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( Apologies for multiple copies )
CALL FOR PAPERS [deadline: November 8, 1999]
===============
=================================================
conference: T H E E V O L U T I O N O F L A N G U A G E
=================================================
Paris April 3-6, 2000
Ecole Nationale Superieure des Telecommunications
Paris - France
http://www.infres.enst.fr/confs/evolang/
ORGANISED BY: Professor Jean Aitchison (Oxford University),
Dr. Jean-Louis Dessalles (ENST Paris), Professor Jim Hurford
(Department of Linguistics, University of Edinburgh),
Dr. Chris Knight (Department of Sociology, University of
East London), Professor Luc Steels (Sony CSL and Vrije
Universiteit Brussel).
LOCAL ORGANISATION: Jean-Louis Dessalles (ENST Paris), Laleh Ghadakpour (CREA),
Frederic Kaplan (Sony CSL), Luc Steels (Sony CSL and Vrije Universiteit
Brussel), Francois Yvon (ENST Paris).
This will be the third conference in a series concerned with the
evolutionary emergence of speech. From a wide range of disciplines,
we seek to attract researchers willing to integrate their
perspectives with those of modern Darwinism.
The aim is to bring together linguists, computer scientists,
anthropologists, palaeontologists, ethologists, geneticists,
neuroscientists, and other scientists who are concerned with
the question of the origin and evolution of language.
CONFIRMED INVITED SPEAKERS:
---------------------------
Frans B. M. de Waal (Emory University), Bernd Heine (Universitat zu Koln),
Ray Jackendoff (Brandeis University), Paul A. Mellars (University of
Cambridge), Sue Savage-Rumbaugh (Georgia State University), Herbert Terrace
(Columbia University), Michael Tomasello (Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary
Anthropology).
PROGRAMME COMMITTEE:
--------------------
Jean Aitchison (Worcester College), Robert C. Berwick (M.I.T.),
Derek Bickerton (Univ. Hawai), Ted Briscoe (University of Cambridge
Computer Laboratory), Rene Carre (ENST), Bernard Comrie (Max Planck Institute
for Evolutionary Anthropology, Leipzig), Jean-Louis Dessalles (ENST Paris),
Jean-Marie Hombert (MSH Rhone-Alpes), James R. Hurford (University of
Edinburgh), Michel Imbert (Universite de Toulouse), Judy Kegl
(University of
Southern Maine), Simon Kirby (University of Edinburgh), Chris Knight
(University of East London), Andre Langaney (Musee de l'Homme),
Frederick J. Newmeyer (University of Washington), Michael Studdert-Kennedy
(Haskins Laboratories), Luc Steels (Sony CSL & Vrije Universiteit Brussel),
Bernard Victorri (Ecole Normale Superieure, Paris).
Sponsored by
- Ecole Nationale Supirieure des Tilicommunications
- Sony Computer Science Laboratory Paris
- Fondation Louis Leprince-Ringuet
- Groupe des Ecoles de Tilicommunications
- CNRS
- France Telecom CNET
Some of the issues that will be discussed are:
origin of language
----------------
. origin of phonetic abilities
. origin of syntax
. origin of symbolic representation semantic abilities
. evolutionary significance of language, compatibility with natural selection
. language and the origin of culture
. chronology of the spread of mankind, and its relationship to language
. the continuity/discontinuity of the language faculty with nonhuman
communication systems.
dynamics of language evolution
----------------------------
. evolution of phonetic systems
. evolution of the lexicon
. evolution of grammar structures
Submission Instructions
=======================
Prospective authors are invited to submit extended abstracts or short papers
(from 1 to 4 pages, max. 2000 words).
Submitted papers will be refereed and selected for oral presentation
(25/30 min) on the basis of quality and relevance to the Conference topics.
Accepted abstracts and papers will be included in the Conference Proceedings
and will be made accessible through the web. Copies of the proceedings
will be available at the Conference. Authors of accepted contributions
will be asked to submit full length papers for a volume to be published
after
the Conference by an international publisher.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
The deadline for submission is November 8th, 1999.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Authors are strongly encouraged to submit their papers electronically
(MS Word preferred, but most formats will be recognised).
Please email your submission to evolang(a)infres.enst.fr
Don't forget to include the submission form (see below) in your message.
If you are planning to submit a paper or abstract, or if you simply
plan to attend the Conference, please send a mail to
evolang(a)infres.enst.fr
You will be kept informed through e-mail of further useful information.
If you cannot send your submission through email, please send four
copies
(and the submission form) to:
J-L Dessalles
ENST / Dep. InfRes
46 rue Barrault
F-75013 Paris - France
Submission Form
===============
[ The first author should fill in the submission form and e-mail
it to evolang(a)infres.enst.fr ]
Last NAME :
First Name :
Laboratory :
Organization/Affiliation :
Street Address :
City :
Postal code:
State/Province :
Country :
E-mail address for correspondence :
Fax :
Paper title :
===========================================================================
Conference web site: http://www.infres.enst.fr/confs/evolang/
Call for papers: http://www.infres.enst.fr/confs/evolang/cfp.html
EMAIL: evolang(a)infres.enst.fr
ELTE TTK Tudomanytortenet es Tudomanyfilozofia Tanszek
Budapest, Pazmany P. setany 1/A
TUDOMANYFILOZOFIA SZEMINARIUM
(http://hps.elte.hu/~leszabo/szeminar/folap.htm)
________________________________________________
1999. oktober 18. (hetfo)
12:30
6. em. 654.
K a t a l i n B a l o g
Yale University
CONCEIVABILITY, POSSIBILITY AND THE MIND-BODY PROBLEM
I want to take on the question of what a class of arguments, usually
called the Conceivability Arguments, have to say about the mind-body
problem. These arguments have two different versions. In one version,
considerations of conceivability are taken to support the claim that
phenomenal consciousness is not identical, realized by, or supervenient
on, physical properties (for example, Kripke 1972, 140-162, Nagel 1974,
Robinson 1993, White 1986, Jackson 1998, and Chalmers 1996). According
to the other version, there is an explanatory gap between phenomenal and
physical levels of description, that does not exist with respect to
other higher level descriptions, and that may have metaphysical
ramifications. (This argument is formulated by Joseph Levine 1998,
although he is himself hesitant to accept the conclusion.) My claim is
that these arguments do not succeed in establishing their conclusions.
That is because, and I take this to be the primary lesson of the
Conceivability Arguments, what they reveal does not have to do with
phenomenal consciousness itself, it rather has to do with the nature of
phenomenal concepts.
In the paper, I will focus on the most elaborate and sophisticated
version of the Conceivability Argument for dualism. I first provide a
general exposition of the structure of Conceivability Arguments, then I
proceed to describe in greater detail Frank Jackson's and David
Chalmers' new Conceivability Argument. Finally I construct a reductio
that at the same time reveals where the arguments went wrong.
--
Laszlo E. Szabo
Department of Theoretical Physics
Department of History and Philosophy of Science
Eotvos University, Budapest
H-1518 Budapest, Pf. 32.
Phone: (36-1)2090-555/6671
Fax: (36-1)372-2509
Home: (36-1)200-7318
http://hps.elte.hu/~leszabo
ELTE TTK Tudomanytortenet es Tudomanyfilozofia Tanszek
Budapest, Pazmany P. setany 1/A
TUDOMANYFILOZOFIA SZEMINARIUM
(http://hps.elte.hu/~leszabo/szeminar/folap.htm)
________________________________________________
1999. oktober 11. (hetfo)
12:30
6. em. 661.
E. S z a b o L a s z l o
ELTE, MTA Elmeleti Fizikai Kutato Csoport
ELTE, Tudomanytortenet es Tudomanyfilozofia Tanszek
EINSTEIN MEGOLDOTTA AZ EPR-BELL PARADOXONT?
Úgy tunik igen, sot meg egy sereg mas problemajat a kvantumelmeletnek.
"Prizma-modell" neven Arthur Fine 1982-ben egy olyan megoldast javasolt
az EPR-Bell problemara, es altalaban a kvantummechanika lokalis-realista
interpretaciojara, amelyrol, mint kesobb o maga kideritette, mar
Einstein is emlitest tett egy 1936-os cikkeben, illetve nehany Rosenhez
es Schrodingerhez irt leveleben. E megoldas nem kapott kulonosebb
visszhangot, sot maga Fine sem vette igazan komolyan, hiszen kesobbi
cikkeiben úgy ir a Bell-tetelrol, mintha az Einstein-Fine-interpretacio
nem is letezne. Ennek oka, hogy tevesen, Fine ezt a megoldast a
valosagban vegrehajtott kiserletekben hasznalt detektorok nem 100%-os
hatasfokaval hozta kapcsolatba.
Az eloadasban az Einstein-Fine-interpretaciot egy új megvilagitasban
mutatom be. Megmutatom, hogy semmi koze nincs a detektorok hatasfokanak
sokat diszkutalt problemajahoz. A valosagban elvegzett EPR-Bell
kiserletek elemzesevel megmutatom, hogy e kiserletek logikai
szerkezetuknel fogva teljesen kompatibilisek az
Einstein-Fine-interpretacioval, amely viszont tokeletesen feloldja az
EPR-Bell paradoxont.
Az Aspect-kiserletet modellezo, es a fentieket illusztralo
(PC/DOS/full-screen) program letolheto:
http://hps.elte.hu/~leszabo/realism.htm
--
Laszlo E. Szabo
Department of Theoretical Physics
Department of History and Philosophy of Science
Eotvos University, Budapest
H-1518 Budapest, Pf. 32.
Phone: (36-1)2090-555/6671
Fax: (36-1)372-2509
Home: (36-1)200-7318
http://hps.elte.hu/~leszabo
Prof. Ivo Schneider (Munchen)
"The philosophical, juridical and mathematical preliminaries of
probability theory"
cimmel eloadas-sorozatot tart
oktober folyaman hetfonkent ( 4.,11.,18.,25.) d.u 4 orakor,
a BME Kozp. epulet (Muegyetem rkp. 3) I.emelet 59-ben,
angol nyelven.
Erdeklodoket szivesen latunk!
BME GTK Filozofia es Tudomanytortenet Tanmszek
--
Laszlo E. Szabo
Department of Theoretical Physics
Department of History and Philosophy of Science
Eotvos University, Budapest
H-1518 Budapest, Pf. 32.
Phone: (36-1)2090-555/6671
Fax: (36-1)372-2509
Home: (36-1)200-7318
http://hps.elte.hu/~leszabo
ELTE TTK Tudomanytortenet es Tudomanyfilozofia Tanszek
Budapest, Pazmany P. setany 1/A
TUDOMANYFILOZOFIA SZEMINARIUM
(http://hps.elte.hu)
________________________________________________
1999. oktober 4. (hetfo)
12:30
6. em. 654. (661 a regi szamozas szerint)
T o m a s z P l a c e k
Department of Philosophy, Jagiellonian University, Cracow
OUTCOMES IN BRANCHING SPACE-TIME (OBST)
-AN ANALYSIS OF BELL'S THEOREM-
The framework of BRANCHING SPACE-TIME (BST; cf. Belnap 1992, SYNTHESE
92, pp. 385--434) has recently been extended to allow for the
introduction of outcomes of events and the analysis of GHZ theorems.
(Kowalski & Placek, forthcoming in BRIT. J. PHIL. SCI. and INT. J.
THEOR. PHYS.)
In BST, space-time and modality are incorporated in the very structure
of the models, which consist of a pair $\langle W, \leq \rangle$, where
$W$ is a non-empty set weakly ordered by $\leq$, which is interpreted as
`causally accessible from.' Maximal upward directed subsets of $W$ are
called `histories,' and proper subsets of histories are called `events.'
Two events are called `space-like separated' if neither causally
precedes the other. `Atomic outcomes' of an event $E$ are those parts of
the event's causal future that split in $E$.
The main result of Kowalski & Placek is that the family of outcomes of
an event forms a Boolean algebra. The paper also proves that in GHZ
setups, there is always a common cause (CC) in the sense of Reichenbach
if directions are held fixed, but that there is no single COMMOM common
cause (cf. Hofer-Szabo et al., forthcoming in BRIT. J. PHIL. SCI.)
accounting for the outcomes of incompatible settings.
For an analysis of Bell's theorem, I assign probabilities to outcomes by
imposing a classical probability measure on the Boolean algebra of the
outcomes of each given event. In the derivation of Bell's theorem, I use
probability measures of the form $p_{L\alpha \cup R\beta}(Lx \cap Ry)$,
$x,y \in \{+,-\}$, where the subscript indicates that the result is an
outcome of the event of measuring the spin projections along directions
$\alpha$ on the left and $\beta$ on the right. Probabilities for single
results on the left or on the right are calculated from these measures,
allowing us to express correlations as $p_{L\alpha \cup R\beta}(Lx \cap
Ry) \neq p_{L\alpha \cup R\beta}(Lx) \times p_{L\alpha \cup
R\beta}(Ry)$.
Since correlations between space-like separated results appear
disturbing, it is natural to look for an explanation in terms of a CC
located in the results' common past. The CC's outcomes divide histories
in such a way that actual runs of a correlation experiment are seen as
belonging to two or more varieties differentiated by hidden factors. You
may think of these hidden factors as restoring the deterministic order.
You may also be more modest and require only that the hidden factors
restore the causal order, i.e., that in each sub-population, the
correlations disappear.
Formally, for space-like separated events $E$ and $F$ with correlated
outcomes $e$ and $f$, respectively, a CC is an event C preceding both
$e$ and $f$, such that for every atomic outcome $\omega_{i}$ of $C$,
$$ p_{E\cup F\cup C}(e \cap f|\omega_{i}) = p_{E\cup F\cup C}(e
|\omega_{i}) \times p_{E \cup F\cup C}(f|\omega_{i})$$,
where $p_{E \cup F \cup C}$ is defined on the enlarged probability
space. Now, for any correlated pair $e,f$, we CAN construct
mathematically an enlarged probability space containing such a CC.
Moreover, for any finite number of correlations we CAN construct a
single large probability space containing a set of distinct CCs, each CC
taking care of one correlation. However, in the Bell/Clauser-Horne
argument, one wants something more: one postulates a single common CC
accounting for all the correlated outcomes of $L\alpha\cup R\beta$,
$L\alpha\cup R\beta--\prime$, $L\alpha--\prime\cup R\beta$, and
$L\alpha--\prime\cup R\beta--\prime$. Given the standard assumptions of
locality and `no conspiracy,' which in our framework take the form
\begin{equation*}
\begin{split}
& \forall \alpha, \beta, \varphi, x p_{L\alpha \cup R\beta\cup C}(Lx)
= p_{L\alpha \cup R\varphi\cup C}(Lx)\ & \forall \alpha, \beta, \gamma,
y p_{L\alpha \cup R\beta\cup C}(Ry) = p_{L\gamma \cup R\beta\cup
C}(Ry)
\end{split}
\tag{LOCALITY}
\end{equation*}
\begin{equation*}
\forall \alpha, \beta, \gamma, \varphi, i p_{L\alpha \cup R\beta\cup
C}(\omega_i) = p_{L\gamma \cup R\varphi\cup C}(\omega_i),
\tag{NO CONSPIRACY}
\end{equation*}
we derive the Bell/CH inequalities, which are empirically violated.
Thus, there cannot be a common common cause accounting for the Bell/CH
correlations.
--
Laszlo E. Szabo
Department of Theoretical Physics
Department of History and Philosophy of Science
Eotvos University, Budapest
H-1518 Budapest, Pf. 32.
Phone: (36-1)2090-555/6671
Fax: (36-1)372-2509
Home: (36-1)200-7318
http://hps.elte.hu/~leszabo
Csaba Pleh
Cognitive Science Group
Department of Psychology
Attila Jozsef University, Szeged
Petofi sgt 30-34, 6722 Hungary
Phone: (36)(62) 454000, extension 3273
Home: Budakeszi Zichy P. u. 4 2092 Hungary, (36)(23) 453932 or 933
Editor, Hungarian Review of Psychology
---------- Forwarded message ----------
Date: Tue, 28 Sep 1999 10:51:47 -0400
From: Cynthia Bradford <cindy(a)cns.bu.edu>
To: cindy(a)cns.bu.edu
Subject: ICCNS 2000
Resent-Date: Tue, 28 Sep 99 18:55:19 +100
Resent-From: PLEH(a)izabell.elte.hu
Resent-To: pleh(a)sol.cc.u-szeged.hu
Enclosed below is a conference announcement. If
you would prefer not to receive further emails
of this type from us, please email me back and
your name will be removed from our mailing list.
Please accept our apologies in advance if you had
asked to be removed from this mailing list at an
earlier time. There was some miscommunication with
our previous computer systems manager, but please
be assured that you will be removed this time, should
you make such a request.
Sincerely,
Cynthia Bradford
Department Administrator
email: cindy(a)cns.bu.edu
***** CALL FOR PAPERS *****
FOURTH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON COGNITIVE AND NEURAL SYSTEMS
Tutorials: May 24, 2000
Meeting: May 25-27, 2000
Boston University
677 Beacon Street
Boston, Massachusetts 02215
http://cns-web.bu.edu/meetings/
Sponsored by Boston University's
Center for Adaptive Systems
and
Department of Cognitive and Neural Systems
This interdisciplinary conference has drawn about 300 people from around
the world each time that it has been offered. Last year's conference was
attended by scientists from 30 countries. The conference is structured to
facilitate intense communication between its participants, both in the
formal sessions and during its other activities. As during previous years,
the millennium conference will focus on solutions to the fundamental
questions:
How Does the Brain Control Behavior?
How Can Technology Emulate Biological Intelligence?
The conference will include invited tutorials and lectures, and
contributed lectures and posters by experts on the biology and
technology of how the brain and other intelligent systems adapt to a
changing world. The conference is aimed at researchers and students of
computational neuroscience, connectionist cognitive science,
artificial neural networks, neuromorphic engineering, and artificial
intelligence.
A single oral or poster session enables all presented work to be
highly visible.
Abstract submissions encourage submissions of the latest results.
Costs are kept at a minimum without compromising the quality of
meeting handouts and social events.
CALL FOR ABSTRACTS
Session Topics:
* vision * spatial mapping and navigation
* object recognition * neural circuit models
* image understanding * neural system models
* audition * mathematics of neural systems
* speech and language * robotics
* unsupervised learning * hybrid systems (fuzzy, evolutionary, digital)
* supervised learning * neuromorphic VLSI
* reinforcement and emotion * industrial applications
* sensory-motor control * cognition, planning, and attention
* other
Contributed abstracts must be received, in English, by January 28,
2000. Notification of acceptance will be provided by email by February
29, 2000. A meeting registration fee of $50 for regular attendees and
$35 for students must accompany each Abstract. See Registration
Information for details. The fee will be returned if the Abstract is
not accepted for presentation and publication in the meeting
proceedings. Registration fees of accepted abstracts will be returned
on request only until April 14, 2000.
Each Abstract should fit on one 8.5" x 11" white page with 1" margins
on all sides, single-column format, single-spaced, Times Roman or
similar font of 10 points or larger, printed on one side of the page
only. Fax submissions will not be accepted. Abstract title, author
name(s), affiliation(s), mailing, and email address(es) should begin
each Abstract. An accompanying cover letter should include: Full title
of Abstract; corresponding author and presenting author name, address,
telephone, fax, and email address; and a first and second choice from
among the topics above, including whether it is biological (B) or
technological (T) work. Example: first choice: vision (T); second
choice: neural system models (B). (Talks will be 15 minutes
long. Posters will be up for a full day. Overhead, slide, and VCR
facilities will be available for talks.) Abstracts which do not meet
these requirements or which are submitted with insufficient funds will
be returned. Accepted Abstracts will be printed in the conference
proceedings volume. No longer paper will be required. The original and
3 copies of each Abstract should be sent to: Cynthia Bradford, Boston
University, Department of Cognitive and Neural Systems, 677 Beacon
Street, Boston, MA 02215.
REGISTRATION INFORMATION: Early registration is recommended. To
register, please fill out the registration form below. Student
registrations must be accompanied by a letter of verification from a
department chairperson or faculty/research advisor. If accompanied by
an Abstract or if paying by check, mail to the address above. If
paying by credit card, mail as above, or fax to (617) 353-7755, or
email to cindy(a)cns.bu.edu. The registration fee will help to pay for a
reception, 6 coffee breaks, and the meeting proceedings.
STUDENT FELLOWSHIPS: Fellowships for PhD candidates and postdoctoral
fellows may be available to cover meeting travel and living costs.
This will be confirmed one way or the other, and broadly advertised if
confirmed, before the deadline to apply for fellowship support, which
will be January 28, 2000. Applicants will be notified by email by
February 29, 2000. Each application should include the applicant's CV,
including name; mailing address; email address; current student status;
faculty or PhD research advisor's name, address, and email address;
relevant courses and other educational data; and a list of research
articles. A letter from the listed faculty or PhD advisor on official
institutional stationery should accompany the application and summarize
how the candidate may benefit from the meeting. Students who also submit
an Abstract need to include the registration fee with their Abstract.
Fellowship checks will be distributed after the meeting.
REGISTRATION FORM
Fourth International Conference on Cognitive and Neural Systems
Department of Cognitive and Neural Systems
Boston University
677 Beacon Street
Boston, Massachusetts 02215
Tutorials: May 24, 2000
Meeting: May 25-27, 2000
FAX: (617) 353-7755
http://cns-web.bu.edu/meetings/
(Please Type or Print)
Mr/Ms/Dr/Prof: _____________________________________________________
Name: ______________________________________________________________
Affiliation: _______________________________________________________
Address: ___________________________________________________________
City, State, Postal Code: __________________________________________
Phone and Fax: _____________________________________________________
Email: _____________________________________________________________
The conference registration fee includes the meeting program,
reception, two coffee breaks each day, and meeting proceedings.
The tutorial registration fee includes tutorial notes and two
coffee breaks.
CHECK ONE:
( ) $75 Conference plus Tutorial (Regular)
( ) $50 Conference plus Tutorial (Student)
( ) $50 Conference Only (Regular)
( ) $35 Conference Only (Student)
( ) $25 Tutorial Only (Regular)
( ) $15 Tutorial Only (Student)
METHOD OF PAYMENT (please fax or mail):
[ ] Enclosed is a check made payable to "Boston University".
Checks must be made payable in US dollars and issued by
a US correspondent bank. Each registrant is responsible
for any and all bank charges.
[ ] I wish to pay my fees by credit card
(MasterCard, Visa, or Discover Card only).
Name as it appears on the card: _____________________________________
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Account number: _____________________________________________________
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Signature: __________________________________________________________
Richardson: HYPERSTRUCTURE IN BRAIN AND COGNITION
http://www.cogsci.soton.ac.uk/cgi/psyc/newpsy?10.031
The target whose abstract appears below has just appeared in
PSYCOLOQUY, a refereed journal of Open Peer Commentary sponsored by
the American Psychological Association. Qualified professional
biobehavioral, neural or cognitive scientists are hereby invited to
submit Open Peer Commentary on it. Please email or see websites for
Instructions if you are not familiar with format or acceptance
criteria for PSYCOLOQUY commentaries (all submissions are
refereed).
To link to the full text of this article:
http://www.cogsci.soton.ac.uk/cgi/psyc/newpsy?10.031
To submit articles and commentaries or to seek information:
EMAIL: psyc(a)pucc.princeton.edu
URL: http://www.princeton.edu/~harnad/psyc.htmlhttp://www.cogsci.soton.ac.uk/psyc
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
psycoloquy.99.10.031.hyperstructure.richardson Thu Sep 23 1999
ISSN 1055-0143 (71 pars, 60 refs, 6 figs, 1 table, 1389 lines)
PSYCOLOQUY is sponsored by the American Psychological Association (APA)
Copyright 1999 Ken Richardson
HYPERSTRUCTURE IN BRAIN AND COGNITION
Target Article on Hyperstructure
Ken Richardson
Centre for Human Development & Learning
The Open University
Walton Hall
Milton Keynes MK7 6AA
United Kingdom
k.richardson(a)open.ac.uk
ABSTRACT: This target article tries to identify the informational
content of experience underlying object percepts and concepts in
complex, changeable environments, in a way which can be related to
higher cerebral functions. In complex environments, repetitive
experience of feature- and object-images in static, canonical form
is rare, and this remains a problem in current theories of
conceptual representation. The only reliable information available
in natural experience consists of nested covariations or
'hyperstructures'. These need to be registered in a
representational system. Such representational hyperstructures can
have novel emergent structures and evolution into 'higher'
forms of representation, such as object concepts and event- and
social-schemas. Together, these can provide high levels of
predictability. A sketch of a model of hyperstructural functions in
object perception and conception is presented. Some comparisons
with related views in the literature of the recent decades are
made, and some empirical evidence is briefly reviewed.
KEYWORDS: complexity, covariation, features, hypernetwork,
hyperstructure, object concepts, receptive field, representation
http://www.cogsci.soton.ac.uk/cgi/psyc/newpsy?10.031
ELTE TTK Tudomanytortenet es Tudomanyfilozofia Tanszek
Budapest, Pazmany P. setany 1/A
TUDOMANYFILOZOFIA SZEMINARIUM
(http://hps.elte.hu/~leszabo/szeminar/folap.htm)
________________________________________________
1999. Szeptember 27. (hetfo !)
12:30
6. em. 661.
B a r r y L o e w e r
Rutgers University
Collegium Budapest
PROBABILITY AND DETERMINISM
Although probability is essential to the formulation (and evaluation) of
scientific theories and although a great deal is known about how to
employ probabilistic concepts, there is still philosophical controversy
concerning the nature of probability. Some hold that only probability
concerns only degrees of belief (either subjective or constrained by
"objective" rules) while others hold that it concerns mind-independent
features of reality. The latter view divides among those who hold that
it concerns only frequencies (actual or hypothetical) and those who hold
that it concerns a "causal propensity." The nature of probability is
especially puzzling when the underlying dynamics is completely
deterministic as in classical mechanics and Bohm's version of quantum
mechanics. Some claim that when the dynamics is deterministic then all
objective probabilities are 1 or 0. But this seems at odd with the
scientific practice. In my talk I will review some of the main ideas
concerning the nature of probability and also an idea suggested by David
Lewis. According to Lewis probability concerns an objective feature of
reality that supervenes on the totality of propositions not concerning
chance. Whether or not Lewis' account is correct for dynamical chances I
argue that it provides a good account of chance statements when the
dynamics are deterministic.
--
Laszlo E. Szabo
Department of Theoretical Physics
Department of History and Philosophy of Science
Eotvos University, Budapest
H-1518 Budapest, Pf. 32.
Phone: (36-1)2090-555/6671
Fax: (36-1)372-2509
Home: (36-1)200-7318
http://hps.elte.hu/~leszabo
M e g h i v o
Az alkotok es az XTV meghivja ont az
EMBER VAGY ORDOG - KI VOLT LAKATOS IMRE?
c. film vetitesere a Taban moziba (1016 Bp. Krisztina krt. 87-89.)
A vetites ideje: 1999. szeptember 22. (szerda) 18 ora
Rendezte: MEREI ANNA
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Laszlo E. Szabo
Department of Theoretical Physics
Department of History and Philosophy of Science
Eotvos University, Budapest
H-1518 Budapest, Pf. 32.
Phone: (36-1)2090-555/6671
Fax: (36-1)372-2509
Home: (36-1)200-7318
http://hps.elte.hu/~leszabo