Philosophy of Science Colloquium, June program

Department of HISTORY AND PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE Eotvos University, Budapest Pazmany P. setany 1/A Budapest Phone/Fax: (36-1) 372 2924 Department's Home Page:http://hps.elte.hu Philosophy of Science Colloquium Room 6.54 (6th floor) Monday 4:00 PM ____________________________________ June Program 3 June 4:00 PM 6th floor 6.54 László E. Szabó Theoretical Physics Research Group of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences Department of History and Philosophy of Science Eötvös University, Budapest A kauzalitás ontológiai felfogása (Ontological theory of causality) Az okság Hume-i analíziséből kiindulva kritikailag áttekintjük a kauzalitás episztemikus, modális és valószínűségi felfogását. Kicsit bővebben időzünk Lewis kontrafaktuális analízisénél és a "véletlen együttjárás" -ra vonatkozó ismert Sober-példánál. Ezt követően argumentumokat hangoztatunk az okság ontológiai felfogása mellett (Salmon és Russell nyomdokain haladva). Vegül megbeszéljük a kauzalitás és a korreláció viszonyát. 10 June 4:00 PM 6th floor 6.54 Language of presentation: English Friedrich Steinle Institute for Philosophy, Bern University Max-Planck-Institute for the History of Science, Berlin Discovering? Justifying? Experiments in History and Philosophy of Science The philosophical 'standard view' on experiment - finding the only epistemic function of experiment in the tests of well-formulated hypotheses - is closely connected to an implicit or explicit distinction of the contexts of discovery and justification. Recent studies, however, have opened more differentiated perspectives. In particular, there is a specific type of experiments discernible which I call "exploratory." Typically, it occurs in situations in which there is not only no theory available, but even the very concepts and categories of a subject field are opened to revision. Periods of exploratory experimentation often end up with a new conceptualization of the field, providing new outlooks and, at the same time, rendering other ones literally unspeakable. Exploratory experimentation can be contrasted to a more theory-driven type in many respects epistemic, procedural, instrumental, situative. Though it might be tempting to attribute those two types again to a dichotomy between discovery and justification, a closer look makes clear that such a view is inappropriate. At the same time, fundamental shortcomings of that distinction itself become visible. In my talk, I shall both explicate those claims in general terms and substantiate them by cases of experimental research in the history of electricity. Moreover, I shall propose a more promising perspective onto research practice and discuss where and why some type of discovery-justification distinction might well be appropriate. ___________________________________ The 60-minute lecture is followed by a 5-minute break. Then we held a 30-60-minute discussion.The participants may comment the talks and initiate discussion on the Internet. The comments should be written in the language of the presentation. The organizer of the colloquium: Laszlo E. Szabo (email: leszabo(a)hps.elte.hu) -- Laszlo E. Szabo Department of Theoretical Physics Department of History and Philosophy of Science Eotvos University, Budapest H-1518 Budapest, Pf. 32, Hungary Phone/Fax: (36-1)372-2924 Home: (36-1) 200-7318 Mobil/SMS: (36) 20-366-1172 http://hps.elte.hu/~leszabo