The CEU Department of Philosophy cordially invites you to a talk
(as part of its Departmental Colloquium series)
by
Julian Fink (University of Vienna)
on
`Is change normatively required?`
Tuesday, 4 October, 2011, 4.30 PM, Zrinyi 14, Room 412
ABSTRACT
This paper discusses whether rationality, morality, or prudence impose process-requirements upon us, i.e. requirements that demand of us to change. It has been argued that process-requirements fulfil two essential functions within a system of rational, moral, or prudential requirements. These functions are considered to prove the existence of process-requirements. First, process-requirements are deemed necessary to ensure that rationality, morality, or prudence can guide our deliberations and actions. Second, their existence is regarded as essential for the correctness of our ordinary explanations of why a person possesses a certain degree of morality, rationality, or prudence. However, I argue that these two functions are unable to show the existence of process-requirements. Instead, I propose a different essential function for process-requirements: they are necessary for attributing the correct degree of rationality, morality, or prudence to a subject who is not entirely rational, moral, or prudent. This function, I argue, necessitates the existence of process-requirements.
PLEASE NOTE: Our seminar room has a limited capacity. Please try to arrive
early to ensure you get a seat!
The next talk in the CDC seminar series will be given by:
Barry Hewlett, Washington State University-Vancouver
Date: October 5, 2011, 5 PM
Location: Hattyú u. 14, 3rd floor
*Social Learning among Congo Basin Hunter-Gatherers
*
Abstract: This paper explores childhood social learning among Aka and Bofi
hunter-gatherers in central Africa. Existing literature suggests
hunter-gatherer social learning is primarily vertical (parent-to-child) and
that teaching is rare. We use behavioral observations, open-ended and
semi-structured interviews and informal and anecdotal observations to
examine the modes (e.g., vertical versus horizontal/oblique) and processes
(e.g., teaching versus observation and imitation) of cultural transmission.
Cultural and demographic contexts of social learning associated with the
modes and processes of cultural transmission are described. Hunter-gatherer
social learning occurred early, was relatively rapid, primarily vertical
under age 5, and oblique and horizontal between the ages of 6 and 12.
Pedagogy and other forms of teaching existed as early as 12 months of age,
but were relatively infrequent by comparison to others processes of social
learning, such as observation and imitation.
Cognitive Science events at CEU: http://cognitivescience.ceu.hu/events
_______________________________________________
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Kedves Érdeklődők,
Az ELTE Kongnitív Péntek sorozata idén is folytatódik, a következő előadásra
jövő hét pénteken kerül sor:
*Nádasdy Zoltán*: Egészséges és patológiás oszcillációk az agykéregben
2011. október 7. 14:00-15:00, Izabella u. 46., 216 terem
Ebben a félévben előre láthatóan a következő előadókat üdvözölhetjük
rendezvényeinken:
Nádasdy Zoltán,
Nemes Gáspár,
Natalie Sebanz
További részletes információk és absztraktok a megszokott helyen:
https://sites.google.com/site/eltekognitiv/home/elte-kognitiv-pentek
Szeretettel várunk minden Kedves Érdeklődőt!
Üdvözlettel:
Garami Linda
ELTE-PPK Kognitív Pszichológia Tanszék
The CEU Department of Philosophy cordially invites you to a talk
(as part of its Departmental Colloquium series)
by
Eric Brown (CEU Business School)
on
`Pro-attitudes and the problem of the wrong kind of reasons`
Tuesday, 27 September, 2011, 4.30 PM, Zrinyi 14, Room 412
ABSTRACT
Wrong kind of reasons (WKR) objections to fitting-attitude analysis of value, as well as the very idea of the wrong kind of reasons, can be defused by paying close attention to the attitudes that are posited or imagined by scenarios, e.g., in which we are told that an evil demon will punish us with
extreme pain unless they admire him. My argument, based on considerations relation to the role proattitudes must play in defeasible practical inference, is that such attitudes are strictly impossible. If the attitudes are impossible, then there cannot be reasons for them. A fortiori there can be no wrong kind
of reasons for them. I also provide a diagnosis of the standard approach to WKR objections. Such approaches focus on trying to sort reasons into the right and wrong kinds using some right- or wrong-making property. I
try to show, through a detailed analysis of two such attempts, why this won't work.
Kriszta Biber
Department Coordinator
Philosophy Department
Tel: 36-1-327-3806
Fax: 36-1-327-3072
E-mail: biberk(a)ceu.hu
Dear Dr. Qwerty:
We are writing you to announce that BBS has just accepted an article for open peer commentary in BBS. The article was already reviewed, and we are now accepting commentary proposals. If you are interested in writing a commentary, you are welcome to submit a short proposal (see instructions below). No action is required if you aren't interested.
Please DO NOT submit a full commentary article unless you are formally invited---AFTER you submit a commentary *proposal*. We will review all commentary proposals and issue invitations around the beginning of November. Also, please be aware that we typically receive far more commentary proposals than we can accommodate with formal invitations. When choosing invitations, we balance over multiple factors, including the interest of the commentary itself, the commentator's expertise, whether the commentator's work has been discussed in the target article, and other considerations.
NOW PROCESSING COMMENTARY PROPOSALS ON:
Target Article: "Towards a Universal Model of Reading"
Author: Ram Frost
Deadline for Commentary Proposals: October 17, 2011
Abstract: In the last decade, reading research has seen a paradigmatic shift. A new wave of computational models of orthographic processing that offer various forms of noisy position or context-sensitive coding, have revolutionized the field of visual word recognition. The influx of such models stems mainly from consistent findings, coming mostly from European languages, regarding an apparent insensitivity of skilled readers to letter-order. Underlying the current revolution is the theoretical assumption that the insensitivity of readers to letter order reflects the special way in which the human brain encodes the position of letters in printed words. The present paper discusses the theoretical shortcomings and misconceptions of this approach to visual word recognition. A systematic review of data obtained from a variety of languages demonstrates that letter-order insensitivity is not a general property of the cognitive system, neither it is a property of the brain in
encoding letters. Rather, it is a variant and idiosyncratic characteristic of some languages, mostly European, reflecting a strategy of optimizing encoding resources, given the specific structure of words. Since the main goal of reading research is to develop theories that describe the fundamental and invariant phenomena of reading across orthographies, an alternative approach to model visual word recognition is offered. The dimensions of a possible universal model of reading, which outlines the common cognitive operations involved in orthographic processing in all writing systems, are discussed.
Keywords: Orthographic processing; visual word recognition; reading; letter-position flexibility; morphological structure; cross-linguistic research
Download Target Article Preprint:http://journals.cambridge.org/BBSJournal/Call/Frost_preprint
COMMENTARY PROPOSALS *MUST* INCLUDE THE FOLLOWING
1. What aspect of the target article or book you would anticipate commenting on.
2. The relevant expertise you would bring to bear on the target article or book.
Please include names and affiliations of your co-authors, if applicable, in the text of your commentary proposal.
SUGGESTING COMMENTATORS AND NOMINATING BBS ASSOCIATES
Commentators must be BBS Associates, or suggested by a BBS Associate. If you are not a BBS Associate, please follow the instructions below. To suggest others as possible Commentators, or to nominate others for BBS Associateship status, please email bbsjournal(a)cambridge.org.
http://journals.cambridge.org/BBSJournal/Inst/Assoc
HOW TO SUBMIT A COMMENTARY PROPOSAL
If you would like to nominate yourself for potential commentary invitation, you must submit a Commentary Proposal via our BBS Editorial Manager site:
1. Log-in as Author
Username: CQwerty-545
Password: Qwerty875632
Log-in to your BBS Editorial Manager account as an author:
http://www.editorialmanager.com/bbs
If you do not have an account, please visit the site and register. You can also submit a request for missing username and password information if you have an existing account.
2. Submit New Manuscript
Within your author main menu please select Submit New Manuscript.
3. Select Article Type
Choose the article type of your manuscript from the pull-down menu. Commentary Proposal article types are temporarily created for each accepted target article or book. Only select the Commentary Proposal article type that you wish to submit a proposal on. For example: "Commentary Proposal (Frost)"
4. Enter Title
Please title your proposal submission by indicating the relevant first author name of the target article or book. For example: "Commentary Proposal on Frost"
5. Add Co-Authors
If you are proposing to write a commentary with any co-authors, the system will not allow you to enter their information here. Instead, include their names in the commentary proposal document you upload. These potential co-authors need not contribute to the Commentary Proposal itself.
6. Attach Files
The only required submission Item is your Commentary Proposal in MSWord or RTF format. In the Description field please add the first author name of the target article or book. For example: "Commentary Proposal on Frost"
7. Approve Your Submission
Editorial Manager will process your Commentary Proposal submission and will create a PDF for your approval. On the "Submissions Waiting for Author's Approval" page, you can view your PDF, edit, approve, or remove the submission. (You might have to wait several minutes for the blue "Action" menu to appear, allowing you to approve. Once you have Approved the Submission, the PDF will be sent to the editorial office.
**It is VERY important that you check and approve your Commentary Proposal manuscript as described above. Otherwise, we cannot process your submission.**
8. Editorial Office Decision
At the conclusion of the Commentary Proposal period, the editors will review all the submitted Commentary Proposals. An undetermined number of Commentary Proposals will be approved and those author names will be added to the final commentary invitation list. At that time you will be notified of the decision. If you are formally invited to submit a commentary, you will be asked to confirm your intention to submit by the commentary deadline.
Note: Before the commentary invitations are sent, the copy-edited and revised target article will be posted for invitees. In the case of Multiple Book Review, invitees will be sent a copy of the book to be commented upon if requested. With Multiple Book Reviews, it is the book, not the précis article that is the target of commentary.
Please do not write a commentary unless you have received an official invitation!
BEING REMOVED FROM THE CALL EMAIL LIST
If you DO NOT wish to receive Call for Commentary Proposals in the future, please reply to bbsjournal(a)cambridge.org, and type "remove" in the subject line.
Sincerely,
Gennifer Levey
Managing Editor, BBS
Cambridge University Press
bbsjournal(a)cambridge.org
http://journals.cambridge.org/bbshttp://bbs.edmgr.com/
ELTE Kognitív Pszichológiai Tanszék 2011 őszi mester és doktori
kurzusai Szeretettel
várunk minden külsős érdeklődőt az ELTE Kognitív Pszichológiai Tanszék
kurzusain. A külsős hallgatók vegyék fel a kapcsolatot az oktatóval, ha be
szeretnének járni az órákra. Az oktatók elérhetősége megtalálható a
honlapunkon: kognitiv.elte.hu
Kurzus címe Oktató Időpont és helyszín Az agyi oszcillációk szerepe a
neurális kódolásban Nádasdy Zoltán Megbeszélés szerint Neuropszichológia -
neurofiziológia Nádasdy Zoltán Kónya Anikó
Tóth Brigitta Kedd, 16:00-17:30, IZU 422
Kedd 17:30-19:00, IZU 405 (okt. 11-ig) A pszichológiai kutatás etikája
Honbolygó
Ferenc Megbeszélés szerint Hallási percepció Honbolygó Ferenc Megbeszélés
szerint Térképek az agyban - a vizuális reprezentációk (mibenléte és
természete) Tompa Tamás Megbeszélés szerint Laborgyakorlatok 1:
Kísérlettervezés, adatelemzés Horváth János Csütörtök, 14:30-16:00,
IZU 402 Magatartásszabályozás,
viselkedésvezérlés Batta Barbara Hétfő, 10:00-11:30, IZU 201 Magasabbrendű
kognitív folyamatok Ragó Anett Csütörtök, 9:30-11:00, IZU 405 Fejezetek a
kognitív fejlődéspszichológia területéről Ragó Anett
Garami Linda Kedd, 12:00-13:30, IZU 402 Neurogenetika és
viselkedésgenetika Gervai
Judit Kedd, 14:00-15:30
Victor Hugo u. 18-22. I. em. 37 terem Fejlődéskutatás Király Ildikó Szerda,
10:00-13:30, IZU 402 Észlelés Horváth János Hétfő, 16:00-17:30, IZU
201 Laborgyakorlatok
2: Szakirányon belüli specializáció Ragó Anett, Garami Linda, Kónya
Anikó Péntek,
13:30-15:00, IZU 201 Evolúciós és/vagy fejlődéspszichológia Topál József Hétfő,
14:30-16:00, IZU 206 Funkcionális képalkotó adatok elemzése Krajcsi Attila
https://sites.google.com/site/kepalkotoeljarasok/Kurzusok/tematika2011osz
Kutatásmódszertan Krajcsi Attila
https://sites.google.com/site/krajcsi/Home/kurzusok/kutatasmodszertan-2011
További információ a tanszék honlapján (kognitiv.elte.hu) és Horváth
Zsuzsától (horvath.zsuzsa(a)ppk.elte.hu).
The CEU Department of Philosophy cordially invites you to a talk
(as part of its Departmental Colloquium series)
by
Eric Brown (CEU Business School)
on
`Pro-attitudes and the problem of the wrong kind of reasons`
Tuesday, 27 September, 2011, 4.30 PM, Zrinyi 14, Room 412
ABSTRACT
Wrong kind of reasons (WKR) objections to fitting-attitude analysis of value, as well as the very idea of the wrong kind of reasons, can be defused by paying close attention to the attitudes that are posited or imagined by scenarios, e.g., in which we are told that an evil demon will punish us with
extreme pain unless they admire him. My argument, based on considerations relation to the role proattitudes must play in defeasible practical inference, is that such attitudes are strictly impossible. If the attitudes are impossible, then there cannot be reasons for them. A fortiori there can be no wrong kind
of reasons for them. I also provide a diagnosis of the standard approach to WKR objections. Such approaches focus on trying to sort reasons into the right and wrong kinds using some right- or wrong-making property. I
try to show, through a detailed analysis of two such attempts, why this won't work.
Kriszta Biber
Department Coordinator
Philosophy Department
Tel: 36-1-327-3806
Fax: 36-1-327-3072
E-mail: biberk(a)ceu.hu
The next talk in the CDC Seminar series will be given by:
Soonja Choi, San Diego State University
Date: Wednesday, September 21, 2011, 5 PM
Location: CEU Cognitive Development Center, Hattyú u. 14, 3rd floor
*Language and Thought: Spatial Semantics & Spatial Cognition from Infancy to
Adulthood*
Abstract: Languages differ significantly in the way they categorize spatial
relations. For example, English makes a distinction between containment
(e.g. putting an apple IN a bowl) and support (e.g. putting a cup ON a
table), whereas Korean makes a distinction between loose fit and tight fit
regardless of containment and support. In Korean, the verb *KKITA* ‘tight
fit or interlock’ is used for both a tight-fit containment relation such as
‘putting a book tightly in its box-shaped cover’ and a tight-fit support
relation such as ‘putting a Lego piece tightly onto another’.
The extensiveness of cross-linguistic differences in spatial semantic
categorization found in recent studies on adult grammars raises questions
about when and how children acquire the spatial semantic system of their
native language, and more generally, about the relationship between language
and cognition in children and adults. In this talk, I present studies that
examine language-specific input and spatial cognition in learners and adult
speakers of English and Korean. In particular, I examine whether and to what
extent language-specific semantics can influence nonverbal spatial
categorization involving tight fit, containment and support. Overall, my
studies show that there is a dynamic interaction between language and
cognition from an early age and that language starts to influence spatial
cognition as children use spatial words productively. However, some
perceptual aspects persist and contribute to spatial categorization in
certain contexts regardless of language-specific input.
Cognitive Science events at CEU: http://cognitivescience.ceu.hu/events
_______________________________________________
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Continuity and Innovation in Medieval and Modern Philosophy of Knowledge, Mind and Language
The Dawes Hicks Symposium
10.30am - 5.30pm, Friday, 28 October 2011
British Academy, 10-11 Carlton House Terrace, London SW1
Main speakers: Martin Lenz (Humboldt University, Berlin); Robert Pasnau (University of Colorado); Dominik Perler (Humboldt University, Berlin)
Commentators (respectively): Michael Ayers FBA (University of Oxford); John Hawthorne (University of Oxford); Andrew Pyle (University of Bristol)
Chairman/organizer: John Marenbon FBA (Trinity College, Cambridge)
How modern is modern philosophy? Recently specialists in medieval philosophy have been examining how scholasticism was developed up to the Seventeenth Century, whilst experts on seventeenth-century philosophers have been looking back to scholasticism. This symposium
explores these continuities and changes.
About the Speakers:
Martin Lenz, whose recent book (Lockes Sprachkonzeption, 2010) shows how far Locke’s philosophy of language is far from a crude mentalist stereotype, will speak on "Essences and
Signification: Medieval Heritage and Innovation in Locke's Philosophy of Language".
Robert Pasnau, author of Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 (2011) looks at "Epistemic Divisions of Labor: Who Should Know, Who Should Believe, and Who Should be Left in the Dark", with special reference to Aquinas, Locke and Averroes.
Dominik Perler, who has just published Transformationen der Gefühle. Philosophische Emotionstheorien 1270-1670, will discuss "What Are Mental Faculties? A Debate in Late Medieval and Early Modern Philosophy", looking especially at Olivi, Ockham, Descartes and Malebranche.
Attendance is free, but registration is required for this event. Please click here to register via our website.
The British Academy, 10-11 Carlton House Terrace, London SW1Y 5AH Tel: 020 7969 5200, Fax: 020 7969 5300, Web: www.britac.ac.uk
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