PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE SEMINAR, October

Department of History and Philosophy of Science Eotvos University Budapest, Pazmany P. setany 1/A PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE SEMINAR (http://hps.elte.hu/seminar) ________________________________________________ 1* October 4:00 PM 6th floor 6.54 (Language: English) J o h n B i c k l e Department of Philosophy and Neuroscience Graduate Program University of Cincinnati, Cincinnati, OH, USA Multiple realization, meet molecular neuroscience In the philosophy of mind, multiple realization refers to the claim that one and the same logical kind (property, state, event) is realized in vastly different physical kinds that share nothing of explanatory relevance in common. Although puzzles about the realization relation remain, this claim has acquired consensus status as a true and important premise in an argument against all forms of psychoneural reduction and type identity. In this paper, I challenge the truth of multiple realization based on some recent discoveries in cellular and molecular neuroscience shared across a variety of species and forms of learning and memory. From sensitization and aversive conditioning in fruit flies and sea slugs through hippocampal-mediated memories for context in mammals, the same "second messenger" intracellular biochemical pathway and molecular genetic process underlies specifically the "consolidation switch" from short-term to long-term memory. Furthermore, this single example illustrates a general principle of evolutionary conservatism at the cellular/molecular level that we can expect to find at work in the mechanisms for all psychological processes. Multiple realization, meet molecular neuroscience. The biochemical and molecular-genetic details that carry the bulk of the argument here will be unfamiliar to many philosophers and cognitive scientists. But they reflect the current state of our scientific knowledge. These details thus serve a useful secondary purpose: they inform scientifically-inspired philosophers and cognitive scientists about recent developments in the cellular and molecular core of current mainstream neuroscience. _________ * The organizer of the seminar wants to apologize to the lecturer and the participants for being absent from the talk of 1 October, because of the ESF Workshop, Bertinoro, Italy. 8 October 4:00 PM 6th floor 6.54 (Language: English, except all participants speak Hungarian) L a s z l o E. S z a b o Theoretical Physics Research Group of HAS Department of History and Philosophy Science Eötvös University, Budapest A Physicalist Interpretation of Probability There is no such property of an event as its "probability." Rather, I argue that probability is a derivative concept, supervening on physical quantities characterizing the state of affairs corresponding to the event in question. The term "probability" can be used only collectively: it means different dimensionless [0,1]-valued physical quantities (measures) in the different particular situations. I also argue that probability is not the limiting value of relative frequency, and not even necessarily related to the notion of frequency. In some cases, the conditions of the sequential repetitions of a particular situation are such, however, that the probability (the corresponding physical quantity) is approximately equal to the relative frequency of the event in question. Sometimes we do not know the value of the physical quantity X, corresponding to the probability of an event A. In this case, if we are convinced about the relationship between X and the relative frequency of A, we can measure X by counting the relative frequency of A. Furthermore, I will argue that probability, as a derivative concept, has nothing to do with (objective) indeterminism and, on the other hand, has nothing to do with "lack of knowledge," even if world is deterministic. 15 October 4:00 PM 6th floor 6.54 (Language: Hungarian) F e r e n c H u o r a n s z k i Philosophy, Central European University, Budapest Tudomány és metafizika (Science and metaphysics) Abstract: TBA 29** October 4:00 PM 6th floor 6.54 (Language: Hungarian) S a n d o r S o o s Department of History and Philosophy Science Eötvös University, Budapest Mit jelent a "Mit jelent a faj?" kérdés? (What does the "What do species mean?" question mean? ) A cimbe agyazott kerdes egy specialis fajtabol valo: egyarant folmerul - es egyarant vitatott - a biologia es a tudomanyfilozofia teruleten, s szovevenyesen osszefonodik a metafizika/ontologia osregi problemaival. Specialis helyzetebol adodoan a valasz szamos iranyban keresheto - mas elegitene ki a biologust, s megint mas a metaszintu diszciplinak kepviselojet. Az eloadas fo celkituzese eppen annak feltarasa, hogy hany ill. hanyfele ertelmet explikalhatjuk a kerdesnek az eddigi valaszkiserletek, s azon kontextusok alapjan, amelyekben gyakran elofordul. A "species problem" elnevezesu tematika egy olyan, attekinto terkepet kivanja megrajzolni, ahol a biologia fajfogalmai, az arisztotelianus es a Quine-i (valamint a kognitiv pszichologiai) termeszeti fajtak, a formalis ontologia osztaly- es individuumfogalmai stb. nyujtanak tampontot a tajekozodashoz. __________ ** The organizer of the seminar wants to apologize to the lecturer and the participants for being absent from the talk of 29 October, because of a short visit to Holland. The organizer of the seminar: László E. Szabó -- Laszlo E. Szabo Department of Theoretical Physics Department of History and Philosophy of Science Eotvos University, Budapest H-1518 Budapest, Pf. 32, Hungary Phone/Fax: (36-1)372-2924 Home: (36-1) 200-7318 Mobil/SMS: (36) 20-366-1172 http://hps.elte.hu/~leszabo