reminder: Cognitive Penetration of Colour Experience: Rethinking the Issue in Light of an Indirect Mechanism - 24. November,4.30 PM

The CEU Philosophy Department cordially invites you to a talk (as part of its Departmental Colloquium series) by Fiona Macpherson (University of Glasgow)) on Cognitive Penetration of Colour Experience: Rethinking the Issue in Light of an Indirect Mechanism Tuesday, 24 November 2009, 4.30 PM, Zrinyi 14, Room 412 ABSTRACT Can the phenomenal character of perceptual experience be altered by the states of one’s cognitive system, for example, one’s thoughts or beliefs? If one thinks that this can happen (at least in certain ways that are identified in the paper) then one thinks that there can be cognitive penetration of perceptual experience; otherwise, one thinks that perceptual experience is cognitively impenetrable. I claim that there is one alleged case of cognitive penetration that cannot be explained away by the standard strategies one can typically use to explain away alleged cases. The case is one in which it seems subjects’ beliefs about the typical colour of objects affects their colour experience. I propose a two-step mechanism of indirect cognitive penetration that explains how cognitive penetration may occur. I show that there is independent evidence that each step in this process can occur. I suspect that people who are opposed to the idea that perceptual experience is cognitively penetrable will be less opposed to the idea when they come to consider this indirect mechanism and that those who are generally sympathetic to the idea of cognitive penetrability will welcome the elucidation of this plausible mechanism. Kriszta Biber Department Coordinator Philosophy Department Tel: 36-1-327-3806 Fax: 36-1-327-3072 E-mail: biberk(a)ceu.hu