27 Sep
2007
27 Sep
'07
2 p.m.
The CEU Department of Philosophy cordially invites you to a talk
by
Aldo Frigerio (Catholic University, Milan)
on
'Conditions of Reference'
5.30 PM, Tuesday, 2 October 2007, Zrinyi 14 building, Room 412
ABSTRACT
According to Frege, in order to refer to an object we must grasp a conceptual content
which uniquely identifies that object. Frege called it sense. Russell did not agree with
Frege about this matter: he thought that grasping a conceptual content is not a sufficient
condition in order to refer to an object. We can grasp a conceptual content that
identifies an object and nonetheless not know which object that object is and not be able
to recognize it among others. Referring requires a much stronger connection between the
speaker and the object. This connection is acquaintance. Only if we know an object by
acquaintance can we refer to it, because only in that case we know which object that
object is and are able to recognize it among others. If we only know an object by
description, the link between our words and the object is not reference but a weaker
connection, which Russell called denotation.
In this talk I would like to give some arguments in favor of Freges view. Particularly, I
will show that Russells theory of reference produces too many ambiguities: every device
of singular reference (proper names, indexicals and definite descriptions) can refer both
to objects we are and to objects we are not acquainted with. If these devices had
different meaning depending on the relation the speaker maintains with the referent, they
would be systematically ambiguous. Another weakness of Russells view is the fact that
according to it, in order to understand other people who refer to an object, we should be
able to know if they are acquainted with their referent or not. But we often fail to have
that information and this fact does not jeopardize our comprehension.
Kriszta Biber
Department Coordinator
Philosophy Department
Tel: 36-1-327-3806
Fax: 36-1-327-3072
E-mail: biberk(a)ceu.hu