, 4.30 PM, Zrinyi 14, Room 412
ABSTRACT
I define a ‘qualia freak’ as someone who holds: (A) that there are
phenomenal concepts, i.e. ways of thinking about conscious states – in
terms of what it’s like to be in them – which are independent of
causal role, (B) that phenomenal concepts are transparent, i.e. reveal
what it is to have the phenomenal properties they denote, (C) that we
possess certain phenomenal concepts such that there is no epistemic
possibility that those concepts are not instantiated. I think a sizeable
minority of analytic philosophers count as ‘qualia freaks’ under
this definition. In this paper I argue/point out that qualia freaks can
and should use conceptual analysis of phenomenal concepts as a solid
foundation for metaphysical enquiry. The conjunction of (A), (B) and (C)
entails that conceptual analysis of phenomenal concepts gets us all the
way to reality: we can know a priori what phenomenal concepts demand of
reality, and we are certain that such demands are satisfied. I go to
show how this method can help us make progress on various metaphysical
questions.
Kriszta Biber
Department Coordinator
Philosophy Department
Tel: 36-1-327-3806
Fax: 36-1-327-3072
E-mail: biberk(a)ceu.hu
FYI
From: Institut Wiener Kreis [mailto:ivc@univie.ac.at]
Sent: Thursday, January 14, 2010 4:25 PM
To: ivc(a)univie.ac.at
Subject: Vienna International Summer University 2010 - Last Call for
Application
Last Call for Application
Extended application deadline: February 15, 2010
VISU Vienna International Summer University
SWC Scientific World Conceptions
The Science of the Conscious Mind
Vienna, July 5 - 16, 2010
organized by the University of Vienna and the Institute Vienna Circle.
A two-week high-level summer course on questions related to fundamental
philosophical problems of the science of mind, spanning a wide range of
topics in empirical psychology and neurophilosophy, and addressing
normative, historical and topical issues from an international perspective.
Main Lecturers:
<http://www.philosophie.tu-berlin.de/menue/mitarbeiter/akademische_mitarbeit
erinnen/dr_uljana_feest/> Uljana Feest (Technische Universität Berlin)
<http://fds.duke.edu/db/aas/Philosophy/faculty/ojf> Owen Flanagan (Duke
University)
<http://www.michael-pauen.de/> Michael Pauen (Humboldt-Universität zu
Berlin)
Guest Lecturer:
<http://sleep.med.harvard.edu/people/faculty/212/J+Allan+Hobson+MD> J.
Allan Hobson (Harvard Medical School)
Cost of the program: EUR 880,-
Lodging in student dormitories in the centre of the City of Vienna available
at approximately EUR 325,- for the whole duration of the course.
Applicants should submit:
A short educational curriculum vitae
A list of most recent courses and grades or a copy of your diplomas
A one-page statement (in English), briefly outlining your previous work and
your reason for attending the VISU-SWC
A (sealed) letter of recommendation from your professor, including some
comment on your previous work. This letter may also be sent directly by your
professor.
A passport photo
Please make sure that all documents arrive in time because we can process
only complete applications.
Application form (available on our web site: www.univie.ac.at/ivc/VISU) may
be sent in advance.
To participate mastering English on a high level is required.
Extended application deadline: February 15, 2010 (Later applications may be
considered if space is still available.)
A letter of admission together with a detailed syllabus will reach
successful applicants by end of February, 2010.
Applications should be sent to
Professor Friedrich Stadler, Institute Vienna Circle
University Campus, Spitalgasse 2-4, Court 1, Entrance 1.13, A-1090 Vienna,
Austria
Fax: +43-1-4277 41297
For further inquiries, please send an email to
friedrich.stadler(a)univie.ac.at or consult the IVC's Web site
www.univie.ac.at/ivc/VISU
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Dear All,
Upcoming seminar at the CEU Cognitive Development Center:
talk by
Clark Barrett (UCLA department of Anthropology)
Monday, 18 of January at 5.00pm.
Title: Additivism versus subtractivism: The right way to think about
evolutionary psychology
Venue:
CEU Cognitive Development Center
Hattyuhaz
1015 Budapest
Hattyu u 14.
level 3 (one level up from the main level)
Abstract:
The role of evolved mechanisms is often seen as providing constraints on
more general-purpose systems that would otherwise find solutions to
problems eventually, but perhaps more slowly, in the absence of the
evolved constraints. On this view, evolved mechanisms are removers of
flexibility rather than enablers of it: to the extent that we could remove
or overcome our evolved mechanisms, we would become more and more free and
flexible. Arguably, this “subtractivist” view stems from a
history in psychology of seeing frame problems as the fundamental problems
that cognitive and developmental mechanisms need to solve. This is true:
cognitive abilities cannot evolve unless frame problems are solved. But it
is a mistake to think that this is generally done first by evolving
general-purpose, unconstrained mechanisms, and then adding constraints to
make them more efficient. Instead, cognitive innovations are selected for
because they work right away: they must solve frame problems at the moment
of their appearance. In this sense, evolution is not a constrainer but an
enabler, altering developmental systems so that new representations and
computations occur that did not occur before. This
“additivist” view in turn implies that each new evolutionary
step proceeds via emergent interactions or synergies between new
(potentially small) changes and pre-existing architecture. This often
occurs by exploiting what was already there in new ways, much as a chef
adding new ingredients to his kitchen makes possible new ways of using old
ingredients. In this talk, I will explore the example of mechanisms that
enable cultural transmission, and use these to illustrate the additivist
view. I will argue that additivism requires revision of widely held
beliefs about what evolutionary views imply for innateness, determinism,
flexibility, and the ability to handle novel, “open” contents.
best,
Ágnes M. Kovács
Marie Curie Research Fellow-DISCOS
MTA PKI
Hungarian Academy of Sciences
&
CEU, Cognitive Development Centre
Budapest
Hungary
tel: +3612796095
The workshop on
Cognitive Social Sciences---Grounding the Social Sciences in the
Cognitive Sciences?
http://www.cogsci.rpi.edu/~rsun/wsp2010
(to be held at CogSci 2010 in Portland, Oregon, on August 11, 2010)
This workshop is aimed at exploring the cognitive (psychological)
basis of the social sciences and the possibilities of grounding the
social sciences in cognition (psychology).
Cognitive sciences have made tremendous strides in recent decades. In
particular, computational cognitive modeling (i.e., computational
psychology; Sun, 2008; Thagard, 1996) has changed the ways in which
cognition/psychology is explored and understood in many profound
respects. There have been many models of cognition/psychology proposed
in the cognitive sciences (broadly defined), leading to detailed
understanding of many cognitive/psychological domains and
functionalities. Empirical psychological research has also progressed
to provide us with much better understanding of many psychological
phenomena.
Given the advances in the cognitive sciences, can we leverage the
successes for the sake of better understanding social processes and
phenomena? More fundamentally, can the cognitive sciences (including
experimental cognitive psychology, computational psychology, social-
personality psychology, developmental psychology, cultural
psychology, psycholinguistics, philosophy of mind, cognitive
neuroscience, and so on) provide a better foundation for important
disciplines of the social sciences (sociology, anthropology,
economics, political science, ethics, as well as some "humanity"
fields: religious studies, history, legal studies, literary studies,
communication, and so on)?
Thus far, although very much a neglected topic, there nevertheless
have been various efforts at exploring this topic. Some of the efforts
were computationally motivated (see, e.g., Sun, 2006: "Cognition and
multi-agent interaction", published by Cambridge University Press).
Some other efforts are more empirical or theoretical in nature (see,
e.g., Turner, 2001: "Cognitive Dimensions of Social Science",
published by Oxford University Press).
There are both theoretical and practical rationales for developing
"cognitive social sciences" (see Turner, 2001; Sun, 2006; DiMaggio,
1997; Tetlock and Goldgeier, 2000; Camerer, 2003). We contend that the
social sciences may find their future in the cognitive sciences (at
least in part), which may well lead to a powerful and productive
combined intellectual enterprise. This combination or grounding may
provide the social sciences with imaginative scientific research
programs, hybridization/integration, new syntheses, novel paradigms/
frameworks, and so on, besides providing the cognitive sciences with
new data sources and problems to address.
The presentation and discussion at this workshop may lead to a
collection of major work in the form of a well edited book or a
special issue.
Confirmed keynote speakers:
Pascal Boyer
Paul Thagard
Mark Turner
Submission:
For regular oral presentation, please submit a paper of 3-8 pages, in
the usual CogSci conference format (as specified at: http://www.cogsci.rpi.edu/~rsun/wsp2010
). Please email the submission to: rsun at rpi dot edu
For short oral or poster presentation, please submit an extended
abstract of 1 page, in the usual CogSci conference format (as
specified at: http://www.cogsci.rpi.edu/~rsun/wsp2010 ). Please email
the submission to: rsun at rpi dot edu
Submission Deadline:
February 15, 2010
Workshop Chair:
Ron Sun
Workshop Program Committee:
Ron Sun
Philip Tetlock
Paul Thagard
Paul Bello
Jun Zhang
References:
Camerer, C. (2003). Behavioral Game Theory: Experiments on Strategic
Interaction. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
DiMaggio, P. (1997). Culture and cognition. Annual Review of
Sociology 23, 263-288.
Sun, R. (2006). Cognition and Multi-Agent Interaction: From Cognitive
Mdoeling to Social Simulation. Cambridge University Press, New York.
2006.
Sun, R. (ed.), (2008). The Cambridge Handbook of Computational
Psychology. Cambridge University Press, New York. 2008.
Tetlock, P. and Goldgeier, J. (2000). Human nature and world
politics: Cognition, identity, and influence. International Journal of
Psychology. 35 (2), 87-96.
Thagard, P. (1996). Mind: Introduction to Cognitive Science. MIT
Press, Cambridge, MA. 1996.
Thagard, P. (2006). Hot thought: Mechanisms and Applications of
Emotional Cognition. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Turner, M. (2001). Cognitive Dimensions of Social Science. Oxford
University Press.
Begin forwarded message:
Date: Fri, 8 Jan 2010 11:28:41 +0100
From: Stephan Hartmann <s.hartmann(a)uvt.nl>
To: philphys(a)philosophy.elte.hu
Subject: [PhilPhys] PhD position at TiLPS
The Department of Philosophy and the Tilburg Center for Logic and
Philosophy of Science (TiLPS; see http://www.uvt.nl/tilps) invite
applications for a three-year full-time PhD position, commencing
September 1, 2010. The successful candidate is expected to work on a
topic from the philosophy science (including general philosophy of
science, formal philosophy of science, philosophy of economics, and
philosophy of psychology) and complete a PhD thesis within three years.
The salary for a full-time employment agreement increases from 2.042
Euro gross a month in the first year to 2.492 Euro gross a month in the
last year. The position is open to candidates with a master’s degree or
equivalent in philosophy and an interest in working in a very active
international and interdisciplinary research environment. Candidates
are invited to submit a letter of interest, a curriculum vitae, a
research proposal of 1000 to 2000 words, certificates, a transcript of
courses taken (including grades), and two letters of recommendation.
Please send your application package to PhD Position Search Committee,
c/o P & O, Department of Philosophy, Tilburg University, Warandelaan 2,
P.O. 90153, 5000 LE Tilburg, The Netherlands, or email to
solliciterenfdl(a)uvt.nl. The deadline for applications is April 15,
2010. Please mention the vacancy number 500.10.01 in your letter.
Informal enquiries may be directed to Professor Stephan Hartmann
(email: S.Hartmann(a)uvt.nl).
--
L a s z l o E. S z a b o
Professor of Philosophy
DEPARTMENT OF LOGIC, INSTITUTE OF PHILOSOPHY
EOTVOS UNIVERSITY, BUDAPEST
http://phil.elte.hu/leszabo
_______________________________________________
PhilPhys - Philosophy of Physics Mail Group
Help & Archives: http://phil.elte.hu/PhilPhys
Enézést, a prorgram helyes linkje:
http://www.cogsci.bme.hu/makog2010/makog_program.pdf
a Szervezők
2010/1/6 MAKOG 2010 <makog2010(a)cogsci.bme.hu>
>
> Kedves Kollégák,
>
> A XVIII. MAKOG--Interfészek a megismeréstudományban konferencia
> programja megtalálható a konferencia honlapján:
>
> http://www.cogsci.bme.hu/makog2010/makog_program.pdf
>
>
> A konferencia ideje: 2010. január 25-26 (hétfő-kedd)
>
> A konferencia helyszíne: Budapesti Műszaki és Gazdaságtudományi
> Egyetem, Műegyetem rkp. 3. I. em. 65., Oktatói klub
>
>
> A regisztrációs díj (5000 forint, diákoknak 3000) befizetése a
> helyszínen történik, de kérünk mindenkit, hogy az alábbi regisztrációs
> felületen jelezze részvételi szándékát:
>
> http://www.cogsci.bme.hu/makog2010/
>
> minden érdeklődőt szeretettel várunk,
>
> a Szervezők
>
>
Dear Colleague,
The 4th annual Rovereto workshop on Concepts, Actions and Objects
(CAOs) will take
place at the Center for Mind/Brain Sciences, May 20th – 23rd, 2010, in
Rovereto, Italy.
Workshop Website
portale.unitn.it/centre/cimec/caos.htm
Speakers at the 2010 CAOs workshop:
-John Assad -Kalanit Grill-Spector -James Haxby -Nancy Kanwisher -
Stephen Macknik
-Maximilian Riesenhuber -Bruno Rossion -Michael Tarr -Simon Thorpe -
Patrik Vuilleumier
In addition, there will be a special session on Computational
Neuroscience in the same place, on the Afternoon of May 20th.
Speakers at the special session:
-Tom Mitchell -Tim Rogers -Lorraine Tyler -Gert Westermann
The Rovereto workshop provides a unique forum for researchers from a
range of perspectives who are interested in Concepts,
Actions, and Objects to come together to discuss their research and
develop new directions and collaborations. There are a small
number of speakers (all invited) and there are no concurrent talks.
There will be a poster session for students, post-docs and young
researchers to present their work. The DEADLINE for submission
of abstracts for the poster session is MONDAY FEBRUARY 22, 2010. A
small number of travel grants will be awarded on a
competitive basis. Decisions will be returned within two weeks of the
deadline.
For more information and to submit an abstract see:
portale.unitn.it/centre/cimec/caos.htm
The CAOs workshop is sponsored by the Center for Mind/Brain Sciences,
at the University of Trento.
Workshop Organizers
Alfonso Caramazza - Mel Goodale - Brad Mahon - Alex Martin - Brian
Murphy
***********PLEASE FORWARD THIS MESSAGE***********
*The Central European Cognitive Science Association (CECOG)* launches
its second international conference in the historical town of
*Dubrovnik, Croatia, 6-9, May, 2010.* The tutorial talks this year will
concentrate on the topic of *perceptual learning*, but the conference is
open for research on *all aspects of cognitive science.*
KEYNOTE SPEAKERS
*J**ózsef **F**iser* <http://www.bio.brandeis.edu/faculty01/fiser.html>
Faculty of Psychology, Brandeis University,Waltham/Boston,
Massachusetts, USA
*I**lona **K**ovács* <http://www.cogsci.bme.hu/%7Eikovacs/>
Department of Cognitive Science, Budapest University of Technology and
Economics, Hungary
*D**ov **S**agi* <http://www.weizmann.ac.il/home/masagi/>
Department of Neurobiology, Brain Research, Weizmann Institute of
Science, Israel
*Steven M. Silverstein*
UMDNJ-Robert Wood Johnson Medical School, Piscataway, New Jersey, USA
for all further information visit our website
www.cecog.eu <http://cecog.eu/>
**
--
The organizing committee
of the 2nd Dubrovnik Conference on Cognitive Science