PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE COLLOQUIUM, April

Department of History and Philosophy of Science Eotvos University Budapest, Pazmany P. setany 1/A PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE COLLOQUIUM (http://hps.elte.hu/seminar) ________________________________________________ April program 8 April 4:00 PM 6th floor 6.54 Panel discussion: A Godel-tetel filozofiai kovetkezmenyei Philosophical upshot of Godel's theorem Panelists: Ferenc Csaba (Logic, Eotvos) Janos Geier (Psychology, Eotvos) Andras Mate (Logic, Eotvos) Istvan Nemeti (Renyi Institute of Mathematics) Moderator: Laszlo E. Szabo (Theoretical Physics & HPS, Eotvos) Iden unnepeljuk Bolyai Janos szuletesenek ketszazadik evfordulojat! Bolyai, Gauss es Lobacsevszkij az elso nem-euklideszi geometriak megalkotasaval inditottak el azt a folyamatot, amit a matematika ontudatra ebredesenek nevezhetnenk. A matematika eme onreflexiojaval a filozofia epitmenyenek masik tartopillere, a racionalizmus is meginogni latszik. (Az elso, az empirizmus ugyanis mar Hume ota aladucolasra szorul.) A 19. szazad vegere vilagos volt, hogy ujra kell gondolnunk a matematika alapveto mibenletet. Ugy tunik, a matematika -- ahogyan Russell megfogalmazta -- "olyan tudomany, amelyben nem tudjuk mirol beszelunk, vagy hogy igaz-e, amit mondunk". A matematikus szamara sem az axiomaknak, sem a beloluk levezetett allitasoknak nincs jelentese, es nincs igazsaga. A matematikus dolga a levezetes maga. Sokaig ugy tunt, hogy a Hilbert-fele formalista/axiomatikus program a dolgokat a helyere teszi, mignem 1931-ben egy fiatal Becsi matematikus, Kurt Godel kozzetette az "Uber formal unentscheidbare Satze der Principia Mathematica und verwandter Systeme" cimu dolgozatat. Altalanos velekedes szerint, Godel eredmenyei lehetetlenne tettek a formalista program folytatasat. Tenyleg igy van-e? Hol tartunk most? Hogyan is kell pontosan ertekelnunk Godel teteleit? Ezekket a kerdeseket fogjuk megvitatni. 15 April 4:00 PM 6th floor 6.54 Evolutionary Moral Realism John Collier Konrad Lorenz Institute for Evolution and Cognition Research, Altenberg, Austria Moral realism is the view that moral kinds, such as values, obligations, rights, duties and the like, are objective kinds that ground moral "oughts". Moral naturalism is the view that moral kinds can best be explained in naturalistic terms. The evolutionary version of moral naturalism holds that evolutionary explanations are central to satisfactory naturalistic explanations of morality. Evolutionary moral realism holds that there are moral natural kinds that can ground moral "oughts", and that these kinds are best explained in evolutionary terms. In previous work we have argued that evolutionary naturalism can be objective: John Collier and Michael Stingl, "Evolutionary Naturalism and the Objectivity of Morality", Biology and Philosophy 8 (1993): 47-60, reprinted in Paul Thompson, ed., Issues in Evolutionary Ethics, SUNY Press, Albany, 1995, pp. 409-429. In this talk I will discuss what is at stake, and how our view differs from other moral naturalisms that try to reduce or eliminate moral kinds. In particular, I will discuss why giving an evolutionary explanation of morality does not need to commit the "is/ought" fallacy. 22 April 4:00 PM 6th floor 6.54 Vallas es tudomany: a konfliktuson innen es tul Religion and Science: this side of the conflict and beyond Mihaly Toth Philosophy, Pazmany Peter Catholic University, Budapest Vallas es tudomany, kulonosen pedig a modern termeszettudomany viszonyara gondolva leggyakrabban valamilyen szembenallas kepe sejlik fel elottunk. Ezt az elkepzelest reszben indokoljak az ujkori tudomanytortenet egyes fejlemenyei. A ket terulet kapcsolata azonban sokkal arnyaltabb annal, semhogy egy egyszeru konfliktus- modellel jellemezheto lenne. Az elmult evtizedekben szamos kiserlet tortent mind teologusok, mind termeszettudosok, mind a kozvetitesre vallalkozo filozofusok reszerol, hogy a kerdeses viszony minel tobb aspektusat feltarjak, valamint hogy a kapcsolat jelen es jovobeni lehetosegeit felvazoljak. Eloadasomban a legfontosabb idevonatkozo eszmefuttatasokat kivanom roviden bemutatni - kiterve a magyar vonatkozasokra -, altaluk illusztralva a kerdeskor aktualitasat es jelentoseget. Vitainditokent igyekszem tovabba ramutatni az eddigi kiserletek nehany problematikus pontjara is. 29 April 4:00 PM 6th floor 6.54 Concepts: where the critics of the classical view went wrong Lilia Gurova Department of Philosophy of Science, Institute of Philosophical Research, Bulgarian Academy of Sciences, Sofia Department of Cognitive Science and Psychology, New Bulgarian University, Sofia In the 1970s, a set of experimental findings convinced cognitive science community that the view whose main claim is that concepts are represented by lists of defining features (the so-called classical view) is to be recognized as inadequate and replaced by a more sound theory. Some of the critics of the classical view have even claimed that this view has failed not only as a psychological theory but also as a methodological prescription in natural sciences (especially in biology). Taken seriously, their claim implies that the search for well-defined concepts in science is generally misleading. Most scientists, however, would hardly agree with such a verdict. Is the criticism against the classical view so unproblematic as it is seen to be today? The aim of this presentation is to denounce some broadly accepted myths concerning the so-called classical view and its alleged main flaws. ___________________ The organizer of the seminar: Lszl E. Szab -- Laszlo E. Szabo Department of Theoretical Physics Department of History and Philosophy of Science Eotvos University, Budapest H-1518 Budapest, Pf. 32, Hungary Phone/Fax: (36-1)372-2924 Home: (36-1) 200-7318 Mobil/SMS: (36) 20-366-1172 http://hps.elte.hu/~leszabo