Philosophy of Science Colloquium, May Program

Department of HISTORY AND PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE Eotvos University, Budapest Pazmany P. setany 1/A Budapest Phone/Fax: (36-1) 372 2924 Department's Home Page:http://hps.elte.hu Philosophy of Science Colloquium Room 6.54 (6th floor) Monday 4:00 PM ____________________________________ May Program 6 May 4:00 PM 6th floor 6.54 (Language: English) Models of cognition and social interactions Mihail Radu Solcan Department of Philosophy, University of Bucharest (1) The talk is an attempt to emphasize some philosophical presuppositions of the application of neural networks models in the analysis of social interactions. (2 )Two main models of cognition are taken into account in the talk: the classical model and the neural network model. (3) The use of neural networks models is rather rarely attempted in social science. The examples known to the author are from economics. (4) The talk suggests that the use of neural networks models in social science is however interesting. The focus is on the implications of the application of the last model as a model of social interactions. (5) Two main advantages of such models are suggested: (a) they offer an explanation for what is called dispersed knowledge; (b) they shift the accent from rational agents to interactions and rules in society. (6) Some criticisms of the use of models in social science are examined. We also consider the advantages of alternative models with (rational) agents. (7) Open problems: the meaning of computer simulations of social interactions based on neural networks models. 13 May 4:00 PM 6th floor 6.54 (Language: English, except all participants speak Hungarian) Indeterminism and Free Will Ferenc Huoranszki Central European University, Budapest The fundamental problem for any libertarian philosophy of action concerns the intelligibility of free choice in an indeterministic world. Since free choice implies control the absence of deterministic processes seems to diminish, rather than enhance, freedom. Chancy processes decrease the capacity of control; "indeterminate decisions" cannot serve as grounds of responsibility-attribution. Consequently, there could be no freedom in an indeterministic world. If our world is in fact indeterministic and such that its indeterminism matters in making choices then we cannot be free agents. One possible answer to this problem is to assume that it is the agent herself, and not some (mental or physical) event, which causes the action. Robert Kane has recently proposed an alternative solution. He argues that what is seen as an indeterministic causal process at the neuro-physiological level can be considered as an effort of the will at the mental level. Indeterminate decisions are not arbitrary in the sense that the agent must have a reason for doing what she does. But in some of the cases reasons themselves are not sufficient for choice. It depends on the agent's choice, which reasons she takes to be weightier. In such cases the outcome of a decision procedure depends only on the agent's ultimate choice but 1. the choice is not causally determined since the "neural basis" of the mental process is indeterministic and 2. it is not arbitrary either since in whatever way the agent acts she has a reason to choose that action. Consequently, probabilistic causation can explain how control is possible in indeterministic worlds. In the talk I'll argue that the idea of probabilistic causation will not help the incompatibilist. If incompatibilism is true, freedom of course implies the falsity of determinism. But probabilistic causation fails to provide the required link between indeterminism and control. Such control can only exist if the agent herself and not her neural or mental states causes her actions. 27 May 4:00 PM 6th floor 6.54 (Language: English) Counterfactuals and the Second Law Barry Loewer Department of Philosophy, Rutgers University Counterfactuals e.g. "if the match had been struck it would have lit", are temporally asymmetric -- the future typically coutnerfactually depends on the past but (typically) not the the past on the future. The second law of thermodynamics is also temporally asymmetric. It says, roughly, that the entropy of an isolated system (the universe as a whole) never decreases. So the idea has occurred to some philosophers and physicists including Einstein, Reichenbach, Lewis, Sklar, Horwich (among others) that there is a connection between counterfactuals and thermodynamics second law, and more generally statistical mechanics. But none of these spell out what that connection is. Lewis remarks that he "does not know how to connect the several asymmetries ...and the famous asymmetry of entropy." We will fill in part of the story here. ___________________________________ The 60-minute lecture is followed by a 5-minute break. Then we held a 30-60-minute discussion.The participants may comment the talks and initiate discussion on the Internet. The comments should be written in the language of the presentation. The organizer of the colloquium: Laszlo E. Szabo (email: leszabo(a)hps.elte.hu) -- Laszlo E. Szabo Department of Theoretical Physics Department of History and Philosophy of Science Eotvos University, Budapest H-1518 Budapest, Pf. 32, Hungary Phone/Fax: (36-1)372-2924 Home: (36-1) 200-7318 Mobil/SMS: (36) 20-366-1172 http://hps.elte.hu/~leszabo