3 Feb
2014
3 Feb
'14
5:28 p.m.
The CEU Department of Philosophy cordially invites you to a talk
(as part of its Departmental Colloquium series)
by
Ulrike Heuer (Leeds)
on
`Acting intentionally`
Tuesday, 4 February, 2014, 5.30 PM, Zrinyi 14, Room 412
ABSTRACT
Generally reasons to act in a certain way are also reasons to form an
intention to do so, some philosophers think. At any rate, the fact that
it would be good to have an intention when there is nothing to be said
for acting as intended is no reason for forming an intention (or
alternatively: it is a reason, but we can’t follow it). Intentions are
like beliefs in that they cannot be formed for state-given reasons.
However, according to an influential account of intentions – Bratman’s
planning conception – intentions enable coordination with oneself and
others. Intentions are useful in that regard. Thus the reasons for
forming them would appear to be instrumental reasons of a certain kind –
not unlike state-given reasons. There is a tension between the two
approaches. I will argue that while the instrumental view of reasons to
intend holds at least a partial truth, the symmetry claim of reasons to
believe and reasons to intend misunderstands the dependence of
intentions on reasons to act.