PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE SEMINAR, Program - MAY

Department of History and Philosophy of Science Eotvos University Budapest, Pazmany P. setany 1/A PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE SEMINAR (http://hps.elte.hu/seminar) ________________________________________________ Program - MAY 7 May 4:00 PM 6th floor 6.54 (Language: English, except all participants speak Hungarian) K a t a l i n F a r k a s Philosophy, Central European University, Budapest The limits of knowledge This is a critical introduction into the ideas of Timothy Williamson's Knowledge and its limits (Oxford Univ. Press, 2000), a book which is considered by many as the most original and significant contribution to epistemology in the last few decades. Working on theories of knowledge has been a flourishing enterprise in the twentieth century. Various versions of foundationalism, coherentism, causal theories, reliabilism, subjunctive theories, contextualist theories - and no doubt other theories - have been defended and criticised with great erudition. Williamson's book breaks a new path in approaching questions of knowledge. Here are some of the main claims of the book: - knowing is - contrary to what most contemporary theories of knowledge hold - a state of mind - the state of knowing is unanalysable to further constituents - it is, to use Williamson's terminology, a prime condition - hence it is not possible to give necessary and sufficient conditions for knowing - Gettierology was a waste of time - the state of knowing is explanatory in actions just like states of beliefs and desires are 14 May 4:00 PM 6th floor 6.54 (Language: Hungarian) P e t e r G n a d i g Atomic Physics, Eotvos University, Budapest Ki lehetett volna ,,talalni'' a specialis relativitaselmeletet 50 evvel Einstein elott? (Could special relativity have been "figured out" 50 years before Einstein?) Kozismert, hogy az elektrodinamika torvenyei teljes osszhangban allnak a specialis relativitaselmelettel, sot, Einstein eppen a ,,mozgo testek elektrodinamikajabol'' jott ra a ter es ido ujszeru viszonyara. Meglepo azonban, hogy ezt a kapcsolatot mar az elektrosztatika (Coulomb-torveny) es az egyenaramok (pl. egy hosszu, egyenes vezeto) Ampere-fele magneses tere magaban rejti, s ez a kapcsolat elemi lepesekkel (az eltolasi aramra, vagy az elektromagneses hullamokra valo hivatkozas nelkul, s felsobb matematikai apparatust mellozve) felszinre hozhato. Megfelelo tolteselrendezest valasztva nehany egyszeru lepes utan eljuthatunk a Lorentz-kontrakciot, az idodilataciot, az egyidejuseg relativitasat, az altalanos Lorentz-transzformaciot es az elektromagneses tererossegek transzformacios kepleteit megado formulakhoz. Erdekes tudomanyfilozofiai kerdes, hogy ha mindez ennyire keszen allt mar az 1800-as evek kozepen, akkor mi volt az a mozzanat, ami egy fel evszazadon keresztul meg hianyzott a relativitaselmelet megfogalmazasahoz. Az eloado velemenye szerint, a toltesek ,darabossaganak'' felismeresere, az atomi reszecskek felfedezesere kellett varni. 21 May4:00 PM 6th floor 6.54 (Language: English, except all participants speak Hungarian) Panel Discussion Panelists: Balázs Gyenis* Gábor Hofer-Szabó* György Kampis* Miklós Rédei* László E. Szabó* Péter Szegedi* Moderator: Márta Fehér** _____________ * HPS, Eötvös University, Budapest ** Philosophy, Technical University, Budapest Reichenbach's Common Cause Principle No correlation without causation. This is, in its most compact and general formulation, the essence of what became called the Common Cause Principle (CCP). If two events A and B are (positively) correlated, p(A&B)>p(A)p(B), then either there is a causal connection between A and B that brings about the correlation or there is a third event C (common cause) that stands in a causal connection with A and B, and it is this C that causes the correlation, that is, (1) p(A&B|C)=p(A|C)p(B|C) (2) p(A&B|notC)=p(A|notC)p(B|notC) (3) p(A&C)>p(A)p(C) (4) p(B&C)>p(B)p(C) A part of the panelists believe that - although some slight modifications of the original Reichenbachian conception seem necessary - (1)-(4) express the proper mathematical formulation of our causal intuition, and are never violated in reality. Some others argue that Reichenbach's concept of common cause is completely pointless and does not apply for many correlations in our world. Suggested readings: - H. Reichenbach: The Direction of Time, University of California Press, Los Angeles,1956, pp. 157-167. - G. Hofer-Szabó, M. Rédei and L. E. Szabó: Reichenbach's Common Cause Principle: Recent Results and Open Questions, Reports on Philosophy, No. 20. (2001) - E. Sober: The principle of the common cause, in J. H. Fetzer (ed.), Probability and Causality, Reidel Pub. Co., Boston,1988. - E. Sober: Common cause explanation, Philosophy of Science, 51 (1984) 212-241. - N. Cartwright: How to tell a common cause - Generalization of the conjunctive fork criterion, in J. H. Fetzer (ed.), Probability and Causality, Reidel Pub. Co., Boston,1988. - Hofer-Szabó, G., Rédei, M., Szabó, L. E., On Reichenbach's common cause principle and Reichenbach's notion of common cause, The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 50 (1999), 377-399. 28 May 4:00 PM 6th floor 6.54 (Language: English, except all participants speak Hungarian) M a r t a U j v a r i Philosophy, Budapest University of Economic Sciences Time, Tense and the 'Indexical Fallacy' in McTaggart's Argument The tenser-detenser debate has got impetus from the new indexical, token reflexive analysis of tensed language which renders the truth conditions of tensed sentences in tenseless terms. According to detensers like Mellor and Poidevin what Taggart's argument shows is that the A-series account of time is a misconstrual leading to regress. Tenser E.J. Lowe, however, argues that the A-regress cannot even have a start since it rests on the indexical fallacy of using compound tenses. His claim, roughly, is that temporal indexicals just like any other indexicals cannot be iterated without violating the contextual constraints on the use, as opposed to the mention, of indexicals. Further, Lowe claims that extending Taggart's fallacious argument to space and personality one could equally argue for the irreality of places and persons. I will show that Lowe's argument is incoherent. When introducing the indexical fallacy he makes appeal to the analogy between temporal and other indexicals. But when he defends the tensed view he makes appeal to Taggart's first two premises ( 1. time involves change essentially; 2.change can be explained only in terms of the A-series) which invite a disanalogy between temporal and other indexicals. So, the indexical fallacy cannot be repeated, pace Lowe, for space and person within the context of McTaggart's argument. Consequently, the threat of the irreality of places and persons does not arise along taggartian lines. The other conclusion with broader implications is that even the indexical analysis shows the specific metaphysical character of time in consonance with the metaphysical tradition. The organizer of the seminar: László E. Szabó -- Laszlo E. Szabo Department of Theoretical Physics Department of History and Philosophy of Science Eotvos University, Budapest H-1518 Budapest, Pf. 32, Hungary Phone/Fax: (36-1)372-2924 Home: (36-1) 200-7318 Mobil/SMS: (36) 20-366-1172 http://hps.elte.hu/~leszabo