[koglist] Meghivo Hans Radder eloadasaira

Tisztelt kollegak! AZ ELTE Tudomanytortenet es Tudomanyfilozofia Tanszekenek vendegekent ket eloadast tart a kozeljovoben Budapesten Hans Radder tudomany es technikafilozofus az amszterdami Vrije Universiteit, Faculteit der Wijsbegeerte tanara http://www.ph.vu.nl/nl/organisatie/medewerkers/medewerkers-m-s/prof-dr-h-ra… Az eloadasokon minden erdeklodot orommel latunk! ------------------------------ Az elso eloadasra 2012 aprilis 2-án, hetfon delutan 6 orakor az ELTE TTK Lagymanyosi kampuszanak Deli Tombjeben, a 0.827-es termeben (Budapest, 1117 Pazmany setany 1/c, foldszint) kerul sor "Mertonian values, scientific norms, and the commodification of academic research" cimmel. Az eloadas kivonata: Since the 1980s the commodification of academic science has strongly increased. To be sure, science at large has always included research primarily carried out for its economic benefit, especially since the second half of the nineteenth century. Yet, the large-scale commodification of academic science is a more recent phenomenon. In the course of the past decade, this phenomenon has been explored and a variety of studies have become available. Assessments of the rise of entrepreneurial academia differ sharply. On the one hand, it is welcomed and sometimes even seen as a necessary step in the history of academic institutions (e.g., Gibbons et al. 1994; Etzkowitz 2004). On the other hand, the problematic consequences of commodified academic science are also widely discussed and increasingly acknowledged (Shulman 1999; Bok 2003; Krimsky 2003; Healy 2006; Resnik 2007; Radder 2010). In response to these problems, universities, research institutes and science policy organizations have composed a variety of normative codes of good scientific conduct (Kourany 2007). Almost invariably, these codes are based on, or derived from, the social ethos of science formulated by Robert K. Merton in 1942. The aim of this paper is to find out to what extent a Mertonian ethos can still be useful in the present context of a strongly commodified science. The discussion will be focused on the issue of the patenting of the results of academic research. The plan of the paper is as follows. First, I briefly review Merton.s account of the ethos of science. The next section deals with some STS criticisms of this account and it suggests a reinterpretation in terms of general Mertonian values and more specific scientific norms. I then discuss the important issue of the patenting of the results of academic research and I demonstrate the significance of a .deflationary neo-Mertonian approach. to this issue. My conclusion is that the recent practices of public universities stand unjustified. The final section addresses some questions regarding the scope and implications of this neo-Mertonian critique of commodified science. -------------------------- A masodik eloadasra 2012 aprilis 4-en, szerdan delutan 5 orakor az ELTE BTK "Theoretical Philosophy Forum" kereteben a BTK Trefort kerti kampuszanak i epuleteben, a 226-os teremben (Budapest, 1088 Muzeum krt. 4/i) kerul sor "Does the Brain 'Initiate' Freely Willed Processes? A Critique of Libet-Type Experiments and Their Interpretation" cimmel. Az eloadas kivonata: In the extensive, recent debates on free will, the pioneering experiments by Benjamin Libet continue to play a significant role. The claim that these experiments demonstrate the illusoriness of freely willed actions is both strongly endorsed and hotly disputed. In this paper, we provide an analysis and evaluation of Libet.s experiments from a philosophy of science perspective, which differs from the usual approaches in philosophy of mind or moral philosophy. Our analysis focuses on Libet.s central notion of the .initiation. of freely willed processes by the brain. First, we use the INUS theory and the manipulability theory of causation to investigate whether the experiments show any causal relationship between brain activity, on the one hand, and free decisions or (freely willed) motor activity, on the other. In addition, we examine three other interpretations of the notion of initiation (in terms of a necessary condition, a correlation and a regular succession). We argue that none of these four interpretations can be supported by the design and results of Libet.s experiments. Significantly enough, on the basis of these experiments we cannot even conclude that each free decision, or each (freely willed) motor action, is always preceded by a readiness potential. Furthermore, more recent Libet-type experiments cannot solve these problems either. Our general conclusion is that neither Libet.s nor Libet-type experiments can justify the claim that the brain initiates freely willed processes. Az eloadasokon valo talalkozas remenyeben udvozlettel: Ropolyi Laszlo ELTE Tudtort. Tudfil Tsz.