koglist February 2010

koglist@maillist.ttk.hu

12 participants
29 discussions

reminder: Knowledge is of universals. The Context of Proof in Aristotle’s Account, 2 March, 4.30 PM

by Krisztina Biber

The CEU Philosophy Department and The Center for Hellenic Traditions cordially invite you to a talk (as part of the Philosophy Department’s Colloquium series) by Pieter Sjoerd Hasper (University of Groningen/Universität Bayreuth) on Knowledge is of universals. The Context of Proof in Aristotle’s Account Tuesday, 2 March, 2010, 4.30 PM, Zrinyi 14, Room 412 ABSTRACT Throughout his works Aristotle claims that scientific knowledge is of universals. It is an important claim for him, because he holds that only of universals, and not of particulars, there are definitions, and definitions are at the basis of scientific knowledge. Moreover, he also characterizes other epistemic states, such as knowledge consisting in having experience, in contrast as being concerned with particulars. I shall discuss two problems with this claim. First, if experience is of particulars, Aristotle’s idea that experience may concern universal propositions seems inconsistent - as it has indeed been held to be. Second, Aristotle’s claim that knowledge is of universals might get him into trouble, for he rejects the Platonic position that universals are ontologically primary and exist independently from particulars. Aristotle thus faces the difficulty of having to explain how scientific knowledge can be of universals without committing himself to independently existing universals and without reducing this knowledge of universals to knowledge of particulars. Both problems can be solved, I shall argue, by taking seriously the context of proof in which Aristotle formulates his account of scientific knowledge. The concept of proof Aristotle presupposes is that of proof conducted in the case of an arbitrary individual. I shall discuss first Aristotle’s argument against the existence of Platonic Forms as an argument concerning the ontological status of this arbitrary individual: is it a universal or a particular? Then I shall show that with Aristotle’s account of such proofs it is possible to interpret his claim that scientific knowledge is of universals in such a way that it does not entail that forms of knowledge which are of particulars, cannot be universal and that it allows Aristotle to maintain the ontological primacy of particulars without reducing scientific knowledge to some form of knowledge of particulars. Kriszta Biber Department Coordinator Philosophy Department Tel: 36-1-327-3806 Fax: 36-1-327-3072 E-mail: biberk(a)ceu.hu

16 years, 2 months

CEU CDC seminar on MONDAY: Walter Schroyens

by Gergely Csibra

Walter Schroyens (Psychology, Gent & Leuven) at 10.00am on Monday, 1 March 2010 Title: Meaning and idealization in reasoning towards an interpretation of conditionals: Is there a singular specific meaning or are there a multitude of ephemeral interpretations of natural language connectives, or both? Abstract: The paper investigates the thesis that while the pragmatics of content and context can yield many interpretations, there is an idealized core- meaning for sentential connectives: People do not reason from this core meaning, but can reason towards a corresponding interpretation, i.e., the conditional interpretation akin to the much dis-reputed material implication of classic logic. In reasoning towards this conditional-interpretation of “if A then C”, the utterances are interpreted as meaning that all possibilities except the “A and not-c” contingency are possible. In idealizing towards the conditional interpretation as the core meaning 'if', theorists abstract, simplify and generalize across conditions. Six experiments show that when the context is idealized by taking account of cognitive processing hurdles and auxiliary hypothesis in the mental-models theory of reasoning (e.g., people tend not to throw away semantic information, they start reasoning on the basis of a minimal representation, they are sensitive to the principles of parsimony in positing theoretical entities, … ) people are more likely to reason towards a conditional interpretation. That is, the context induces people to reason towards a more idealized interpretation (which must not be an ideal interpretation). A series of developmental studies additionally indicates that with age (i.e., experience and education) people are more likely to reason towards the conditional interpretation and two individual-differences studies show that people higher in general ability are similarly more likely to reason towards the conditional interpretation. Venue: CEU Cognitive Development Center Hattyuhaz 1015 Budapest Hattyu u 14. Level 3 (one level up from the entrance level) Everyone is welcome to attend.

16 years, 2 months

XVIII. MAKOG--számla

by MAKOG 2010

Kedves Kollégák! Elnézést kérünk a MAKOG XVIII. számlák késlekedéséért. A szervező CECOG bírósági regisztrációja folyamatban van, őszintén reméljük, hogy 5-6 hét alatt elintéződik. Kérünk egy kis további türelmet és megértést, üdvözlettel, a Szervezők

16 years, 2 months

Budapest INCORE conference on cooperation

by Altbacker Vilmos

Kedves Gergő, két napja van konf honlapunk, és most tesszük fel a listákra. Kérlek segits, hogy a koglistre felkerüljön... remek előadóink lesznek, érdemes jönni! Vili Honlap: http://incore2010.elte.hu The objectives of this conference are to bring together researchers from diverse fields, set out the state of the art in cooperation research, and showcase the value of an interdisciplinary approach to answering the many important questions that remain about why and how we cooperate. INCORE Integrating Cooperation Research in Europe. An Interdisciplinary Dialogue The conference will take place at the Flamenco Hotel in Budapest, from April 18th - 20th 2010, and feature plenary sessions, discussion workshops and poster presentations, focussing around five major themes: -Model systems and the evolution of cooperation -The ecology of cooperation -The dynamics of cooperation: experiment and theory -Language, empathy and the development of cooperation -Genetics and the neurobiology of cooperative behaviour -- http://incore2010.elte.hu Local Organizing Comittee Vilmos Altbacker, DSc Eötvös University Hungary altbac(a)gmail.com tel +36 1 3812179 fax +36 1 3812180

16 years, 2 months

CEU CDC seminar TOMORROW: Andras Lorincz

by Gergely Csibra

Andras Lorincz (Informatics, ELTE) at 4.00pm on Thursday, 25 February 2010 Title: Goal Oriented Intelligence: A Workable Hypothesis? Abstract: In cognitive science, one starts from the assumption that cognitive functions are, or at least can be modeled by computations. Then, we need a pragmatic definition for intelligence that lends itself into a workable algorithm. We start from the hypothesis that basically all facets of intelligence are related to goal oriented behavior. Goal oriented behavior, however, can be the result of evolution and may not be intelligent per se. On the other hand, intelligence can manifest itself through communication. We consider problem types of different complexities and (i) establish the category of problems that are worth to communicate, (ii) give a definition for intelligence based on this special category, and (iii) identify another computational problem type, which is necessary for communication and which is highly problematic for present day machine learning algorithms. Communication requires agreements about symbol meaning associations. We show that such agreements are very hard without a mind model, where mind simply means a predictive model of the communicating partner and partial access (observation) to her actual internal rewards (emotions). We will present two examples to illustrate matters. Our project called “Innovation Engine in BlogSpace” intends to develop information seeking conversational agents that could interfere with people in BlogSpace. The other example is about “Testing and communicating with severely handicapped, non-speaking, but speech understanding children”, where the goal is to estimate the zone of proximal development and to optimize training materials. Very recent results on collaborative filtering made recommendation systems highly efficient provided that databases are available. Collection of the data without endangering privacy has become feasible. Venue: CEU Cognitive Development Center Hattyuhaz 1015 Budapest Hattyu u 14. Level 3 (one level up from the entrance level) Everyone is welcome to attend.

16 years, 2 months

Theoretical Philosophy Forum, Gomori/Szabo

by Laszlo E. Szabo

THEORETICAL PHILOSOPHY FORUM Institute of Philosophy Faculty of Humanities, Eotvos University Wednesday 5:00 PM Room 226 Muzeum krt. 4/i, Budapest Web site: http://phil.elte.hu/tpf 3 March (Wednesday) 5:00 PM Room 226 Marton Gomori (speaker) and Laszlo E. Szabo Department of Logic, Institute of Philosophy Eotvos University, Budapest Mit is allit pontosan a relativitas elve? (What exactly does the relativity principle state?) Abstract: http://phil.elte.hu/tpf/2009-2010/March/#1 ___________________________________ The Forum is open to everyone, including students, visitors, and faculty members from all departments and institutes! Format: 60 minute lecture, 10 minute coffee break, followed by a 30-60 minute discussion. The language of presentation is English or Hungarian. A printable poster is available from here: http://phil.elte.hu/tpf/2009-2010/March/poster.pdf Please feel free to post it in your institution! The organizer of the Forum: Laszlo E. Szabo (leszabo(a)phil.elte.hu) -- L a s z l o E. S z a b o Professor of Philosophy DEPARTMENT OF LOGIC, INSTITUTE OF PHILOSOPHY EOTVOS UNIVERSITY, BUDAPEST http://phil.elte.hu/leszabo

16 years, 2 months

Knowledge is of universals. The Context of Proof in Aristotle’s Account, 2 March!!!

by Krisztina Biber

The CEU Philosophy Department and The Center for Hellenic Traditions cordially invite you to a talk (as part of the Philosophy Department’s Colloquium series) by Pieter Sjoerd Hasper (University of Groningen/Universität Bayreuth) on Knowledge is of universals. The Context of Proof in Aristotle’s Account Tuesday, 2 March, 2010, 4.30 PM, Zrinyi 14, Room 412 ABSTRACT Throughout his works Aristotle claims that scientific knowledge is of universals. It is an important claim for him, because he holds that only of universals, and not of particulars, there are definitions, and definitions are at the basis of scientific knowledge. Moreover, he also characterizes other epistemic states, such as knowledge consisting in having experience, in contrast as being concerned with particulars. I shall discuss two problems with this claim. First, if experience is of particulars, Aristotle’s idea that experience may concern universal propositions seems inconsistent – as it has indeed been held to be. Second, Aristotle’s claim that knowledge is of universals might get him into trouble, for he rejects the Platonic position that universals are ontologically primary and exist independently from particulars. Aristotle thus faces the difficulty of having to explain how scientific knowledge can be of universals without committing himself to independently existing universals and without reducing this knowledge of universals to knowledge of particulars. Both problems can be solved, I shall argue, by taking seriously the context of proof in which Aristotle formulates his account of scientific knowledge. The concept of proof Aristotle presupposes is that of proof conducted in the case of an arbitrary individual. I shall discuss first Aristotle’s argument against the existence of Platonic Forms as an argument concerning the ontological status of this arbitrary individual: is it a universal or a particular? Then I shall show that with Aristotle’s account of such proofs it is possible to interpret his claim that scientific knowledge is of universals in such a way that it does not entail that forms of knowledge which are of particulars, cannot be universal and that it allows Aristotle to maintain the ontological primacy of particulars without reducing scientific knowledge to some form of knowledge of particulars. Kriszta Biber Department Coordinator Philosophy Department Tel: 36-1-327-3806 Fax: 36-1-327-3072 E-mail: biberk(a)ceu.hu

16 years, 2 months

invitation: Knowledge is of universals. The Context of Proof in Aristotle’s Account, 9 March,4.30 PM

by Krisztina Biber

16 years, 2 months

Kognitív péntek 26án

by Rago Anett

Tisztelt Kollégák, elnézést, a pontos dátum 26-a Krajcsi Attila A számjelölések szerepe a numerikus feldolgozásra az előadás időpontja: Február 26. 15 óra helye: ELTE Pszichológia Intézet, Izabella u. 46. 216. terem -- Ragó, Anett rago(a)cogpsyphy.hu INSTITUTE for PSYCHOLOGY Hungarian Academy of Sciences H- 1068 Budapest, Szondi utca 83-85 36/1-3542390 __________ Information from ESET NOD32 Antivirus, version of virus signature database 4885 (20100221) __________ The message was checked by ESET NOD32 Antivirus. http://www.eset.com __________ Information from ESET NOD32 Antivirus, version of virus signature database 4885 (20100221) __________ The message was checked by ESET NOD32 Antivirus. http://www.eset.com

16 years, 2 months

Kognitív péntek meghívó

by Rago Anett

Tisztelt Kollégák, ezúton továbbítom az ELTE PPK Kognitív Pszichológiai Tanszékének meghívóját a 'Kognitív péntek' elnevezésű előadássorozat következő rendezvényére, most péntekre, melynek programja: Krajcsi Attila A számjelölések szerepe a numerikus feldolgozásra az előadás időpontja: Február 16. 15 óra helye: ELTE Pszichológia Intézet, Izabella u. 46. 216. terem Minden érdeklődőt szeretettel várunk! -- Ragó, Anett rago(a)cogpsyphy.hu INSTITUTE for PSYCHOLOGY Hungarian Academy of Sciences H- 1068 Budapest, Szondi utca 83-85 36/1-3542390 __________ Information from ESET NOD32 Antivirus, version of virus signature database 4885 (20100221) __________ The message was checked by ESET NOD32 Antivirus. http://www.eset.com

16 years, 2 months

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koglist February 2010