The CEU Department of Philosophy cordially invites you to a talk
(as part of its Departmental Colloquium series)
by
Carla Bagnoli (University of Modena and Reggio)
on
`Respect and Objectivity`
Tuesday, 1 October, 2013, 5.30 PM, Zrinyi 14, Room 412
ABSTRACT
This paper addresses the issue of ethical objectivity and argues that the emotion of respect plays a crucial role in an objectivist account of practical cognition. This argument is part of a constructivist yet cognitivist defense of ethical objectivity.
Dear all,
This is to inform you that unfortunately Coralie Chevallier's talk,
scheduled on Wednesday, September 25, is cancelled. Our next seminar will
take place on Wednesday October 2.
Olivier.
_______________________________________________
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Dear all,
The next talk in our seminar series will by given by:
Coralie Chevallier (Ecole Normale Supérieure, Paris)
Date: Wednesday, September 25, 2013, 5 PM
Location: Cognitive Development Center, Hattyú u. 14, 3rd floor
Title: Social motivation and social cognition in autism: what are the links?
Autism Spectrum Disorders are characterized by pervasive social deficits.
The idea that impaired Theory of Mind is a primary cause behind these
impairments has had a profound impact on the field and remains one of the
most prominent accounts of the condition. In this talk, I will sketch out
an alternative framework based on the idea that social motivation is a
driving force guiding human behaviour and that disruption of these
motivational mechanisms is a core deficit in autism. In this framework,
deficits in social interest are construed as a consequence, rather than a
cause, of impairments in social cognition.
PLEASE NOTE: Our seminar room has a limited capacity. Please arrive early
to ensure you get a seat. The talk will begin promptly at 5.
Cognitive Science Events at CEU: http://cognitivescience.ceu.hu/events
_______________________________________________
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_______________________________________________
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The CEU Department of Philosophy cordially invites you to a talk
(as part of its Departmental Colloquium series)
by
Tim Crane (Cambridge University)
on
No identity without an entity
Tuesday, 24 September, 2013, 5.30 PM, Zrinyi 14, Room 412
ABSTRACT
We often think about things that don't exist, and we seem to make judgements about the sameness and difference of such non-existent objects (Hermes is the same god as Mercury). But what does it mean to say that one non-existent object is the same as another? This question was posed by PT Geach many years ago under the label 'intentional identity'. In this talk I argue that there is no such thing as intentional identity, but nonetheless it is true that non-existent intentional objects can be the same as, or different from, other non-existent objects.
THEORETICAL PHILOSOPHY FORUM
Institute of Philosophy
Faculty of Humanities, Eötvös University
Address: Múzeum krt. 4/i, Budapest
25 September (Wednesday) 5:00 PM Room 226
Judit Gébert* and János Tőzsér**
* Institute of Economics and Economic Development, University of Szeged
** Department of Social Science, University of Kaposvár
Kezdőtőke haladóknak
(Start-up capital for progressives)
___________________________________
Abstracts and printable program (poster) are available from the web
site of the Forum: http://phil.elte.hu/tpf (Please feel free to post
the program in your institution!)
The Forum is open to everyone, including students, visitors, and faculty
members from all departments and institutes! Format: 60 minute lecture,
coffee break, 60 minute discussion.
The organizer of the Forum: László E. Szabó
(leszabo(a)phil.elte.hu)
--
L a s z l o E. S z a b o
Professor of Philosophy
DEPARTMENT OF LOGIC, INSTITUTE OF PHILOSOPHY
EOTVOS UNIVERSITY, BUDAPEST
http://phil.elte.hu/leszabo
--
L a s z l o E. S z a b o
Professor of Philosophy
DEPARTMENT OF LOGIC, INSTITUTE OF PHILOSOPHY
EOTVOS UNIVERSITY, BUDAPEST
http://phil.elte.hu/leszabo
Dear All,
First of all let us thank all the ones who have already submitted their papers to the forthcoming 4th IEEE CogInfoCom 2013 Conference (we really appreciate your efforts as we understand that September is a very busy period of the year).
At the same time, we have some good news as we could extend the FIRST submission deadline till 22 September, 2013. To submit your manuscripts please use the following link:https://www.easychair.org/account/signin.cgi?conf=coginfocom2013 .
It is important to know that draft papers can also be uploaded (the final submission deadline is 08 November, 2013 so authors will have ca. 2 months to complete and/or amend their manuscripts).
Should you have any questions that needs our attention or assistance please send us an e-mail so that we can support you to a successful submission process.
Kind regards,
Bernadette
Bernadette Mérő
on behalf of the CogInfoCom 2013 International Organizing Committee
1111 Budapest
Kende utca 13-17. VI/611.
Tel.: +36.1 / 279-6111
Fax: +36.1 / 279-6218
http://coginfocom.hu/conference/CogInfoCom13
*Kedves kollégák,*
*hadd ajánljam a figyelmetekbe a következő konferenciát.*
*Üdvözlettel,*
*Tőzsér János*
**
*
*
*KONFERENCIAFELHÍVÁS*
A Kaposvári Egyetem Pedagógiai Karának Társadalomtudományi Tanszéke az
"Analitikus filozófia és fenomenológia" konferenciasorozat keretén belül
konferenciát szervez
*Más elmék*
címmel.
*A konferencia ideje:* 2014. január 17-18.
*A konferencia helyszíne:* Kaposvári Egyetem (Kaposvár, Guba Sándor u.
40.).
*A konferenciára való jelentkezés határideje*: 2013. december 15.
*A konferencia szervezői:* Bács Gábor, Molnár Gábor, Tőzsér János.
A jelentkezéseket (melyeknek a tervezett előadás 10-15 soros
összefoglalóját kell tartalmazniuk) a következő e-mailcímre kérjük:
analitikusesfenomenologia(a)gmail.com
THEORETICAL PHILOSOPHY FORUM
Institute of Philosophy
Faculty of Humanities, Eötvös University
Address: Múzeum krt. 4/i, Budapest
October Program
2 October (Wednesday) 5:00 PM Room 226
Balázs Gyenis
Institute of Philosophy, Research Center for the Humanities, Hungarian Academy of Sciences
Department of History and Philosophy of Science, University of Pittsburgh
The birth of statistical mechanics: a colored vision
9 October (Wednesday) 5:00 PM Room 226
Michael Epperson
Center for Philosophy and the Natural Sciences California State University, Sacramento
Potentiality and Contextuality in Quantum Mechanics: The Relational Realist Approach
16 October (Wednesday) 5:00 PM Room 226
Márta Ujvári
Institute of Sociology and Social Policy, Corvinus University, Budapest
Mereological principles doing metaphysical job
___________________________________
Abstracts and printable program (poster) are available from the web
site of the Forum: http://phil.elte.hu/tpf (Please feel free to post
the program in your institution!)
The Forum is open to everyone, including students, visitors, and faculty
members from all departments and institutes! Format: 60 minute lecture,
coffee break, 60 minute discussion.
The organizer of the Forum: László E. Szabó
(leszabo(a)phil.elte.hu)
--
L a s z l o E. S z a b o
Professor of Philosophy
DEPARTMENT OF LOGIC, INSTITUTE OF PHILOSOPHY
EOTVOS UNIVERSITY, BUDAPEST
http://phil.elte.hu/leszabo
--
L a s z l o E. S z a b o
Professor of Philosophy
DEPARTMENT OF LOGIC, INSTITUTE OF PHILOSOPHY
EOTVOS UNIVERSITY, BUDAPEST
http://phil.elte.hu/leszabo
The CEU Department of Philosophy cordially invites you to a talk
(as part of its Departmental Colloquium series)
by
Tim Crane (Cambridge University)
on
No identity without an entity
Tuesday, 24 September, 2013, 5.30 PM, Zrinyi 14, Room 412
ABSTRACT
We often think about things that don't exist, and we seem to make judgements about the sameness and difference of such non-existent objects (Hermes is the same god as Mercury). But what does it mean to say that one non-existent object is the same as another? This question was posed by PT Geach many years ago under the label 'intentional identity'. In this talk I argue that there is no such thing as intentional identity, but nonetheless it is true that non-existent intentional objects can be the same as, or different from, other non-existent objects.