Krisztina Biber
Department of Philosophy
Coordinator
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Central European University
Nador u. 9. | 1051 Budapest, Hungary
The CEU Department of Philosophy cordially invites you to a talk
(as part of its Departmental Colloquium series)
by
on
‘Epiphenomenalism for Functionalists’
Tuesday, 10 February 2015, 5.30 PM, Zrinyi 14, Room 412
ABSTRACT
This paper explores a less well-known cousin of the Exclusion Problem for non-reductive physicalism (NRP): what I’ll call the Extrinsicality Problem. Non-reductive physicalists hold that mental properties are generally multiply realised by physical properties. The Exclusion Problem is that if the physical properties are causally sufficient for a given effect, there is no causal work left for the mental properties to do; hence NRP entails the causal inefficacy of the mental. Various promising counterfactual-based solutions are available to the Exclusion Problem; however, a deeper problem remains. Mental properties are thought to be multiply realised because they are functional properties: properties individuated by their typical causes and effects. But functional properties are extrinsic, and extrinsic properties are ill-suited for having causal status. This is the Extrinsicality Problem. I show how various proposed solutions to the Exclusion Problem are subject to the Extrinsicality Problem, but argue that the natural conclusion — epiphenomenalism with respect to the mental — is not as unfortunate as it is commonly taken to be.