PSYCOLOQUY CALL FOR BOOK REVIEWERS
Below is the Precis of "The Neuropsychological Theories of Lashley
and Hebb" by Jack Orbach (427 lines). This book has been selected
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AUTHOR'S RATIONALE FOR SOLICITING COMMENTARY
My rationale for seeking open peer commentary is primarily that the
book says some things about both Lashley and Hebb that some peers
might find controversial and startling if not downright outrageous.
To get these views out in the open may be of pedagogical value not
only to to me but to the neuropsychological community at large.
Obviously, I don't believe that my arguments are wrong or weak. But
the feedback I get might conceivably persuade me to rethink the
matter.
psycoloquy.99.10.029.lashley-hebb.1.orbach Sat Sep 18 1999
ISSN 1055-0143 (16 paragraphs, 16 references, 427 lines)
PSYCOLOQUY is sponsored by the American Psychological Association (APA)
Copyright 1999 Jack Orbach
Precis of:
THE NEUROPSYCHOLOGICAL THEORIES OF LASHLEY AND HEBB
Precis of Orbach on Lashley-Hebb
[University Press of America, 1998 xiv, 395 pp. ISBN: 0-761-81165-6]
Jack Orbach
Department of Psychology
Queens College
Flushing, NY
U.S.A.
jorbach(a)worldnet.att.net
ABSTRACT: Beginning in the 1920s, K. S. Lashley startled
psychologists with his theories of the memory trace within the
cerebral cortex. Using terms such as terms mass action,
equipotentiality, and sensory/motor equivalence, Lashley presented
evidence that the engram is widely distributed in the brain, and
that unactivated synapses, like activated ones, seem to show
evidence of learning. His research and nativistic theories made him
world famous by 1929, when he was just 39. He spent his
professional career searching for a mechanism for the reduplication
of the engram. While his contemporaries tried to specify the locus
of the engram in the brain, Lashley found it everywhere. He liked
to quip that the problem is not to find where the trace is located,
but where it is not. Lashley's student, D. O. Hebb, published his
empiricistic theories in 1949, in "The Organization of Behavior,"
and the monograph created a sensation. Hebb used Lorente de No's
reverberatory circuit to provide a mechanism to maintain activity
in the cerebral cortex after the stimulus terminated, the so-called
central autonomous process. This led him to the cell assembly, a
complex reverberatory circuit that could be assembled by
experience. Changes in resistance at the synapse with learning came
to be called the Hebb synapse. That monograph was highly praised
for the breadth of its treatment. The present book documents how
Lashley anticipated Hebb's introduction of the reverberatory
circuit by some 12 years. Lashley's Vanuxem Lectures of 1952 are
printed for the first time, together with nine of his previously
published theoretical papers. Lashley's and Hebb's theories are
reviewed and reevaluated fifty years after publication of Hebb's
monograph, and a systematic effort is made to compare and contrast
the views of teacher and student.
KEYWORDS: cell assembly, central autonomous process, engram,
equipotentiality, Hebb, Hebbian learning, Lashley, localization,
memory trace, nativism, reverberatory circuit, Vanuxem Lectures
1. Part 1 of the book opens with a summary of Lashley's last public
lecture given at the University of Rochester in 1957, one year before
his death and eight years after the publication of Hebb's monograph. In
this lecture, Lashley was still consumed with the notion of irradiating
waves of excitation in the cerebral cortex, a notion he developed in
detail in 1942. In citing theories of stimulus equivalence, Lashley
wrote 'That of Hebb is most in accord with conditioned reflex theory.
He assumes that multiple paths are developed by learning. Such learning
is ruled out by a mass of evidence for innate discriminations and
equivalencies.' In this unpublished address, Lashley cited Hebb's
empiricistic theory for the first and only time. He never cited the
monograph itself in the literature.
2. An early chapter entitled 'Setting the Stage' offers another look at
Lashley's early critique of the native Watsonian connectionism of his
day. Lashley's early efforts to revise and revitalize
neuropsychological theory are reviewed. The problem, Lashley suggested
in the 1920s, was the omission of the brain from the Watsonian S-R
formula. And when a model of cortical function was finally introduced,
using the analogy of the telephone switchboard, it was based on the
idea of linear reflex activity in the spinal cord, as suggested by
Dewey, leaving no room for psychological categories that require
sustained activity in the brain such as thought, memory, emotion,
motivation, selective attention and the like. And then, along came
Pavlov who undercut all contemporary speculations of psychologists with
his physiological theories of conditioned reflexes and brain function.
It was at this point that Lashley burst upon the scene.
3. Hebb must have experienced an epiphany when he was introduced to the
reverberatory circuit of Lorente de N. He realized that this anatomical
curiosity provided him with a mechanism for the autonomous central
process that he developed so masterfully in the 1949 monograph. Hebb's
revelation involving the reverberatory circuit was especially important
for it gave neurological meaning to the earlier proposals of central
motive state of Morgan and central excitatory mechanism of Beach as
well as the putative reduplicated memory trace of Lashley. However,
Lashley had already appropriated the reverberatory circuit for
neuropsychological theory in 1937, some 12 years before Hebb's
monograph was published and some three years before its presentation by
Hilgard and Marquis in their Conditioning and Learning of 1940. This is
documented with excerpts from Lashley's papers published in 1937, 1938,
1941, 1942 and 1949. The latter two papers are republished in their
entirety in this volume.
4. The next chapter deals with the learning theory that synaptic
resistance is reduced by the passage of the nerve impulse. Lashley's
1924 assault on this theory is reviewed in detail. (This 1924 paper is
also reprinted in this volume.) In Lashley's own words, 'Among the many
unsubstantiated beliefs concerning the physiology of the learning
process, none is more widely prevalent than the doctrine that the
passage of the nerve impulse through the synapse somehow reduces
synaptic resistance and leads to the fixation of a new habit . . . but
no direct evidence for synaptic resistance has ever been obtained. The
hypothesis is not based upon neurological data but is merely a
restatement of the observed fact that increased efficiency follows
repeated performance . . . Familiar learning curves are obviously an
expression of these successive integrations and we have no knowledge of
the conditions prevailing in formation of a new simple neural
integration. (On the other hand,) the instantaneous character of
simpler associations in man . . . suggests that . . . a single
performance serves to fix the habit. Even if this were the case for
every simple reintegration within the nervous system, we should still
get the appearance of gradual improvement through practice because of
the formation of many simple associations . . . The fact of gradual
improvement in complex functions cannot therefore be taken as evidence
for a gradual wearing down of synaptic resistance by repeated passage
of the nerve impulse' (Lashley, 1924). The reemergence of this theory
in Hebb's monograph as a neuropsychological postulate is documented and
evaluated. In the fourth edition of Hebb's Textbook (1994), Donderi
refers to the postulate as Hebb's rule. Today, it is frequently
referred to as the Hebb synapse.
5. Next, 'Lashley's Memory Mechanisms', considers:
i. Lashley's view that the memory trace is reduplicated in the
cerebral cortex and the implications of that view on the
interpretation of cerebral localization. In 1952, Lashley wrote 'I
have never been able by any operation on the brain to destroy a
specific memory' even when the memory is elicited by electrical
stimulation of the part of the cerebral cortex that is subsequently
removed.
ii. Lashley's early introduction of the reverberatory circuit in
neuropsychological theory is documented. It is important to note
that Lashley never abandoned the principle of synaptic transmission
in favor of a cortical field theory, as had been alleged by Hebb
and others. This claim is fully documented.
iii. Lashley assumed throughout his career that memory is a unitary
function. He was of course aware of the distinction between long
and short term memory but he never referred to the modern
distinction between storage and retrieval. Nor did he ever consider
associative and working memory as distinct forms of memory when he
searched for the engram in the cerebral cortex.
iv. Lashley's position on the continuity-discontinuity debate is
reviewed as well as his championing the concept of instinct at a
time when the concept was falling into disfavor in America. In
1950, Lashley championed the European ethologists' views of fixed
action patterns though he himself preferred the term instinct. His
article on instinct in the Encyclopaedia Britannica of 1956 is
especially noteworthy.
6. The next chapter, entitled 'Issues of Priority, Opinion and
Criticism', includes:
i. a reconsideration of Lashley's obsession with theoretical
criticism in his later years, as alleged by Hebb.
ii. an interpretation of the meaning of Lashley's refusal of Hebb's
offer to coauthor the 1949 volume with him.
iii. the history of the reverberatory circuit in the psychological
literature, and questions of priority as far as the integration of
the reverberatory circuit into neuropsychological theory is
concerned.
iv. the fact that Lashley failed to acknowledge data and theory
that were unfavorable to his views, during his search for the
engram. This is documented.
v. Lashley's opinion of Hebb's theories was never known because
Lashley hardly ever spoke of them. But Lashley's 1947 review of
Hebb's manuscript-in-progress is revealing in this regard.
Revealing as well is Lashley's letter of congratulations to Hebb
after publication of his 1949 monograph.
Finally, the personal relationship of Lashley, the teacher, and Hebb,
the student, is delineated.
7. The next chapter, titled 'Hebb's The Organization of Behavior 50
Years After Publication', offers a contemporary view of Hebb's enduring
contributions to neuropsychological theory. Hebb bolstered his theories
with the following facts:
i. adults seem to be able to sustain brain injury with fewer
permanent consequences than can infants and children;
ii. learning in children is much more difficult compared to similar
learning in adults.
Hebb further argued that:
iii. distinctions should be made between primitive unity,
non-sensory figure and identity in perception;
iv. stimulus equivalence and generalization are learned in early
life;
v. the ratio of association cortex to sensory cortex should be
considered in phylogenetic development;
vi. the evidence of post-tetanic potentiation supports the
importance of the Hebb synapse in learning (this phenomenon was
described after the 1949 monograph was published but it found its
way into Hebb's later writings);
vii. there is a distinction between intelligence A (innate
potential) and intelligence B (achievement);
viii. following Tolman, Hebb introduced a new way of thinking about
neuropsychological problems in his 1960 presidential address to
APA. That discourse is today named cognitive psychology;
ix. later research on the stabilized retinal image supported cell
assembly theory.
8. The Left and Right Cerebral Hemispheres reviews the case of Alex, a
nine year old boy whose left hemisphere was removed for the relief of
intractable epileptic seizures. Though he never learned to speak before
surgery, Alex began to show remarkable gains in speech and language and
in cognitive skills in general. Alex's postoperative achievements
challenge the widely held view, shared by Hebb, that early childhood is
a particularly critical period for the acquisition of cognitive skills.
It must be concluded that clearly articulated, well-structured, and
appropriate language can be acquired for the first time as late as nine
years of age with the right hemisphere alone. Hebb and Lashley did no
live to see this case. My guess is that Hebb would have had great
difficulty in explaining Alex's achievements, but Lashley would have
chuckled and muttered in so many words, 'You see, not only do you have
reduplication of the memory trace within a hemisphere but also between
hemispheres.'
9. The next chapter is entitled, 'A Comparison of Lashley and Hebb on
the Concepts of Attention and Stimulus Generalization'. On the concept
of attention, Lashley took off from his observations of attempted
solutions in rats during the learning of the maze. It was Spence's
concession on this matter that persuaded Lashley that he had bested the
neo-behaviorists on the continuity-discontinuity debate. In the 1942
paper (reprinted in this volume), Lashley argued that a pattern of
excitation in the cortex in the form of a reverberatory circuit may
form a relatively stable and permanent foundation, modifying the
effects of later stimulation, as attention determines the selection of
stimuli. These ideas precede Hebb's formulation of the central
autonomous process by some seven years. And then in the Vanuxem
Lectures of 1952, Lashley went way beyond Hebb when he introduced the
ideas of a priming or pre-setting of circuits based upon the spacing of
the end-feet on the post-synaptic cell. Hebb was by far the more
accomplished writer and so, with the publication of his monograph in
1949, he captured the attention of the neuropsychological community
with ideas that did not differ substantially from Lashley's.
10. However, on the matter of stimulus generalization their positions
were radically different. Lashley's position is nativistic stimulus
generalization, if it exists at all, is built into the organism. His
conception derived from his critique of the neo-Pavlovian view of a
gradient in stimulus similarity underlying stimulus generalization. His
discontinuity position on learning led him to write in 1946 'Stimulus
generalization is generalization only in the sense of failure to note
distinguishing charateristics of the stimulus or to associate them with
the conditioned reaction. A definite attribute of the stimulus is
abstracted and forms the basis of reaction; other attributes are either
not sensed or are disregarded. So long as the effective attribute is
present, the reaction is elicited as an all-or-none function of that
attribute. Other characteristics of the stimulus may be radically
changed without affecting the reaction' (Lashley and Wade, 1946). The
neo-Pavlovian gradient of similarity on a stimulus continuum is an
artifact of inattention. Such a stimulus generalization is
generalization by default.
11. Hebb's concept of stimulus generalization was developed in
connection with his delineation of the formation of the cell assembly
underlying the perception of a triangle. Hebb's contribution was to
perceptual theory. He proposed the startling idea that a simple figure
like an outline triangle is not perceived as a whole, innately, as
alleged by the gestaltists. He went on to show how the elements of line
and angle become integrated into a unified perception of a triangle. To
persuade the skeptical reader, Hebb introduced the idea of perceptual
identity, something that has to be learned. He then proposed a
mechanism involving neural fractionation and recruitment. Fractionation
eliminates the variable cells that are excited extramacularly. Macular
excitation, which is due to ocular fixation, remains constant despite
the variable angular size of the stimulus object.
12. In short, stimulus generalization emerges secondarily from the slow
development of each complex concept. And yet, there is some doubt
regarding the universality of stimulus generalization according to
Hebb. His theory cannot always predict stimulus generalization from the
learning of a simple discrimination. Take for example the learning to
discriminate a vertical from a horizontal line. In this case, the
stimuli belong to the category of primitive unity for which, unlike the
triangle, no learning is required, according to Hebb, to build a
unified percept. Nevertheless, our best guess is that, empirically,
after the initial learning to discriminate the two lines, the organism
would show stimulus generalization to a vertical rectangle vs. a
horizontal rectangle and even to a vertical row of circles vs. a
horizontal row of circles. Since there is no initial learning to build
a unified perception of the vertical and horizontal lines, it is
difficult to see how Hebb would derive the empirical data of stimulus
generalization in this case.
13. A late chapter of commentary is entitled, 'Lashley's Enduring
Legacy to Neuropsychological Theory'. A contemporary perspective is
offered in reviewing the concepts of vicarious functioning,
equipotentiality, reduplicated memory trace, the reverberatory
circuit. Lashley's lesson that synapses inactive during learning can
show the effects of learning is emphasized. Lashley's lesson was never
acknowledged by Hebb or any of his students. Lashley derided the use of
wiring diagrams in neuropsychological theory especially those derived
from computer technology. Neurons are live metabolizing cells, he
argued, not inert paths like copper wires. They interact at synapses,
which are not solder joints like soldered copper wires. The synaptic
contacts are variable. Furthermore, synaptic contacts may be excitatory
and/or inhibitory. Soldered wires are always excitatory and fixed. Both
are pathways to be sure but the differences between neurons and copper
wires far outnumber their similarities. Thus brain organization cannot
be modelled by circuit diagrams representing inert pathways.
14. An epilogue presents a number of personal vignettes of both Lashley
and Hebb. Lashley's career was reviewed earlier in some detail in
Orbach (1982). The most disturbing part of this story has to do with
Lashley's racism, as alleged by Weidman (1996). I would not have raised
this matter in a scholarly volume concerned with Lashley's
contributions to neuropsychological theory were it not for Weidman's
allegation that Lashley's racist attitudes influenced his theoretical
views. But, did these odious attitudes of Lashley affect his science? I
can attest to Lashley's anti-African-American attitudes, but I can find
no evidence that Lashley's racism colored his theories. A lifelong
student of genetics, Lashley had an abiding interest in the concept of
instinct and in the genetics of behavior in general. These facts must
have eluded Weidman. Both Hebb and Lashley were honored many times
during their lifetimes. It is especially noteworthy that Hebb was
appointed Chancellor of McGill University, and that he was nominated,
in 1965, for the Nobel Prize.
15. During his freshman year, at the age of 16, Lashley studied general
zoology and comparative anatomy with Albert M. Reese at the University
of West Virginia. Reese appointed him departmental assistant, at a
salary of $0.25 per hour. One of the new assistant's first tasks was to
sort out various materials in the basement. The result of this
assignment can best be expressed in Lashley's own words: 'Among them I
found a beautiful Golgi series of the frog brain. I took these to Reese
and proposed that I draw all of the connections between the cells. Then
we would know how the frog worked (sic!). It was a shock to learn that
the Golgi method does not stain all cells, but I think almost ever
since I have been trying to trace those connections' (Beach in Orbach,
1982). Only later did Lashley realize that functional variables such as
spatial and temporal summation, excitatory and inhibitory states, and
micro-movements of elements influencing synaptic contact need not be
represented microscopically. The lesson is that neurons are not inert
and static, like soldered wires. They are live metabolizing cells with
synaptic contacts that vary. If Lashley were alive today, there is no
doubt that he would continue to scold modern neuroscientists who still
have not become aware of the importance of this fact.
16. Part 2 of the book consists of nine of Lashley's major theoretical
papers reprinted in their entirety. These are listed in the References
below. Part 2 also includes Lashley's four Vanuxem Lectures given at
Princeton University in 1952, and published here for the first time. In
these lectures, Lashley referred to the anatomical observations of
Lorente de N and emphasized the neural net as the active neural unit in
the cerebral cortex. He introduced the idea of a neural priming or
presetting, concepts all highly reminiscent of Hebb's theorizing on the
central autonomous process and the cell assembly. The term neural
lattice was coined by Lashley in 1949. This term was discarded by Hebb
in his 1949 monograph in favor of cell assembly.
REFERENCES:
http://www.wabash.edu/depart/psych/Courses/Psych_81/LASHLEY.HTMhttp://www.archives.mcgill.ca/guide/volume2/gen01.htm#HEBB, DONALD OLDING
http://www.princeton.edu/~harnad/hebb.htmlhttp://www.cogsci.soton.ac.uk/bbs/Archive/bbs.amit.html
Hebb, D. O. (1949) The Organization of Behavior: a Neuropsychological
Theory. New York: Wiley.
Hebb, D. O. and Donderi, D.C. (1994) Textbook of Psychology, fourth
edition, revised. Dubuque, Iowa: Kendall/Hunt Publishing Company.
Hilgard, E. R. and Marquis, D. G. (1940) Conditioning and Learning,
NY: Appleton-Century.
Lashley, K. S. (1924) 'Studies of cerebral function in learning. VI.
The theory that synaptic resistance is reduced by the passage of the
nerve impulse.' Psychol. Rev., 31, 369-375.
Lashley, K. S. (1931) 'Mass action in cerebral function.' Science 73,
245-254.
Lashley, K. S. 'The problem of cerebral organization in vision.' Biol.
Symp, 1942, 7, 301-322.
Lashley, K. S. (1949) 'Persistent problems in the evolution of mind.'
Quart. Rev. Biol., 24, 28-42.
Lashley, K. S. (1950) 'In search of the engram.' In Symp. Soc. Exp.
Biol. No. 4, Cambridge, Eng.,: Cambridge Univ. Press.
Lashley, K. S. (1951) 'The problem of serial order in behavior.' In
Jeffress, L. A. (Ed.) Cerebral mechanisms in behavior, New York,
Wiley.
Lashley, K. S. (1952) Vanuxem Lectures delivered at Princeton
University in Feb. 1952. Untitled.
Lashley, K. S. (1954) 'Dynamic processes in perception.' In Adrian, E.
D. Bremer, F. and Jasper, H. H. (Eds.) Brain Mechanisms and
Consciousness. Illinois, Charles C. Thomas, 422-443.
Lashley, K. S. (1968) 'Cerebral organization and behavior.' In The
Brain and Human Behavior, Proc. Ass. Res. Nerv. Ment. Dis., 36, 1-18.
Lashley, K. S. and Wade, M. (1946) 'The Pavlovian theory of
generalization.' Psychol. Rev., 53, 72-87.
Lashley, K. S., Chow, K.-L, and Semmes, J., (1951) 'An examination of
the electrical field theory of cerebral integration.' Psychol. Rev.,
58, 123-136.
Orbach, J. (1982) Neuropsychology After Lashley: Fifty Years Since the
Publication of Brain Mechanisms and Intelligence. Hillsdale, NJ.:
Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
Weidman, N. (1996) 'Psychobiology, progressivism, and the
anti-progressive tradition.' J. Hist. Biol, 29, 267-308.
Annak, akit illet:
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Kampis Gyorgy: Bev. a kognitiv tud.-ba hetfo 17 ora (6.em. 662)
hely: ELTE TTK Lagymanyosi Campus
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Department of History and Philosophy of Science,
ELTE University, 1518 Budapest, P.O. Box 32, Hungary
Phone/FAX: (36) 1 372 2924 email: gk(a)hps.elte.hu
http://hps.elte.hu/~gk ftp://hps.elte.hu
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Koch/Gobell/Roid: INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES IN COLOR STROOP
The target article below has just appeared in PSYCOLOQUY, a
refereed journal of Open Peer Commentary sponsored by the American
Psychological Association. Qualified professional biobehavioral,
neural or cognitive scientists are hereby invited to submit Open
Peer Commentary on it. Please email or see websites for
Instructions if you are not familiar with format or acceptance
criteria for PSYCOLOQUY commentaries (all submissions are
refereed).
To submit articles and commentaries or to seek information:
EMAIL: psyc(a)pucc.princeton.edu
URL: http://www.princeton.edu/~harnad/psyc.htmlhttp://www.cogsci.soton.ac.uk/psyc
AUTHORS' RATIONALE FOR SOLICITING COMMENTARY: We have found a
pattern of individual differences on the Stroop color-word test
that do not seem to be among those reported previously (MacLeod,
1991). Two separate attempts to identify the source of these
individual differences have failed, although we kept finding the
same patterns of responding. We hope the article will draw
attention to the need to examine individual differences in Stroop
processing and and that the Psycoloquy it elicits will help
identify their basis.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
psycoloquy.99.10.025.stroop-differences.1.koch Thu Sep 16 1999
ISSN 1055-0143 (27 paragraphs, 29 references, 599 lines)
PSYCOLOQUY is sponsored by the American Psychological Association (APA)
Copyright 1999 Christopher Koch, Joetta Gobell, & Gale H. Roid
EXPLORING INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES IN STROOP PROCESSING WITH CLUSTER ANALYSIS
Target Article on Stroop-Differences
Christopher Koch, Joetta Gobell, & Gale H. Roid
Department of Psychology
George Fox University
414 N. Meridian St.
Newberg OR 97132 USA
ckoch(a)georgefox.edu
http://www.georgefox.edu/people/faculty/ckoch/
ABSTRACT: A relatively small number of studies of the Stroop task
has examined individual differences in age, sex, hemispheric
processing, and language. The amount of interference is the primary
dependent measure in most studies, not the factors that contribute
to the interference. In the present target article, cluster
analysis is used to identify groups of participants who respond
similarly on the Stroop task. Integrated color-word Stroop stimuli
were presented for varying durations in the first study.
Significant individual differences were found. A cluster analysis
identified two groups of subjects. One group responded consistently
across durations and conditions while the other responded more
erratically. Potential sources of individual differences were
examined in a second study. 120 subjects were given the Color and
Word Test along with selected subtests of the Stanford Binet
Intelligence Test, age appropriate Wechsler tests, and the Detroit
Tests of Learning Aptitude. Again, cluster analysis found two
groups of subjects. The group with higher scores on visual
reasoning and short-term memory produced more interference.
KEYWORDS: cluster analysis, individual differences, short-term
memory, Stroop interference, visual reasoning
PSYCOLOQUY CALL FOR BOOK REVIEWERS
Below is the Abstract of the Precis of "The g Factor" by Arthur Jensen.
This book has been selected for multiple review in PSYCOLOQUY. If you
wish to submit a formal book review please write to
psyc(a)pucc.princeton.edu indicating what expertise you would bring to
bear on reviewing the book if you were selected to review it.
(If you have never reviewed for PSYCOLOQUY or Behavioral & Brain
Sciences before, it would be helpful if you could also append a copy of
your CV to your inquiry.) If you are selected as one of the reviewers
and do not have a copy of the book, you will be sent a copy of the book
directly by the publisher (please let us know if you have a copy
already). Reviews may also be submitted without invitation, but all
reviews will be refereed. The author will reply to all accepted
reviews.
The Full Precis of the book is available at these URLs (bot note that
the Reviews are to be of the BOOK, not the Precis: :
http://www.cogsci.soton.ac.uk/cgi/psyc/newpsy?10.023
or
ftp://ftp.princeton.edu/pub/harnad/Psycoloquy/1999.volume.10/
psyc.99.10.023.intelligence-g-factor.1.jensen
Full Psycoloquy book review instructions at:
http://www.princeton.edu/~harnad/psyc.htmlhttp://www.cogsci.soton.ac.uk/psycoloquy/
Relevant excerpts:
Psycoloquy reviews are of the book not the Precis. Length should be
about 200 lines [c. 1800 words], with a short abstract (about 50
words), an indexable title, and reviewer's full name and
institutional address, email and Home Page URL. All references that
are electronically accessible should also have URLs.
AUTHOR'S RATIONALE FOR SOLICITING COMMENTARY
The g factor arises from the empirical fact that scores on a large
variety of independently designed tests of extremely diverse cognitive
abilities all turn out to be positively correlated with one another.
The g factor appears to be a biological property of the brain, highly
correlated with measures of information-processing efficiency, such as
working memory capacity, choice and discrimination reaction times, and
perceptual speed. It is highly heritable and has many biological
correlates, including brain size, evoked potentials, nerve conduction
velocity, and cerebral glucose metabolic rate during cognitive
activity. It remains to investigate and explain its neurobiological
basis. Commentary is invited from psychometricians, statisticians,
geneticists, neuropsychologists, psychophysiologists, cognitive
modellers, evolutionary psychologists and other specialties concerned
with cognitive abilities, their measurement, and their cognitive and
neurobiological basis.
psycoloquy.023.intelligence-g-factor.1.jensen Wed Sep 15 1999
ISSN 1055-0143 (70 paragraphs, 12 references, 905 lines)
PSYCOLOQUY is sponsored by the American Psychological Association (APA)
Copyright 1999 Arthur Jensen
Precis of :
THE G FACTOR: THE SCIENCE OF MENTAL ABILITY
[Praeger, 1998 xiv + 648 pp. ISBN 0-275-96103-6 ISSN 1063-2158]
Arthur R. Jensen
Graduate School of Education
University of California, Berkeley
Nesnejar(a)aol.com
ABSTRACT: The g factor is the highest-order common factor that can
be extracted in a hierarchical factor analysis from a large battery
of diverse tests of various cognitive abilities. It is the most
important psychometric construct in the study of individual
differences in human cognitive abilities. Since its discovery by
Spearman in 1904, the g factor has become so firmly established as
a major psychological construct in terms of psychometric and factor
analytic criteria that further research along these lines is very
unlikely either to disconfirm the construct validity of g or to add
anything essentially new to our understanding of it. In fact, g,
unlike any of the primary, or first-order, factors revealed by
factor analysis, cannot be described in terms of the knowledge
content of cognitive test items, or in terms of skills, or even in
terms of theoretical cognitive processes. It is not essentially a
psychological or behavioral variable, but a biological one, a
property of the brain. But although not itself a cognitive ability,
g is what causes positive correlations among individual differences
in performance, even on cognitive tasks that differ greatly with
respect to sensory motor modality, brain modularity, and learned
cognitive skills and knowledge. The g factor derived from
conventional nonspeeded psychometric tests shows higher
correlations than any other factors independent of g with various
measures of information-processing efficiency, such as working
memory capacity, choice and discrimination reaction times, and
perceptual speed. A test's g loading is the best predictor of its
heritability and its sensitivity to inbreeding depression.
Psychometric g also has more direct biological correlates than any
other independent source of test variance, for example brain size,
brain evoked potentials, nerve conduction velocity, and the brain's
glucose metabolic rate during cognitive activity. The ultimate
arbiter among various "theories of intelligence" must be the
physical properties of the brain itself. The current frontier of g
research is the investigation of the anatomical and physiological
features of the brain that cause g. Research has reached the point
at which the only direction left in which to go is that presaged by
Spearman himself, who wrote that the final understanding of g must
"come from the most profound and detailed direct study of the human
brain in its purely physical and chemical aspects" (1927, p.403).
KEYWORDS: behavior genetics, cognitive modelling, evoked
potentials, evolutionary psychology, factor analysis, g factor,
heritability, individual differences, intelligence, IQ,
neurometrics, psychometrics, psychophyiology, skills, Spearman,
statistics
The Full Precis of the book is available at these URLs (bot note that
the Reviews are to be of the BOOK, not the Precis: :
http://www.cogsci.soton.ac.uk/cgi/psyc/newpsy?10.023
or
ftp://ftp.princeton.edu/pub/harnad/Psycoloquy/1999.volume.10/
psyc.99.10.023.intelligence-g-factor.1.jensen
Full Psycoloquy book review instructions at:
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Relevant excerpts:
Psycoloquy reviews are of the book not the Precis. Length should be
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Dear Colleagues,
I am writing to tell you about an exciting conference
planned for this November. Please take a moment to
note the details of this event.
TOWARD A SOCIOLOGY OF CULTURE AND COGNITION
November 12-13, 1999
In recent years, a small but growing chorus of voices
has argued for the utility of a sociology of the mind.
Proponents of this agenda, a group rooted primarily in
the study of culture, contend that targeted sociological
work on culture and cognition would greatly enhance the
existing literatures on human thought.
In order to firmly establish a coherent sociology of
culture and cognition, I have organized a two day
national conference designed to engage this topic.
The conference, entitled "Toward a Sociology of Culture
and Cognition,"will take place on November 12-13, 1999.
The event will be held on the Rutgers University campus.
This conference will consist of both formal panels and
informal discussion sessions. In this way, participants
will have the opportunity to engage in lively and in-depth
discussion of issues. A complete conference schedule is
available at our web site:
http://sociology.rutgers.edu/conference/
The site also provides information about meeting room
locations, registration, lodging, and directions to
the campus.
Should you have further questions or require additional
information, please contact me at (908) 317-9727 or at
cerulo(a)rci.rutgers edu
I look forward to seeing you at what promises to be a
most engaging event.
Karen A. Cerulo
Associate Professor of Sociology
Tisztelt Kollegak!
2000-ben megrendezesere kerul a Magyar Megismerestudomanyi
Alapitvany immar szokasos evi konferenciaja a
VIII. MAKOG
A konferencia temaja:
A KOGNITIV FUNKCIOK FEJLODESE ES ZAVARAI
-Helyszin: Szeged
-Idopont: 2000. februar, elso hetvegeje (pentek-vasarnap)
-Koltsegek: a mult evhez hasonlo
Eloadasokra jelentkezoket varunk a fenti temakorben es termeszetesen
a kognitiv tudomanyok egyeb teruleteirol is.
Eloadasok idotartama: 15-20 perc
Jelentkezni absztraktokkal az alabbi cimen lehet:
Keri Szabolcs, SZOTE Pszichiatriai Klinika, Szeged, Semmelweis u. 6,
6725
Elozetes jelentkezeseket e-mail-en is elfogadunk, de a vegleges
absztraktokat postan varjuk. Az absztraktok terjedelme max. 1 A4-es
oldal, kerjuk mind lemezen, mind kinyomtatva is elkuldeni. Az
anyagokat a szervezo bizottsag elbiralja, az elfogadasrol a szerzoket
e-mail-en ertesiti.
Tovabbi informaciokkal a kesobbiekben jelentkezunk.
Udvozlettel a szegedi szervezok neveben:
Pleh Csaba Keri Szabolcs Szendi Istvan
ELTE TTK Tudomanytortenet es Tudomanyfilozofia Tanszek
Budapest, Pazmany P. setany 1/A
Tudomanyfilozofia Szeminarium
________________________________________________
1999. Szeptember 27. (hetfo !)
12:30
6. em. 661.
B a r r y L o e w e r
Rutgers University
Collegium Budapest
PROBABILITY AND DETERMINISM
Although probability is essential to the formulation (and evaluation) of
scientific theories and although a great deal is known about how to
employ probabilistic concepts, there is still philosophical controversy
concerning the nature of probability. Some hold that only probability
concerns only degrees of belief (either subjective or constrained by
"objective" rules) while others hold that it concerns mind-independent
features of reality. The latter view divides among those who hold that
it concerns only frequencies (actual or hypothetical) and those who hold
that it concerns a "causal propensity." The nature of probability is
especially puzzling when the underlying dynamics is completely
deterministic as in classical mechanics and Bohm's version of quantum
mechanics. Some claim that when the dynamics is deterministic then all
objective probabilities are 1 or 0. But this seems at odd with the
scientific practice. In my talk I will review some of the main ideas
concerning the nature of probability and also an idea suggested by David
Lewis. According to Lewis probability concerns an objective feature of
reality that supervenes on the totality of propositions not concerning
chance. Whether or not Lewis' account is correct for dynamical chances I
argue that it provides a good account of chance statements when the
dynamics are deterministic.
1999. oktober 4. (hetfo)
12:30
6. em. 661.
T o m a s z P l a c e k
Department of Philosophy, Jagiellonian University, Cracow
OUTCOMES IN BRANCHING SPACE-TIME (OBST)
-AN ANALYSIS OF BELL'S THEOREM-
The framework of BRANCHING SPACE-TIME (BST; cf. Belnap 1992, SYNTHESE
92, pp. 385--434) has recently been extended to allow for the
introduction of outcomes of events and the analysis of GHZ theorems.
(Kowalski & Placek, forthcoming in BRIT. J. PHIL. SCI. and INT. J.
THEOR. PHYS.)
In BST, space-time and modality are incorporated in the very structure
of the models, which consist of a pair $\langle W, \leq \rangle$, where
$W$ is a non-empty set weakly ordered by $\leq$, which is interpreted as
`causally accessible from.' Maximal upward directed subsets of $W$ are
called `histories,' and proper subsets of histories are called `events.'
Two events are called `space-like separated' if neither causally
precedes the other. `Atomic outcomes' of an event $E$ are those parts of
the event's causal future that split in $E$.
The main result of Kowalski & Placek is that the family of outcomes of
an event forms a Boolean algebra. The paper also proves that in GHZ
setups, there is always a common cause (CC) in the sense of Reichenbach
if directions are held fixed, but that there is no single COMMOM common
cause (cf. Hofer-Szabo et al., forthcoming in BRIT. J. PHIL. SCI.)
accounting for the outcomes of incompatible settings.
For an analysis of Bell's theorem, I assign probabilities to outcomes by
imposing a classical probability measure on the Boolean algebra of the
outcomes of each given event. In the derivation of Bell's theorem, I use
probability measures of the form $p_{L\alpha \cup R\beta}(Lx \cap Ry)$,
$x,y \in \{+,-\}$, where the subscript indicates that the result is an
outcome of the event of measuring the spin projections along directions
$\alpha$ on the left and $\beta$ on the right. Probabilities for single
results on the left or on the right are calculated from these measures,
allowing us to express correlations as $p_{L\alpha \cup R\beta}(Lx \cap
Ry) \neq p_{L\alpha \cup R\beta}(Lx) \times p_{L\alpha \cup
R\beta}(Ry)$.
Since correlations between space-like separated results appear
disturbing, it is natural to look for an explanation in terms of a CC
located in the results' common past. The CC's outcomes divide histories
in such a way that actual runs of a correlation experiment are seen as
belonging to two or more varieties differentiated by hidden factors. You
may think of these hidden factors as restoring the deterministic order.
You may also be more modest and require only that the hidden factors
restore the causal order, i.e., that in each sub-population, the
correlations disappear.
Formally, for space-like separated events $E$ and $F$ with correlated
outcomes $e$ and $f$, respectively, a CC is an event C preceding both
$e$ and $f$, such that for every atomic outcome $\omega_{i}$ of $C$,
$$ p_{E\cup F\cup C}(e \cap f|\omega_{i}) = p_{E\cup F\cup C}(e
|\omega_{i}) \times p_{E \cup F\cup C}(f|\omega_{i})$$,
where $p_{E \cup F \cup C}$ is defined on the enlarged probability
space. Now, for any correlated pair $e,f$, we CAN construct
mathematically an enlarged probability space containing such a CC.
Moreover, for any finite number of correlations we CAN construct a
single large probability space containing a set of distinct CCs, each CC
taking care of one correlation. However, in the Bell/Clauser-Horne
argument, one wants something more: one postulates a single common CC
accounting for all the correlated outcomes of $L\alpha\cup R\beta$,
$L\alpha\cup R\beta--\prime$, $L\alpha--\prime\cup R\beta$, and
$L\alpha--\prime\cup R\beta--\prime$. Given the standard assumptions of
locality and `no conspiracy,' which in our framework take the form
\begin{equation*}
\begin{split}
& \forall \alpha, \beta, \varphi, x p_{L\alpha \cup R\beta\cup C}(Lx)
= p_{L\alpha \cup R\varphi\cup C}(Lx)\ & \forall \alpha, \beta, \gamma,
y p_{L\alpha \cup R\beta\cup C}(Ry) = p_{L\gamma \cup R\beta\cup
C}(Ry)
\end{split}
\tag{LOCALITY}
\end{equation*}
\begin{equation*}
\forall \alpha, \beta, \gamma, \varphi, i p_{L\alpha \cup R\beta\cup
C}(\omega_i) = p_{L\gamma \cup R\varphi\cup C}(\omega_i),
\tag{NO CONSPIRACY}
\end{equation*}
we derive the Bell/CH inequalities, which are empirically violated.
Thus, there cannot be a common common cause accounting for the Bell/CH
correlations.
1999. oktober 11. (hetfo)
12:30
6. em. 661.
E. S z a b o L a s z l o
ELTE, MTA Elmeleti Fizikai Kutato Csoport
ELTE, Tudomanytortenet es Tudomanyfilozofia Tanszek
EINSTEIN MEGOLDOTTA AZ EPR-BELL PARADOXONT?
Úgy tunik igen, sot meg egy sereg mas problemajat a kvantumelmeletnek.
"Prizma-modell" neven Arthur Fine 1982-ben egy olyan megoldast javasolt
az EPR-Bell problemara, es altalaban a kvantummechanika lokalis-realista
interpretaciojara, amelyrol, mint kesobb o maga kideritette, mar
Einstein is emlitest tett egy 1936-os cikkeben, illetve nehany Rosenhez
es Schrodingerhez irt leveleben. E megoldas nem kapott kulonosebb
visszhangot, sot maga Fine sem vette igazan komolyan, hiszen kesobbi
cikkeiben úgy ir a Bell-tetelrol, mintha az Einstein-Fine-interpretacio
nem is letezne. Ennek oka, hogy tevesen, Fine ezt a megoldast a
valosagban vegrehajtott kiserletekben hasznalt detektorok nem 100%-os
hatasfokaval hozta kapcsolatba.
Az eloadasban az Einstein-Fine-interpretaciot egy új megvilagitasban
mutatom be. Megmutatom, hogy semmi koze nincs a detektorok hatasfokanak
sokat diszkutalt problemajahoz. A valosagban elvegzett EPR-Bell
kiserletek elemzesevel megmutatom, hogy e kiserletek logikai
szerkezetuknel fogva teljesen kompatibilisek az
Einstein-Fine-interpretacioval, amely viszont tokeletesen feloldja az
EPR-Bell paradoxont.
1999. oktober 18. (hetfo)
12:30
6. em. 661.
K a t a l i n B a l o g
Yale University
CONCEIVABILITY, POSSIBILITY AND THE MIND-BODY PROBLEM
I want to take on the question of what a class of arguments, usually
called the Conceivability Arguments, have to say about the mind-body
problem. These arguments have two different versions. In one version,
considerations of conceivability are taken to support the claim that
phenomenal consciousness is not identical, realized by, or supervenient
on, physical properties (for example, Kripke 1972, 140-162, Nagel 1974,
Robinson 1993, White 1986, Jackson 1998, and Chalmers 1996). According
to the other version, there is an explanatory gap between phenomenal and
physical levels of description, that does not exist with respect to
other higher level descriptions, and that may have metaphysical
ramifications. (This argument is formulated by Joseph Levine 1998,
although he is himself hesitant to accept the conclusion.) My claim is
that these arguments do not succeed in establishing their conclusions.
That is because, and I take this to be the primary lesson of the
Conceivability Arguments, what they reveal does not have to do with
phenomenal consciousness itself, it rather has to do with the nature of
phenomenal concepts.
In the paper, I will focus on the most elaborate and sophisticated
version of the Conceivability Argument for dualism. I first provide a
general exposition of the structure of Conceivability Arguments, then I
proceed to describe in greater detail Frank Jackson's and David
Chalmers' new Conceivability Argument. Finally I construct a reductio
that at the same time reveals where the arguments went wrong.
1999. oktober 25. (hetfo)
12:30
6. em. 661.
K o v a c s G y u l a
SZOTE, Elettani Intezet
OUR BRAIN AND OUR MIND
The neuronal bases of consciousness
(Az eloadas magyarul lesz!)
1. Introduction
1.1. Definition of awareness & consciousness for the non-philosopher
1.2. "Components" of consciousness
1.3. Levels of human consciousness, coma, sleep, awake states
1.4. "Prerequisites" of consciousness
2. Recent results on the brain and mind problem
2.1. Visual consciousness
2.2. Blindsight
2.3. Perception vs. action
2.4. Bistable percepts
2.4.1. Ambiguous figures
2.4.2. Binocular rivalry
2.5. Electrical brain stimulation and conscious behavior
2.6. Subliminal and supraliminal stimulus processing
2.7. Time scale of consciousness
Humans & Monkeys:
2.8. NCC - Neural Correlate of Consciousness
Theories & models
--
Laszlo E. Szabo
Department of Theoretical Physics
Department of History and Philosophy of Science
Eotvos University, Budapest
H-1518 Budapest, Pf. 32.
Phone: (36-1)2090-555/6671
Fax: (36-1)372-2509
Home: (36-1)200-7318
http://hps.elte.hu/~leszabo
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-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
CONFERENCE ANNOUNCEMENT: The Cognitive Basis of Science.
On November 5 - 7, 1999, the Rutgers Center for Cognitive Science at Rutg=
ers
University and the Hang Seng Centre for Cognitive Studies at the Universi=
ty of
Sheffield will be sponsoring the first of two conferences on The Cognitiv=
e
Basis of Science.
The goal of these conferences is to bring together scientists and scholar=
s
from a variety of disciplines to explore what is known about the cognitiv=
e
mechanisms and processes that underlie scientific reasoning and practice =
and
to chart directions for future research.
This first conference will be held at Rutgers University in New Brunswick=
, New
Jersey, from Friday, November 5th through Sunday, November 7th, 1999. The=
conference is open to all; no registration fee will be required.
Speaking at the Rutgers conference will be:
Susan Carey (Psychology, NYU)
Kevin Dunbar (Psychology, McGill)
Rochel Gelman (Psychology, UCLA)
Ronald Giere (Philosophy, University of Minnesota)
Alison Gopnik (Psychology, Berkeley) =
Philip Kitcher (Philosophy, Columbia)
Howard Margolis (Public Policy, University of Chicago)
Nancy Nersessian (Cognitive Science, Georgia Tech)
Richard Nisbett (Psychology, University of Michigan)
David Papineau (Philosophy, Kings College London)
Michael Siegal (Psychology, University of Sheffield)
Elizabeth Spelke (Psychology, MIT)
Paul Thagard (Philosophy & Cognitive Science, University of Waterloo)
More information may be found at the conference website:
http://philosophy.rutgers.edu/cbs-conference/
Any further questions concerning the conference may be directed to:
Professor Stephen Stich
Department of Philosophy & Center for Cognitive Science
Rutgers University
E-mail: stich(a)ruccs.rutgers.edu
Office phone: (732) 932-9091
Fax: (732) 932-8617
Gary C. Bartlett, Graduate student
Dept. of Philosophy, Rutgers University
26 Nichol Avenue, New Brunswick, NJ 08901
garybartru(a)netscape.net
Office phone: (732) 932-3788
____________________________________________________________________
Get your own FREE, personal Netscape WebMail account today at http://webm=ail.netscape.com.
Kedves Olvasok !
A SZEGEDI UNIVERSITAS kereteben szervezzodik egy kognitiv muhely. Ennek
reszekent ebben a felvbe a Soros Alapitvay tamogatasaval kurzusok is
lesznek. Kerjuk, hivjatok fel rajuk az erdeklodok figyelmet.
Az elso heten a kapcsolatfelvetel az orak helyen tortenik. Szeptember 13-an,
hetfon 16 es 17h30 kozott altalanos oramegbeszelest is tartunk, a
JATE Irinyi epuleteben a foldszinti pszichologia teremben (a HOK-tol
jobbra), ahol tanaraink varjak az erdeklodoket.
Az 1999. oszi szegedi kognitiv kurzusok osszefoglalo tablazata
Bevezetes a kognitiv tudomanyba
Pleh Csaba
hetfo, 16:00- 17:30
Irinyi epulet, tanterem, Boldogasszony
sgt 4, foldszint
pleh(a)edpsy.u-szeged.hu
Tarsasnyelvszeti alapismeretek
Sandor Klara es
Kontra Miklos
csutortok 12:00- 13:30
JGyTF diszterem Boldogasszony sgt 6
A megismeres neurobiologiai alapjai
Kovacs Gyula es
Fiser Jozsef
kedd, 18:00-19:30
SZOT Elettani Intezet tanterme Dom ter 10
Kovacs Gyula
kogyu(a)phys.szote.u-szeged.hu
Human emlekezet
Racsmany Mihaly
hetfo, 12:00- 13:30
Varkonyi terem, Petofi sgt 30, III. emelet
racsmany(a)izabell.elte.hu
Kognitiv neuropszichologia
Keri Szabolcs
az oramegbeszelesen hirdetettek szerint
szkeri(a)phys.szote.u-szeged.hu
Az irodalmi megismeres: Az essze
Mikola Gyongyi
hetfo, 17:30- 19:00
Irinyi epulet, tanterem, Boldogasszony sgt 4, foldszint
mgyongyi@hung..u-szeged.hu
Decemberben varhatoan vendegunk lesz Hernad Istvan (Southampton) : A
nyelv keletkezese
es Szilagyi N. Sandor (Kolozsvar): A metafora elmletei temaban.
Errol kesobb kuldunk ertesitest.
Mindenkit szeretettel varunk az orakon s egyebkent is:
Pleh Csaba es kollegai
Csaba Pleh
Cognitive Science Group
Department of Psychology
Attila Jozsef University, Szeged
Petofi sgt 30-34, 6722 Hungary
Phone: (36)(62) 454000, extension 3273
Home: Budakeszi Zichy P. u. 4 2092 Hungary, (36)(23) 453932 or 933
Editor, Hungarian Review of Psychology