reminder-philosophy lecture

The CEU Philosophy Department cordially invites you to a lecture by Bill Brewer (Warwick) on "How to Account for Illusion" Tuesday, 29 November 2005 6.00pm Zrinyi 14, room 412 Abstract In a visual illusion, a physical object, o, looks F, although o is not actually F. Early modern empiricists acount for this by postulating a mind-dependent direct object of experience which is F, and is therefore distinct from o. Current orthodoxy rejects this idea that the subjective character of perceptual experience is constituted by its direct objects, and appeals instead to its representational content: in illusion, a non-F physical o is falsely (visually) represented as being F. This current Content View is in my view a mistake. Here I argue that the early modern insight that the subjective character of perceptual experience is simply constituted by its direct objects can account for illusion without resorting to the postulation of any mind-dependent such objects. I end by distinguishing my own position from Berkeley's attempted reconciliation of his immaterialist mentalism with the commonsense conception of the physical world. Kriszta Biber Department Coordinator Philosophy Department Tel: 36-1-327-3806 Fax: 36-1-327-3072 E-mail: biberk(a)ceu.hu