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Scepticism about one's own existence,9th March - 4.30 PM

by Krisztina Biber

The CEU Philosophy Department cordially invites you to a talk (as part of its Departmental Colloquium series) by Rory Madden (University College London)) on Scepticism about one's own existence Tuesday, 9 March, 2010, 4.30 PM, Zrinyi 14, Room 412 ABSTRACT Is it beyond doubt that one exists? In this talk I will describe a number of ways of constructing scenarios which form the basis of a sceptical challenge to the knowledge that one exists . Some of these possibilities depend upon unorthodox metaphysical views about the nature of existence, or the conditions for thought ownership -- but some of them do not. Instead they build on the general point that a sceptical scenario concerning a certain proposition p need not be a case in which p is false. I will conclude that scepticism about one's own existence should be taken no less seriously than other, more familiar, forms of sceptical challenge. Kriszta Biber Department Coordinator Philosophy Department Tel: 36-1-327-3806 Fax: 36-1-327-3072 E-mail: biberk(a)ceu.hu

16 years, 3 months

DISCOS conference, June 2010 Budapest

by Gergely Csibra

DISCOS: International conference on Intersubjectivity and the Self’ Budapest, 17-19 June, 2010 During the last decade, philosophical, psychological and neurobiological approaches to the self have increasingly overcome their disciplinary constraints and entered into a productive dialogue. Different levels of self-awareness such as the ‘core’ or ’minimal self’ and the ’extended’ or ’narrative self’ have been distinguished and investigated from a phenomenological, developmental and neurocognitive perspective. In this context, disorders of self-experience have also attracted growing attention. This integrative and interdisciplinary approach is well represented by the European Marie-Curie Research Training Network entitled “Disorders and Coherence of the Embodied Self” (DISCOS), a consortium of 10 European research facilities which organizes this present conference. The aim of the conference is to create an interdisciplinary forum for the exchange of ideas on the themes of intersubjectivity, self-awareness and its disorders. Special emphasis will be placed on the interplay of biological and social factors that are crucially important for establishing self-coherence, assuming that intersubjectivity and the development of the self are inherently related. Thus, exploring the self from different perspectives will elucidate and enrich our understanding of the mechanisms underlying intersubjectivity and self-other differentiation. Main Speakers Developmental Science - Renée Baillargeon, Hannes Rakoczy, György Gergely Neuroscience – Julie Grezes, Gergely Csibra, Kai Vogeley, Vittorio Gallese Philosophy – Shaun Gallagher, Dan Zahavi, Pierre Jacob Psychiatry – Efraim Bleiberg, Louis Sasse, Josef Parnas/Andrea Raballo, Thomas Fuchs/Hanne De Jaegher Organisers: György Gergely, Ágnes Kovács, Ernő Téglás, Andrea Schrök Venue: Hotel President, Budapest Further information: www.discos-2010.com Contact: gergelygy(a)ceu.hu (scientific issues), schroka(a)ceu.hu (program issues) Further information: www.discos-rtn.eu

16 years, 3 months

Theoretical Philosophy Forum, Alexander V. Tyaglo

by Laszlo E. Szabo

THEORETICAL PHILOSOPHY FORUM Institute of Philosophy Faculty of Humanities, Eotvos University Wednesday 5:00 PM Room 226 Muzeum krt. 4/i, Budapest Web site: http://phil.elte.hu/tpf 10 March (Wednesday) 5:00 PM Room 226 Alexander V. Tyaglo Department of Philosophy and Political Science National University of Internal Affairs, Kharkiv Is informal logic a manifestation of new logical and philosophical paradigm? Abstract: http://phil.elte.hu/tpf/2009-2010/March/#2 ___________________________________ The Forum is open to everyone, including students, visitors, and faculty members from all departments and institutes! Format: 60 minute lecture, 10 minute coffee break, followed by a 30-60 minute discussion. The language of presentation is English or Hungarian. A printable poster is available from here: http://phil.elte.hu/tpf/2009-2010/March/poster.pdf Please feel free to post it in your institution! The organizer of the Forum: Laszlo E. Szabo (leszabo(a)phil.elte.hu) -- L a s z l o E. S z a b o Professor of Philosophy DEPARTMENT OF LOGIC, INSTITUTE OF PHILOSOPHY EOTVOS UNIVERSITY, BUDAPEST http://phil.elte.hu/leszabo

16 years, 3 months

lecture invitation

by Krisztina Biber

A lecture hosted jointly by CEU and the ELTE Theoretical Philosophy Forum, Alexander V. Tyaglo (Department of Philosophy and Political Science, National University of Internal Affairs, Kharkiv ) Is informal logic a manifestation of new logical and philosophical paradigm? 10 March (Wednesday) 5:00 PM. ELTE, Budapest, Muzeum krt. 4/i, Room 226 Note that this lecture will take place at ELTE. Address and map with directions are here http://philosophy.elte.hu/tpf/info.html#location Abstract: I would like to start with the basic attempt of traditional logic and epistemology to find an "absolute weapon of cognition", e.g. like Leibniz' scientia universalis. This fundamental approach was rejected finally in the 20th century only - due to Popper and a few other thinkers. In human rational sphere there is neither ideal knowledge ("absolute truth") nor ideal way of cognition (the "absolute weapon"). What comes after this simple but fundamental statement? First of all, special emphasis on different mistakes, both paralogisms and sophisms: they are immanent features of human knowledge; therefore we have to study these errors as well as how to fight these deeply and systematically (e.g., an infinite task is to complete a theoretical classification of errors). Second, "end of deductivism" and transition to some different way of thinking with accent on probability. In context of this general shift it seems reasonable to study non-demonstrative argument as a basic norm, and methods to evaluate its soundness (while deductive argument appears as a simplification only). I will address this last issue in my talk in detail.

16 years, 3 months

CEU CDC seminar TOMORROW: Afra Alishahi

by Gergely Csibra

Afra Alishahi (Computational Linguistics, Saarland University) at 4.30 pm on Wednesday, 3 March 2010 Title: Modeling different aspects of child language acquisition as a probabilistic process Abstract: I will first present a probabilistic model of word learning by children. A major source of disagreement among the different theories of word learning is whether children are equipped with special mechanisms and biases for word learning, or their general cognitive abilities are adequate for the task. I present a novel computational model of early word learning which learns word meanings as probabilistic associations between words and semantic elements, using an incremental learning mechanism, and drawing only on general cognitive abilities. The computational simulations of the model demonstrate that much about word meanings can be learned from naturally-occurring child-directed utterances (paired with meaning representations), without using any special biases or constraints, and without any explicit developmental changes in the underlying learning mechanism. Furthermore, our model provides explanations for the occasionally contradictory child experimental data, and offers predictions for the behaviour of young word learners in novel situations. Children use their knowledge of word meanings in order to learn the structural properties of the language. I will also present a probabilistic usage-based model of verb argument structure acquisition that can successfully learn abstract knowledge of language from instances of verb usage, and use this knowledge in various language tasks. The model further demonstrates the feasibility of a usage-based account of language learning, and provides concrete explanation for the observed patterns in child language acquisition. Venue: CEU Cognitive Development Center Hattyuhaz 1015 Budapest Hattyu u 14. Level 3 (one level up from the entrance level) Everyone is welcome to attend.

16 years, 3 months

Emlékeztető - BME kognitív szeminárium

by Attila Keresztes

A BME Kognitív Tudományi Tanszék szeretettel vár mindenkit tanszéki szemináriumsorozatának *következő előadásá*ra: Március 3., szerda, 14:00-15:00, BME, XI., Stoczek u. 2., St. ép., 320.-as terem. * An Information Theoretic Approach to the Processing of Inflectional Paradigms and Classes * *Petar Milin* Department of Psychology, University of Novi Sad Laboratory for Experimental Psychology, University of Belgrade Bővebb info itt <http://cogsci.bme.hu/Esem.php?esemIndex=108> -- Attila Keresztes PhD student Budapest University of Technology and Economics Dept. of Cognitive Science, Stoczek u. 2, Budapest 1111, Hungary Tel & Fax: +36 1 4631072

16 years, 3 months

CEU CDC seminar TOMORROW: Patrick Shafto

by Gergely Csibra

Patrick Shafto (Psychology, Lousville) at 10.00 am on Tuesday, 2 March 2010 Title: Computational modeling of pedagogical reasoning Abstract: Much of human learning goes on in social situations. Among these situations, pedagogical situations stand out as potentially the most important. In pedagogical situations, a person (a teacher) chooses data for the purpose of helping another person learn a concept. I will present a computational model of pedagogical data sampling, which formalizes the problem as complementary inferences on the parts of both the teacher and learner. I will present a series of experiments that test the model's predictions about reasoning with adults and children. I will conclude by sketching a larger picture, in which pedagogical sampling is a special case of reasoning about intentionally sampled data, and outline directions of future research in this context. Venue: CEU Cognitive Development Center Hattyuhaz 1015 Budapest Hattyu u 14. Level 3 (one level up from the entrance level) Everyone is welcome to attend.

16 years, 3 months

reminder: Knowledge is of universals. The Context of Proof in Aristotle’s Account, 2 March, 4.30 PM

by Krisztina Biber

The CEU Philosophy Department and The Center for Hellenic Traditions cordially invite you to a talk (as part of the Philosophy Department’s Colloquium series) by Pieter Sjoerd Hasper (University of Groningen/Universität Bayreuth) on Knowledge is of universals. The Context of Proof in Aristotle’s Account Tuesday, 2 March, 2010, 4.30 PM, Zrinyi 14, Room 412 ABSTRACT Throughout his works Aristotle claims that scientific knowledge is of universals. It is an important claim for him, because he holds that only of universals, and not of particulars, there are definitions, and definitions are at the basis of scientific knowledge. Moreover, he also characterizes other epistemic states, such as knowledge consisting in having experience, in contrast as being concerned with particulars. I shall discuss two problems with this claim. First, if experience is of particulars, Aristotle’s idea that experience may concern universal propositions seems inconsistent - as it has indeed been held to be. Second, Aristotle’s claim that knowledge is of universals might get him into trouble, for he rejects the Platonic position that universals are ontologically primary and exist independently from particulars. Aristotle thus faces the difficulty of having to explain how scientific knowledge can be of universals without committing himself to independently existing universals and without reducing this knowledge of universals to knowledge of particulars. Both problems can be solved, I shall argue, by taking seriously the context of proof in which Aristotle formulates his account of scientific knowledge. The concept of proof Aristotle presupposes is that of proof conducted in the case of an arbitrary individual. I shall discuss first Aristotle’s argument against the existence of Platonic Forms as an argument concerning the ontological status of this arbitrary individual: is it a universal or a particular? Then I shall show that with Aristotle’s account of such proofs it is possible to interpret his claim that scientific knowledge is of universals in such a way that it does not entail that forms of knowledge which are of particulars, cannot be universal and that it allows Aristotle to maintain the ontological primacy of particulars without reducing scientific knowledge to some form of knowledge of particulars. Kriszta Biber Department Coordinator Philosophy Department Tel: 36-1-327-3806 Fax: 36-1-327-3072 E-mail: biberk(a)ceu.hu

16 years, 3 months

CEU CDC seminar on MONDAY: Walter Schroyens

by Gergely Csibra

Walter Schroyens (Psychology, Gent & Leuven) at 10.00am on Monday, 1 March 2010 Title: Meaning and idealization in reasoning towards an interpretation of conditionals: Is there a singular specific meaning or are there a multitude of ephemeral interpretations of natural language connectives, or both? Abstract: The paper investigates the thesis that while the pragmatics of content and context can yield many interpretations, there is an idealized core- meaning for sentential connectives: People do not reason from this core meaning, but can reason towards a corresponding interpretation, i.e., the conditional interpretation akin to the much dis-reputed material implication of classic logic. In reasoning towards this conditional-interpretation of “if A then C”, the utterances are interpreted as meaning that all possibilities except the “A and not-c” contingency are possible. In idealizing towards the conditional interpretation as the core meaning 'if', theorists abstract, simplify and generalize across conditions. Six experiments show that when the context is idealized by taking account of cognitive processing hurdles and auxiliary hypothesis in the mental-models theory of reasoning (e.g., people tend not to throw away semantic information, they start reasoning on the basis of a minimal representation, they are sensitive to the principles of parsimony in positing theoretical entities, … ) people are more likely to reason towards a conditional interpretation. That is, the context induces people to reason towards a more idealized interpretation (which must not be an ideal interpretation). A series of developmental studies additionally indicates that with age (i.e., experience and education) people are more likely to reason towards the conditional interpretation and two individual-differences studies show that people higher in general ability are similarly more likely to reason towards the conditional interpretation. Venue: CEU Cognitive Development Center Hattyuhaz 1015 Budapest Hattyu u 14. Level 3 (one level up from the entrance level) Everyone is welcome to attend.

16 years, 3 months

XVIII. MAKOG--számla

by MAKOG 2010

Kedves Kollégák! Elnézést kérünk a MAKOG XVIII. számlák késlekedéséért. A szervező CECOG bírósági regisztrációja folyamatban van, őszintén reméljük, hogy 5-6 hét alatt elintéződik. Kérünk egy kis további türelmet és megértést, üdvözlettel, a Szervezők

16 years, 3 months

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