Csaba Pléh
professor of psychology
presently: Collegium de Lyon
15 parvis Rene Descartes
ENS Recherche R 147
69007 Lyon France
T: 33437376596 Fax: 33437376273
Mobile: 36303493735, csaba.pleh(a)ens-lyon.fr
Eszterhazy Karoly College
Eger H-3300
editor in chief, Hungarian Review of Psychology
member, Academia Europaea and the Hungarian Academy of Sciences
The CEU Department of Philosophy cordially invites you to a talk
(as part of its Departmental Colloquium series)
by
Alfred Mele (Florida State University)
on
“Free Will and Neuroscience”
Tuesday, 22 January, 2013, 5.30 PM, Zrinyi 14, Room 412
ABSTRACT
A major source of scientific skepticism about free will is the belief
(defended by neuroscientist Benjamin Libet, social psychologist Daniel
Wegner, and others) that conscious decisions and intentions never play a
role in producing corresponding actions. I discuss two serious problems
encountered by any attempt to justify this belief by appealing to
existing neuroscientific data.
Kriszta Biber
Department Coordinator
Philosophy Department
Tel: 36-1-327-3806
Fax: 36-1-327-3072
E-mail: biberk(a)ceu.hu
Csaba Pl�h
professor of psychology
presently: Collegium de Lyon
15 parvis Rene Descartes
ENS Recherche R 147
69007 Lyon France
T: 33437376596 Fax: 33437376273
Mobile: 36303493735, csaba.pleh(a)ens-lyon.fr
Eszterhazy Karoly College
Eger H-3300
editor in chief, Hungarian Review of Psychology
member, Academia Europaea and the Hungarian Academy of Sciences
----- Original Message -----
From: JAM Organizers
To: JAM5in2013(a)gmail.com
Sent: Monday, January 14, 2013 2:36 PM
Subject: [Cogsci-Dept] 2ND CALL FOR ABSTRACTS: JOINT ACTION MEETING (JAM),Deadline February 1st
**Apologies for multiple postings**
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2nd call for abstracts: 5th Joint Action Meeting (JAM)
Berlin, July 27- 29 2013
Deadline for submissions February 1, 2013
Website: http://somby.info/page4/page4.html
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5th Joint Action Meeting
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Berlin, July 27- 29 2013 (preceding the Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society)
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It´s time to JAM again! The bi-annual Joint Action Meeting (JAM) brings together cognitive scientists and researchers from related disciplines sharing an interest in individuals’ ability to act together.
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Human life is full of joint actions, ranging from a handshake to the performance of a symphony. We are highly skilled at coordinating our actions with those of others to reach common goals, and rely on this ability throughout our daily lives. What are the processes underlying this ability? How does joint action develop? What are the basic principles needed to build robotic systems that can interact with humans? What might differentiate joint action from individual action, both conceptually and in terms of experience? The scientific program will comprise oral presentations and posters addressing these questions. Contributions will present the latest research and thinking on a range of different topics, including language as a form of joint action, the interplay of perception and action in joint action, and the phylogenetic, ontogenetic, and cultural foundations of joint action.
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http://somby.info/page4/page4.html
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SUBMISSIONS
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We invite submissions for talks (about 20 minutes) or posters on joint action. Please e-mail an abstract with the subject “JAM submission” to JAM5in2013(a)gmail.com. The abstract should be no longer than 200 words. The email should contain your name, affiliation, and contact address. Please indicate whether you prefer a talk or a poster. Deadline for submission is 1st February 2013.
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The abstract title should clearly define the work discussed. Abstracts reporting empirical studies must contain the specific goals of the study, the methods used, a summary of the results, and a conclusion. For theoretical work, the abstract should contain the specific goals and clear conclusions. Abstracts will be reviewed and authors will receive notification by email. Please note that although we do encourage submissions from a broad range of topics and perspectives, we will only be able to accept contributions that directly inform our understanding of joint action. We will do our best to accommodate your preference for talk/poster, but given the tight schedule we cannot guarantee that we will be able to accommodate your preference.
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REGISTRATION
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If you would like to attend JAM 5 without presenting a talk or poster, please send an e-mail with the subject “JAM Registration” to JAM5in2013(a)gmail.com. The email should contain your name, affiliation, and contact address. Note that first authors on submissions are automatically registered.
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All participants are asked to contribute a registration fee to the meeting. The registration fee is 30 Euros for students (including PhD students) and 60 Euros for all other participants, to be paid in cash at the meeting.
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We look forward to seeing you in Berlin next summer!
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Anna Kuhlen, Günther Knoblich, & Natalie Sebanz (Organizing team)
Itt van egy interju ami foleg a nyari iskolarol szol, a tudatossagrol.
Ha erdekelne, szivessen tartanek skypal minikurzusokat ahogy szoktam regebben.
Olel, Istvan
THEORETICAL PHILOSOPHY FORUM
Institute of Philosophy
Faculty of Humanities, Eötvös University
Address: Múzeum krt. 4/i, Budapest
16 January (Wednesday) 5:00 PM Room 226
Hong Yu Wong
Philosophy of Neuroscience Group, Centre for Integrative Neuroscience,
University of Tuebingen
A Motor Theory of Bodily Action?
___________________________________
Abstracts and printable program (poster) are available from the web
site of the Forum: http://phil.elte.hu/tpf (Please feel free to post
the program in your institution!)
The Forum is open to everyone, including students, visitors, and faculty
members from all departments and institutes! Format: 60 minute lecture,
coffee break, 60 minute discussion.
The organizer of the Forum: László E. Szabó
(leszabo(a)phil.elte.hu)
--
L a s z l o E. S z a b o
Professor of Philosophy
DEPARTMENT OF LOGIC, INSTITUTE OF PHILOSOPHY
EOTVOS UNIVERSITY, BUDAPEST
http://phil.elte.hu/leszabo
The CEU Department of Philosophy cordially invites you to a talk
(as part of its Departmental Colloquium series)
by
Helen Steward (University of Leeds)
on
'Helping it'
Tuesday, 15 January, 2012, 5.30 PM, Zrinyi 14, Room 412
ABSTRACT
There is a long-standing debate in the literature on moral
responsibility about the general idea that there is some sort of control
condition on our assignment of blameworthiness to agents. In this paper,
I try to defend the claims of a very ordinary, everyday locution to
offer the best means of formulating a version of the control principle
that stands some chance of fitting with our ethical intuitions. The
locution whose merits I intend to champion is the ‘can’t help it’
locution, as used in the phrase ‘I can’t help it’, I couldn’t help it’,
‘I can’t help that’, etc.. Because the locution is in a certain sense
colloquial, it tends to be avoided in philosophical discussion when
getting down to precise details – though it often appears in initial,
stage-setting statements of the philosophical problems surrounding the
issue of control and blame. My claim here will be that none of the
commonly utilised locutions with which it tends to be replaced is able
properly to express the sorts of things we can express by saying, for
example, ‘I couldn’t help it’. Being able to help it, I shall argue, is
a distinctive and important power, and for a number of significant
reasons, no other way of saying what kind of control is needed for
blameworthiness will do as well.
THEORETICAL PHILOSOPHY FORUM
Institute of Philosophy
Faculty of Humanities, Eötvös University
Address: Múzeum krt. 4/i, Budapest
January Program
There is only one exceptional lecture in January!
16 January (Wednesday) 5:00 PM Room 226
Hong Yu Wong
Philosophy of Neuroscience Group, Centre for Integrative Neuroscience,
University of Tuebingen
A Motor Theory of Bodily Action?
___________________________________
Abstracts and printable program (poster) are available from the web
site of the Forum: http://phil.elte.hu/tpf (Please feel free to post
the program in your institution!)
The Forum is open to everyone, including students, visitors, and faculty
members from all departments and institutes! Format: 60 minute lecture,
coffee break, 60 minute discussion.
The organizer of the Forum: László E. Szabó
(leszabo(a)phil.elte.hu)
--
L a s z l o E. S z a b o
Professor of Philosophy
DEPARTMENT OF LOGIC, INSTITUTE OF PHILOSOPHY
EOTVOS UNIVERSITY, BUDAPEST
http://phil.elte.hu/leszabo
The CEU Department of Philosophy cordially invites you to a talk
(as part of its Departmental Colloquium series)
by
Robert Rupert (University of Colorado)
on
"Embodiment, Consciousness, and the Massively Representational Mind"
Tuesday, 8 January, 2013, 5.30 PM, Zrinyi 14, Room 412
ABSTRACT
In this paper, I first describe the embodied perspective on cognition. I then argue that research on embodiment has produced a wealth of data that, along with a variety of other results, support a massively representational view of the mind. According to this view, the brain is rife with representations that possess overlapping and redundant content, and many of these represent other mental representations or derive their content from them. Moreover, many behavioral phenomena associated with attention and consciousness are best explained by the coordinated activity of units with redundant content. I finish by arguing that this massively representational picture challenges the reliability of a priori theorizing about consciousness.