THEORETICAL PHILOSOPHY FORUM
Institute of Philosophy
Faculty of Humanities, Eotvos University
Wednesday 5:00 PM Room 226 Muzeum krt. 4/i, Budapest
Web site: http://phil.elte.hu/tpf
17 February (Wednesday) 5:00 PM Room 226
Balazs Toth
Institute of Philosophy
Eotvos University, Budapest
A fuggo keletkezes es a tudomanyfilozofia
(Nagarjuna's theory of causality and the philosophy of science)
Abstract: http://phil.elte.hu/tpf/2009-2010/February/#3
___________________________________
The Forum is open to everyone, including students, visitors, and faculty
members from all departments and institutes!
Format: 60 minute lecture, 10 minute coffee break, followed by a 30-60
minute discussion. The language of presentation is English or Hungarian.
A printable poster is available from here:
http://phil.elte.hu/tpf/2009-2010/February/poster.pdf
Please feel free to post it in your institution!
The organizer of the Forum: Laszlo E. Szabo
(leszabo(a)phil.elte.hu)
--
Laszlo E. Szabo
professor of philosophy
DEPARTMENT OF LOGIC, INSTITUTE OF PHILOSOPHY
EOTVOS UNIVERSITY, BUDAPEST
http://phil.elte.hu/leszabo
The CEU Philosophy Department cordially invites you to a talk
(as part of its Departmental Colloquium series)
by
Paul Noordhof (University of York)
on
Three Approaches to Phenomenal Content
Tuesday, 16 February 2010, 4.30 PM, Zrinyi 14, Room 412
ABSTRACT
I compare three approaches to the determination of phenomenal content (that which characterises what it is like to have mental states or events). They are representation, relation, and property possession. For a variety of reasons, and at the risk of spoiling the suspense, representation (my favoured position) comes out on top. Along the way, I consider spectrum inversion, blurred vision, unconscious representational states, the phenomenal difference between belief and perception, and the implications of the existence of imaginary and hallucinatory states.
Kriszta Biber
Department Coordinator
Philosophy Department
Tel: 36-1-327-3806
Fax: 36-1-327-3072
E-mail: biberk(a)ceu.hu
A BME Kognitív Tudományi Tanszék szeretettel vár mindenkit
tanszéki szemináriumsorozatának következő előadására:
Február 22., hétfő, 12:00-13:00, BME, XI., Stoczek u. 2., St. ép.,
320.-as terem.
How to compare apples and oranges: Controlling visual salience in
infant studies
Káldy Zsuzsa
Associate Professor
UMass Boston
Bővebb info itt
Attila Keresztes
PhD student
Junior research fellow
Budapest University of Technology and Economics
Dept. of Cognitive Science,
Stoczek u. 2., Budapest
1111, Hungary
+36 1 4631072
akeresztes(a)cogsci.bme.hu
The CEU Philosophy Department cordially invites you to a talk
(as part of its Departmental Colloquium series)
by
Konrad Talmont-Kaminski (Marie Curie-Sklodowska University)
on
The desirability of religion and the function of non-cognitive beliefs
Tuesday, 9 February, 2010, 4.30 PM, Zrinyi 14, Room 412
ABSTRACT
Beliefs have the capacity to guide human behaviour regardless of their truth. In particular, false beliefs can motivate behaviour that is adaptive. Disconfirmation of the beliefs is a threat to their stability, however. The beliefs can be protected from disconfirmation by having content that minimises potential empirical consequences as well as existing in a context that discourages investigation of them or provides only very limited access to the methods that might be used to investigate them. Due to their disconnection from the truth, the plausibility of such beliefs must be explained in terms of human psychology, primarily in terms of a variety of cognitive by-products (Boyer, Atran). Properly understood, such beliefs may be termed *non-cognitive* as their truth or falsehood is irrelevant to their function - they only appear to be assertions. The paradigmatic example of such non-cognitive beliefs is provided by religious traditions: Their content appears to refer to unobservable entities, and they are protected by social rules surrounding the treatment of the sacred as well as having often opposed the development of science.
The persistence and potentially adaptive nature of non-cognitive beliefs does not indicate that their effects are such as we might desire. This is the case for two reasons. Firstly, they may only be adaptive for themselves, as suggested by some memeticians (Blackmore, Dawkins). Secondly, even if they are adaptive for believers (Stark) or groups of believers (D. S. Wilson), being adaptive does not necessary equate with furthering actual human well-being. This means that to determine whether religious and other non-cognitive beliefs are desirable we have to investigate their evolutionary function. The proper theoretical framework to examine this question is gene-culture co-evolution theory (Boyd & Richerson) as it is complex enough to allow for and distinguish between all of the alternatives considered above. Ironically, however, the close investigation necessary to determine the desirability of individual non-cognitive beliefs is anathema to their maintaining their plausibility and, therefore, their functionality.
Kriszta Biber
Department Coordinator
Philosophy Department
Tel: 36-1-327-3806
Fax: 36-1-327-3072
E-mail: biberk(a)ceu.hu
Summer course on "MEANING, CONTEXT, INTENTION"
Course dates: JULY 19-30, 2010
Location: Central European University (CEU), Budapest, Hungary,
Detailed course description: http://www.summer.ceu.hu/meaning
Tuition fee: EUR 550. Financial aid is available.
*Application deadline: February 15, 2010*
Online application:
http://www.sun.ceu.hu/03-application/howto_apply.php
Course directors:
* Zsofia Zvolenszky, Eötvös University (ELTE), Institute of Philosophy,
Budapest, Hungary;
* Jason Stanley, Rutgers, Philosophy Department, New Brunswick, USA;
Faculty:
* Ray Buchanan, University of Texas, Philosophy Department, Austin,
USA
* Herman Cappelen, University of St Andrews, Department of Philosophy,
UK
* Wayne A. Davis, Georgetown University, Philosophy Department,
Washington DC, USA
* Katalin Farkas, Central European University, Philosophy
Department
* Ernest Lepore, Rutgers University, Center for Cognitive Science,
Rutgers University, New Brunswick US
* Stephen Neale, CUNY Graduate Center, New York, USA
*Craige Roberts, Ohio State University, Linguistics Department, Columbus,
USA
* Adam Sennet, University of California, Davis, Department of
Philosophy, USA
* Zoltan Gendler Szabo, Yale University, Department of Philosophy, USA
What we express, communicate by uttering a sentence varies with the
context of utterance. What is the role of semantics in bringing this
about? According to one simple model, a semantic theory assigns to
sentences relative to contexts what would be expressed by those
sentences in normal assertive utterances, by assigning values to the
meaningful parts of the sentences in those contexts and combining them
via a recursive process. According to another, radically different
model, the meanings of words are rules that constrain the use of
expressions, but there is no notion of what is said by a sentence (as
opposed to the person) that matches the speaker's communicative
intentions, and that plays a fundamental role in the account of
communication. There are many versions of each of these views of
linguistic communication. How we think about language is determined by
which we adopt. The purpose of this course is to bring together leading
researchers who have formed the debate, together with some younger
researchers with new approaches.
This summer school invites applications from junior faculty and doctoral
students at philosophy and linguistics departments. Minimum background
required: philosophy of language at the advanced undergraduate level.
Participants should ideally bring some work in progress related to the
course theme for discussion during the course.
THEORETICAL PHILOSOPHY FORUM
Institute of Philosophy
Faculty of Humanities, Eotvos University
Wednesday 5:00 PM Room 226 Muzeum krt. 4/i, Budapest
Web site: http://phil.elte.hu/tpf
February Program
17 February (Wednesday) 5:00 PM Room 226
Balazs Toth
Institute of Philosophy
Eotvos University, Budapest
A fuggo keletkezes es a tudomanyfilozofia
(Nagarjuna's theory of causality and the philosophy of science)
Abstract: http://phil.elte.hu/tpf/2009-2010/February/#3
22 February (Monday!!!) 4:30 PM Room 226
(Please note the unusual day and time!)
Martina Fuerst
Department of Philosophy, University of Graz
The Phenomenal Concept Strategy as Response to the Knowledge Argument
Abstract: http://phil.elte.hu/tpf/2009-2010/February/#4
___________________________________
The Forum is open to everyone, including students, visitors, and faculty
members from all departments and institutes!
Format: 60 minute lecture, 10 minute coffee break, followed by a 30-60
minute discussion. The language of presentation is English or Hungarian.
A printable poster is available from here:
http://phil.elte.hu/tpf/2009-2010/February/poster.pdf
Please feel free to post it in your institution!
The organizer of the Forum: Laszlo E. Szabo
(leszabo(a)phil.elte.hu)
--
Laszlo E. Szabo
professor of philosophy
DEPARTMENT OF LOGIC, INSTITUTE OF PHILOSOPHY
EOTVOS UNIVERSITY, BUDAPEST
http://phil.elte.hu/leszabo
We invite applications for the Summer School on "Beliefs and
Decisions: of Minds and Machines" that will be held in Budapest,
Hungary between 5-9 July 2010.
http://www.summer.ceu.hu/02-courses/course-sites/beliefs/index-beliefs.php
Application deadline: 15 February 2010
The aim of the course is to demonstrate that some basic principles of
decision making can provide a unifying framework for constructing
intelligently behaving artefacts on one hand, and for explaining human
and animal cognition both in simple as well as in the most complex
domains of behaviour on the other hand. To achieve this, lectures will
progress via domains of gradually increasing abstraction that machine
learning algorithms and humans deal with starting from representing
uncertainty and beliefs about unobserved quantities, through learning
internal models of the environment, to making adaptive and successful
decisions.
The course is aimed at students, post docs, and junior faculty working
in machine learning, cognitive science, neuroscience, or related
fields, and especially those who are interested in a combination of
these approaches.
Faculty:
- József Fiser, Brandeis University, Department of Psychology and the
Neuroscience Program, USA
- Zoubin Ghahramani, University of Cambridge, Department of
Engineering, UK
- Máté Lengyel, University of Cambridge, Department of Engineering, UK
- Michael N. Shadlen, University of Washington, Medical School, Howard
Hughes Medical Institute, USA
- Daniel Wolpert, University of Cambridge, Department of Engineering, UK
(Apologies for crossposting.)
Kedves Kollégák!
Csatoltam a Szegedi Megismeréstudományi és Neuropszichológiai Programot
(MS Word és PDF) formátumban.
Reklámozzátok kollégáitok és hallgatók között!
Várunk minden érdeklődőt!
üdv.
Dezső
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SZTE Pszichológiai Intézet
Megismeréstudományi és Neuropszichológia Csoport
Web: http://www.staff.u-szeged.hu/~nemethd/
Megismeréstudományi Csoport: http://kognit.edpsy.u-szeged.hu
Pszichológiai Intézet: http://www.pszich.u-szeged.hu/