The CEU Department of Philosophy cordially invites you to a talk
(as part of its Departmental Colloquium series)
by
Debbie Roberts (Edinburgh)
on
Explanatory Indispensability Arguments in Metaethics and Philosophy of
Maths
Tuesday, March 17, 2015, 5.30 PM, Zrinyi 14, Room 412
ABSTRACT
My aim is to defend explanatory indispensability arguments in
metaethics against a certain objection, drawing on recent work in the
philosophy of mathematics. Explanatory indispensibility arguments claim,
roughly, that an entity or property is a genuine feature of the world if
reference to that entity or property figures ineliminably in the best
explanation of some phenomena. The objection that I’m concerned to
defend such arguments against holds that even if the relevant terms (be
they mathematical, ethical, or whatever) are indispensible to the best
explanation of some phenomenon, this does not generate ontological
commitment to the particular entities or properties that the relevant
kind of realist is keen on admitting to our ontology. I draw on recent
work by platonists in philosophy of maths to reply to the metathical
version of this objection.
Krisztina Biber
Department of Philosophy
Coordinator
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Central European University
Nador u. 9. | 1051 Budapest, Hungary
Office: + 36.1.327.3806 | biberk(a)ceu.hu |
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