Dear All,
I received a kind notice that again, some older text was embedded to
the email body right before the actual title and abstract of the coming
talk. While the IT is asked to correct it in the email system, because
what I see differs from what you see, please accept my apologies. The
next talk title is Voluntary action and social responsibility and the
abstract is
Our social culture provides a dualist concept of action: it assumes
that the conscious mind decides on our actions, that we could therefore
have chosen alternative actions to those we did choose, and that we are
therefore responsible for what we have done. This talk will examine two
key questions about voluntary action from a neuroscientific point of
view. First, I will discuss how the brain's capacity for voluntary
action is related to conscious awareness. I will show that conscious
experience is a product of brain activity that precedes action, and not
a cause of it. In the second part of the talk, I will consider how a
mechanistic, neuroscientific account of voluntary action might relate to
the essential social concept of individual responsibility.
Kind regards,
Reka
>> "Gyorgyne Finta"
<Szabor(a)ceu.hu> 1/8/2015 11:16 AM >>>
Happy New year!
The CEU Department of Cognitive Science cordially invites you to its
first talk of 2015 (as part of its Departmental Colloquium series)
by
Patrick Haggard (UCL)
Date: Wednesday, January 14, 2014 - 17:00-18:30
Location: Department of Cognitive Science, CEU, Frankel Leó út 30-34.,
Room G15
Voluntary action and social responsibility
Abstract:
Our social culture provides a dualist concept of action: it assumes
that the conscious mind decides on our actions, that we could therefore
have chosen alternative actions to those we did choose, and that we are
therefore responsible for what we have done. This talk will examine two
key questions about voluntary action from a neuroscientific point of
view. First, I will discuss how the brain's capacity for voluntary
action is related to conscious awareness. I will show that conscious
experience is a product of brain activity that precedes action, and not
a cause of it. In the second part of the talk, I will consider how a
mechanistic, neuroscientific account of voluntary action might relate to
the essential social concept of individual responsibility.
Title: Investigating the sensorimotor basis of human communication
Abstract: Disembodied automated systems cannot reach human-like
performance when dealing with the decoding of human non-verbal
communicative signals. Automated systems, in fact, rarely exploit human
brain/body solutions. All attempts that do not take this fact into
account are bound to be unreliable in variable environments, to fail in
generalizing to new examples and to be unable to scale up to solve more
complex problems. For this very reason, I will first report basic
neurophysiological studies dedicated to the description of the basic
mechanisms of inter-individual sensorimotor communication. I will then
move to the discussion of current attempts to quantify sensorimotor
information flow among interacting participant and finally propose a
roadmap to build better computational tools to decode human sensorimotor
communication.- See more at:
http://cognitivescience.ceu.hu/events/2014-12-03/departmental-colloquium-al…
We're looking forward to see you there (Frankel Leo u. 30-34) !
Cognitive Science Events at CEU:
http://cognitivescience.ceu.hu/events
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