The CEU Department of Philosophy cordially invites you to a talk (as part of its Departmental Colloquium series) by Helen Beebee (University of Manchester) on ‘Epiphenomenalism for Functionalists’ Tuesday, 10 February 2015, 5.30 PM, Zrinyi 14, Room 412 ABSTRACT This paper explores a less well-known cousin of the Exclusion Problem for non-reductive physicalism (NRP): what I’ll call the Extrinsicality Problem. Non-reductive physicalists hold that mental properties are generally multiply realised by physical properties. The Exclusion Problem is that if the physical properties are causally sufficient for a given effect, there is no causal work left for the mental properties to do; hence NRP entails the causal inefficacy of the mental. Various promising counterfactual-based solutions are available to the Exclusion Problem; however, a deeper problem remains. Mental properties are thought to be multiply realised because they are functional properties: properties individuated by their typical causes and effects. But functional properties are extrinsic, and extrinsic properties are ill-suited for having causal status. This is the Extrinsicality Problem. I show how various proposed solutions to the Exclusion Problem are subject to the Extrinsicality Problem, but argue that the natural conclusion — epiphenomenalism with respect to the mental — is not as unfortunate as it is commonly taken to be. Krisztina Biber Department of Philosophy Coordinator ------------------------------------------ Central European University Nador u. 9. | 1051 Budapest, Hungary Office: + 36.1.327.3806 | biberk(a)ceu.hu | www.ceu.hu