The CEU Department of Philosophy cordially invites you to a talk by Gergely Ambrus (University of Miskolc) on '(Indirect) Arguments for a Structuralist Realist Account of Consciousness' 5.00 PM, Tuesday, 27 February, Zrinyi 14, Room 412 Abstract "In the lecture I survey the most important naturalist views about consciousness, i.e. (1) analytic behaviorism/functionalism; (2) eliminativism; (3) type-identity with pure belief theory; (4) supervenient materialism with logical supervenience (a priori materialism); (5) supervenient materialism with strong metaphysical supervenience (a posteriori materialism); (6) structuralist realist materialism, and (7) naturalist dualism. I shall argue that among these it is only (epistemic) structural realist materialism that can be squared with two plausible assumptions, namely that we are not zombies, and that there are no strong metaphysical necessities." Kriszta Biber Department Coordinator Philosophy Department Tel: 36-1-327-3806 Fax: 36-1-327-3072 E-mail: biberk(a)ceu.hu