koglist February 2010

koglist@maillist.ttk.hu

12 participants
29 discussions

Theoretical Philosophy Forum, Balazs Toth

by Laszlo E. Szabo

THEORETICAL PHILOSOPHY FORUM Institute of Philosophy Faculty of Humanities, Eotvos University Wednesday 5:00 PM Room 226 Muzeum krt. 4/i, Budapest Web site: http://phil.elte.hu/tpf 17 February (Wednesday) 5:00 PM Room 226 Balazs Toth Institute of Philosophy Eotvos University, Budapest A fuggo keletkezes es a tudomanyfilozofia (Nagarjuna's theory of causality and the philosophy of science) Abstract: http://phil.elte.hu/tpf/2009-2010/February/#3 ___________________________________ The Forum is open to everyone, including students, visitors, and faculty members from all departments and institutes! Format: 60 minute lecture, 10 minute coffee break, followed by a 30-60 minute discussion. The language of presentation is English or Hungarian. A printable poster is available from here: http://phil.elte.hu/tpf/2009-2010/February/poster.pdf Please feel free to post it in your institution! The organizer of the Forum: Laszlo E. Szabo (leszabo(a)phil.elte.hu) -- Laszlo E. Szabo professor of philosophy DEPARTMENT OF LOGIC, INSTITUTE OF PHILOSOPHY EOTVOS UNIVERSITY, BUDAPEST http://phil.elte.hu/leszabo

16 years, 2 months

invitation - `Three Approaches to Phenomenal Content`16 February,4.30 PM

by Krisztina Biber

The CEU Philosophy Department cordially invites you to a talk (as part of its Departmental Colloquium series) by Paul Noordhof (University of York) on Three Approaches to Phenomenal Content Tuesday, 16 February 2010, 4.30 PM, Zrinyi 14, Room 412 ABSTRACT I compare three approaches to the determination of phenomenal content (that which characterises what it is like to have mental states or events). They are representation, relation, and property possession. For a variety of reasons, and at the risk of spoiling the suspense, representation (my favoured position) comes out on top. Along the way, I consider spectrum inversion, blurred vision, unconscious representational states, the phenomenal difference between belief and perception, and the implications of the existence of imaginary and hallucinatory states. Kriszta Biber Department Coordinator Philosophy Department Tel: 36-1-327-3806 Fax: 36-1-327-3072 E-mail: biberk(a)ceu.hu

16 years, 2 months

Meghívó - BME Kognitív Szemináriumsorozat

by Attila Keresztes

A BME Kognitív Tudományi Tanszék szeretettel vár mindenkit tanszéki szemináriumsorozatának következő előadására: Február 22., hétfő, 12:00-13:00, BME, XI., Stoczek u. 2., St. ép., 320.-as terem. How to compare apples and oranges: Controlling visual salience in infant studies Káldy Zsuzsa Associate Professor UMass Boston Bővebb info itt Attila Keresztes PhD student Junior research fellow Budapest University of Technology and Economics Dept. of Cognitive Science, Stoczek u. 2., Budapest 1111, Hungary +36 1 4631072 akeresztes(a)cogsci.bme.hu

16 years, 3 months

The desirability of religion and the function of non-cognitive beliefs - 9 February, 4.30 PM

by Krisztina Biber

The CEU Philosophy Department cordially invites you to a talk (as part of its Departmental Colloquium series) by Konrad Talmont-Kaminski (Marie Curie-Sklodowska University) on The desirability of religion and the function of non-cognitive beliefs Tuesday, 9 February, 2010, 4.30 PM, Zrinyi 14, Room 412 ABSTRACT Beliefs have the capacity to guide human behaviour regardless of their truth. In particular, false beliefs can motivate behaviour that is adaptive. Disconfirmation of the beliefs is a threat to their stability, however. The beliefs can be protected from disconfirmation by having content that minimises potential empirical consequences as well as existing in a context that discourages investigation of them or provides only very limited access to the methods that might be used to investigate them. Due to their disconnection from the truth, the plausibility of such beliefs must be explained in terms of human psychology, primarily in terms of a variety of cognitive by-products (Boyer, Atran). Properly understood, such beliefs may be termed *non-cognitive* as their truth or falsehood is irrelevant to their function - they only appear to be assertions. The paradigmatic example of such non-cognitive beliefs is provided by religious traditions: Their content appears to refer to unobservable entities, and they are protected by social rules surrounding the treatment of the sacred as well as having often opposed the development of science. The persistence and potentially adaptive nature of non-cognitive beliefs does not indicate that their effects are such as we might desire. This is the case for two reasons. Firstly, they may only be adaptive for themselves, as suggested by some memeticians (Blackmore, Dawkins). Secondly, even if they are adaptive for believers (Stark) or groups of believers (D. S. Wilson), being adaptive does not necessary equate with furthering actual human well-being. This means that to determine whether religious and other non-cognitive beliefs are desirable we have to investigate their evolutionary function. The proper theoretical framework to examine this question is gene-culture co-evolution theory (Boyd & Richerson) as it is complex enough to allow for and distinguish between all of the alternatives considered above. Ironically, however, the close investigation necessary to determine the desirability of individual non-cognitive beliefs is anathema to their maintaining their plausibility and, therefore, their functionality. Kriszta Biber Department Coordinator Philosophy Department Tel: 36-1-327-3806 Fax: 36-1-327-3072 E-mail: biberk(a)ceu.hu

16 years, 3 months

felhívás - CEU Nyári Egyetem, Nyelvfilozófia, Nyelvészet

by Somodi Gergo

Summer course on "MEANING, CONTEXT, INTENTION" Course dates: JULY 19-30, 2010 Location: Central European University (CEU), Budapest, Hungary, Detailed course description: http://www.summer.ceu.hu/meaning Tuition fee: EUR 550. Financial aid is available. *Application deadline: February 15, 2010* Online application: http://www.sun.ceu.hu/03-application/howto_apply.php Course directors: * Zsofia Zvolenszky, Eötvös University (ELTE), Institute of Philosophy, Budapest, Hungary; * Jason Stanley, Rutgers, Philosophy Department, New Brunswick, USA; Faculty: * Ray Buchanan, University of Texas, Philosophy Department, Austin, USA * Herman Cappelen, University of St Andrews, Department of Philosophy, UK * Wayne A. Davis, Georgetown University, Philosophy Department, Washington DC, USA * Katalin Farkas, Central European University, Philosophy Department * Ernest Lepore, Rutgers University, Center for Cognitive Science, Rutgers University, New Brunswick US * Stephen Neale, CUNY Graduate Center, New York, USA *Craige Roberts, Ohio State University, Linguistics Department, Columbus, USA * Adam Sennet, University of California, Davis, Department of Philosophy, USA * Zoltan Gendler Szabo, Yale University, Department of Philosophy, USA What we express, communicate by uttering a sentence varies with the context of utterance. What is the role of semantics in bringing this about? According to one simple model, a semantic theory assigns to sentences relative to contexts what would be expressed by those sentences in normal assertive utterances, by assigning values to the meaningful parts of the sentences in those contexts and combining them via a recursive process. According to another, radically different model, the meanings of words are rules that constrain the use of expressions, but there is no notion of what is said by a sentence (as opposed to the person) that matches the speaker's communicative intentions, and that plays a fundamental role in the account of communication. There are many versions of each of these views of linguistic communication. How we think about language is determined by which we adopt. The purpose of this course is to bring together leading researchers who have formed the debate, together with some younger researchers with new approaches. This summer school invites applications from junior faculty and doctoral students at philosophy and linguistics departments. Minimum background required: philosophy of language at the advanced undergraduate level. Participants should ideally bring some work in progress related to the course theme for discussion during the course.

16 years, 3 months

Theoretical Philosophy Forum, February

by Laszlo E. Szabo

THEORETICAL PHILOSOPHY FORUM Institute of Philosophy Faculty of Humanities, Eotvos University Wednesday 5:00 PM Room 226 Muzeum krt. 4/i, Budapest Web site: http://phil.elte.hu/tpf February Program 17 February (Wednesday) 5:00 PM Room 226 Balazs Toth Institute of Philosophy Eotvos University, Budapest A fuggo keletkezes es a tudomanyfilozofia (Nagarjuna's theory of causality and the philosophy of science) Abstract: http://phil.elte.hu/tpf/2009-2010/February/#3 22 February (Monday!!!) 4:30 PM Room 226 (Please note the unusual day and time!) Martina Fuerst Department of Philosophy, University of Graz The Phenomenal Concept Strategy as Response to the Knowledge Argument Abstract: http://phil.elte.hu/tpf/2009-2010/February/#4 ___________________________________ The Forum is open to everyone, including students, visitors, and faculty members from all departments and institutes! Format: 60 minute lecture, 10 minute coffee break, followed by a 30-60 minute discussion. The language of presentation is English or Hungarian. A printable poster is available from here: http://phil.elte.hu/tpf/2009-2010/February/poster.pdf Please feel free to post it in your institution! The organizer of the Forum: Laszlo E. Szabo (leszabo(a)phil.elte.hu) -- Laszlo E. Szabo professor of philosophy DEPARTMENT OF LOGIC, INSTITUTE OF PHILOSOPHY EOTVOS UNIVERSITY, BUDAPEST http://phil.elte.hu/leszabo

16 years, 3 months

final call for the II. DuCog Conference

by Dubrovnik Conference on Cognitive Science

sorry for possible multiple posting -- The II. Dubrovnik Conference on Cognitive Science

16 years, 3 months

Summer School on "Beliefs and Decisions: of Minds and Machines"

by Máté Lengyel

We invite applications for the Summer School on "Beliefs and Decisions: of Minds and Machines" that will be held in Budapest, Hungary between 5-9 July 2010. http://www.summer.ceu.hu/02-courses/course-sites/beliefs/index-beliefs.php Application deadline: 15 February 2010 The aim of the course is to demonstrate that some basic principles of decision making can provide a unifying framework for constructing intelligently behaving artefacts on one hand, and for explaining human and animal cognition both in simple as well as in the most complex domains of behaviour on the other hand. To achieve this, lectures will progress via domains of gradually increasing abstraction that machine learning algorithms and humans deal with starting from representing uncertainty and beliefs about unobserved quantities, through learning internal models of the environment, to making adaptive and successful decisions. The course is aimed at students, post docs, and junior faculty working in machine learning, cognitive science, neuroscience, or related fields, and especially those who are interested in a combination of these approaches. Faculty: - József Fiser, Brandeis University, Department of Psychology and the Neuroscience Program, USA - Zoubin Ghahramani, University of Cambridge, Department of Engineering, UK - Máté Lengyel, University of Cambridge, Department of Engineering, UK - Michael N. Shadlen, University of Washington, Medical School, Howard Hughes Medical Institute, USA - Daniel Wolpert, University of Cambridge, Department of Engineering, UK (Apologies for crossposting.)

16 years, 3 months

Kognitív Tavasz - Szeged

by Dezso NEMETH

Kedves Kollégák! Csatoltam a Szegedi Megismeréstudományi és Neuropszichológiai Programot (MS Word és PDF) formátumban. Reklámozzátok kollégáitok és hallgatók között! Várunk minden érdeklődőt! üdv. Dezső ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- SZTE Pszichológiai Intézet Megismeréstudományi és Neuropszichológia Csoport Web: http://www.staff.u-szeged.hu/~nemethd/ Megismeréstudományi Csoport: http://kognit.edpsy.u-szeged.hu Pszichológiai Intézet: http://www.pszich.u-szeged.hu/

16 years, 3 months

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koglist February 2010