THEORETICAL PHILOSOPHY COLLOQUIUM
Institute of Philosophy
Faculty of Humanities, Eotvos University
Room 208 Monday 4:00 PM Puskin u. 3, Budapest
Web site: http://philosophy.elte.hu/colloquium
!!! Notice that the location is:
Room 208, 2nd Floor, Building "i" (Puskin u. 3), Faculty of Humanities,
Eotvos University !!!
5 March 4:00 PM Room 208 (Puskin u. 3)
Janos Laszlo Farkas
Institute for Philosophical Research
Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Budapest
Megjeleno mozgas es igaz mozgas
(Apparent motion vs. true motion)
Abstract: http://philosophy.elte.hu/colloquium/2007/March/#1
___________________________________
The Colloquium is open to everyone, including students,
visitors, and faculty members from all departments and institutes!
Format of the colloquium: 60 minute lecture, 10 minute break, followed
by a 30-60 minute discussion.The language of presentation is English or
Hungarian.
A printable poster is available from here:
http://philosophy.elte.hu/colloquium/2007/March/poster.pdf
Please feel free to post it in your institution!
The organizer of the colloquium: Laszlo E. Szabo
(leszabo(a)philosophy.elte.hu)
--
L a s z l o E. S z a b o
Theoretical Physics Research Group of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences
Department of History and Philosophy of Science
Eotvos University, Budapest
http://philosophy.elte.hu/leszabo
The CEU Department of Philosophy cordially invites you to a talk
by
Gergely Ambrus (University of Miskolc)
on
'(Indirect) Arguments for a Structuralist Realist Account of
Consciousness'
5.00 PM, Tuesday, 27 February, Zrinyi 14, Room 412
Abstract
"In the lecture I survey the most important naturalist views about
consciousness, i.e. (1) analytic behaviorism/functionalism; (2)
eliminativism; (3) type-identity with pure belief theory; (4)
supervenient
materialism with logical supervenience (a priori materialism); (5)
supervenient materialism with strong metaphysical supervenience (a
posteriori materialism); (6) structuralist realist materialism, and
(7)
naturalist dualism. I shall argue that among these it is only
(epistemic)
structural realist materialism that can be squared with two plausible
assumptions, namely that we are not zombies, and that there are no
strong
metaphysical necessities."
Kriszta Biber
Department Coordinator
Philosophy Department
Tel: 36-1-327-3806
Fax: 36-1-327-3072
E-mail: biberk(a)ceu.hu
The CEU Department of Philosophy cordially invites you to a talk
by
Gergely Ambrus (University of Miskolc)
on
'(Indirect) Arguments for a Structuralist Realist Account of
Consciousness'
5.00 PM, Tuesday, 27 February, Zrinyi 14, Room 412
Abstract
"In the lecture I survey the most important naturalist views about
consciousness, i.e. (1) analytic behaviorism/functionalism; (2)
eliminativism; (3) type-identity with pure belief theory; (4)
supervenient
materialism with logical supervenience (a priori materialism); (5)
supervenient materialism with strong metaphysical supervenience (a
posteriori materialism); (6) structuralist realist materialism, and
(7)
naturalist dualism. I shall argue that among these it is only
(epistemic)
structural realist materialism that can be squared with two plausible
assumptions, namely that we are not zombies, and that there are no
strong
metaphysical necessities."
THEORETICAL PHILOSOPHY COLLOQUIUM
Institute for Philosophy
Faculty of Humanities, Eotvos University
Room 208 Monday 4:00 PM Puskin u. 3, Budapest
Web site: http://philosophy.elte.hu/colloquium
Program: March 2007
!!! Notice that the location of the Theoretical Philosophy Colloquium
is: Puskin u. 3. !!!
5 March 4:00 PM Room 208 (Puskin u. 3)
Janos Farkas
Institute for Philosophical Research
Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Budapest
Megjeleno mozgas es igaz mozgas
(Apparent motion vs. true motion)
Abstract: http://philosophy.elte.hu/colloquium/2007/March/#1
12 March 4:00 PM Room 208 (Puskin u. 3)
Miklos Marton
Department of Philosophy, Faculty of Law and Political Sciences
Eotvos University
A mentalis antirealizmus eselyei
(Perspectives of mental anti-realism)
Abstract: http://philosophy.elte.hu/colloquium/2007/March/#2
19 March 4:00 PM Room 208 (Puskin u. 3)
Gabor Kutrovatz
Department of History and Philosophy of Science, Eotvos University
Demarkacia-problema, hatarmunkalatok, publikus tudomanyfelfogas
(Demarcation problem, crossing borders, public understanding of science)
Abstract: http://philosophy.elte.hu/colloquium/2007/March/#3
26 March 4:00 PM Room 208 (Puskin u. 3)
Nenad Miscevic
Philosophy, Central European University, Budapest
Philosophy, University of Maribor
Thought experiments, inference and apriority
Abstract: http://philosophy.elte.hu/colloquium/2007/March/#4
___________________________________
Format of the colloquium: 60 minute lecture, 10 minute break, followed
by a 30-60 minute discussion.The language of presentation is English or
Hungarian. The Colloquium is open to everyone, including students,
visitors, and faculty members from all departments and institutes.
A printable poster is available from here:
http://philosophy.elte.hu/colloquium/2007/March/poster.pdf
Please feel free to post it in your institution!
The organizer of the colloquium: Laszlo E. Szabo (email:
leszabo(a)philosophy.elte.hu)
--
L a s z l o E. S z a b o
Theoretical Physics Research Group of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences
Department of History and Philosophy of Science
Eotvos University, Budapest
http://philosophy.elte.hu/leszabo
Announcement of THEORETICAL PHILOSOPHY COLLOQUIUM
The weekly Theoretical Philosophy Colloquium (TPC) is organized and
hosted by the Institute for Philosophy at the Faculty of Humanities of
Eotvos University. Following the traditions set by the Philosophy of
Science Colloquium hosted by the Department of History and Philosophy of
Science (Faculty of Sciences, Eotvos University) between 1999 and 2006,
it aims to bring together not only the Budapest philosophy community
working on a wide range of theoretical philosophy, but also scientists
interested in philosophical and foundational problems of natural and
social sciences.
The scope of the Colloquium includes all aspects of theoretical
philosophy, including:
* logic and philosophy of mathematics
* philosophy of science
* modern metaphysics
* epistemology
* philosophy of language
* problems in history of philosophy and history of science,
relevant to the above topics
* particular issues in natural and social sciences, important for
the discourses in the main scope of the Colloquium.
Format of the colloquium: 60 minute lecture, 10 minute break, followed
by a 30-60 minute discussion.The language of presentation is English or
Hungarian.
The Colloquium is open to everyone, including students, visitors, and
faculty members from all departments and institutes.
The regular venue: Monday 4:00 PM, Room 208, Puskin u. 3, Budapest.
(Notice the difference in location between TPC and the earlier
Philosophy of Science Colloquium!!!!
The Colloquium will start in March 2007.
Web site: http://philosophy.elte.hu/colloquium
For any further information, please, contact the organizer:
Laszlo E. Szabo (e-mail: leszabo(a)philosophy.elte.hu).
--
L a s z l o E. S z a b o
Theoretical Physics Research Group of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences
Department of History and Philosophy of Science
Eotvos University, Budapest
http://philosophy.elte.hu/leszabo
Dear Dr. Qwerty,
==================================================================
*** CALL RESPONSE INSTRUCTIONS ***
==================================================================
Please DO NOT respond to this email. If you wish to submit a proposal for
commentary and/or suggest potential commentators, please go to the new
Online Commentary Proposal System at the following URL:
http://www.bbsonline.org/perl/commentary/commproposal?authordir=Barbey-0605…
* If you only wish to suggest potential commentators, please ignore prompts to
submit a proposal with expertise information.
* If you experience technical difficulties, please email bbs(a)bbsonline.org.
* Please respond to this Call no later than March 12, 2007
NOTE: Behavioral and Brain Sciences (BBS) is an international,
interdisciplinary journal providing Open Peer Commentary on important and
controversial current research in the biobehavioral and cognitive sciences.
Commentators must be BBS Associates, or suggested by a BBS Associate. If you
are not a BBS Associate, please follow the instructions linked below:
http://www.bbsonline.org/Instructions/associnst.html
==================================================================
** Target Article Information **
==================================================================
To help you decide whether you would be an appropriate commentator for this
article, an unedited, uncorrected target article is retrievable at the URL
that follows the abstract and keywords below. This unedited draft has been
prepared only for potential commentators who wish to nominate themselves for
formal commentary invitation. Please DO NOT write a commentary until you
receive a formal invitation. If you are invited to submit a commentary, a
copyedited, corrected version of this paper will be posted in the invitation
letter. The commentary invitation list is compiled by the Editors so as to
balance proposals, areas of expertise, and frequency of prior commentaries in
BBS.
TITLE: Base-rate Respect: From Ecological Rationality to Dual Processes
AUTHOR: Aron K. Barbey and Steven A. Sloman
ABSTRACT: The phenomenon of base-rate neglect has elicited much debate. One
arena of debate concerns how people make judgments under conditions of
uncertainty. Another more controversial arena concerns human rationality.
In this paper, we attempt to unpack the perspectives in the literature on both
kinds of issues and evaluate their ability to explain existing data and their
conceptual coherence. We will conclude that the best account of the data
should be framed in terms of a dual-process model of judgment that attributes
base-rate neglect to associative judgment strategies that fail to adequately
represent the set structure of the problem. Base-rate neglect is reduced when
problems are presented in a format that affords accurate representation in
terms of nested sets of individuals.
KEYWORDS: Base-rate neglect, Probability judgment, Bayesian reasoning, Dual
process theory, Nested set hypothesis
FULL TEXT: http://www.bbsonline.org/Preprints/Barbey-06052006/Referees/
==================================================================
*** CALL RESPONSE INSTRUCTIONS ***
==================================================================
Please DO NOT respond to this email. If you wish to submit a proposal for
commentary and/or suggest potential commentators, please go to the new
Online Commentary Proposal System at the following URL:
http://www.bbsonline.org/perl/commentary/commproposal?authordir=Barbey-0605…
* If you only wish to suggest potential commentators, please ignore prompts to
submit a proposal with expertise information.
* If you experience technical difficulties, please email bbs(a)bbsonline.org.
* Please respond to this Call no later than March 12, 2007
NOTE: Behavioral and Brain Sciences (BBS) is an international,
interdisciplinary journal providing Open Peer Commentary on important and
controversial current research in the biobehavioral and cognitive sciences.
Commentators must be BBS Associates, or suggested by a BBS Associate. If you
are not a BBS Associate, please follow the instructions linked below:
http://www.bbsonline.org/Instructions/associnst.html
==================================================================
==================================================================
Paul Bloom - Editor
Barbara Finlay - Editor
Behavioral and Brain Sciences
bbs(a)bbsonline.org
http://www.bbsonline.org
-------------------------------------------------------------------
==================================================================
*** CALL RESPONSE INSTRUCTIONS ***
==================================================================
Please DO NOT respond to this email. If you wish to submit a proposal for
commentary and/or suggest potential commentators, please go to the new
Online Commentary Proposal System at the following URL:
http://www.bbsonline.org/perl/commentary/commproposal?authordir=Barbey-0605…
* If you only wish to suggest potential commentators, please ignore prompts to
submit a proposal with expertise information.
* If you experience technical difficulties, please email bbs(a)bbsonline.org.
* Please respond to this Call no later than March 12, 2007
NOTE: Behavioral and Brain Sciences (BBS) is an international,
interdisciplinary journal providing Open Peer Commentary on important and
controversial current research in the biobehavioral and cognitive sciences.
Commentators must be BBS Associates, or suggested by a BBS Associate. If you
are not a BBS Associate, please follow the instructions linked below:
http://www.bbsonline.org/Instructions/associnst.html
==================================================================
** Target Article Information **
==================================================================
To help you decide whether you would be an appropriate commentator for this
article, an unedited, uncorrected target article is retrievable at the URL
that follows the abstract and keywords below. This unedited draft has been
prepared only for potential commentators who wish to nominate themselves for
formal commentary invitation. Please DO NOT write a commentary until you
receive a formal invitation. If you are invited to submit a commentary, a
copyedited, corrected version of this paper will be posted in the invitation
letter. The commentary invitation list is compiled by the Editors so as to
balance proposals, areas of expertise, and frequency of prior commentaries in
BBS.
TITLE: Base-rate Respect: From Ecological Rationality to Dual Processes
AUTHOR: Aron K. Barbey and Steven A. Sloman
ABSTRACT: The phenomenon of base-rate neglect has elicited much debate. One
arena of debate concerns how people make judgments under conditions of
uncertainty. Another more controversial arena concerns human rationality.
In this paper, we attempt to unpack the perspectives in the literature on both
kinds of issues and evaluate their ability to explain existing data and their
conceptual coherence. We will conclude that the best account of the data
should be framed in terms of a dual-process model of judgment that attributes
base-rate neglect to associative judgment strategies that fail to adequately
represent the set structure of the problem. Base-rate neglect is reduced when
problems are presented in a format that affords accurate representation in
terms of nested sets of individuals.
KEYWORDS: Base-rate neglect, Probability judgment, Bayesian reasoning, Dual
process theory, Nested set hypothesis
FULL TEXT: http://www.bbsonline.org/Preprints/Barbey-06052006/Referees/
==================================================================
*** CALL RESPONSE INSTRUCTIONS ***
==================================================================
Please DO NOT respond to this email. If you wish to submit a proposal for
commentary and/or suggest potential commentators, please go to the new
Online Commentary Proposal System at the following URL:
http://www.bbsonline.org/perl/commentary/commproposal?authordir=Barbey-0605…
* If you only wish to suggest potential commentators, please ignore prompts to
submit a proposal with expertise information.
* If you experience technical difficulties, please email bbs(a)bbsonline.org.
* Please respond to this Call no later than March 12, 2007
NOTE: Behavioral and Brain Sciences (BBS) is an international,
interdisciplinary journal providing Open Peer Commentary on important and
controversial current research in the biobehavioral and cognitive sciences.
Commentators must be BBS Associates, or suggested by a BBS Associate. If you
are not a BBS Associate, please follow the instructions linked below:
http://www.bbsonline.org/Instructions/associnst.html
==================================================================
==================================================================
Paul Bloom - Editor
Barbara Finlay - Editor
Behavioral and Brain Sciences
bbs(a)bbsonline.org
http://www.bbsonline.org
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Dear Everyone,
After two unfortunate events that earlier prevented this talk now we are
really going to have it. All are welcome!
Zoltán
György Gergely
Institute for Psychological Research
Hungarian Academy of Sciences
*Learning 'about' versus learning 'from other minds: *
*The role of ostensive cues in triggering pedagogical knowledge transfer
in human infants***
Tuesday, 6 March, 2007, 5 PM
CEU Department of Philosophy, 1051 Budapest, Zrínyi u. 14, 4th floor,
rm. 412.**
* Abstract*
By the end of their first year human infants start to exhibit a number
of species-unique social cognitive competences (such as social
referencing, imitative learning of novel means, or proto-declarative
pointing) that involve triadic interactions in ostensive communicative
cuing contexts. The currently dominant interpretation of these early
social-cognitive phenomena assumes that their primary function is to
serve /social motives/ (such as intersubjective sharing of mental
states). In this talk I shall contrast this view with an alternative
interpretation based on the theory of human 'pedagogy' (Csibra &
Gergely, 2006; Gergely & Csibra, 2005, 2006) which assumes that
ostensively cued triadic interactions serve primarily the /epistemic
/function of transferring new and relevant cultural knowledge about
referents to infants. The theory argues that others' referential
manifestations during triadic interactions are typically framed by
specific types of /ostensive-communicative cues/ for which infants show
early sensitivity and preference. These include eye-contact, contingent
turn-taking reactivity, the prosodic intonation pattern of motherese,/
/and/ /addressing infants by their own name/./ Such ostensive cues
trigger in infants the interpretation that the other exhibits a
communicative intention addressed to them to manifest new and relevant
information for them to fast learn about the referent. It is
hypothesized that ostensive cues can act as an 'interpretation switch'
directing infants to construe others' referential knowledge
manifestations as pedagogical 'teaching' events. I shall review recent
evidence from studies of relevance-guided selective imitative learning
and of infants' differential interpretation of others' referential
emotion expressions during the second year that provide convergent
empirical support for the hypothesized interpretation-modulating role of
ostensive cuing in early infancy.
The Philosophy Department cordially invites you to a talk
by
Dmitriy Vinnik
(SEP fellow, CEU Philosophy Department, Institiute of Philosophy and Law,Russian Academy of Science)
on
"The criteria of personal identity in property dualism framework"
Wednesday, 14. February,, 5.00 PM , Philosophy Department
Zrinyi str. 14 /room 412
Abstract:
Due to the nonreductionist form of property dualistic conceptions we can not reduce the problem of personal identity only to the relevance of usage of one type of criteria (physical or psychological). It is plausible that brain and memory criteria are necessary but not enough to solve the problem of personal identity. Such objections against the relevance of these criteria known as reduplication argument and circularity objection (relatively) are serious and cant be ignored. An attempts to defend brain and memory criteria in a simple form are being described. These attempts known as simple view and quasi-memory conception. Simple view is a contemporary form of classical metaphysical conception of nonobservable mental ego. A great number of contemporary dualistic conceptions implies this point of view or contain it unobviously. This conception is irrelevant for predicate or conceptual dualism but seems plausible for property dualism, double-aspect theory and neutral monism. Despite to the contemporary character of this argumentation this kind of standpoint may be found out in cartesian and kantians philosophy. The notion of quasi-memory was suggested as rather sophisticated attempt to solve the pure logical, not essential mind-body problem. This problem derives from the Humes notion of mental subject. However even Hume used this notion in some unobvious way because his concept of mental content is transubjective.
The analysis of relationships between physical and mental criteria is very topical. This criteria has to be used as a pare in property dualism. By the way in the other forms of nonproductive physicalism one of criterias may be successfully excluded. In supervenient theories the physical criteria plays more fundamental role. In functionalism, for example, physical criteria is not necessary at all, since we are acknowledge the conceptual dualistic character of functionalism as a form of the token-identity theory. It is evident that the choice of several criteria depends of ontological premises However the concepts of nonobservable mental subject and transubjective mental content cant be airily ignored when philosophers try to solve the problem of personal identity and the problem of unity of consciousness.
Kriszta Biber
Department Coordinator
Philosophy Department
Tel: 36-1-327-3806
Fax: 36-1-327-3072
E-mail: biberk(a)ceu.hu