17 Sep
2014
17 Sep
'14
9:55 a.m.
The CEU Department of Philosophy cordially invites you to a talk
(as part of its Departmental Colloquium series)
by
Hans-Johann Glock (Zurich)
on
`The Anthropological Difference: what makes us human?`
Tuesday, 23 September 2014, 5.30 PM, Zrinyi 14, Room 412
ABSTRACT
I start out from the question of whether there is a fundamental or categorical
human-animal difference. Now, there is nothing special about being special. Every
biological species differs from all the others, i.e. has some unique characteristics. But
this leaves open the possibility that humans possess features that
a) set us apart ‘categorially’ or ‘essentially’ from all other animals (henceforth
simply animals);
b) are fundamental, in that (all) other relevant differences derive from them;
c) are important, notably to our self-image, for instance because they assure us of
a higher spiritual or moral status than animals.
(c), in particular, has invited the blanket charge of anthropocentrism, on the grounds
that we set ourselves apart through human concepts rather than those of other animals.
However, this accusation is uncompelling. Our concepts are tools serving our cognitive and
practical needs. For this reason, they capture differences that we can capture and are
interested in. To that extent, these concepts themselves are anthropocentric, but
unavoidably and legitimately so. Indeed, the anthropocentrism charge itself relies on
concepts—notably anthropocentrism and concept—which are indisputably the prerogative of
humans, even if one grants that non-human animals can possess concepts of their own. And
from the fact that our concepts are human concepts and in that sense anthropocentric, it
does not follow that it is anthropocentric to insist that some of these concepts preclude
application to animals.
(a) faces two fundamental objections, biological continuity and Darwinist
anti-essentialism. The former is based on a misunderstanding of biological evolution. The
second has invited three responses--potentiality, normality and typicality—which are
inadequate to reinstate the idea of a categorical human-animal difference. If one seeks a
human-animal difference of a more than statistic kind, one needs to abandon the idea of an
essence possessed by all and only individual human beings. Instead, such differences are
to be sought in the realm of capacities underlying specifically human societies (forms of
communication and action).
There are three striking features prevalent in and presupposed by all human societies:
· a special and highly complex system of communication, namely language
· a highly complex kind of social relationships, one which involves cooperation,
norms and values, division of labour and institutions.
· a special kind of plasticity: the capacity to adapt to highly diverse
circumstances and environments not just intelligently through tools (technology) and
rational deliberation (planning), a capacity which in turn depends on our special
cognitive powers.
While some animals or animal societies may possess some of these features in more or less
rudimentary form, none of them combine all three of them. And it is this combination that
enables uniquely human phenomena like cumulative cultural development. To that extent,
even desideratum (b) might be satisfied.
The talk will partly be based on the following two publications of mine:
“The Anthropological Difference”, in C. Sandis and M.J. Cain (eds.), Human Nature, Royal
Institute of Philosophy Supplement: 70 (Cambridge University Press , Cambridge 2012), pp.
105-131.
“Mental Capacities and Animal Ethics”, in K. Petrus and M. Wild (eds.), Animal Minds and
Animal Ethics (transcript, Bielefeld 2013), pp. 113-146.
Krisztina Biber
Department of Philosophy
Coordinator
------------------------------------------
Central European University
Nador u. 9. | 1051 Budapest, Hungary
Office: + 36.1.327.3806 | biberk(a)ceu.hu | www.ceu.hu
