The CEU Department of Philosophy cordially invites you to a talk
(as part of its Departmental Colloquium series)
by
Yitzhak Melamed (Johns Hopkins University)
on
"Spinoza's Mereology"
PLEASE NOTE THAT THE TALK IS SCHEDULED ON
WEDNESDAY IN ROOM 311!!!!!!
Wednesday, 28 November, 2012, 5.30 PM, Zrinyi 14, Room 311
ABSTRACT
Mereology and the concept of part has a central role in Spinoza’s
metaphysics and is closely related to many of his key notions, such as
substance, Extension, power, infinity, infinite modes, parallelism,
adequacy and inadequacy of ideas, individuals, and singular things [res
singulares]. Yet, the topic has hardly been discussed in the existing
literature. Mereology became a vital field in analytic metaphysics only
relatively recently (roughly over the past two decades), and this could
explain part of the scholarly neglect among historians of modern
metaphysics who frequently follow the trends of contemporary
metaphysics. Paucity of early modern primary resources discussing
mereology was never an issue; most of Spinoza’s works include detailed
discussions of part and whole. In fact, one of the major obstacles in
the study of Spinoza’s mereology is finding a way to ease and reconcile
the tensions among various claims of Spinoza, tensions that could be due
to local inconsistencies, equivocal use of ‘part [pars]’, or genuine
changes in Spinoza’s understanding of parts and wholes. Spinoza
developed his philosophy over a period of almost two decades, and it is
clear that he kept revising his views, including, as we shall see, some
of his mereological assumptions.
We cordially invite you to the next lecture of the BME Cognitive Seminar
Series:
Date & Time: December 3, Monday, 12:00-13:00
Location: BME, XI., Egry József utca 1., T. ép 515.
*General and specific factors of reading development*
*Dénes Tóth, PhD*
MTA-TTK
(Hungarian Academy of Sciences - Institute of Cognitive Neuroscience and
Psychology)
web: http://www.mtapi.hu/index.php?mi=419&lang=en&
Abstract
On the psychological level, phonological processing, especially phoneme
awareness is regarded as a key factor in early reading development.
Based on a large-scale international behavioral study, we present an
alternative view instead of the commonly adopted schema which suggests
causal or reciprocal cognitive factors. The general (g) factor model of
reading presumes a general (mostly genetically determined) factor and
several independent specific factors behind reading and reading-related
behavioral performance. The model is universal in the sense that it has
almost the same structure in several alphabetical orthographies and it
also partly explains non-phonological, that is purely orthographic
processing. The g factor can be conceived as a specialization ability
that certain brain areas not devoted to reading-related processing are
able to transform in the first phase of reading acquisition in a way
which enables the mapping or recoding of orthographic and phonological
information at an elementary level, allowing the automatisation of both
phonological and orthographic access. However, the optimization of
orthographic processing corresponding to the statistical regularities of
a given orthography contains components which are almost fully
independent from these processes. We base the latter argument on a
large-scale developmental experiment in which the encoding of various
visual elements (letters, digits and symbols) and their position was
investigated and complex interactions were found, suggesting that the
development of orthographic processing also reflects adaptive
specialization.
--
Attila Keresztes
Junior Research Fellow
Budapest University of Technology and Economics
Dept. of Cognitive Science,
Egry József u. 1, Budapest
1111, Hungary
Tel: +36 1 4633525
THEORETICAL PHILOSOPHY FORUM
Institute of Philosophy
Faculty of Humanities, Eötvös University
Address: Múzeum krt. 4/i, Budapest
December Program
5 December (Wednesday) 5:00 PM Room 226
Tomislav Bracanović
Department of Philosophy, Center for Croatian Studies at the University of
Zagreb
Respect for Cultural Diversity or Bioethics?
12 December (Wednesday) 5:00 PM Room 226
Márton Gömöri
Department of Logic, Institute of Philosophy, Eötvös University, Budapest
Only one kind of convention
19 December (Wednesday) 5:00 PM Room 226
Zalán Gyenis* and Miklós Rédei**
* Department of Mathematics, Central European University, Budapest
** Department of Philosophy, Logic and Scientific Method, LSE, London
Why `Bertrand's paradox' is not paradoxical
___________________________________
Abstracts and printable program (poster) are available from the web
site of the Forum: http://phil.elte.hu/tpf (Please feel free to post
the program in your institution!)
The Forum is open to everyone, including students, visitors, and faculty
members from all departments and institutes! Format: 60 minute lecture,
coffee break, 60 minute discussion.
The organizer of the Forum: László E. Szabó
(leszabo(a)phil.elte.hu)
--
L a s z l o E. S z a b o
Professor of Philosophy
DEPARTMENT OF LOGIC, INSTITUTE OF PHILOSOPHY
EOTVOS UNIVERSITY, BUDAPEST
http://phil.elte.hu/leszabo
Dear All,
The Department of Cognitive Psychology, Eötvös Loránd University cordially
invites you again to the next public lecture of Eötvös Loránd University
Cognitive Seminar Series by *Paavo Leppänen, *professor at University of
Jyväskylä (
https://www.jyu.fi/ytk/laitokset/psykologia/henkilokunta/leppanen_p).
Title: Language related disorders and neurobiological risk factors
Date: 06. dec. 2012.* *17:00-18:00
Venue: ELTE-PPK, Izabella u. 46., room 211.
Everyone is welcome to attend.
Best regards,
Linda Garami
garami.linda(a)ppk.elte.hu <linda.garami(a)ppk.elte.hu>
Department of Cognitive Psychology
Eötvös Loránd University
THEORETICAL PHILOSOPHY FORUM
Institute of Philosophy
Faculty of Humanities, Eötvös University
Address: Múzeum krt. 4/i, Budapest
28 November (Wednesday) 5:00 PM Room 226
Péter Fazekas
Institute of Philosophy, Research Center for the Humanities, Hungarian
Academy of Sciences
From H2O to Water - The Prospects of Reductive Explanation
___________________________________
Abstracts and printable program (poster) are available from the web
site of the Forum: http://phil.elte.hu/tpf (Please feel free to post
the program in your institution!)
The Forum is open to everyone, including students, visitors, and faculty
members from all departments and institutes! Format: 60 minute lecture,
coffee break, 60 minute discussion.
The organizer of the Forum: László E. Szabó
(leszabo(a)phil.elte.hu)
--
L a s z l o E. S z a b o
Professor of Philosophy
DEPARTMENT OF LOGIC, INSTITUTE OF PHILOSOPHY
EOTVOS UNIVERSITY, BUDAPEST
http://phil.elte.hu/leszabo
The CEU Department of Philosophy cordially invites you to a talk
(as part of its Departmental Colloquium series)
by
Yitzhak Melamed (Johns Hopkins University)
on
"Spinoza's Mereology"
PLEASE NOTE THAT THE TALK IS SCHEDULED ON
WEDNESDAY IN ROOM 311!!!!!!
Wednesday, 28 November, 2012, 5.30 PM, Zrinyi 14, Room 311
ABSTRACT
Mereology and the concept of part has a central role in Spinoza’s
metaphysics and is closely related to many of his key notions, such as
substance, Extension, power, infinity, infinite modes, parallelism,
adequacy and inadequacy of ideas, individuals, and singular things [res
singulares]. Yet, the topic has hardly been discussed in the existing
literature. Mereology became a vital field in analytic metaphysics only
relatively recently (roughly over the past two decades), and this could
explain part of the scholarly neglect among historians of modern
metaphysics who frequently follow the trends of contemporary
metaphysics. Paucity of early modern primary resources discussing
mereology was never an issue; most of Spinoza’s works include detailed
discussions of part and whole. In fact, one of the major obstacles in
the study of Spinoza’s mereology is finding a way to ease and reconcile
the tensions among various claims of Spinoza, tensions that could be due
to local inconsistencies, equivocal use of ‘part [pars]’, or genuine
changes in Spinoza’s understanding of parts and wholes. Spinoza
developed his philosophy over a period of almost two decades, and it is
clear that he kept revising his views, including, as we shall see, some
of his mereological assumptions.
Tisztelt Kollégák!
Megkértek a csatolt file-ban lévő meghívó körbeküldésére. A Magyar
Tudomány Ünnepének keretén belül holnap (november 22.) 16 órától
Lendület pályázatot elnyert kutatók tartanak előadást.
Winkler István: Mielőtt megtanulunk beszélni: A kommunikáció
előfeltételei csecsemőknél
Hájos Norbert: Az elbódított figyelem. Hogyan befolyásolja a marihuána
az agyhullámokat?
Orbán Gergő: Csalhatatlan (?) idegrendszer
Üdvözlettel,
Gaál Zsófia Anna
--
Zsófia Anna Gaál, PhD
Institute of Cognitive Neuroscience and Psychology
Research Centre for Natural Sciences
Hungarian Academy of Sciences
Tel.: +36-1-354-2297
1394 Budapest, POB 398.
www.mtapi.hu/gaalzs
PLEASE NOTE: Our seminar room has a limited capacity. Please arrive early to ensure you get a seat. The talk will begin promptly at 5.
The next talk in the CDC Seminar series will be given by:
Thomas C. Gunter (Max Planck Institute for Human, Cognitive and Brain Sciences, Leipzig)
Date: Wednesday, November 21, 2012, 5 PM
Location: Cognitive Development Center, Hattyú u. 14, 3rd floor
Title: Gesture-speech integration: Some examples of how gestures impact our verbal communication
Abstract: In everyday face-to-face conversation, speakers not only use speech to transfer information but also rely on facial expression, body posture and gestures. In this talk I will take a closer look on how gestures potentially influence language processing on a semantic (part 1) as well as on a syntactic (part 2) level. The first part of the talk sketches some of the semantic influences of gestures and focus on how iconic gestures affect speech comprehension. Iconic gestures have a close formal relationship to the semantic content of speech. For instance, a speaker might perform a typing movement with her fingers while saying: “Yesterday I wrote the letter”. Clearly, a listener can extract additional information from these gestures (e.g. we know that the letter was written on a keyboard and not with a pen). Although there is no doubt that iconic gestures are communicative and can be integrated online with speech, little is known about the nature of this process and how our own communicative abilities and also our environment influence this integration process. In order to shed some light on these issues I will review several ERP-experiments which looked at the influence of task, timing and environment on gesture-speech integration. We will also discuss the issue whether gestures are incorporated in a personal communication style and whether they will selectively impact the perception of the communication of a specific individual. The second part of the talk will explore the possibility that gesture influences the syntactic aspect of language and will focus on beat-gestures. A beat gesture is a short, rhythmic movement or series of movements of the hand. They have been suggested to accent or emphasize portions of the co-expressive speech and may therefore influence which syntactic structure is assigned to a sequence of words. Recently we have carried out several ERP-experiments that suggest that indeed such gestures (and not other types of emphasis) can disambiguate ambiguous syntactic structures. Taken all the experimental evidence together, I will suggest that most effective communication not only involves the mouth, but also the hands.
Cognitive Science Events at CEU: http://cognitivescience.ceu.hu/events
_______________________________________________
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Dear All,
This is a kind reminder about Alex Rosenberg's public lecture.
Please find attached Professor Rosenberg's notes that he'll base his
lecture on.
The Department of Philosophy & the Provost’s Office at CEU
cordially invite you to a public lecture by
ALEX ROSENBERG
Duke University
on
on
>From Rational Choice to Reflexivity: Learning from Sen, Keynes, Hayek,
and Soros
at 17:30 on Wednesday, November 21, 2012
CEU-Auditorium, 1051 Bp., Nádor u. 9.
This lecture identifies the major failings of mainstream economics and
the rational choice theory it relies upon. These failures were
identified by the four figures mentioned in the title: economics treats
agents as rational fools; by the time the long run equilibrium arrives,
we are all dead; the social, political and economic institutions that
meet most urgent human needs most effectively could not have been the
result of rational choice, but their "spontaneous order" needs to be
explained; human uncertainty and reflexivity prohibit a predictively
useful rational choice approach to human affairs, and even limit its
role in institution design. The upshot is not a counsel of despair for
social science but a guide to the kind of knowledge that the guidance of
policy--public and private--really needs.
Alex Rosenberg is the R. Taylor Cole Professor of Philosophy at Duke
University, where is also professor of biology and political science.
Rosenberg has been a visiting professor and fellow of the at the Center
for the Philosophy of Science, University of Minnesota, visiting
lecturer at Oxford University and a visiting fellow at the Research
School of Social Science, of the Australian National University. In 1993
Rosenberg received the Lakatos Award in the philosophy of science. In
2007 he held a fellowship at the National Humanities Center. In the same
year he was also the Phi Beta Kappa-Romanell Lecturer. He is the author
of many books in the philosophy of social and biological sciences.
Kind regards,
Zsuzsanna Bajó
Assistant
Office of Provost & the Pro-Rector for Hungarian and EU Affairs
Central European University
H-1051 Budapest, Nador u. 9.
Tel.: (+ 36 1) 327 3000/2188
Fax: (+ 36 1) 327 3007 ( tel:%28%2B%2036%201%29%20327%203007 )
E-mail: bajozs(a)ceu.hu ( mailto:bajozs@ceu.hu )
Web: www.ceu.hu
The CEU Department of Philosophy cordially invites you to a talk
(as part of its Departmental Colloquium series)
by
Stephen Butterfill (University of Warwick)
on
'Shared Agency and Motor Representation'
Tuesday, 20 November, 2012, 5.30 PM, Zrinyi 14, Room 412
ABSTRACT
Shared agency is paradigmatically involved when two or more people paint a house together, tidy the toys away together, or lift a two-handled basket together. To characterise shared agency, some philosophers have appealed to a special kind of intention or structure of intention, knowledge or commitment often called 'shared intention'. In this talk I shall argue that fully characterising shared agency may additionally require appeal to motor representation. Shared agency is not only a matter of what we intend: sometimes it also depends on interlocking structures of motor representation. This may have consequences for some metaphysical, normative and phenomenological questions about shared agency.