The CEU Philosophy Department cordially invites you to a talk
(as part of its Departmental Colloquium series)
by
David Lauer (Freie Universität, Berlin))
on
The World in View. McDowell vs. Brandom on the Necessity of Experience
Tuesday, 3 February, 2009, 5.30 PM, Zrinyi 14, Room 412
ABSTRACT
Discussion of John McDowell’s contribution to the philosophy of
perception tends to concentrate on his conceptualism - the thesis that
the contents of perceptual experience are „conceptual through and
through“. However, this astounding claim of McDowell’s is in fact
just a corollary of two more basic tenets of his philosophy, namely the
rejection of what Sellarsians call the „Myth of the Given“, and a
commitment to what McDowell himself calls „Minimal Empiricism“.
Therefore, in order to assess the credentials of McDowell’s
conceptualism, his reasons for holding on to these tenets should be
assessed. I will do so for the latter of the two. Minimal Empiricism is
the thesis that we cannot understand our empirical beliefs as being
about the world - and therefore, as being beliefs - if experience does
not offer us reasons for them. Many commentators have complained that
they cannot find a satisfying argument for this thesis in Mind and
World. I will try to reconstruct an argument for Minimal Empiricism on
McDowell’s behalf, using materials gathered from a series of exchanges
between him and Robert Brandom, which revolves around a thought
experiment originally introduced by Brandom and known as the story of
the chickensexers. Brandom, like Davidson, thinks that we cannot and
need not make sense of experience as offering us reasons for belief, and
that we can understand the intentionality and world-involvingness of our
thought and talk without relying on any theoretical notion of experience
altogether. Against this, McDowell defends the claim that casting out
experience from the realm of rational relations renders the position of
the epistemic subject toward the world unrecognizable and therefore
makes intentionality unintelligible. I will reconstruct McDowell as
arguing for the idea that without reconstructing intentional
world-involvingness as a structural feature of the sensory consciousness
of an epistemic subject, as part and parcel of the phenomenology of our
being-in-the-world, any attempt to exorcise the Myth of the Given (which
unites McDowell with Brandom and Davidson) would remain incomplete.
Kriszta Biber
Department Coordinator
Philosophy Department
Tel: 36-1-327-3806
Fax: 36-1-327-3072
E-mail: biberk(a)ceu.hu
CEU Cognitive Development Center
Our seminar series continues in the Spring term with the following
talks:
4 Feb, 5.30pm
Brenda Philips (Psychology, Sheffield)
Acquiring artifact knowledge: How children use pedagogical and
intentional cues to learn the function of novel tools
11 Feb, 5.30pm
Ernő Téglás (Psychology, MTA)
Mechanisms of probability computation in preverbal infants
18 Feb, 5.30pm
Vlad Namescu (Anthropology, CEU)
Learning religion in Eastern Christian monasticism: a case for the
role of the imagination in religious experience
25 Feb, 5.30pm
Mária Farkas (Biztos Kezdet Program)
Sure Start in Hungary: Preventive Early Intervention for Socially
Disadvantaged Children
11 March, 5.30pm
Marcel Brass (Psychology, Gent)
Shared representations of self and other: from visuo-motor priming to
joint action
25 March, 5.30pm
László Mérő (Psychology, ELTE)
To see face to face: The nature of belief and belief-blindness
Venue:
Department of Philosophy, CEU
Room 412, Zrinyi u. 14., 1051 Budapest
Everyone is welcome to attend.
---
Gergely Csibra
THEORETICAL PHILOSOPHY FORUM
Institute of Philosophy
Faculty of Humanities, Eotvos University
Room 226 Monday 4:00 PM Muzeum krt. 4/i, Budapest
Web site: http://phil.elte.hu/tpf
February Program
16 February 4:00 PM Room 226
Gabor Kutrovatz
Department of History and Philosophy of Science
Faculty of Science, Eotvos University, Budapest
Szakertelem es meta-szakertelem a tudomanyban
(Expertise and Meta-expertise in Science)
Abstract: http://phil.elte.hu/tpf/2008-2009/February/#3
23 February 4:00 PM Room 226
Ferenc Csatari
Department of Logic, Institute of Philosohy
Eotvos University, Budapest
Az egytol az omegaig - fejezetek a szamfogalom tortenetebol
(From '1' to 'omega' - selected topics from the history of arithmetic)
Abstract: http://phil.elte.hu/tpf/2008-2009/February/#4
___________________________________
The Forum is open to everyone, including students,visitors, and faculty
members from all departments and institutes!
Format: 60 minute lecture, 10 minute coffee break, followed by a 30-60
minute discussion. The language of presentation is English or Hungarian.
A printable poster is available from here:
http://phil.elte.hu/tpf/2008-2009/December/poster.pdf
Please feel free to post it in your institution!
The organizer of the Forum: Laszlo E. Szabo
(leszabo(a)phil.elte.hu)
--
L a s z l o E. S z a b o
Department of Logic, Institute of Philosophy
Faculty of Humanities, Eotvos University, Budapest
http://phil.elte.hu/leszabo
The CEU Philosophy Department cordially invites you to the next screening
of its Philm Club series:
Dr. Strangelove or: How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Bomb
(1964) by Stanley Kubrick, 93 min.
Friday, 30 January, 6:00 p.m.
TIGy Room, Nador 11 Courtyard
The Philm Club aims at screening and discussing movies that raise
philosophically relevant issues in accessible as well as entertaining ways.
Find out more on the club's blog: http://philmclub.wordpress.com/
Kriszta Biber
Department Coordinator
Philosophy Department
Tel: 36-1-327-3806
Fax: 36-1-327-3072
E-mail: biberk(a)ceu.hu
The CEU Philosophy Department cordially invites you to two lectures
(as part of its Departmental Colloquium series)
by
John Cooper (Princeton University))
on
Chrysippus on Physical Elements
NOTE! Monday!! 26 January,, 5.30 PM, Zrinyi 14, Room 412
ABSTRACT
This paper concerns fundamental aspects of the Stoic conception of the
physical world (Stoic cosmology). In Stoic theory, everything there is
is corporeal (there are no "spirits" or "spiritual entities" of the sort
that Platonist philosophy indulges in with abandon). But not all
corporeal things arematerial entities: reason (whether in nature as a
whole, organizing the world at large, or in our own minds and souls) is
a spatially extended thing, able to act on matter, through which it is
extended, but it is not a material thing. I discuss a neglected and not
well appreciated text of Chrysippus, the most important philosopher
among the originators of the Stoic "school" of philosophy, in which he
identifies three usages of the term (physical) "element." One of these
refers to the familiar physical elements of Greek theory: fire, water,
air, and earth (the elements of matter). The other two usages are hard
to figure out, and my focus in the paper is on how to understand these
other two usages.
AND
by
Alberto Voltolini (University of Turin)
on
The Mark of the Mental
Tuesday, 27 January, 2009, 5.30 PM, Zrinyi 14, Room 412
ABSTRACT
I will claim that intentionalism about qualitative states, i.e. the
thesis that qualitative states are identical with or supervene on
intentional states, is incorrect even in its weak form, according to
which qualitative states also have an intentional content. The best way
to argue for intentionalism is to show that qualitative states have the
features that qualify the simplest intentional states, i.e. objectual
states such as Othello’s being jealous of Desdemona or Vladimir’s
looking for Godot, namely the possible nonexistence and the possible
aspectual shape of the intentional object of a state. Yet there are
cases of qualitative states which fail to possess those features. As a
result, if one wants to look for the mark of mental, it is better to
turn one’s eyes away from intentionality.
Kriszta Biber
Department Coordinator
Philosophy Department
Tel: 36-1-327-3806
Fax: 36-1-327-3072
E-mail: biberk(a)ceu.hu
The CEU Philosophy Department cordially invites you to the next
screening
of its Philm Club series:
Irréversible
2002, directed by Gaspar Noé , 97 min.
Friday, 23rd January,, 6:00 p.m.
TIGy Room, Nador 11 Courtyard
The Philm Club aims at screening and discussing movies that raise
philosophically relevant issues in accessible as well as entertaining
ways.
Find out more on the club's blog: http://philmclub.wordpress.com/
Kriszta Biber
Department Coordinator
Philosophy Department
Tel: 36-1-327-3806
Fax: 36-1-327-3072
E-mail: biberk(a)ceu.hu
Dear Dr. Qwerty,
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TITLE: A Socio-Relational Framework of Sex Differences in the Expression of Emotion
AUTHORS: Jacob Miguel Vigil
ABSTRACT: Despite a staggering body of research demonstrating sex differences in
expressed emotion, very few theoretical models (neither evolutionary nor
nonevolutionary) offer a critical examination of the adaptive nature of such
differences. From the perspective of a socio-relational framework, emotive
behaviors evolved to facilitate the motivation to either exploit or avert
specific types of relationships, and do so by advertising the two most
parsimonious properties of reciprocity potential, or perceived attractiveness as
a prospective social partner. These are the individual's (a) perceived capacity
or ability to provide expedient resources or to inflict immediate harm onto
others, and their (b) perceived trustworthiness or probability of actually
reciprocating altruism (Vigil, 2007). Depending on the unique social demands and
relational constraints that each sex evolved, individuals should be sensitive to
advertise "capacity" and "trustworthiness" cues through selective displays of
dominant vs. submissive and masculine vs. feminine emotive behaviors,
respectively. In this article, I introduce the basic theoretical assumptions and
hypotheses of the framework, and show how the models provide a solid scaffold to
begin to interpret common sex differences in the emotional development
literature. I conclude by discussing how the framework can be used to predict
condition- and situation-based variation in mood and other forms of expressive
behaviors.
KEYWORDS: emotion, evolutionary psychology, femininity, masculinity, mood,
motivation, nonverbal behaviors, sex differences, social behaviors, social cognition
FULL TEXT: http://www.bbsonline.org/Preprints/Vigil-02212008/Referees/
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-------------------------------------------------------------------
The CEU Philosophy Department cordially invites you to a talk
(as part of its Departmental Colloquium series)
by
Robert Scharff (University of New Hampshire)
on
Heidegger's 'Untimely' Critique of Technology
Tuesday, 20 January, 2009, 5.30 PM, Zrinyi 14, Room 412
ABSTRACT
Heidegger’s treatment of technology is undoubtedly and fundamentally
critical from beginning to end. About the hegemony and increasingly
global reach of technoscientific understanding, he is deeply
“distressed.” Yet his critics are wrong to conclude that
Heidegger’s criticisms are overdrawn-that he suffers from
anti-technoscientific bias or terminal pessimism. Objections of this
sort typically misread Heidegger’s aims and selectively read his
texts. His critique of technology is, in fact, “untimely” in
Nietzsche’s sense. It says what people do not want to hear, precisely
when they need to hear it. Hence, the standard objections to
Heidegger’s critique are best viewed as the sign of a widespread
contemporary tendency-a tendency found even among allegedly
post-positivist and phenomenological writers about technoscience-to
overestimate the degree to which we have left behind a Comtean, or
classical positivist understanding of our age.
Kriszta Biber
Department Coordinator
Philosophy Department
Tel: 36-1-327-3806
Fax: 36-1-327-3072
E-mail: biberk(a)ceu.hu
KONFERENCIAFELHÍVÁS
XVII. MAKOG
A Magyar Kognitív Tudományi Alapítvány az MTA-ELTE Nyelvfilozófiai
Kutatócsoportjával közösen konferenciát rendez
A nyelvi és a mentális reprezentáció természete
címmel.
A konferencia ideje: 2009. május 7–9.
A konferencia helyszíne: Az ELTE BTK Filozófia Intézete (Budapest
1088, Múzeum krt. 4. I. épület, Bence-terem).
A konferenciára való jelentkezés határideje: 2009. április 1.
A jelentkezéseket (melyeknek a tervezett előadás 10-15 soros
összefoglalóját kell tartalmazniuk) a következő címre kérjük:
xvii.makog(a)gmail.com
Regisztrációs díj: 5000 Ft. Diákoknak: 3000 Ft.
A konferencia weboldala: http://phil.elte.hu/MAKOG2009
A4-es méretű színes plakát letölthető innen:
http://phil.elte.hu/MAKOG2009/makog2009.pdf
A konferenciaelőadások írásos változataiból tanulmánykötet
megjelentetését tervezzük.
--
L a s z l o E. S z a b o
Department of Logic, Institute of Philosophy
Faculty of Humanities, Eotvos University, Budapest
http://phil.elte.hu/leszabo
European Society for Philosophy and Psychology
17th ANNUAL MEETING: CEU Budapest, Hungary, August 27-30th 2009
CALL FOR PAPERS: Deadline 15th April 2009.
ESPP Webpage: www.eurospp.org
Conference Webpage: http://web.ceu.hu/phil/espp09/
Invited speakers include:
Dare Baldwin (University of Oregon)
Leonard Talmy (SUNY at Buffalo)
Giacomo Rizzolatti (University of Parma)
Invited symposium organizers include:
Loiuse Röska-Hardy - Rational Imitation
Nick Shea and Tim Bayne - Consciousness in Vegetative State Patients
Pierre Jacob - Dissociations Between Perception and Action
The Society invites submitted papers, posters and symposia for this
meeting.
Previous topics covered at ESPP include spatial concepts, emotion,
perception, simulation theory, attention, reference, problems of
consciousness, early numerical cognition, infants' understanding of
intentionality, memory and time, motor imagery, causal understanding,
counterfactuals, the semantics/pragmatics distinction, reasoning,
vagueness,
mental causation, action and agency, thought without language,
externalism,
connectionism, hypnosis, and the interpretation of neuropsychological
results.
See www.eurospp.org for full details of electronic submission
requirements.
Submissions are refereed and selected on the basis of quality and
relevance
to psychologists, philosophers and linguists.
Submissions of papers and posters must include an abstract of 250 words
maximum, in addition to a 750 word summary (psychology and
linguistics) or a
short paper (philosophy) They have to be submitted electronically
through
the ESPP web page www.eurospp.org by April 15, 2009.
Symposium submissions should consist of a 250 word description and a
list of
speakers and should be sent by the potential convenor to the appropriate
programme chair by March 15, 2009.
We particularly welcome POSTER submissions. Posters will be displayed
throughout the conference as well as at designated poster sessions. The
first author of each accepted poster (and who does not also present a
paper)
will get free ESPP membership for 2009.
Programme chairs:
Philosophy: Matt Nudds, U. Edinburgh, UK. matthew.nudds(a)ed.ac.uk
Psychology: Sarah Beck, U. Birmingham, UK. s.r.beck(a)bham.ac.uk
Linguistics: Peter Svenonius, U. Tromsoe, Norway. Peter.Svenonius(a)hum.uit.no
---
Local organizers:
Katalin Farkas (CEU)
Gergely Csibra (CEU)
György Gergely (CEU)
Csaba Pléh (BME)