The CEU Department of Philosophy cordially invites you to a talk
(as part of its Departmental Colloquium series)
by
Eric Brown (CEU Business School)
on
`Pro-attitudes and the problem of the wrong kind of reasons`
Tuesday, 27 September, 2011, 4.30 PM, Zrinyi 14, Room 412
ABSTRACT
Wrong kind of reasons (WKR) objections to fitting-attitude analysis of value, as well as
the very idea of the wrong kind of reasons, can be defused by paying close attention to
the attitudes that are posited or imagined by scenarios, e.g., in which we are told that
an evil demon will punish us with
extreme pain unless they admire him. My argument, based on considerations relation to the
role proattitudes must play in defeasible practical inference, is that such attitudes are
strictly impossible. If the attitudes are impossible, then there cannot be reasons for
them. A fortiori there can be no wrong kind
of reasons for them. I also provide a diagnosis of the standard approach to WKR
objections. Such approaches focus on trying to sort reasons into the right and wrong kinds
using some right- or wrong-making property. I
try to show, through a detailed analysis of two such attempts, why this won't work.
Kriszta Biber
Department Coordinator
Philosophy Department
Tel: 36-1-327-3806
Fax: 36-1-327-3072
E-mail: biberk(a)ceu.hu