We invite applications for the Summer School on "Beliefs and
Decisions: of Minds and Machines" that will be held in Budapest,
Hungary between 5-9 July 2010.
http://www.summer.ceu.hu/02-courses/course-sites/beliefs/index-beliefs.php
*Note extended deadline: 15 March 2010*
The aim of the course is to demonstrate that some basic principles of
decision making can provide a unifying framework for constructing
intelligently behaving artefacts on one hand, and for explaining human
and animal cognition both in simple as well as in the most complex
domains of behaviour on the other hand. To achieve this, lectures will
progress via domains of gradually increasing abstraction that machine
learning algorithms and humans deal with starting from representing
uncertainty and beliefs about unobserved quantities, through learning
internal models of the environment, to making adaptive and successful
decisions.
The course is aimed at students, post docs, and junior faculty working
in machine learning, cognitive science, neuroscience, or related
fields, and especially those who are interested in a combination of
these approaches.
Faculty:
- József Fiser, Brandeis University, Department of Psychology and the
Neuroscience Program, USA
- Zoubin Ghahramani, University of Cambridge, Department of
Engineering, UK
- Máté Lengyel, University of Cambridge, Department of Engineering, UK
- Michael N. Shadlen, University of Washington, Medical School, Howard
Hughes Medical Institute, USA
- Daniel Wolpert, University of Cambridge, Department of Engineering, UK
(Apologies for crossposting.)
A BME Kognitív Tudományi Tanszék szeretettel vár mindenkit
tanszéki szemináriumsorozatának következő előadására:
Március 3., szerda, 14:00-15:00, BME, XI., Stoczek u. 2., St. ép.,
320.-as terem.
An Information Theoretic Approach to the Processing of Inflectional
Paradigms and Classes
Petar Milin
Department of Psychology, University of Novi Sad
Laboratory for Experimental Psychology, University of Belgrade
Bővebb info itt
Attila Keresztes
Junior research fellow
Budapest University of Technology and Economics
Dept. of Cognitive Science,
Stoczek u. 2., Budapest
1111, Hungary
+36 1 4631072
akeresztes(a)cogsci.bme.hu
The CEU Philosophy Department and The Center for Hellenic Traditions
cordially invite you to a talk
(as part of the Philosophy Department’s Colloquium series)
by
Katerina Ierodiakonou (National and Kapodistrian University of Athens
)
on
ON GALEN’S THEORY OF VISION
Tuesday, 23 February 2010, 4.30 PM, Zrinyi 14, Room 412
ABSTRACT
The standard interpretation of Galen’s general philosophical stance
presents him as an eclectic, that is to say as a philosopher who does
not commit himself to the entirety of the doctrines of a particular
philosophical school, but selects from different theories different
elements which seem fitting to him and which he combines in such a way
as to produce a coherent system. Galen’s theory of vision confirms, I
think, such an overall account of his philosophical position, for there
is no indication in the Galenic corpus which could suggest that Galen is
a devoted adherent of one or another of the various theories of vision
presented in antiquity by his predecessors. Thus, my aim in this paper
is simply to focus on how Galen interacts with the previous
philosophical tradition when it comes to his understanding of how we
see. I hope to show that Galen refuses to blindly follow the views of a
particular philosophical school, but collects elements from the
Platonic, the Aristotelian and the Stoic model in order to form his own
eclectic theory. Indeed, it is quite intriguing to study the amalgam
which Galen himself produces for two reasons:
(a) in order to understand why he selects the specific elements
which he does from the previous theories of vision; and
(b) in order to investigate whether the theory of vision that he
finally comes up with is actually coherent or not.
Kriszta Biber
Department Coordinator
Philosophy Department
Tel: 36-1-327-3806
Fax: 36-1-327-3072
E-mail: biberk(a)ceu.hu
Upcoming seminars at the Cognitive Development Center of CEU:
---------------------------------------------
Water Schroyens (Psychology, Gent & Leuven)
at 10.00am on Monday, 1 March 2010
Title:
Meaning and idealization in reasoning towards an interpretation of
conditionals: Is there a singular specific meaning or are there a
multitude of ephemeral interpretations of natural language
connectives, or both?
Abstract:
The paper investigates the thesis that while the pragmatics of content
and context can yield many interpretations, there is an idealized core-
meaning for sentential connectives: People do not reason from this
core meaning, but can reason towards a corresponding interpretation,
i.e., the conditional interpretation akin to the much dis-reputed
material implication of classic logic. In reasoning towards this
conditional-interpretation of “if A then C”, the utterances are
interpreted as meaning that all possibilities except the “A and not-c”
contingency are possible. In idealizing towards the conditional
interpretation as the core meaning 'if', theorists abstract, simplify
and generalize across conditions. Six experiments show that when the
context is idealized by taking account of cognitive processing hurdles
and auxiliary hypothesis in the mental-models theory of reasoning
(e.g., people tend not to throw away semantic information, they start
reasoning on the basis of a minimal representation, they are sensitive
to the principles of parsimony in positing theoretical entities, … )
people are more likely to reason towards a conditional interpretation.
That is, the context induces people to reason towards a more idealized
interpretation (which must not be an ideal interpretation). A series
of developmental studies additionally indicates that with age (i.e.,
experience and education) people are more likely to reason towards the
conditional interpretation and two individual-differences studies show
that people higher in general ability are similarly more likely to
reason towards the conditional interpretation.
---------------------------------------------
Patrick Shafto (Psychology, Lousville)
at 10.00am on Tuesday, 2 March 2010
Title:
Computational modeling of pedagogical reasoning
Abstract:
Much of human learning goes on in social situations. Among these
situations, pedagogical situations stand out as potentially the most
important. In pedagogical situations, a person (a teacher) chooses
data for the purpose of helping another person learn a concept. I will
present a computational model of pedagogical data sampling, which
formalizes the problem as complementary inferences on the parts of
both the teacher and learner. I will present a series of experiments
that test the model's predictions about reasoning with adults and
children. I will conclude by sketching a larger picture, in which
pedagogical sampling is a special case of reasoning about
intentionally sampled data, and outline directions of future research
in this context.
---------------------------------------------
Afra Alishahi (Computational Linguistics, Saarland University)
at 16.30pm on Wednesday, 3 March 2010
Title:
Modeling different aspects of child language acquisition as a
probabilistic process
Abstract:
I will first present a probabilistic model of word learning by
children. A major source of disagreement among the different theories
of word learning is whether children are equipped with special
mechanisms and biases for word learning, or their general cognitive
abilities are adequate for the task. I present a novel computational
model of early word learning which learns word meanings as
probabilistic associations between words and semantic elements, using
an incremental learning mechanism, and drawing only on general
cognitive abilities. The computational simulations of the model
demonstrate that much about word meanings can be learned from
naturally-occurring child-directed utterances (paired with meaning
representations), without using any special biases or constraints, and
without any explicit developmental changes in the underlying learning
mechanism. Furthermore, our model provides explanations for the
occasionally contradictory child experimental data, and offers
predictions for the behaviour of young word learners in novel
situations.
Children use their knowledge of word meanings in order to learn the
structural properties of the language. I will also present a
probabilistic usage-based model of verb argument structure acquisition
that can successfully learn abstract knowledge of language from
instances of verb usage, and use this knowledge in various language
tasks. The model further demonstrates the feasibility of a usage-based
account of language learning, and provides concrete explanation for
the observed patterns in child language acquisition.
---------------------------------------------
József Fiser (Psychology, Brandeis)
at 16.30pm on Monday, 8 March 2010
Title:
Developing internal representations in the mind to understand the
visual world
Abstract:
Arguably, the mind's internal representations of its environment have
a crucial role in the emergence of intelligent behavior, yet there are
few concrete proposals about the nature of these internal
representations or the way they are acquired. Using the domain of
visual recognition, I will present a framework and a combined
empirical-computational program that explore these issues. First, I
will demonstrate that in everyday perceptual tasks humans process not
only the sensory information but also their uncertainty about that
information, and they do this in a theoretically optimal manner. As
such behavior assumes a probabilistic internal representation of the
world, I present evidence that indeed, adults and infants develop such
representations when they face a novel visual environment. I will show
how this framework can cover not only low-level statistical
regularities of events and features, but also more complex abstract
“rules” of the sensory world, as well as internal models of higher
cognitive functions. Next, I turn to the issue of whether the
implementation of such representations and computations is feasible in
the brain. I will outline how probabilistic internal representations
could be implemented in the cortex in a sampling-based manner, and how
this can explain a wide range of puzzling observations such as
illusions and dreams, as well as the high level of spontaneous
activity in the brain. I provide confirmation of this framework by
demonstrating that as young animals grow, the visually evoked and
spontaneous activity in their brains becomes statistically similar,
indicating how their internal model gets tuned to the structure of
their environment. Thus this framework offers a rigorous approach to
the age-old question of subjectivity and it provides tools for
exploring empirically the structure of internal representations in the
mind.
---------------------------------------------
Venue:
CEU Cognitive Development Center
Hattyuhaz
1015 Budapest
Hattyu u 14.
Level 3 (one level up from the entrance level)
Everyone is welcome to attend.
A BME Kognitív Tudományi Tanszék szeretettel vár mindenkit
tanszéki szemináriumsorozatának következő előadására:
Február 22., hétfő, 12:00-13:00, BME, XI., Stoczek u. 2., St. ép.,
320.-as terem.
How to compare apples and oranges: Controlling visual salience in
infant studies
Káldy Zsuzsa
Associate Professor
UMass Boston
Bővebb info itt
Attila Keresztes
Junior research fellow
Budapest University of Technology and Economics
Dept. of Cognitive Science,
Stoczek u. 2., Budapest
1111, Hungary
+36 1 4631072
akeresztes(a)cogsci.bme.hu
Tisztelt Érdeklődők,
Megjelent a XVI. MAKOG tanulmánykötete (L'Harmattan és Tan Kapuja Buddhista
Főiskola Kelet - Nyugat Kutatóintézet Kiadása, Bp., 2009) "Szubjektív Tudás
- Objektív Tudomány" címmel.
SZERKESZTETTE: Csörgő Zoltán és Szabados Levente
TANULMÁNYSZERZŐK: Paksi Dániel, Limbay Róbert, Deczki Sarolta,Bodor
Péter,Illés Anikó, Levendel Sára,Végh József,Porosz Tibor, Szekeres András
Márk,Simon Lehel - Czibere András - Szilágyi Levente, Lehmann Miklós,Zemplén
Gábor, Kutrovátz Gábor,Mund Katalin,Turcsány Borbála- Kubinyi Enikő -
Miklósi Ádám, Bodor Péter - Végh Viola
Megvásárolható a L'Harmattan Könyvesboltban:1053 Budapest, Kossuth Lajos
utca 14-16.
(1)2675979
A Tan Kapuja Buddhista Főiskola április elején tervez egy könyvbemutatóval
egybekötött minikonferenciát, erről időben tájékoztatnak.
Simon Lehel
THEORETICAL PHILOSOPHY FORUM
Institute of Philosophy
Faculty of Humanities, Eotvos University
Wednesday 5:00 PM Room 226 Muzeum krt. 4/i, Budapest
Web site: http://phil.elte.hu/tpf
22 February (Monday!!!) 4:30 PM Room 226
(Please note the unusual day and time!)
Martina Fuerst
Department of Philosophy, University of Graz
The Phenomenal Concept Strategy as Response to the Knowledge Argument
Abstract: http://phil.elte.hu/tpf/2009-2010/February/#4
___________________________________
The Forum is open to everyone, including students, visitors, and faculty
members from all departments and institutes!
Format: 60 minute lecture, 10 minute coffee break, followed by a 30-60
minute discussion. The language of presentation is English or Hungarian.
A printable poster is available from here:
http://phil.elte.hu/tpf/2009-2010/February/poster.pdf
Please feel free to post it in your institution!
The organizer of the Forum: Laszlo E. Szabo
(leszabo(a)phil.elte.hu)
--
Laszlo E. Szabo
professor of philosophy
DEPARTMENT OF LOGIC, INSTITUTE OF PHILOSOPHY
EOTVOS UNIVERSITY, BUDAPEST
http://phil.elte.hu/leszabo
Correction: the seminar will start at 4pm.
----
Upcoming seminar at the CEU Cognitive Development Center:
A talk by
Andras Lorincz (Informatics, ELTE)
at 4.00pm on Thursday, 25 February 2010
Title:
Goal Oriented Intelligence: A Workable Hypothesis?
Abstract:
In cognitive science, one starts from the assumption that cognitive
functions are, or at least can be modeled by computations. Then, we
need a pragmatic definition for intelligence that lends itself into a
workable algorithm. We start from the hypothesis that basically all
facets of intelligence are related to goal oriented behavior. Goal
oriented behavior, however, can be the result of evolution and may not
be intelligent per se. On the other hand, intelligence can manifest
itself through communication. We consider problem types of different
complexities and (i) establish the category of problems that are worth
to communicate, (ii) give a definition for intelligence based on this
special category, and (iii) identify another computational problem
type, which is necessary for communication and which is highly
problematic for present day machine learning algorithms.
Communication requires agreements about symbol meaning associations.
We show that such agreements are very hard without a mind model, where
mind simply means a predictive model of the communicating partner and
partial access (observation) to her actual internal rewards (emotions).
We will present two examples to illustrate matters. Our project called
“Innovation Engine in BlogSpace” intends to develop information
seeking conversational agents that could interfere with people in
BlogSpace. The other example is about “Testing and communicating with
severely handicapped, non-speaking, but speech understanding
children”, where the goal is to estimate the zone of proximal
development and to optimize training materials. Very recent results on
collaborative filtering made recommendation systems highly efficient
provided that databases are available. Collection of the data without
endangering privacy has become feasible.
Venue:
CEU Cognitive Development Center
Hattyuhaz
1015 Budapest
Hattyu u 14.
Level 3 (one level up from the entrance level)
Everyone is welcome to attend.
THEORETICAL PHILOSOPHY FORUM
Institute of Philosophy
Faculty of Humanities, Eotvos University
Wednesday 5:00 PM Room 226 Muzeum krt. 4/i, Budapest
Web site: http://phil.elte.hu/tpf
March Program
3 March (Wednesday) 5:00 PM Room 226
Marton Gomori (speaker) and Laszlo E. Szabo
Department of Logic, Institute of Philosophy
Eotvos University, Budapest
Mit is allit pontosan a relativitas elve?
(What exactly does the relativity principle state?)
Abstract: http://phil.elte.hu/tpf/2009-2010/March/#1
10 March (Wednesday) 5:00 PM Room 226
Alexander V. Tyaglo
Department of Philosophy and Political Science
National University of Internal Affairs, Kharkiv
Is informal logic a manifestation of new logical and philosophical
paradigm?
Abstract: http://phil.elte.hu/tpf/2009-2010/March/#2
17 March (Wednesday) 5:00 PM Room 226
Szilvia Rati
Department of Logic, Institute of Philosophy
Eotvos University, Budapest
A genek es az a priori
(Genes and the a priori)
Abstract: http://phil.elte.hu/tpf/2009-2010/March/#3
24 March (Wednesday) 5:00 PM Room 226
Adam Majdanyi
Institute of Philosophy
Eotvos University, Budapest
A fenomenalis tudatossag intencionalista magyarazatanak vedelme
(In defence of an intentionalist theory of consciousness)
Abstract: http://phil.elte.hu/tpf/2009-2010/March/#4
___________________________________
The Forum is open to everyone, including students, visitors, and faculty
members from all departments and institutes!
Format: 60 minute lecture, 10 minute coffee break, followed by a 30-60
minute discussion. The language of presentation is English or Hungarian.
A printable poster is available from here:
http://phil.elte.hu/tpf/2009-2010/March/poster.pdf
Please feel free to post it in your institution!
The organizer of the Forum: Laszlo E. Szabo
(leszabo(a)phil.elte.hu)
--
L a s z l o E. S z a b o
Professor of Philosophy
DEPARTMENT OF LOGIC, INSTITUTE OF PHILOSOPHY
EOTVOS UNIVERSITY, BUDAPEST
http://phil.elte.hu/leszabo
Upcoming seminar at the CEU Cognitive Development Center:
A talk by
Andras Lorincz (Informatics, ELTE)
on Thursday, 25 February 2010
Title:
Goal Oriented Intelligence: A Workable Hypothesis?
Abstract:
In cognitive science, one starts from the assumption that cognitive
functions are, or at least can be modeled by computations. Then, we
need a pragmatic definition for intelligence that lends itself into a
workable algorithm. We start from the hypothesis that basically all
facets of intelligence are related to goal oriented behavior. Goal
oriented behavior, however, can be the result of evolution and may not
be intelligent per se. On the other hand, intelligence can manifest
itself through communication. We consider problem types of different
complexities and (i) establish the category of problems that are worth
to communicate, (ii) give a definition for intelligence based on this
special category, and (iii) identify another computational problem
type, which is necessary for communication and which is highly
problematic for present day machine learning algorithms.
Communication requires agreements about symbol meaning associations.
We show that such agreements are very hard without a mind model, where
mind simply means a predictive model of the communicating partner and
partial access (observation) to her actual internal rewards (emotions).
We will present two examples to illustrate matters. Our project called
“Innovation Engine in BlogSpace” intends to develop information
seeking conversational agents that could interfere with people in
BlogSpace. The other example is about “Testing and communicating with
severely handicapped, non-speaking, but speech understanding
children”, where the goal is to estimate the zone of proximal
development and to optimize training materials. Very recent results on
collaborative filtering made recommendation systems highly efficient
provided that databases are available. Collection of the data without
endangering privacy has become feasible.
Venue:
CEU Cognitive Development Center
Hattyuhaz
1015 Budapest
Hattyu u 14.
Level 3 (one level up from the entrance level)
Everyone is welcome to attend.